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PREFACE
I have never been a big fan of pirates. Yet here I am having written a doc-
toral dissertation and now a book on medieval pirates. How did that come 
about? Well, my Magister artium dissertation at the University of Copen-
hagen was about Danish warfare in the twelfth century. A major source for 
that dissertation was Saxo Grammaticus’ Gesta Danorum. To my astonish-
ment in that chronicle (and other twelfth century Danish sources), Saxo 
happily described both enemies and protagonists as pirates. Indeed, even 
Saxo’s patron and one of the main protagonists of the chronicle, Arch-
bishop Absalon of Lund, was described as conducting piracy. This collided 
with my basic understanding of pirates as bandits at sea diametrically 
opposed to the state and its agents of order, justice and peace. It turned 
out that Saxo’s use of the term pirate was contingent on the Danes’ past 
as victorious Vikings. Thus Saxo’s pirate terminology might be perceived 
of as a Scandinavian particularism isolated to a specifĳic time and situation 
in Scandinavian history. Yet when I turned to French and English sources 
from the twelfth and thirteenth century I discovered to my astonishment 
that chroniclers from these countries also used the term pirate in a more 
ambiguous way than one would have expected.
Furthermore, I found the literature on the subject somewhat lacking. 
So, like Marc Bloch’s ogre I felt that I had caught the scent of a meaty 
prey and I engaged the subject with voracious appetite. After having fĳin-
ished my magister artium in 2007, I decided to follow my “gut” and apply 
for a PhD. position to explore how piracy and pirates were perceived of 
in medieval England and France. A fortnight after having applied for the 
position and a stipend to fĳinance the research, Somali pirates hijacked the 
Danish cargo ship, Danica White, in the Gulf of Aden. The media attention 
and the public uproar were immense. In Denmark—as well as globally—
piracy was thought a thing of the past, yet here was a true piratical hijack-
ing at the beginning of the twenty-fĳirst century. In the ensuing years, 
piracy has regrettably become an increasing scourge on maritime life. 
Thus my research for the dissertation and its revision which became this 
book was done on the backdrop of the global rise of piracy. The analyses 
and conclusions of the book do not claim universal application, nor were 
they intended to. It is a study of a practice in the Middle Ages that has 
traditionally received scant attention, but which seems to have had more 
x preface
importance than hitherto acknowledged. Nevertheless, it is my hope that 
this book will contribute to an understanding of the phenomenon that is 
piracy, how it emerges, what causes it, what its mechanisms are, how it is 
perceived by victims, governments and the pirates themselves and, lastly, 
how one prevents it.
I owe a debt of gratitude to a number of people and institutions. Firstly, 
I would like to thank the Danish Research Council for Culture and Com-
munication (FKK) for funding this research. Throughout the course of 
the writing of the dissertation which eventually became this book, I have 
relied on the advice and support of several people. First and foremost I 
would like to thank my supervisor, Nils Hybel, who during my studies at 
the University of Copenhagen has always given me very sound advice, 
while granting me the freedom to pursue my own research interests. His 
longstanding confĳidence in my abilities has been a source of real solace. 
I would also like to thank Michael H. Gelting with whom I have spent 
many inspirational nights discussing topics of medieval history. I would 
especially like to thank him for his invaluable assistance in transcrib-
ing various documents for this book. Needless to say, any errors in the 
transcriptions are completely my own. I would also like to thank the 
evaluation board of my dissertation and especially the chairman, Vincent 
Gabrielsen. During the preparation of this book, Gabrielsen offfered very 
sound and valuable advice on how to understand and treat pirates and 
piracy in a theoretical perspective. His advice has much improved that 
part of my analysis. Marcella Mulder and Marjolein Schaake at Brill should 
also be thanked for guiding me with sure hands through the publication 
process.
My own special thanks go to my friends and colleagues, Lasse Sonne 
and Mia Münster-Swendsen whose critical and valuable advice has been 
a huge help in the discussion of various complex aspects of this disserta-
tion. Likewise I would like to thank Guilhem Pépin who was kind enough 
to provide me with extracts from the online Gascon Rolls’ project prior to 
their publication. David Bloch should also be thanked for his help with 
the interpretation of various Latin texts, and Tifffany D. Vann Sprecher for 
her help in checking my translations from Latin and French into English. 
I should likewise thank my old English teacher, Peter W. Carlsen, for his 
corrections of my English. Of course, all remaining linguistic errors are my 
own. I owe a debt of gratitude to my family, whose encouragements over 
the years have been immensely important to me. I would especially like 
to thank my parents for their generous fĳinancial support, which provided 
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me with the opportunity to learn French, an indispensable profĳiciency for 
the making of this study. Finally, I owe my greatest debt of gratitude to 
my wife, Ulla, and my daughters, Alicia and Elina. Their love and patience 
with me in the sometimes very difffĳicult life of the writing of this book can-
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Piracy was an endemic problem in the waters of northern Europe in the 
Middle Ages. This phenomenon has traditionally been included in stud-
ies of military and commercial history of medieval northern Europe. 
However, pirates and piracy as an isolated subject has received very little 
attention. For military historians, piracy and pirates were auxiliaries to 
the royal navies during wars, where they supplied man-power to the war-
ring kings and harassed enemy trafffĳic, especially supply lines. In peace 
time, they were criminals who had to be exterminated for peace and 
trade to resume. Thus, military historians have primarily been interested 
in pirates from the viewpoint of the military institutions. In commercial 
history, piracy has been treated as a “natural” hazard at sea akin to storms. 
Both were potential natural disasters which had to be included in the 
risk assessment of a commercial endeavour. However, all other things 
being equal, this subject was not of great concern for commercial his-
torians, since it was assumed that piracy had little over-all impact on 
 maritime trade.
Furthermore, both disciplines of medieval history have viewed the 
phenomenon of piracy strictly from the perspective of rulers and govern-
ments. The study of piracy and pirates in northern Europe in the Middle 
Ages from the perspective of the pirates themselves has received scant 
attention. However, to understand the phenomenon and its implications 
for military, commercial and other disciplines of medieval history, one 
has to study the pirates themselves. In this book, I argue that piracy and 
pirates can only be understood and interpreted in relation to the functions 
they supplied to their local maritime communities. I hope to demonstrate 
that piracy and pirates were not criminals who ought to be eradicated, nor 
were they merely a “natural” hazard. Rather, pirates and piracy were an 
intricate part of both the military and the commercial world in the Mid-
dle Ages. Indeed, the traditional state-based view of pirates as criminals 
or potential privateers obscures the much more nuanced phenomenon 
of piracy and its relationship with society, war and trade. I thus hope to 
break new ground by analysing the pirates on their own terms, rather 
than through a governmental perspective.
2 chapter one
Cicero and Saint Augustine
In De Offfĳiciis, Cicero wrote that: “a pirate is not included in the number 
of lawful enemies, but is the common foe of all the world; and with him 
there ought not to be any pledged word nor any oath mutually binding”, 
and in The Verrine Orations he likewise stated that: “You [Verres] behaved 
just as the pirates are wont to behave. They are the general enemies of all 
mankind”.1 The sum of these quotations is that pirates are the enemy of 
all. In many studies of piracy, Cicero’s remarks on pirates are quoted as 
evidence of the inherent inhumanity of the pirate from Antiquity to the 
present. Accordingly, they were literally outlaws, meaning unprotected by 
law, and one was not bound to keep a promise given to them. The signifĳi-
cance of this condemnation of the pirate is explained by Daniel Heller-
Roazen thus:
some . . . fall outside of this collectivity [of the fellowship of the human spe-
cies]. They are individuals strikingly unlike all others: people who, while 
capable of speech and reason, may not be said to unite in any lawful com-
munity; people who, while committing acts that are wrong, may not be 
defĳined as criminals: people, fĳinally, who, while often foreign and aggres-
sive may not be accorded any of the many rights of enemies. Cicero names 
such people ‘pirates’ . . . For a pirate is not included in the number of lawful 
enemies, but is the common enemy of all. With him there ought not to be 
any pledged word nor any oath mutually binding. . . . ‘The common enemy of 
all’ (communis hostis omnium), he cannot be considered a criminal, because 
he does not belong to the city-state; yet he also cannot be counted among 
the foreign opponents of war, since he cannot be ‘included in the number 
of lawful enemies’. He moves, as Cicero presents him, in a region in which 
duties no longer hold.2
The studies which promote this view are primarily those concerned either 
with the Roman Empire or the emerging global European empires in the 
seventeenth century.3 This is no coincidence, since Cicero’s  condemnation 
1  “nam pirata non est ex perduellium numero defĳinitus, sed communis hostis omnium: 
cum hoc nec fĳides nec ius iurandum esse commune”, Cicero, De Offfĳiciis, ed. William Miller 
(London, 1968), Book III, 29, “Fecisti item ut praedones solent; qui cum hostes communes 
sint omnium.” Cicero, The Verrine Orations, ed. L.H.G. Greenwood, 2 vols (London, 1935), 
vol. 2, II. IV. 9 (§21).
2 Heller-Roazen, Daniel, The Enemy of All (Cambridge, 2009), p. 16.
3 For instance, Andersen, Lars E., “Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Reflections on the con-
cepts of piracy and order,” in N. Hvidt and H. Mouritzen, eds, Danish Foreign Policy Year-
book 2009 (Copenhagen, 2009), pp. 87 and 91, Ormerod, Henry A., Piracy in the Ancient 
World (Liverpool, 1978), pp. 54–55, to a certain extent Mollat, Michel, “De la piraterie 
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of pirates was formulated at a time of an emerging hegemonic power in 
the Mediterranean, namely the Roman Empire. Cicero’s condemnation 
was repeated by philosophers during the emergence of another hege-
monic power, collectively speaking, the European states in the seven-
teenth and especially the eighteenth century. Eventually, the thoughts of 
these philosophers, in combination with the increasing strength of the 
state, became the norm for the view on pirates. In this view pirates are 
parasites on the international trade.4 This entails a water-tight separa-
tion between the peaceful merchants and the ruthless pirates. However, 
like “the pirate as the enemy of mankind”, this dichotomy is a result of 
the emerging “global” European states and is not really detectable before 
the eighteenth century.
I shall term this the “Ciceronean paradigm”, where pirates and piracy 
are objectifĳied as inherently criminal. This is a category created by a hege-
monic and durable regime in a region with the power to defĳine right and 
wrong and where the pirate is cast as the enemy of the commonality. 
Emily Sohmer Tai, a historian on late medieval piracy in the Mediter-
ranean, argues that the force of this Ciceronean paradigm stems from 
“characterizations of maritime theft as piracy have often been applied to 
campaigns of maritime predation undertaken in the context of imperial 
systems in pragmatic . . . ways, in order to de-politicize the political iden-
tity or objectives of those who practised maritime theft”.5 From a difffer-
ent perspective, the historian of Antiquity, Vincent Gabrielsen, has argued 
that the problem with modern scholarship on the subject of piracy is that 
it “subscribes to the nineteenth-century historicist assumption that there 
is a full correspondence between ‘legitimacy’ (usually vested in only one 
historical category, the righteous acting state), on the one hand, and ratio-
nal or ethical behaviour, on the other hand”.6
However, in the latter days of the Roman Empire, another famous quo-
tation on pirates was formulated by St. Augustine in his dialogue between 
Alexander the Great and a captured pirate:
 sauvage à la course réglementée (XIVe–XVe siècle),” Mélanges de l’École française de Rome, 
87 (1975), 7–8.
4 See, for instance, Anderson, John L., “Piracy and world history,” in C.R. Pennell, ed., 
Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader (New York, 2001), p. 82.
5 Tai, Emily S., “Marking Water: Piracy and Property in the Pre-Modern West,” http://
www.historycooperative.org/proceedings/seascapes/tai.html accessed on 31 January 2012.
6 Gabrielsen, Vincent, “Economic activity, maritime trade and piracy in the Hellenistic 
Aegean,” Revue des Études Anciennes, 103 (2001), 222.
4 chapter one
Kingdoms without justice are similar to robber bands. And so if justice is 
left out, what are kingdoms except great robber bands? For what are robber 
bands except little kingdoms? The band also is a group of men governed by 
the orders of a leader, bound by a social compact, and its booty is divided 
according to a law agreed upon. If by repeatedly adding desperate men this 
plague grows to the point where it holds territory and establishes a fĳixed 
seat, seizes cities and subdues peoples, then it more conspicuously assumes 
the name of kingdom, and this name is now openly granted to it, not for any 
subtraction of cupidity, but by addition of impunity. For it was an elegant 
and true reply that was made to Alexander the Great by a certain pirate 
whom he had captured. When the king asked him what he was thinking of, 
that he should molest the sea, he said with defĳiant independence: ‘The same 
as you when you molest the world! Since I do this with a little ship I am 
called a pirate. You do it with a great fleet and are called an emperor.’7
Here the subjectivity of the term “pirate” becomes clear. The Augustinian 
defĳinition is especially applicable for regions and epochs with no clear 
and uncontested hegemonic power.
Several newer studies on piracy in the Hellenic and Hellenistic, the 
medieval and the early modern periods all point to the problem in apply-
ing a Ciceronean paradigm to the understanding of pirates and piracy. 
Instead they argue from what I will term an Augustinian paradigm.
For the Hellenic and Hellenistic world, Gabrielsen has argued that the 
words pirate and piracy (or rather their principal Greek equivalents leistes 
and leisteia) were subjective terms used to condemn the actions of the 
enemy. For all intents and purposes, it was a term used to construct an 
image of the enemy, whether it was a rival state or insurrectionists, as an 
inhuman criminal. In other words, it was a subjective term used to facili-
tate the mobilisation and motivation to fĳight this enemy with all available 
7 “Quam similia sint latrociniis regna absque iustitia. Remota itaque iustitia quid 
sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia? quia et latrocinia quid sunt nisi parua regna? manus 
et ipsa hominum est, imperio principis regitur, pacto societatis adstringitur, placiti lege 
praeda diuiditur. hoc malum si in tantum perditorum hominum accessibus crescit, ut et 
loca teneat sedes constituat, ciuitates occupet populos subiuget, euidentius regni nomen 
adsumit, quod ei iam in manifesto confert non dempta cupiditas, sed addita inpunitas. 
eleganter enim et ueraciter Alexandro illi Magno quidam conprehensus pirata respondit. 
nam cum idem rex hominem interrogaret, quid ei uideretur, ut mare haberet infestum, 
ille libera contumacia: quod tibi, inquit, ut orbem terrarum; sed quia id ego exiguo nauigio 
facio, latro uocor; quia tu magna classe, imperator.” Augustine, City of God, transl. Wil-
liam M. Green (Cambridge, 1963), Book IV, ch. iv, pp. 16–17. This passage may originally 
have been formulated by Cicero in De re publica, 3. 14. 24., see Cicero, De Re Publica, De 
Legibus, transl. Clinton W. Keyes (Cambridge, 1961), pp. 9–11.
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resources.8 However, the act of piracy (waterborne plunder) was by no 
means an inherently reprehensible action, either for merchants or for the 
state issuing condemnations of the enemy’s actions.9 The maritime com-
munities who were victims of piracy also enjoyed economic prosperity 
because of the actions of their own pirates.10 Thus, piracy was only crimi-
nal when it was the enemy who engaged in it. Indeed, until the fourth 
century bc the pirate was not an inherently bad person; for instance, 
Aristotle considered piracy to be one of several natural ways of making 
a living.11 Thus, Cicero’s condemnation of pirates in the fĳirst century bc 
was the pinnacle of a development over several centuries of the pirate 
from a general plunderer to an enemy deprived of the natural “rights” of 
humanity, a development made possible by the establishment of a Roman 
hegemony in the Mediterranean.
A fundamental problem in relation to the defĳinition of piracy was the 
distinction between criminal violent plunder and legitimate spoils of war. 
In Antiquity, the plunder of defeated enemies during war was a perfectly 
acceptable action. Whereas the defeated enemies might see the plunder as 
theft, for the victors it was the legitimate acquisition of booty.12 This same 
approach to warfare was present in medieval Europe, where the Vegetian 
paradigm for warfare seems to have held sway. The core of this paradigm 
is that is it preferable to subdue your enemy by famine, raids and ter-
ror than to confront him on the battlefĳield. The cornerstone in Vegetian 
warfare was exactly plunder, both to enrich oneself, but also as a tool 
to terrorise one’s opponent into submission, surrender or  negotiations.13 
 8 Gabrielsen, Vincent, “Piracy and the slave-trade,” in A. Erskine, ed., A Companion to 
the Hellenistic World (Malden, 2003), pp. 398–399.
 9 For a similar view on piracy in the Mediterranean in the Middle Ages, see Burns, 
Robert I., “Piracy as an Islamic-Christian interface in the thirteenth century,” Viator, 11 
(1980), 165.
10 Gabrielsen, “Economic activity,” pp. 221–222.
11  Ormerod, Piracy, p. 69, Souza, Philip de, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World (Cam-
bridge, 1999), p. 18.
12 Gabrielsen, Vincent, “Warfare and the state,” in P. Sabin et al., eds, The Cambridge 
History of Greek and Roman Warfare, (Cambridge, 2007), I, 250.
13 Vegetius, Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science, transl. N.P. Milner (Liverpool, 2001), 
p. 116. The concept of Vegetian warfare is disputed, however. In Journal of Medieval Military 
History vols 1 and 2, Cliffford Rogers and Stephen Morillo have doubted the pervasive-
ness of the Vegetian warfare while John Gillingham has defended it. Rogers, Cliffford J., 
“The Vegetian science of war,” Journal of Medieval Military History, 1 (2003), 1–19, Morillo, 
Stephen, “Battle seeking: The contexts and limits of Vegetian strategy,” Journal of Medi-
eval Military History, 1 (2003), 21–37, Gillingham, John, “ ‘Up with orthodoxy!’ In defense of 
Vegetian warfare,” Journal of Medieval Military History, 2 (2004), 149–158. While medieval 
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The use of organised violence in this manner permeated medieval society 
from top to bottom. Much of the piracy that I will present in this book 
should be understood in this line of thought, that is, as vindictive raids, 
organised plunder and the destruction of the possessions of commercial 
rivals.
Medieval maritime studies have also reached this conclusion. 
N.A.M. Rodger has argued that it was impossible to distinguish hostile 
from peaceful trade and trading vessels in the Middle Ages. He states 
that peaceful trade was almost non-existent, not the least due to the fact 
that the sea was regarded as an area beyond laws and treaties. In this 
environment, peace or war between kingdoms meant little, and a ship at 
sea always had to be vigilant, since piracy abounded. Whereas medieval 
jurists agreed that technically there was such a thing as piracy (that is, 
criminal violent plunder at sea), in practice an agreed defĳinition was lack-
ing. The reaction of the English Crown to this use of violence was ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, piracy was an integrated part of maritime trade, 
and it served the purpose of training the mariners in maritime war to 
the benefĳit of the king when he went to war. On the other hand, piracies 
against neutrals and allies continually disrupted English foreign policy. 
Though the public did not care much if a foreigner got assaulted, it posed 
a diplomatic problem for the kings. This meant that only strong kings had 
the power to suppress piracy whereas weak kings had to tolerate it.14
In The Medieval Sea, Susan Rose also notes the problem of perceiving 
piracy as a reprehensible, criminal activity in the Middle Ages. She asserts 
that the fĳirst problem for a historian studying medieval piracy is that the 
contemporary defĳinition of piracy was loose and vague. Furthermore, 
since piracy essentially occupied a grey area between theft, semi-offfĳicial 
activity and low-level commercial warfare, it is hard to tell where crime 
ended and reprisals and private war began.15 Like Rodger, Rose questions 
the notion of a distinction between peaceful trade and warlike piracy. In 
Medieval Naval Warfare 1000–1500 she writes:
It is perhaps unsafe to say that ships engaged in aggressive activities were 
always clearly acting with the knowledge of a ruler. The distinction between 
outright piracy and the actions of privateers, conveniently described by the 
phrase ‘guerre de course’ was blurred and might be a respected renowned 
warfare does indeed seem to have been more nuanced than just being campaigns of plun-
der, Vegetian warfare still seems to have been the cornerstone of medieval warfare.
14 Rodger, N.A.M., The Safeguard of the Sea (London, 2004), pp. 115–116.
15 Rose, Susan, The Medieval Sea (London & New York, 2007), pp. 123–125.
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naval leader at one point in his career and the leader of at least quasi-
 piratical raids at another.16
Thus, both of these English historians note the problem of distinguishing 
piracy from warfare and reprisals. Accordingly, they both object to the 
Ciceronean paradigm that has as its claim to universalism the protection 
offfered by the state against lawless robbers.
In French maritime historiography, Marc Russon has also questioned 
the Ciceronean paradigm. Based on evidence from the fĳifteenth century, 
the influential maritime historian Michel Mollat wrote, according to the 
Ciceronean paradigm, that pirates were “the shipmasters that respected 
no law, spared no one, and who escaped all control”,17 but Russon points 
out that this defĳinition is too restrictive and is only applicable for a small 
number of medieval pirates. Most of those arrested and judged for piracy 
do not fall within this defĳinition. Rather, “pirate” was simply a term 
employed by victims of those who had attacked them, irrespective of 
whether the context was of open warfare or private war, and it was quite 
often used to criminalise one’s maritime rivals.18 What Russon essentially 
argues is that piracy as an act and as a term in the Middle Ages was sub-
jective and cannot not be confĳined to an objective, juridical category. At 
most, it could be used as a term to vilify one’s enemy. In efffect, an Augus-
tinian perspective.
In sum, scholars increasingly stress the subjectivity of the term pirate 
and question the classic dichotomy between legitimate force wielded by 
the governments and the criminal violence done by pirates. However, 
while the above-mentioned “Augustinians” have noted the subjectivity 
of the term “pirate”, they then tend to concentrate on piracy in relation 
to either trade or war. Consequently, they have seen the issue of piracy 
(mostly) from the viewpoint of the governments and their naval policies.
For medieval studies, this is probably due to the fact that most historians 
seem incapable of conceiving of the Anglo-French ports and the mariners 
as being able to conduct their own “foreign” policies, including waging 
private war, independently of the kingdoms. Rather, their view of  politics 
16 Rose, Susan, Medieval Naval Warfare 1000–1500 (London & New York, 2002), p. 1.
17 “maîtres de navires qui ne respectent aucune loi, n’épargnent personne et échappent 
à tout contrôle sont des pirates.” Mollat, “Piraterie sauvage,” p. 17.
18 “Les pirates étaient en fait pour chacun ceux qui l’avaient attaqué, les ennemis, que 
l’on soit en état de guerre ouverte ou couverte, tout simplement ceux qui étaient consid-
érés souvent de toute antiquité comme des rivaux sur mer. La justice, n’était pour beau-
coup de dirigeants politiques qu’un moyen parmi d’autres de lutter contre les agressions 
extérieures.” Russon, Marc, Les Côtes guerrières (Rennes, 2004), pp. 303–304.
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at sea is binary. They assume that ports were only interested in trade and 
that they left all handling of conflict to the kings.19 For instance, J.C. Ford 
and K.L. Grufffydd claim that piracy surged in the intervals between royal 
wars in the fourteenth and fĳifteenth centuries and that this surge was 
directly related to royal war. Indeed, Ford argues that piracy in peace-
time should often be seen as proxy wars between the kings.20 Whereas 
this may be true for some periods of the Hundred Years War, it does not 
allow for a more detailed understanding of piracy as a phenomenon in a 
non-hegemonic international order. It rather resembles a transposition 
of the situation around 1700, when piracy indeed surged when the kings 
made peace, and the mariners, previously employed as privateers, sud-
denly lost a valuable source of income. Some maritime historians have, 
however, noted the piracies and the bellicosity of the mariners,21 but this 
has only been analysed in the context of the Cinque Ports and Great Yar-
mouth’s conflict in the latter part of the thirteenth century and the fĳirst 
decades of the fourteenth century.22 To my knowledge, no other medieval 
maritime conflict outside the Mediterranean has been the subject of a 
detailed analysis.
Thus, the recognition of the subjectivity of the term “pirate” has opened 
the way for new questions not sufffĳiciently explored by historians to be 
considered. This is where I hope to make a contribution to the research, 
by changing the focus from kings to mariners and ports. Contrary to the 
usual studies on piracy, which are primarily seen from the perspective 
of the governments, the focus of this study is on the pirates and their 
communities, in other words the mariners and the ports as agents in a 
politically ungoverned space. It can therefore be assumed that medi-
eval pirates should be understood in light of the Augustinian paradigm, 
where pirates and piracy are seen as subjective terms rather than as an 
19 See, for instance Ward, Robin, The World of the Medieval Shipmaster (Woodbridge, 
2009) and Krieger, Karl-Friedrich, Ursprung und Wurzeln der Rôles d’Oléron (Cologne & 
Vienna, 1970).
20 Ford, J.C., “Piracy or policy: The crisis in the Channel, 1400–1403,” Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, 5th Series, 29 (1979), 63–78, Grufffydd, K.L., “Piracy, privateering 
and maritime Wales during the later Middle Ages,” Cymru a’r mor, 24 (2003), 24–25.
21  See, for instance, Runyan, Timothy J., “Naval logistics in the late Middle Ages: The 
example of the Hundred Years’ War,” in J.A. Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars (Boulder, CO, 1993), 
p. 93.
22 See Brooks, Frederick W. “The Cinque Ports’ feud with Yarmouth in the thirteenth 
century,” The Mariner’s Mirror, 19 (1933), 27–51, and Sylvester, David. G., “Communal piracy 
in medieval England’s Cinque Ports,” in N. Christie and M. Yazigi, eds, Noble Ideals and 
Bloody Realities (Leiden, 2006), pp. 163–177.
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 objective, government-defĳined criminal category as expressed in the Cice-
ronean paradigm. It should be noted, though, that both the Ciceronean 
and the Augustinian perspectives were present in the Middle Ages. While 
the Ciceronean perspective rests on a unitary and agreed defĳinition of 
who can legitimately use violence, the victims of piracy surely felt that 
they had been victims of a crime and consequently saw pirates as a most 
heinous enemy meriting harsh punishments. However, to understand the 
phenomenon in the Middle Ages, a period with disputed and negotiable 
rights to the legitimate use of violence, the use of a Ciceronean perspec-
tive would prohibit an understanding of why people resorted to piracy.
Preliminary Definitions
Before progressing further it is necessary to briefly defĳine what is meant 
by pirates and piracy, and to determine the diffference between pirates 
and corsairs or privateers.
The best defĳinition I have seen yet is by Philip de Souza:
Piracy is a term normally applied in a pejorative manner. Pirates can be 
defĳined as armed robbers whose activities normally involve the use of ships. 
They are men who have been designated as such by other people, regardless 
of whether or not they consider themselves to be pirates.23
For my studies, however, I shall expand a bit on de Souza’s defĳinition. My 
defĳinition of the act of piracy (and not the person, which is amply defĳined 
by de Souza) is thus:
Piracy is the seaborne appropriation or destruction of goods and values 
in a maritime (high seas, estuaries, coasts) or a riverine space through 
violence or threats of violence. Piracy requires that the agents consciously 
attack their victim in a situation arisen either by misfortune (for example, 
ship stuck in a port because of bad weather) or by premeditated action 
(for example, lying in wait).
I do not consider wreckers to be pirates, since they are land-based and 
wholly dependent on a natural disaster in order for them to carry out the 
plunder. While wreckers may try to alter the situation in their favour—for 
instance by “false” lighthouses—they lack the fundamental prerequisites 
of piracy, namely that pirates are seaborne, and that they actively and at 
personal risk undertake an armed operation with the aims of plunder. 
23 Souza, Piracy, p. 1.
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Thus, I will restrict myself to the instances where people actively sought 
out and plundered their victims, who would otherwise have enjoyed a safe 
voyage, if the pirates had not attacked them.
This brings me to the pirate’s Siamese twin, the corsair or the priva-
teer. In this book, I shall use the term “privateer” for private mariners 
licensed by a government in wartime to hurt the enemies of the realm 
during war. It should be noted, however, that the closest one comes to 
the term “privateer” in medieval languages is cursarius. It was used in the 
Middle Ages as a novel expression specifĳically to separate the pirate from 
the  government-licensed sea warrior.24
Michel Mollat has argued that in the Middle Ages the diffference between 
pirates and privateers was that piracy was an action deprived of any insti-
tutional character and which was conducted indiscriminately against all 
ships at sea. Accordingly, it did not call for any justifĳication other than 
the mere “might is right”, and consequently the pirate was accountable 
to no authority. In contrast, privateering (la course) was conducted with 
the permission of the public authorities from the port where the privateer 
hailed. It was carried out either as reprisals for acts committed by crimi-
nals at sea or their presumed accomplices or as acts of war against people 
from an enemy state. As justifĳication, the privateer were supplied with 
letters of marque from the government.25
Mollat here identifĳies three ways of practising rapacious violence at sea 
in the Middle Ages: fĳirstly, as a criminal who attacks and plunders indis-
criminately at sea; secondly, as an act of reprisal against pirates or their 
fellow-citizens; and thirdly, as a privateer, that is, a private citizen com-
missioned by the state to wage war against its enemies. Mollat’s defĳinition 
24 I understand that this term in English is usually applied to the Mediterranean pirates 
of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, but in Mediterranean languages “corsair” merely 
means “privateer”. Earle, Peter, The Pirate Wars (London, 2003), p. 39. While there was no 
clear term for these in Northern Europe, the Latin, cursarius, was an oft-used term used 
in the Mediterranean in the Middle Ages. For the institutional developments of privateer-
ing in the fourteenth century, see Katele, Irene B., “Captains and corsairs: distinguishing 
protection and aggression,” in K. Friedland, ed., Maritime Aspects of Migration (Cologne & 
Vienna, 1989), pp. 87–103, Katele, Irene B., “Piracy and the Venetian State: The Dilemma 
of Maritime Defense in the Fourteenth Century,” Speculum, 63 (1988), 865–889, and Tai, 
“Marking Water”. An example of the distinction between corsairs and pirates is provided in 
Philippe de Mezières, Songe du vieil pélérin, ed. G.W. Coopland, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1969), 
I, pp. 254–255 and 261. To avoid confusion amongst readers, I have, however, retained the 
anachronistic term “privateer” for the Middle Ages.
25 Mollat, Michel, “Guerre de course et piraterie à la fĳin du Moyen Âge: aspects 
économiques et sociaux. Position de problèmes,” in M. Mollat, Études d’histoire maritime 
(1938–75) (Torino, 1977), pp. 473–486.
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is based on the situation in the fĳifteenth century, and it is rather prob-
lematic. While Mollat mentions three diffferent types of maritime aggres-
sion, in fact he only operates with two: aggression legitimised by public 
authorities (the second and third) and that which is not (the fĳirst). In the 
centuries prior to the fĳifteenth, and indeed during that century as well, 
the kingdoms had little control over the seas and the use of rapacious 
violence there. Furthermore, I question the banding together of repri-
sals with genuine war-time commissions, since, as I shall demonstrate in 
chapter 5, reprisals in the Middle Ages were only authorised in peace-time 
and as a last resort in the restitution of goods lost to pirates.
The political scientist Janice E. Thomson’s defĳinition in this regard 
is more nuanced. She defĳines the diffference between pirates and priva-
teers thus:
Acts of piracy are distinguished from other acts of violence on or emanating 
from the high seas by the fact that the former ‘are done under conditions 
which render it impossible or unfair to hold any state responsible for their 
commission’. Though ‘the absence of competent authority is the test of piracy, 
its essence consists in the pursuit of private, as contrasted with public, ends 
[my italics].’ Thus, the distinction between a privateer and a pirate is that 
the former acts under the authority of a state that accepts or is charged with 
responsibility for his acts, while the latter acts in his own interests and on 
his own authority.26
This distinction is more precise, yet it is still hampered by the fact that 
the main dividing line is between legitimate and illegitimate aggression 
at sea. As the maritime historian Gonçal López Nadal has put it, the only 
diffference between privateering and piracy was the institutional element. 
Otherwise, the two phenomena were practically identical.27
For medieval studies, there is furthermore the problem of determining 
which authorities could authorise such actions. While the political philos-
ophers of the Middle Ages argued that only a sovereign prince could wage 
just war, many political groups such as nobles, towns and indeed some-
times the clergy waged de facto war in the Middle Ages and claimed that 
they had sufffĳicient just cause and authority to wage these legitimately.
In the end, the best distinction for these activities in the Middle Ages 
resembles the one prevalent around 1600. That was, as Peter Earle has put 
it, “a confused period when piracy, privateering, reprisals and ‘ aggressive 
26 Thomson, Janice E., Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns (Chichester, 1994), p. 22.
27 Nadal, Gonçal L., “Corsairing as a commercial system,” in C.R. Pennell, ed., Bandits at 
Sea: A Pirates Reader (New York, 2001), p. 125.
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commerce’ all existed alongside each other and are difffĳicult to disentan-
gle”. In that period, three distinct kinds of violent, maritime action was 
in play:
the indiscriminate, persistent and criminal pursuit of maritime robbery; 
offfĳicially authorized reprisals by merchants for loss of ships or goods; and 
government-commissioned but privately promoted action against enemy 
shipping and goods in time of war. Or, to put it more simply, piracy, repri-
sals and privateering, three diffferent forms of private maritime violence of 
which only the fĳirst, piracy, was illegal though all three were very similar in 
motivation and methods.28
The same distinction was prevalent in Middle Ages, if only in an even 
more confusing state due to the relative weakness of the royal govern-
ments. I shall use the three categories distinctly from one another. Thus, 
I operate with pirates, with reprisal-takers (with or without royal authori-
sation) and with privateers, or royally commissioned sea-warriors.
To these considerations should be added two requisites for people hav-
ing recourse to piracy:
1. That piracy appears very profĳitable, and/or
2. The risk of getting caught and punished for piracy is rather low.
Furthermore, piracy is never an isolated act. It is almost by defĳinition 
organised “crime”, since:
1.  A crew needs to be organised in order for the vessel to function, and 
by extension the coordination of hostile acts at sea and the sharing 
of booty demands a formalised organisation in order for piracy to be 
durable.
2.  There is no point in committing robbery at sea if there is no one to buy 
the booty. To put it bluntly, one cannot eat silver. Thus, all pirates need 
secure bases with allies and a network to buy the goods and provide a 
measure of protection.
Thus, piracy can never be treated or understood as a purely maritime 
operation. Rather, the intangible and inherently uncontrollable nature 
of the sea which, on the one hand, does not permit a territorialisation 
proper, on the other hand makes it impossible to live exclusively at sea 
28 Earle, Pirate Wars, pp. 21–22.
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without contact with land. Thus, pirates and piracy were a part of the ter-
restrial world. It was here that they recruited their crews, and it was from 
the ports they went out and returned to sell their loot. The ports served as 
the nexus between land and sea. This made the ports the pirates’ accom-
plices, and created a symbiotic relationship between pirates and ports. 
Indeed, as the sociologist, Anton Blok, has put it: “The more successful a 
man is as a bandit, the more extensive the protection granted him.”29
Pirate Terminology
Not until the sixteenth century was piracy a legal term, and not until the 
end of the seventeenth century was the Ciceronean paradigm wholly inte-
grated into the discourse on pirates, who accordingly were considered to 
be an evil to be eradicated.30
The judicial situation is reflected in the terms for pirates—or rather 
people conducting acts of piracy—in the medieval sources. Here the use 
of the terms “pirate” and “piracy” are often ambiguous or absent outright, 
even though the meaning of the acts described is clear enough, namely 
violent robbery at sea.
It has often been assumed by scholars that the image of pirates as the 
enemy of mankind has run in a direct line from the late Roman Republic 
in the formulation of Cicero to the present.31 For the Middle Ages, evi-
dence for this discourse can be found in Bartolus de Saxoferrato’s (1313–
57) commentaries on the forty-ninth book of Justinian’s Digest, (who in 
turn cites James of Arena fl. 1261–96). Here, Bartolus expressed that:
‘enemies [hostes] are not to be compared to pirates [pyrate], for the lat-
ter have renounced [difffĳidati], by the law itself, the very principle of faith.’ 
Employing a term of phrase not found before him but that was fated to 
have a long life in the law, Bartolus then explained, rewriting Cicero, that 
such unworthy opponents are most properly said to be ‘the enemies of the 
human species’ (hostes humani generis).32
29 Blok, Anton, Honour and Violence (Cambridge, 2001), p. 19.
30 Rubin, Alfred P., The Law of Piracy (Newport, 1988), pp. 32–35, Earle, Pirate Wars, 
pp. 21 and 56, Law and Custom of the Sea, vol. 1, ed. Reginald G. Marsden (London, 1915), 
pp. 99–100, n. 1.
31  See, for instance, Eklöf, Stefan, Pirates in Paradise (Copenhagen, 2006), p. 7.
32 Heller-Roazen, Enemy of All, p. 103, “Bartolus de Sassoferrato, Lucernae iuris, omnia 
quae extant, opera, 11 vols (Venice, 1590–1602), Commentaria, Tomus sextus: In secundum 
Digesti novi partem (Venice 1596) f. 214v., Hostes, Additiones, a: “piratae aequiparantur hos-
tibus fĳidei et principis et sunt ipso facto difffĳidati et possunt impune a quodlibet derobi, in 
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Heller-Roazen has prudently remarked, however, that the problem of dis-
tinguishing between legitimate combatants (privateers/corsairs) and rob-
bers at sea (pirates) made it difffĳicult to apply the Ciceronean (or more 
correctly, the Bartolean) distinction between the two.33 Nevertheless, the 
thought of pirates constituting an especially abominable enemy with no 
claims to any rights whatsoever is maintained in much research. Thus, the 
conception of pirates as the enemy of mankind (rather than all) actually 
has a late-medieval origin rather than a late-Roman Republican one.
However, while legal thinkers like Bartolus contemplated the question 
of the status of pirates, in the sources of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries these reflections are absent. Indeed, Claude Gauvard has pointed 
out that the use of Bartolus’s thoughts has not been detected anywhere in 
French legal writing before 1375, and for the fourteenth century the influ-
ence of Bartolus in France is almost non-existent.34
The closest evidence for a Ciceronean discourse is in two Church 
decrees. In the Third Lateran Council of 1179, it was remarked about 
pirates that: “There are even some who for gain act as captains or pilots 
in galleys or Saracen pirate vessels.”35 These persons were to be excom-
municated for their robberies or crimes against fellow Christians, yet this 
referred to a Mediterranean situation and not initially to a universal one. 
Likewise, in the Second Council of Lyon of 1274, the Church pronounced 
a condemnation of pirates, only stronger this time:
Furthermore, since corsairs and pirates greatly impede those travelling to 
and from that Land, by capturing and plundering them, we bind with the 
bond of excommunication them and their principal helpers and supporters. 
We forbid anyone, under threat of anathema, knowingly to communicate 
with them by contracting to buy or sell.36
auth. navigia ubi Baldi C. de fur. Item hypocritae dicuntur . . . hostes humani generis, vnde 
dignum est a cunctis publicum bellum contra eos indicere, secundum Iac. de Are. in ora-
tione contra hypocritas . . .”. Quoted in: Tai, Emily S., “Piracy and law in medieval Genoa: 
The consilia of Bartolomeo Bosco,” Medieval Encounters, 9 (2003), p. 260, n. 7, Rubin, Law 
of Piracy, pp. 15–18.
33 Heller-Roazen, Enemy of All, p. 104.
34 Gauvard, Claude, “Punir le crime,” in C. Gauvard, Violence et ordre public au Moyen 
Age (Paris, 2005), p. 49.
35 “Sunt etiam qui pro sua cupiditate in galeis et piraticis Sarracenorum navibus regi-
men et curam gubernationis exercent.” Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. Norman 
Tanner, 2 vols (New York, 1990), I, 223.
36 “Ceterum quia cursarii et piratae nimium impediunt capiendo et spoliando tran-
seuntes ad illam et redeuntes de illa, nos eos et principales adiutores et fautores eorum 
excommunicationis vinculo innodamus, sub interminatione anathematis inhibentes, ne 
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While this initially seems to draw on the Ciceronean discourse, this con-
demnation of “cursarii et piratae” was actually a specifĳic one related to 
the situation in the Mediterranean with the ongoing crusades. The occa-
sion for writing this decree was thus the attacks on pilgrims and the trade 
with Muslims. It was not a general condemnation of all pirates. Indeed, in 
none of the other sources for the period studied in this book have I found 
any reproduction of the statements of either Bartolus or the councils. It 
was not until 1455, with Pope Nicolas V’s bull Inhibitio contra piratas, that 
there was a general ecclesiastical condemnation of pirates, in this case 
those on Belle-Île, and in 1475, Pope Sixtus IV issued a bull excommunicat-
ing pirates, escumeurs de mer, kidnappers, enemies, men of war, bandits 
and malefactors.37
Contrary to the ecclesiastical stance on piracy, the chronicles had a dif-
ferent way of describing plunderers at sea. While the chronicles were just 
as ideological and moralising as the Church decrees—with the notable 
addition of an often strong patriotism—the use of the terms pirata and 
piratica in the Ciceronean sense was absent. Thus, despite the patriotic 
disposition of the chroniclers and that their chronicles were often des-
tined for a domestic audience, they seem reluctant to use damning terms 
for their opponents’ mariners. Furthermore, terms involving pirat- (both 
as a noun and an adjective) were more often used in a neutral terminus 
technicus sense than as a condemnation of criminals. For instance, in 
the twelfth century, Abbot Suger characterised the French king’s forces 
attacking Gournay Castle on the Marne-river as fĳighting piratarum more. 
It was by no means pejorative, but rather referring to a waterborne mili-
tary operation and fĳighting manner.38
In the following I shall briefly examine a few signifĳicant examples of the 
way in which medieval chroniclers described pirates in the thirteenth and 
the fĳirst decades of the fourteenth century.
The fĳirst example is of Eustache le Moine. Eustache was the son of a 
minor Boulonnais noble. He was a runaway monk who served King John 
as a pirate/privateer in the English Channel in the fĳirst decade of the 
thirteenth century. In 1215, however, he switched to the French side and 
quis cum eis communicet scienter in aliquot contractu venditionis vel emptionis.” Tanner, 
Decrees, I, 311.
37 Russon, Côtes, pp. 337–338. See also Toureille, Valérie, Vol et brigandage au Moyen 
Âge (Paris, 2006), pp. 268–278.
38 “loricati et galeati de classe, piratarum more, audacissime committunt, repellentes 
repellent.” Suger, Ouevres complètes de Suger, ed. A. Lecoy de la Marche (Paris, 1847), p. 42.
16 chapter one
supplied vital assistance to the French invasion of England in 1216. In the 
end, he was captured and immediately executed on his ship in 1217.39
Unsurprisingly, the English chroniclers were not very fond of Eustache. 
Roger of Wendover called Eustache a “viro flagitiosissimo et piratæ 
nequissimo” and “Eustachius Monachus, proditor regis Angliæ et pirata 
 nequissimus”.40 Roger thus termed Eustache as a most vile pirate, a despi-
cable man and a traitor. In the poem about the life of William Marshal, 
Eustache was also portrayed as a despicable person, especially since 
 William was one of the young king Henry III’s most ardent supporters. In 
the poem it says that Eustache le Moine, “who never failed to do as much 
evil as possible and showed God more evil than was ever seen before, was 
made master of this French fleet, but then arrived his day of celebration 
( feste) for he had his head cut offf ”.41 Thus, the poem not only stressed the 
evil ways of Eustache, but in fact cast him as a blasphemer openly chal-
lenging God with his wicked ways. It then ends with an inverted version 
of a saint’s martyrdom, since Eustache’s celebration was in fact a celebra-
tion of divine retribution and the liberation of the Christians from his 
evils. The term pirate is not used here, but the meaning is clear. Matthew 
Paris, who after 1235 continued Roger of Wendover’s chronicle, likewise 
described Eustache in negative terms, while he praised his hero and source 
for the story, Hubert de Burgh. Matthew Paris wrote that Eustache proved 
himself as a master pirate, and he caused much hurt and cruelty, but the 
plunderer plundered so much that he ended up collecting the fruits of his 
wicked life.42 However, immediately before this passage, Matthew Paris 
described a desperate discussion between Hubert de Burgh, the bishop of 
Winchester, William Marshal and the supporters of Henry III. The terms 
used in this passage are quite interesting: The nobles answered Hubert 
de Burgh that they were neither sea-warriors [milites maris], pirates nor 
fĳishermen, and thus claimed that taking to the sea would mean certain 
39 Cannon, Henry L., “The Battle of Sandwich and Eustace the Monk,” The English His-
torical Review, 27, (1912), 649–670.
40 Roger of Wendover, Flores Historiarum, ed. H.O. Coxe, 4 vols (London, 1841–1842), 
IV, pp. 28–29.
41  “Eüstace li moines, cil qui unques ne quist essoines a faire mal de son poeir, e li fĳist 
Dex aparceveir plus mal engingnos ne puet estre, de ceste flotte se fĳist mestre; mes a cel 
avint sa feste, car il i ot coupé sa teste.” Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal, ed. Paul Meyer, 
2 vols (Paris, 1894), II, 255–256.
42 “Eustachium . . . existens pirata et piratarum magister, multis dampnosus fuit et cru-
entus; sed tandem prædo præda factus, fructus collegit viarum suarum.” Chronica Majora, 
III, 29.
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death.43 However, the Annales Dunstaplia only call Eustache a “pyrata 
fortissimus” (most powerful pirate) in his actions against the English, but 
no further condemnation is found.44 While this initially could be read in a 
pejorative sense, the following will show that it could also just be a neutral 
description of a sea-warrior.
The French sources are more moderate in their description of Eustache 
le Moine. Guillaume le Breton, the chronicler of Philippe Auguste, 
described Eustache thus: “miles tam mari quam terra probatissimus”,45 
that is, that Eustache was a most accomplished knight at sea as well as 
on land, akin to Matthew Paris’s milites maris. Initially, this could be con-
strued as a French attempt to avoid the criminalised term pirata, but le 
Breton wrote that Philippe Auguste asked the Poitevin nobleman, Savary 
de Mauléon, to supply reinforcements and that he turned up with “Pic-
tonesque sui, quibus ars piratica nota est” (and with his Poitevins who are 
renowned for their skills in the art of piracy).46 There is nothing pejorative 
in this description, and it supports the assumption that to a certain extent 
piracy was a term for a legitimate way of warfare—as long as it served a 
just purpose.
Returning to Matthew Paris, it becomes evident that a diffferent word 
than pirate existed for warriors fĳighting at sea, milites maris. If there was 
a bigger emphasis on the term “pirate” in the Ciceronean meaning, would 
one not have avoided using it for one’s protagonists? Thus it transpires 
that in many instances “pirate” did not mean anything other than a warrior 
specialised in maritime warfare, as is shown, for instance, in the Histoire 
des ducs de Normandie et des rois d’Angleterre’s descriptions of Eustache 
le Moine as a knight and an ingenious sea-warrior.47 Indeed, during the 
war of 1216–17, Matthew Paris described the mariners of the Cinque Ports 
as “piratæ regis Anglorum” (the pirates of the king of the English).48 Bjorn 
Weiler has recently stressed the strongly moralising dimension of Paris’s 
work.49 This makes Matthew Paris’s choice of words for describing these 
43 “Cui [Hubert de Burgh] responderunt [the bishop of Winchester, William Marshal 
and other noblemen], Non sumus milites maris, non piratæ, piscatores, vade autem tu 
mori.” Chronica Majora, III, 28.
44 Annales Dunstaplia, p. 46.
45 Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, ed. Jean Renouard (Paris, 1867), p. 314.
46 Oeuvres de Rigord, p. 260.
47 Histoire des ducs de Normandie et des rois d’Angleterre, ed. Francisque Michel (Paris, 
1840), pp. 167, 185 and 200–202.
48 Chronica Majora, III, 26.
49 Weiler, Bjorn, “Matthew Paris on the writing of history,” Journal of Medieval History¸ 
35 (2009), 259.
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acts at sea all the more interesting, for if the meaning of pirata was clearly 
negative, he would not have used the word to describe his protagonists 
as well.
For the 1292–93 maritime war between the Normans and the Anglo-
Bayonnais (see chapter 4), it is moreover interesting that, despite the clear 
depiction of adversaries employing unlawful plundering operations at sea, 
the chroniclers refrain from using the terms pirata or piratica. Instead, 
most of them simply used ethno-geographical terms such as Normanni 
and Anglicos.50 Some of the chronicles, as well as some of the legal and 
diplomatic records, sometimes specifĳied by adding their function, marina-
rios, to the geographical denominations.51 The most specifĳic is the Annales 
Wigorniensis, which described the Normans as “bellatoribus et nautis 
navium” (ship-borne warriors and mariners).52 Peter Langtoft includes a 
decidedly pejorative word, roberie, (see chapter 8) which, however, only 
described the Normans’ claim of the criminality of their adversaries and 
not Langtoft’s view of the justice of their claim.53 Thus, while none of 
these accounts doubt the criminal nature of their enemies, the authors 
still refrained from calling them pirates.
However, the chronicles were by no means unaware of the term “pirate” 
and its meaning. In the Bury St. Edmunds Chronicle, the Genovese adven-
turer, merchant and pirate (and between 1294–1300, admiral of France), 
Benedetto Zaccaria, was praised for his defeat of Muslims in the Mediter-
ranean in 1293: “After a pirate from Genoa called Benedict Zacharias had 
won a victory over the infĳidels in the Mediterranean and taken possession 
of their spoils, he sent twelve captive infĳidels to each of the fĳive Christian 
kings, of France, England, Germany, Spain and Cyprus.”54 Once again, we 
see the terminus technicus.
In the Vita Edwardi Secundi, Hugh Despenser the Younger was con-
demned for his piracies with the mariners of the Cinque Ports in 1321–22 
when he and his father were temporarily exiled from England. Here, if 
50 Annales Londinienses, p. 101, Annales Dunstaplia, pp. 374 and 384, Annales Oseneia, 
p. 335, Chronographia, I, 39, Bury St. Edmunds, pp. 4 and 117–118, Rishanger, pp. 130–131 and 
137, Flores, III, 85, Nangis, p. 574, Foedera 1272–1307, p. 793.
51  Guisborough, pp. 240–243, Olim, II, 3–8.
52 Annales Wigorniensis, p. 512.
53 Langtoft, p. 200.
54 “Habita uictoria de paganis in mari Mediteraneo quidam pirata de Ianuensibus, 
Benedictus Zacharie dictus, eorumque spoliis potitus cuilibet quinque regum Christiano-
rum uidelicet Francie, Anglie, Alemannie, Hyspannie et Cypri, duodecim paganos trans-
misit captiuos.” Bury St. Edmunds, p. 118. 
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the Ciceronean paradigm had had its full meaning, he would probably 
be termed a pirata, yet the Vita instead employs a Biblical reference by 
calling Despenser a belua marina (sea monster), even though the sense 
plunderer of the seas is clear from the context.55 Thus, while the condem-
nation is clear, the term with the Roman baggage is absent.
It was not until the second part of the fourteenth century that an 
increasing condemnation of pirates began to appear in the chronicles. 
Geofffrey le Baker described the Genovese and Norman pirates attacking 
the English coasts and island in the 1330s, 40s and 50s as ruthless pirates 
(that is, piratas crudeles) in the service of the French tyrant—his word 
for the French king.56 However, no English mariners were described by 
these words, and interestingly neither was the French fleet at Sluis. Thus, 
le Baker seems to have employed a Ciceronean version of the term to 
denote criminals without any real legitimate military commission work-
ing for a criminal tyrant against the rightful king of France, Edward III. 
Froissart described the Normans and the Genovese prior to the Battle of 
Sluis thus: “These Normans and these Genovese were all esqumeurs and 
accustomed to the sea and all too eagerly went there for in all their life 
they had never done anything else but armed pursuit of their fortune at 
sea”.57 This term, esqumeur (“skimmer” of the riches of the sea) was the 
usual French term in the fourteenth and fĳifteenth centuries, rather than 
pirate, which seems to have entered French vernacular usage at a later 
date.58 Indeed, the term esqumeur was also used by the pirates them-
selves, thus hinting a self-conscious identifĳication by the mariners of their 
activities. For instance, in 1344, Edward III ordered offfĳicers to inquire into 
the activities of one Simon de Rathby, master of the ship the Escumer(!) 
who was plundering merchants offf the Isle of Wight,59 and in the 1480s 
the Breton pirate (and later admiral of Portugal) Jean Coatanlem’s ship 
was called, somewhat ironically, Le Cuiller (the spoon).60
55 Vita Edwardi Secundi. The Life of Edward the Second, ed. Wendy Childs (Oxford, 2005), 
p. 196. This may be a reference to the Biblical sea monster, the Leviathan.
56 Geofffrey le Baker, Chronicon Angliæ, ed. John A. Giles (London, 1847), pp. 132, 133, 
134, 135, 136, 145, 174 and 220.
57 “chil Normant et chil Génevois estoient tout esqumeur et costumiés de la mer, 
et trop bien en prenoient la painne, car en tout lor vivant il n’avoient fait aultre cose que 
poursievir les aventures d’armes sus la mer.” Froissart, III, 205.
58 For the use of classical texts in French legal discourse, see Gauvard, Claude, “Pou-
voir de l’État et justice en France à la fĳin du Moyen Âge,” in J.-P. Genet, ed., Rome et l’état 
moderne européen (Rome, 2007), pp. 348–351.
59 CPR 1343–45, p. 388. See also Runyan, “Naval logistics,” p. 59, n. 54.
60 Russon, Côtes, p. 477.
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However, in the fĳifteenth century, in the documents concerning naval 
service or protection of the coasts, the French authorities mentioned that 
this was a fĳight against robbers, pirates, escumeurs de mer and enemies, 
and studies conducted by Jean Bernard on trade in Bordeaux from 1400–
1550 show the following terms applied to pirates: pilhars de mer, larrons 
de mer, archerobe and archipirate (pillagers of the sea, bandits of the sea, 
arch-robber and arch-pirate).61 The same development is detectable in 
English sources.62
The most usual term and indeed condemnation of mariners as pirates 
in the sources, and especially in the legal and diplomatic records, is the 
term malefactor (“wrong-doer/evil-doer”). However, malefactor was a term 
used for criminals in general without any diffference as to whether the 
crime took place on land or at sea. For instance, Jean de Joinville praised 
the provost of Paris, Etienne Boileau, for his repression of malefactors in 
Paris in the 1260s:
there were so many criminals and thieves in Paris and the adjoining coun-
try that the whole land was full of them . . . One of the men recommended 
to him was a certain Étienne Boileau, who subsequently maintained and 
upheld the offfĳice of provost so well that no wrong-doer, thief, or murderer 
dared to remain in Paris, for all who did were soon hanged or put out of 
the way; neither parentage, nor noble descent, nor gold and silver availed 
to save them.63
Thus, there is no connection between the Ciceronean/Bartolean revul-
sion against pirates and the wider term malefactor which in many regards 
seems closer in content to the Ancient Greek leistes (plunderer on sea as 
well as on land), than to piratae.64
61  Bernard, Jean, Navires et gens de mer à Bordeaux (v. 1400–v. 1550), 3 vols (Paris, 1968), 
II, 774.
62 Rubin, Law of Piracy, p. 35.
63 Jean de Joinville, Chronicles of the Crusades, transl. Margaret R.B. Shaw (London, 
1963), pp. 341–342. “. . . il avoit tant de maulfeteurs et de larrons a Paris et dehors que tout 
le païs en estoit plein. [. . .] Si li fu enditié Estienne Boilyaue, le quel maintint et garda si 
la prevosté que nul malfaiteur ne liarre ne meutrier n’osa demourer a Paris, qui tantost 
ne feust pendu ou destruit, ne parent ne lignage ne or ne argent ne le pot garantir.” Jean 
de Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis, transl. Jean Monfrin (Paris, 1995), p. 576. See also Foedera 
1307–1327, pp. 77–78.
64 Ancient Greek had two words for pirate. The oldest was leistes, which meant armed 
robber or plunderer. The second word, peirates, is at its earliest datable to the mid-third 
century bc. “The derivation of peirates is probably from the word peira, meaning a trial 
or attempt, and it may be connected with peirao, meaning to make an attempt at some-
thing.” Souza, Piracy, p. 3. However, leistes was by far the most common term, but both 
terms meant plunderers writ large. Souza, Piracy, p. 8. See also Gabrielsen, “Piracy and 
slave-trade,” p. 390.
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Furthermore, in the medieval complaints over piracy, the pirates were 
often at fĳirst termed as “malefactores”, but as the case progressed, they 
changed denomination to “the king’s subjects or men”. The scarcity of the 
word “pirate” in the legal and diplomatic records can be illustrated by a 
survey of the word “pirat-” (thus permitting for both the noun and the 
adjective) in Thomas Rymer’s Foedera from the volume dealing with the 
years 1066–1361.
What is of immediate interest in this survey is that “pirat-” as an adjective 
does not appear at all in these volumes of the Foedera.
Admittedly, these documents were selected by Rymer and are not an 
exhaustive collection of the many legal and diplomatic records in the Eng-
lish National Archives. Nevertheless, while there was a very low frequency 
of the word in these documents, there was no lack of piracy. The medieval 
governments, however, refrained from using the term pirata, preferring 
instead to use “malefactor” or occasionally “sons of perdition”, but mostly 
just men or mariners of a certain region or men of the power of the king. 
Some of the legal and diplomatic records write malefactores et piratas, 
showing the synonymy of the words, but possibly also because they were 
unsure if the meaning of the word pirate would be efffectively transmitted to 
the receiver. This may in part be because of the neutral use of the term (ter-
minus technicus) in the thirteenth century and earlier in the chronicles.
I will briefly present a number of diffferent ways in which the words pirata 
and malefactor are used in the legal and diplomatic records. This survey is 
merely indicative of the use of the words, and it is by no means exhaustive.
I have only come across the adjective rapta more piratico (plundered 
in a piratical fashion) once in the records, which is from a letter from 
Philippe le Bel to Edward II demanding restitution for wine plundered 
by English mariners from French merchants.65 Sometimes we encounter 
65 Champollion, II, 32.








 formulations where the synonymy between malefactores and pirates is 
clear, as in Edward III’s letter to the Castilian king in 1328 concerning 
the maritime war between the Bayonnais and the Castilians. Here it says 
about the Castilians: “Quidam malefactores & pirati villarum de Sancto 
Andero”. (certain evil-doers and pirates from the town of Santander).66 In 
1333 a variation of this can be seen in Edward’s letter to the Aragonese con-
cerning marcher-law and reprisals: “pro malefĳiciis, per piratas” (for evils 
committed by pirates).67 Another variant can be seen in Edward II’s letter 
to Philippe le Bel concerning Norman pirates. These are termed: “piratæ 
& deprædatores, portum de Lere in Normannia” (pirates and plunderers 
from the port of Leure in Normandy),68 or in Edward II’s letter to Castile 
concerning pirates from Santander, Castro Urdiales and Laredo: “plures 
marinarios & piratas”.69
However, most often the terms “malefactor” or its derivatives, “men 
of ” or “people of ”, are used.70 Thus, in 1328 Edward III complained about 
“malefactores, de partibus Franciæ & Normanniæ” (malefactors from 
parts of France and Normandy),71 and in 1335 “alii malefactores, tam de 
dicto ducatu Normandiæ & partibus Franciæ, quam de Scoti” (malefac-
tors, some from the Duchy of Normandy and other parts of France, others 
were Scots). In 1311 Philippe le Bel complained to Edward II that Rochelais 
merchants had been subjected to “roberiis, malefĳicios, & homicidios, in 
mari, and in costerâ maris Britan, per homines in regno nostro . . . malefac-
tores illos”. Interestingly, in Edward’s reply these malefactors are simply 
termed homines (since they were not as such convicted).72 However, in 
most sources they were simply called “homines de portubus” or “gentes 
regni vestry”.73 The single strongest condemnations in the legal and dip-
lomatic records is the portrayal of Portuguese pirates in 1295 as perditionis 
fĳilii (sons of perdition) and in 1315 where Flemings and Scots are termed 
as Filii iniquitatis (sons of injustice).74
66 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 732.
67 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 870.
68 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 40.
69 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 331.
70 For example, “per gentes Regis Francie”. Champollion, II, 14.
71  Foedera 1307–1327, p. 745 and 1327–1344, p. 912.
72 Foedera 1273–1307, pp. 146 and 149.
73 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 712 and 1327–1344, p. 951.
74 Foedera 1273–1307, p. 828 and 1307–1327, p. 262.
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Outline of the Argument
Around 1300, royal control over the kingdom of England as well as of 
France was advancing. In War, Justice and Public Order, Richard W. 
 Kaeuper focuses on the development of increased English and French 
royal control over the economy of the kingdoms, the tightening of royal 
control over the military resources of realms75 and fĳinally, an increased 
royal interference in the exercise of justice in the kingdom at all levels.
Kaeuper notes that while the English kings traditionally had had more 
judicial control over the realm than their French counterparts, in the later 
part of the thirteenth century there was a general rise in the level of royal 
intervention in both England and France, and from 1300 at the latest, Eng-
lish and French kings had become very preoccupied with public order, 
not just in theory but also in practice.76 The methods applied in both 
kingdoms was a developing bureaucracy, the revival of classic notions 
of law and jurisprudence and an increasing expectation of regular and 
peaceful procedures for the settlement of conflict in society. There was 
especially a growing royal interest in interfering in the jurisdiction at all 
levels of society to promote and expand the royal power.77 However, this 
was not unproblematic. Kaeuper noted that from the reign of Edward II (if 
not already during the reign of his father) there was an increase in judicial 
corruption and a perversion of the law. This was because the English royal 
claim to jurisdiction had passed beyond the capabilities of government and 
had thus become unmanageable.78 Indeed, the demands of the reforms 
of the judicial procedure and the increasing  governmental  meddling in 
75 From 1290, a larger share of the wealth in the towns and countryside permitted the 
kings to raise larger armies, which in turn enabled them to engage in longer or protracted 
campaigns. These more protracted wars had a stimulating efffect on royal control, since 
threats to the kingdom allowed for the demand for more taxes to be justifĳied in order 
to increase protection of the population. Kaeuper, Richard W., War, Justice, and Public 
Order (Oxford, 1988), pp. 117–118 and 140. These conclusions have recently been supported 
by Xavier Hélary’s studies of the French royal armies around 1300. Hélary, Xavier, “Ser-
vir? La noblesse française face aux sollicitations militaires du roi (fĳin du règne de Saint 
Louis—fĳin du règne de Philippe le Bel),” Cahiers de Recherches Médiévales, 13 (2006), 21–40, 
Hélary, Xavier, “Délegation du pouvoir et contrôle des offfĳiciers: Les lieutenants du roi sous 
Philippe III et sous Philippe IV (1270–1314),” in L. Feller, ed., Contrôler les agents du pouvoir 
(Limoges, 2004), pp. 169–190.
76 Kaeuper, War, p. 139.
77 Kaeuper, War, p. 156.
78 Kaeuper, War, p. 180, Kaeuper, Richard W. “Law and order in fourteenth-century 
England: The evidence of special commissions of Oyer and Terminer,” Speculum, 54 (1979), 
734–784.
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judicial afffairs could not be met by the administrative resources of the 
kingdom.
In relation to crime and violence, Kaeuper is especially interested in 
the transgressors’ social backgrounds and the phenomenon of “private 
war”.79 Here the kings faced a structural problem where royal expecta-
tions clashed with practical realities. Indeed, one of the greatest threats to 
order and peace came from the knightly classes and their regular recourse 
to violent self-help and their perception of this as their inalienable right. 
Against these, the kings had a hard time imposing their rule.80 While pri-
vate war in England had been prohibited since the reign of William the 
Conqueror,
repressing the right of private war certainly did not relieve the English 
crown of the problem of open violence by lords and gentry. In a curi-
ous way the long-standing English prohibition against private warfare 
may have increased the business of outlaw gangs like the Folvilles or the 
Coterels . . . These gangs were available for hire and so were useful agents 
in local feuding. They could, as it were, carry out extra-legal services for 
those who wished to remain, or at least to appear to remain, technically 
within the law. Either the evidence on similar groups in France has not been 
brought to light or the diffferent status of private warfare in France made 
them unnecessary.81
For France in the Middle Ages, the picture was a bit diffferent, as the 
French kings never managed to completely repress the nobles’ private 
wars even though, according to Kaeuper, the French kings managed to 
make them accept judicial suits as one way of solving disputes.82 Indeed, 
the most they achieved was, from the reign of Philippe le Bel, a prohibi-
tion on private war when the kings of France waged war.83 The essential 
problem in royal French attempts of prohibiting private war was that the 
79 It should be noted that the term “private war” is a modern term used by historians 
to denote the wars and feuds between nobles, that is, the non-royal wars. See, for instance, 
Carbonnières, Louis de, “Le pouvoir royal face aux mécanismes de la guerre privée à la fĳin 
du Moyen Âge. L’exemple du Parlement de Paris,” Droits, 46 (2007), 3, Gauvard, ”Pouvoir 
de l’État,” p. 342.
80 Kaeuper, War, pp. 184–185.
81  Kaeuper, War, p. 165, see also Bellamy, J.G., “The Coterel gang: An anatomy of a 
band of fourteenth century criminals,” The English Historical Review, 79 (1964), 698–717, 
and Stones, E.L.G., “The Folvilles of Ashby-Folville, Leicestershire, and their associates in 
crime, 1326–1347,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 7 (1957), 117–136.
82 Kaeuper, War, p. 259.
83 Cazelles, Raymond, “La réglementation royale de la guerre privée de Saint Louis à 
Charles V et la précarité des ordonnances,” Revue historique de droit français et étranger, 
4 série, 38e année (1960), 530–548.
 introduction 25
nobles considered it an inalienable right. If the kings wished to maintain 
the loyalty of the nobility, they had to accept and/or pardon this activity.84 
Thus, what was actually at stake was a relationship of domestic power 
characterised by bargaining, rather than a hierarchy. Here, the ports and 
the mariners were no diffferent from nobles in their dealings with each 
other and the Crown.
I hypothesize that piracy in the period between c. 1280–c. 1330 cannot 
be viewed solely as mere robbery at sea. Rather, piracy was a tool in the 
ports’ and the mariners’ competition with their rivals for economic gains. 
Like the French nobles, this economic competition took the form of pri-
vate war with the mobilisation of the maritime communities of the ports. 
Also, like the nobles’ private wars, these maritime wars were not illegal 
per se but were rather retaliations over the rivals’ alleged crimes against 
the maritime community in question. Hence, it was a just response to the 
rivals’ felonious piracies against the mariners. The royal governments did 
not crack down hard upon this practice, since they were dependent on the 
mariners for naval service, and furthermore, in principle acknowledged 
the right to retaliatory self-defence. Rather, the royal governments merely 
tried to minimise the negative efffects of maritime war and to control, but 
not permanently prohibit, the recourse to the private action of reprisals. 
Thus, the relationship between the kings and the maritime communities 
was not hierarchical but was rather horizontal—just like the kings’ rela-
tionship with the nobles. In practice, this meant that bargaining was the 
governing principle of the interaction between royal government and the 
mariners of the kingdoms.
Method and Sources
In 1292, a seemingly insignifĳicant quarrel between Bayonnais and Norman 
mariners developed into a maritime war engaging not just Bayonne and 
the Norman ports, but also the English ports. Eventually it brought thirty-
fĳive years of peace between England and France to an end. The main 
weapon in these maritime wars was piracy.
The maritime wars of these ports in the Atlantic and the English Chan-
nel from c. 1280–c. 1330 and their main expression, piracy, is the subject of 
this study. I have chosen this period for three reasons. Firstly, this period 
84 Gauvard, Claude, “Violence licite et violence illicite,” in C. Gauvard, Violence et ordre 
public au Moyen Âge (Paris, 2005), p. 273.
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was characterised primarily by peace between the kingdoms of England 
and France. While they waged two wars in this period, the Gascon War 
(1294–97) and the War of Saint-Sardos (1324–25), these wars were brief, 
and the period was characterised in general by a peaceful relationship 
between the English and the French monarchs. Times of peace between 
the overlords of the mariners and ports are important to the study of 
piracy because it makes it easier to disentangle privateering from piracy. 
Furthermore, it permits a study of the politico-legal structures of preda-
tion at sea, which is impossible during war, since any action, whether 
“public” or “private”, against the enemy is essentially just.
Secondly, in the fĳirst decades of the fourteenth century, the wine export 
out of Bordeaux grew tremendously. Hundreds of ships went to Bordeaux 
(and other French wine-exporting ports on the Atlantic coast) during this 
period, and it seems as if the increased volume of shipping and the huge 
amount of money to be made out of this trade had a stimulating efffect 
on piracy.
Thirdly, in this period a number of novelties in royal policy towards the 
sea were introduced by England and France alike. It was in this period 
that the fĳirst admirals by that title were employed by the kings to serve as 
commanders of the naval forces of the realms. Furthermore, in 1306 as the 
fĳirst northern European monarch, King Edward I proclaimed sovereignty 
over the seas, thus theoretically making a claim to the ultimate jurisdic-
tional authority over the seas. These initiatives (and others) denote an 
increasing royal interest in maritime afffairs.
I will focus on the ports of Bayonne, the Cinque Ports, and the Norman 
ports, since their piracies are especially prominent in the sources. Further-
more, these three maritime communities provide a geographical spread to 
the analysis; a Gascon, an English, and a French example.
I have primarily worked with administrative and legal documents for 
this study. These documents can be divided into fĳive groups: petitions 
and complaints over piracy; royal orders to offfĳicers to make inquiries into 
the accusations of piracy and to carry out arrests of goods as a reprisal 
for piracy; diplomatic correspondences between the kings over claims 
of piracy; accounts of the mariners’ actions by royal offfĳicers and the 
 mariners themselves; and fĳinally peace negotiations and treaties between 
the ports.
Amongst these sources the English are by far the largest group, fĳirstly 
because more sources from England than anywhere else have survived 
from this period, and secondly because England’s geographical position 
places it squarely in the middle of the northern European maritime trade. 
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However, this means that there is a risk of focusing too heavily on Eng-
land and English issues of both English and Gascon subjects, as they are 
the principal consideration in the sources dealing with the maritime the-
atre of trade and war. I have tried to alleviate this somewhat one-sided 
tendency by using French sources when available. Furthermore, given 
the wide geographical spread of the English realm on the west coast of 
France, I do not fĳind this to be an insuperable obstacle to the analysis of 
a more general north-western European situation of trade, war and piracy. 
Finally, the English legal and diplomatic records contain many details 
about Continental maritime practices and replies to requests by European 
kings for redress in cases of piracy, which means that we can often deduce 
what was going on in the Continental courts as well.
A fundamental challenge to the study of piracy in this period is the 
fact that most of the sources have an origin in the royal chanceries. Con-
sequently, they mostly reflect events and procedures from the perspective 
of the royal governments. Nevertheless, it is possible to make qualifĳied 
assumptions on the views and the world of the mariners from these 
sources. In the following, I will discuss how to read these sources.
When we encounter piracy in the sources, it is initially through the 
complaints to the kings by merchants and mariners who had been the 
victims of piracy. However, most complaints over piracy initially seem 
to have been presented to local authorities in the ports, for instance the 
 bailifff.85 If nothing came of this complaint, or if the aggrieved felt insecure 
about the impartiality of the local offfĳicer, he would complain to the king. 
This means that we only have knowledge of a portion of the collective 
petitions and complaints over piracy in the period studied, since the com-
plaints to the local authorities have rarely survived.
Once the complaint reached the king, he and his council could exam-
ine it, even though it seems that both the kings of France and England 
would often present complaints in the Parlement de Paris, the Supreme 
Court for the kingdom of France, or in the Parliament of England.86 In 
cases of piracy committed by foreigners against the king’s subjects, if the 
85 Dumas, Auguste, Étude sur le jugement des prises maritimes en France jusqu’à la sup-
pression de l’offfĳice d’amiral (1627) (Paris, 1908), pp. 34–35, CPR 1313–17, pp. 147, 231 and 323. 
For an example of the procedure, see the case of Bartholomew de Welle in chapter 2.
86 Dumas, Étude, p. 31. Dodd assumes the same for many of the documents in the 
TNA SC 8 series, which contain numerous complaints over piracy. Dodd, Gwilym, “Par-
liamentary petitions? The origins and provenance of the “Ancient Petitions” (SC 8) in the 
National Archives,” in W.M. Ormrod et al., eds, Medieval Petitions: Grace and Grievance 
(Woodbridge, 2009), p. 14.
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complaint was found valid, a request was usually sent to the foreign king 
demanding restitution for the losses sufffered and for justice in general. 
This procedure is described in further detail in chapter 5.
A complaint over piracy and the subsequent petition for justice would 
usually contain the following components: where the assault took place; 
how much money and goods were stolen; the level of violence applied in 
the piracy; and more rarely when the piracy took place. The complaint 
ended in an appeal for justice by royal intercession. The complaints 
never contained any description of emotions. The most personal details 
in the complaints were that the merchant had been reduced to poverty 
by the piracy. In a sense this was the “script” for a medieval complaint 
over piracy.
In Gwilym Dodd’s words, complaints and petitions presented to the 
kings were a “mixture of complaints and requests. The complaints tend 
to relate to injustices that could not be readily resolved through common 
law process; the requests were usually prompted by the supplicant’s desire 
to obtain some form of royal favour, such as a grant, offfĳice or pardon.”87 
However, we must be aware that even though these complaints initially 
seem to yield a lot of information on the social, economic, cultural and 
material conditions of individuals and groups, the petitions were almost 
always written, not by the supplicant himself, but by men with admin-
istrative and paralegal experience who knew how to present a case and 
make it favourable for treatment.88 In other words, the petitions followed 
a paralegal script rather than being a verbatim account of the complaint 
as it was presented by the petitioner to the notary. Thus, the complaints 
constitute a methodological problem, namely whether the complaint was 
based on a true event or whether it had been invented and fĳitted into the 
script to obtain money for a loss occurring under more dubious circum-
stances, for instance, a wreck or a failed piracy by the petitioner himself ? 
The reading of these sources is a balance between two extremes. The fĳirst 
extreme is total incredulity, as everything in the sources could be made 
up since the petitioner certainly had a motive for giving a false or twisted 
report in order to obtain money. The other extreme is total credulousness, 
where all the accounts are taken at face value, since a government notary 
had written them down and thus guaranteed their veracity. One must 
strike a balance between the two, for surely the petitions were referring 
87 Dodd, “Parliamentary petitions?,” p. 12.
88 Dodd, “Parliamentary petitions?,” pp. 10–11.
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to a reality where people were indeed victims of piracy which occurred 
roughly the way in which it was described in the sources. However, some 
sources are clearly deliberate attempts to get more out a situation than 
was lost and sometimes even covering up corruption, fraud, failed piracies 
and smuggling on the part of the petitioner himself.
A solution to this problem is to read these sources as Claude Gauvard 
has done in her study of royal pardons in fourteenth- and fĳifteenth-century 
France. On these sources, she writes that it is futile to look for the truth 
in each particular case or indeed whether the presentation was true at 
all. However, the narrative in the complaint would not seem true if it did 
not correspond to an authentic and plausible course of events, not only 
to the narrator but also to the accused party and indeed to the chancery 
and courts treating the case. Thus, we can rely on the essential part of the 
complaint, namely what was found within the reasonable limits of credi-
bility in society in general and their perception of reality.89 While the peti-
tions indeed may have followed a paralegal script (in order to make them 
pass better), this does not mean that the contents are not true. Gauvard’s 
approach is useful for complaints over piracy and accounts of maritime 
war, since we can thereby use the sources to verify the overall contents 
and patterns of medieval piracy. These are the peace treaties between the 
maritime communities. Here we are told what actions had been taken 
during the maritime wars and what actions the mariners should abstain 
from in future or face severe punishment. The peace negotiation and trea-
ties thus confĳirm the picture presented not just of the legal and diplo-
matic records, but also of royal orders and diplomatic correspondences 
between the kings as well. The treaties present an agreed reality by two 
opposing parties which confĳirms the picture of conflict at sea already pre-
sented in the petitions and the diplomatic letters of the kings. Thus, the 
petition presents a credible account of how things might have taken place, 
even though for detailed analyses each case has to be treated separately. 
In other words, the accounts have a realistic form and content, which, 
however, for the individual cases are often impossible to verify.
I have also used chronicles and literary sources. These have been used 
sparingly and primarily to establish how piracy and pirates were per-
ceived, as well as to understand their practices around 1300. The prob-
lem with these sources is that none of the chroniclers seem to have been 
89 Gauvard, Claude, “De Grace Especial” Crime, Etat et Société en France (Paris, 2010 
(1991)), pp. 67–68.
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especially knowledgeable when they accounted for events at sea.90 How-
ever, the chronicles and literary texts are useful if used collectively for 
the understanding in society (at least amongst the learned) of maritime 
events and its causes. Thus, they are the closest thing that we have to 
a “public” opinion about events and agents in their day. Furthermore, if 
they are used in connection with the legal and diplomatic records, they 
can illuminate certain courses of events, since they supply valuable addi-
tions to the more restrictive script of the complaints.
I will not conduct a statistical survey of the volume of piracy. First of all, 
this is due to the rather disparate nature of the sources and initial prob-
lems of their veracity as shown above. As David Sylvester has remarked in 
relation to the piracies of the Cinque Ports:
the documentary evidence is not reliably representative, and the monetary 
fĳigures recorded are without a doubt inflated by medieval victims looking 
to capitalize at the expense of the attackers, a quantitative assessment of 
the scale of ‘malefaction’ at sea or a comparison to other types of maritime 
activity is not possible.91
Furthermore, in the source material there are relatively few complaints 
compared to the level of trade, but the problem must have been much 
bigger than what these express. If, for a given year, one would compare 
the number of occurrences of piracy with the volume of ships and com-
merce, piracy would no doubt fĳigure as less than one percent of the 
total of the ship and trade volume in the English customs accounts. 
For instance, Boston had approximately fĳifty ships trading in its port in 
1303, in 1308–9, thirty-fĳive vessels traded in Southampton and in 1324–25, 
110 ships traded in Lynn.92 In comparison, the number of what I would 
characterise as piracy assaults and attempted assaults for the whole of 
England and beyond in the Calendar of Close Rolls and the Calendar of Pat-
ent Rolls between 1301–7 is approximately twenty-nine, between 1307–13 it 
is approximately forty-fĳive and between 1323–27 it is approximately four-
teen. Given that the English ports alone must have been visited by thou-
sands of ships each year, these fĳigures appear minuscule. But the peace 
treaties, on the other hand, signify that the threat of piracy and its impact 
90 Given-Wilson, Chris, Chronicles (London, 2004), p. 11.
91  Sylvester, “Communal piracy,” p. 168.
92 The Early English Customs System: A Documentary Study of the Institutional and Eco-
nomic History of the Customs From the Thirteenth to the Sixteenth Century, ed. Norman S.B. 
Gras (Cambridge, 1918), pp. 288–302 and 360–392.
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on trade (at least locally) was taken very seriously by the royal authorities, 
signalling a level of piracy at times signifĳicantly over the one shown by a 
simple comparison of the number of complaints over piracy and the vol-
ume of shipping. Thus, at times piracy must have been a severe nuisance 
and a risk which made merchants refrain from sending out their ships, as 
testifĳied by some of the sources.
One probable reason there are relatively so few complaints of piracy in 
the extant source material is that in all likelihood only the complaints of 
the richest victims reached the royal courts. Because of their wealth, these 
victims were more likely to have the ear and support of the kings. At least, 
the huge amounts reckoned to be lost due to piracy seem to indicate this. 
This may also be the reason for the high losses registered in the relatively 
few cases for which we have evidence. These losses often ran into hun-
dreds of pounds, sometimes thousands. To put these sums into context, 
in 1301–02, in Winchester, the richest see of England, the bishop’s gross 
receipts came to £5,200, and in the fĳirst decades of the fourteenth century, 
the lawyer John Stonor, who was a clever businessman, and whose suc-
cess was due to a career in royal service, had an income of probably over 
£600 a year. These were some of the richest men in the realm, and other 
well-offf people had even less. Around 1300, an English knight banneret 
received 4s. a day, a knight 2s. and squires and sergeants 1s.93 The custom-
ary law of the sea, the Rôles d’Oléron from 1315 in the earliest versions, 
assumed a day wage of a mariner to be 4d.,94 and the mariners impressed 
for military service against the French in 1326 were to receive 3d. a day 
while the shipmaster received 6d.95 This comparison of income strongly 
suggests that only a proportion of piracy cases were actually recorded, 
and our knowledge of their full extent is almost certainly incomplete. 
Furthermore, the losses to pirates of the richest merchants may have 
been prone to exaggeration or been used fraudulently, for example, to 
cover up a shipwreck [see chapter 2 and the case of the plunder of the de 
France brothers, pp. 219–220]. Thus, due to the problems of veracity and 
the under-reporting in the source material of losses at sea to pirates, my 
analysis is a qualitative one.
93 Prestwich, Plantagenet England, pp. 371 and 399, Prestwich, Michael, War, Politics 
and Finance under Edward I (London, 1972), p. 160.
94 Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, p. 105.
95 CCR 1323–1327, pp. 608–613.
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The book consists of two parts. The fĳirst part deals with how and why 
piracy was conducted. Thus, chapter 2 contains an examination of the 
various ways in which piracy and pirates appear in the sources when we 
are dealing with singular occurrences. The aim of the chapter is to estab-
lish how and under what conditions medieval piracy took place. In chap-
ter 3, the focus is on the background of the three maritime communities, 
Bayonne, the Cinque Ports and the Norman ports, which I concentrate on 
in the book. These were not only especially prone to piracy, but they also 
employed piracy in their wars against commercial rivals. Furthermore, in 
this chapter I consider the impact of the Gascon wine trade on piracy in 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In chapter 4, I shall present a case 
study of maritime war. The war in question is the one which broke out 
between the Normans and the Anglo-Bayonnais, essentially the Cinque 
Ports and Bayonne, in the 1290s. Here I analyse not only what caused the 
war in the fĳirst place, but also how contemporaries viewed it and what 
practices were employed in maritime wars.
The second part, beginning with chapter 5, examines the politico-legal 
framework. In chapter 5, I deal with medieval maritime law. It seems as 
if no law was in place to govern conflict at sea in the North around 1300, 
but recourse to restitution and vengeance in the form of government-
authorised reprisal was an accepted practice or convention. Thus, while 
there was no legal permit for piracy per se, a person could still legally seek 
redress for piracy by court of law or through private acts of aggression. In 
chapter 6, I shall analyse the politico-legal status of the sea as tradition-
ally governed by legal customs defĳined mainly by seafaring communities, 
which, from the fourteenth century, were increasingly countered by royal 
claims to sovereignty over the seas on the borders of the rulers’ king-
doms. An example of the problems of defĳining the legal status of the sea 
is analysed through the Anglo-French negotiations in 1306 in Montreuil 
over reciprocal piracies. In chapter 7, the settlement procedure for mari-
time wars is analysed. I focus on the king’s role in these negotiations, the 
gradual change in how kings treated these wars in the fĳirst decades of the 
fourteenth century, and fĳinally how mariners and the maritime communi-
ties themselves reacted to these treaties. In chapter 8, I shall examine the 
relationship between robbery, violence and the governments’ reaction to 
piracy. One of the major paradoxes when working with medieval piracy 
is that the usual severe punishments for violence and robbery were not 
implemented by the courts. The aim of the chapter is thus to determine 
why this was not so. Finally, chapter 9 contains a brief conclusion of the 
results of the investigation undertaken in the book.
CHAPTER TWO
THE ANATOMY OF MEDIEVAL PIRACY
In this chapter I shall deal with the anatomy of medieval piracy. By anat-
omy I mean an analysis of the vessels used by the pirates as well as their 
victims, the geography of piracy, the procedure of a pirate assault, the 
fate of the victims and their goods and, fĳinally, the collaboration between 
pirates and their land-based accomplices. It should be noted that these 
cases are rather hard to disentangle, and it is important to stress the con-
fusion that reigned. Even contemporaries had trouble telling what had 
actually happened in the reported incidents of piracy. Piracy in practice 
did not adhere to fĳixed schemes of crime despite the formal script of the 
complaints. Thus, the image of piracy provided in this chapter is some-
what impressionistic.
While it may seem as if piracy was omnipresent in the Middle Ages and 
that mariners and merchants lived in continual danger of being assaulted, 
it must be noted that sea-borne trade generally functioned and functioned 
well. On the whole, trading voyages could and would be conducted with-
out any signifĳicant disturbances from other sea-folk. Hence, this chap-
ter does not seek to present piracy as an overwhelming problem at sea. 
Nonetheless, the maritime wars of Bayonne and the Norman ports, and 
the continual conflicts between the Cinque Ports and Great Yarmouth, at 
times endangered maritime commerce in general. Furthermore, natural 
disasters like the Great Famine of 1315–17 and the kings’ wars had a stimu-
lating efffect on piracy. The 1310s were particularly rife with piracy due to 
the wars between England and Scotland and between France and Flan-
ders. This chapter, however, deals solely with piracy as an act of personal 
enrichment, that is, as an inherently opportunistic action. The issues of 
law, reprisal and maritime wars will be explored in the later chapters.
The Vessels of Trade and War
It is difffĳicult to get a clear picture of the exact types and composition of 
medieval ships. This is due to the somewhat uncertain source material. It 
consists of archaeological excavations of shipwrecks, images (for instance, 
in chronicles and on town seals), and textual sources such as chronicles, 
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medieval literature and legal, commercial and diplomatic records. These 
diffferent types of sources often give a somewhat confusing and contradic-
tory presentation of ships. The literary sources were frequently written 
by people with no knowledge of, or interest in, maritime matters. The 
legal, commercial and diplomatic records usually only indicate carrying 
capacities of the ships and sometimes the size of the crew. The archaeo-
logical evidence is relatively sparse and often does not correspond with 
the textual presentations. Finally, since the images frequently followed 
an iconographic programme, it is unclear how much realism was applied 
in the portrayal of ships.1 I will therefore confĳine myself to some general 
remarks on the ships, since a detailed analysis is beyond the purpose of 
this book. I shall specifĳically focus on the military advantages and short-
comings of the medieval vessels.
In the Middle Ages, there were basically two types of vessels in use, 
defĳined by their means of propulsion. One was purely sail-driven ships, 
the other vessels which relied on oars as well as sails as a driving force.2
The sailing ships are usually assumed to be either of the cog type (a flat-
bottomed cargo ship with high sides and distinctive straight-angled stem- 
and sternposts) or a hulk (supposedly a keel-less vessel lacking stem- and 
sternposts).3 However, Carsten Jahnke has shown that the name “cog” 
refers to carrying capacity rather than a specifĳic shape.4 Yet identifĳica tion 
based on the carrying capacity of the ships is deceptive. The sources use 
the term “tuns” as a designation of the weight-carrying potential of the 
ship, but tunnage was literally the number of tuns a vessel could carry, 
and estimations for the Gascon wine tuns are that they could contain 
from 750 to 900 litres.5 This discrepancy means that the determination of 
ship sizes—even when we estimate it by the number of tuns that it could 
carry—is uncertain. While it is difffĳicult to make generalisations about the 
size of medieval ships, in the fourteenth century the tonnage of ships as 
1  Rodger, Safeguard, p. 61.
2 I have borrowed this terminology from Englert, Anton, “Naves magnae—den profes-
sionelle søhandels fartøjer. Store lastskibe i danske farvande 1000–1250” in P. Carelli et al., 
eds, Ett annat 1100-tallet. Individ, kollektiv och kulturella mönster i medeltidens Danmark 
(Gothenburg & Stockholm, 2004), pp. 111–119. For warships, see also Rodger, N.A.M., “The 
naval service of the Cinque Ports,” The English Historical Review, 111 (1996), 637–638.
3 Friel, Ian, The Good Ship (London, 1995), pp. 35–36.
4 Jahnke, Carsten, “Handelsstrukturen im Ostseeraum im 12. und beginnenden 13. Jahr-
hundert. Ansätze einer Neubewertung,” Hansische Geschichtsblätter, 60 (2008), 178–181.
5 Hutchinson, Gillian, Medieval Ships and Shipping (Cranbury, 1994), pp. 90–92.
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indicator for size shows that about half of all English ships were fĳifty to 
ninety-nine tuns, but some ships could be over 200 tuns.6
These “cog” ships often had a rather deep hull and sat deep into the 
waters. Accordingly, they needed quays for the ships to unload and 
moor. However, as few ports in this period had facilities for these large 
ships, many of them anchored outside the port and used smaller vessels 
(“lighters”) to freight the goods to the ports.7 Furthermore, since a ship 
en route from, for instance, Gascony to Flanders had to make many stops 
along the way, both for provisions and to take refuge from tempestuous 
weather or pirates, these small boats were needed for day-to-day opera-
tions. The lighters also served the purpose of avoiding paying full cus-
toms to the local authorities. For example, if a ship en route to a big trade 
emporium made a stop in Calais, it had to use lighters in order to avoid 
paying customs to the French authorities for the whole cargo.8
The success of the cog was caused by a large cargo carrying capacity 
and a very strong hull. It was furthermore cheap to build, and the high 
freeboard gave the cog an advantage over lower vessels in combat.
While sail-driven ships (cogs, hulks) were the mainstay of long-distance 
trade, ships of the oar-sail variant were also in use in northern European 
waters during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. These were the 
long, slender ships of the Norse tradition, the Mediterranean galleys, the 
barges, and the balingers.
The Mediterranean galley was not usually built in the North, except by 
the French kings in the Clos des Galées, a royal French shipyard and naval 
requisitioning centre in Rouen, from the end of the thirteenth century. 
The main instances where galleys are mentioned in the sources are when 
they were built by the kings with a specifĳic military purpose in mind9 or by 
Mediterranean seafarers either trading in the North or hired by the kings 
for military service. In the fourteenth century, oar-sail type ships named 
balingers and barges were also used, but in the terminology neither galley, 
balinger nor barge seems to have described a specifĳic size, even though 
the balinger could carry as much as fĳifty tuns, and the larger barge could 
carry as much as 100 to 150 tuns. Therefore, they could also be used as 
6 Friel, Good Ship, p. 202, Unger, Richard W., The Ship in the Medieval Economy (Lon-
don, 1980), p. 163.
7 Hutchinson, Medieval Ships, pp. 111–112.
8 Derville, Alain, “Calais avant 1347. La vie d’un port,” in Les hommes et la mer dans 
l’Europe du Nord-Ouest de l’antiquité à nos jours: actes du colloque de Boulogne-sur-Mer, 
15–17 juin, 1984 (1984), p. 194.
9 Friel, Good Ship, p. 146.
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cargo vessels.10 The balinger seems to have relied on speed, and it was a 
valuable addition to the heavier sailing ships, the latter of which became 
the mainstay of English naval operations in the fourteenth  century.11 
Ships of the Norse tradition like knarrs, that is, slender, oar-sail driven 
 vessels with a low freeboard, were probably also in use in this period, even 
though the kinship between this kind of ship and the barges and balingers 
is unclear.12 Despite the Clos des Galées, the French naval situation was 
generally similar to that of the English. Both the English and the French 
kings relied to a large extent on drafted ships of the merchant marine for 
naval service. For instance, Gyrart le Barillier’s list of wine provisions for 
French ships mobilised for war in 1295 demonstrates the dominance of 
nefs (223 in total), that is, sail driven ships, in French naval service. While 
his list also includes galies and the smaller galiot (fĳifty-seven in total), it 
does not seem possible to make a more precise distinction between the 
actual size and carrying capacity of these vessels.13
There was a distinct diffference between the military potential of the 
sailing vessels and the oar-sail type of ship. The galleys were primarily 
used for convoy duty, for stopping and searching ships, for enforcing cus-
toms regulations and for amphibious incursions on land. However, the 
oar-sail type had distinct disadvantages compared to the sailing ship in 
combat. The large crews and the narrow shallow hulls of the oar-sail ships 
entailed low storage capacity, and due to the need for large amounts of 
drinking water, they only permitted short range operations. Furthermore, 
the low freeboard meant that most often they were out-matched when 
they boarded sailing ships. However, this by no means made the sail ships 
impregnable. During the French naval operations on the south-eastern 
coast of England in 1315–16 to intercept trade with Flanders, English ships 
were taken over by smaller French barges and boats (bargiis et batellis) 
because of the numerical superiority of the latter and their apparent 
10 Rodger, Safeguard, p. 67, Unger, The Ship in the Medieval Economy, pp. 171–172.
11  Friel, Good Ship, p. 150.
12 Rose, Medieval Naval Warfare, p. 135, Rodger, Safeguard, p. 589. Traditionally, it has 
been assumed that the name “balinger” derived from the French baleinier and that origi-
nally it was a whaling vessel which eventually proved to be very efffĳicient in war at sea. 
However, William Sayers has recently challenged this understanding. Through studies 
of Old Norse and Irish maritime vocabulary, he proposes rather that the balinger was a 
regional English and French further development of the knarr, sharing some character-
istics with the Mediterranean galley while still being a distinct vessel from these. Sayers, 
William, “Fourteenth century English balingers: Whence the name?,” The Mariner’s Mirror, 
93 (2007), 4–15.
13 Archéologie navale, ed. Augustin Jal, 2 vols (Paris, 1840), II, 301–319.
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employment of a swarming tactic.14 In addition, for short spells of time 
the oar-sail vessel was a faster and in general a more manoeuvrable vessel 
than sailing ships. In relation to piracy, this made it efffective for opera-
tions relying on speed, such as scouting and ambush.15
It should be noted here that major naval battles were a relatively rare 
occurrence in the Middle Ages, because it was difffĳicult to acquire accu-
rate information about the enemy’s whereabouts before descending upon 
them. Furthermore, the combatants often seem to have preferred not to 
fĳight these battles, as the losses were potentially enormous. For the most 
part, the ships used in warfare served as logistical support, and therefore 
were not meant for offfensive action.16 In addition, medieval ships were 
mainly built for trade. Ships made exclusively for war were very rare.17
The inventories for naval campaigns mention large weapons like sprin-
gals (a heavy torsion weapon on mounting),18 but these seem only to 
have been used in wartime on ships specifĳically equipped for war, not 
freight. Yet the mariners always seem to have been armed with at least 
some weapons—crossbows,19 swords and daggers, and grappling mate-
rial for closing in but which could also be used for civil purposes when 
going to a port, and at least for some, armour like haketons20 and helmets. 
This was a basic defensive precaution against potential pirate attacks, but 
obviously it might also be used in assaults. Thus, the mere fact that the 
mariners were armed did not necessarily imply hostile intent.
In terms of whether a ship had hostile intentions, the real give-away 
was whether the ship itself was visibly ready for battle with a forecastle, 
an aftercastle and a topcastle set at the mast-head, and whether they were 
flying banners signalling hostile intent. The use of castles on the ships 
gradually became standard in the thirteenth century, but not all were per-
manent features in this period, and it was presumably only on the largest 
ships that these were fully integrated with the hull.21 This means that at 
14  Foedera 1307–1327, pp. 279–280.
15  Hutchinson, Medieval Ships, p. 151, Rodger, Safeguard, pp. 65–66.
16  Rose, Medieval Naval Warfare, pp. 57–65.
17  Hutchinson, Medieval Ships, p. 88.
18  Rodger, Safeguard, p. 604.
19  The crossbow was particularly efffective on sailing ships. Lane, Frederic C., “The 
crossbow in the nautical revolution of the Middle Ages,” Explorations in Economic History, 
7 (1969), 166.
20 “A leather jacket plated with (or worn under) mail.” Musson, Anthony, ed., Crime, 
Law and Society in the Later Middle Ages (Manchester & New York, 2009), p. xxi. TNA C 
47/31/5/1 mentions Norman mariners wearing “aketonis”.
21  Friel, Good Ship, p. 79, Hutchinson, Medieval Ship, pp. 153–154, Rodger, Safeguard, p. 63.
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least for some ships, it was clearly visible whether they had been readied 
in advance for conflict, thus giving away its hostile intentions. However, 
most pirates would try to avoid battles. Instead they preferred surprise 
attacks.
The Pirate Assault
Marc Russon has categorised some of the main occasions when medieval 
piracy occurred. He notes that piracy could occur:
–  By attack, pursuit and hailing of isolated ships, as well as of ships sailing 
in convoy at high sea.
–  While patrolling at unavoidable passage points and capes and along 
sea-lanes.
–  By ambush in the estuaries, the anchorages or the bays by means of 
maritime or coastal surveillance.
–  By observation of the maritime trafffĳic from the ports and the harbours 
with the attack taking place just outside the ports.
–  Inside the ports themselves following either a spontaneous or a pre-
meditated quarrel amongst disembarked mariners, followed by the 
pirates’ rapid escape.
–  By fraud where a crew highjacks the cargo of a merchant and sells it 
for their own profĳit.22
Russon’s categories serve as a good guideline for a more detailed analysis 
of individual cases of piracy from 1280 to 1330.
The typical pirate assault seems to have played out like this: Pirates 
would try to defeat the victim by a superior number of vessels. During 
the attack, they would try to halt the prey by using grappling hooks or 
something similar in order to board the ship. At the same time they would 
shower the ship with arrows, bolts, stones or javelins to break resistance, 
to provide cover for the men boarding and to deter the victim from cutting 
the ropes of the grappling hooks. In principle, the victims could defend 
themselves, but in practice many seem to have surrendered once  boarding 
commenced, or after a short but brutal combat as the mariners may well 
have felt required to put up at least a token resistance in order to avoid 
22 Russon, Côtes, pp. 65–66.
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being accused afterwards of collaborating with the pirates. Fighting to the 
last man does not seem to have been the normal defensive  procedure.23 
Instead, the victims attempted to avoid confrontation altogether by eva-
sion. While this seems like the usual procedure in pirate assault, piracy 
could, in fact, happen under many diffferent circumstances.
I will use examples mainly from the English complaints over piracy to 
illustrate the diversity and forms that piracy could take. They show not 
only how piracy functioned in practice, but also who was involved and 
what maritime conditions made piracy attractive.
Medieval shipping was essentially a coast-hugging experience,24 and 
while some sources state that the attack occurred at high seas, this should 
probably be interpreted as either sailing along the coast or crossing the 
Channel from France to England. The uncertainty of the meaning of the 
term is shown by an example from 1317. That year, a Spanish ship laden 
in Harfleur and bound for Calais was plundered en route by mariners 
from Southampton who wounded the men and took the loot to the Isle 
of Wight.25 While the sources state that this occurred at “high sea”, this 
should probably still be understood within the context of coastal sailing.
The coastal sailing and the Channel crossing were good places for 
piracy. By lying in wait, the pirates would have an easy time apprehend-
ing their prey, and piracy often happened at isolated places, thereby mini -
mising the risk of being caught. In 1304, two Spanish merchants were 
bringing a ship to England laden in Seville with goods to the value of 
4200 l.t.. As the ship was preparing to make the crossing to England, offf 
Saint-Mathieu (Brittany), eight English ships from Yarmouth, the Isle 
of Wight, Haversford, Dunwich, Bristol and Shoreham attacked her, took 
the goods, ropes, anchors and other gear with them to their home counties, 
and disposed of the booty in the ports along the English coast.26 In this 
case, it is not clear whether the English were merchants returning from 
Gascony, or were lying in wait offf Brittany and then pursued the Spanish 
as they headed for England. The description in the complaint seems to 
support the latter assumption, and the mariners from these diverse ports 
may well have planned the ambush in advance. By dispersing the goods in 
their homeports, they made identifĳication and thus apprehension by the 
23 Hutchinson, Medieval Ship, p. 146.
24 Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, pp. 122–123 and 143.
25 CPR 1317–1321, pp. 82, 84, 89 and 95.
26 CPR 1301–1307, p. 286.
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authorities almost impossible. This dispersion of goods over a large area 
seems to have been a tactic favoured by many English pirates.27
A case from 1323 further demonstrates the procedure when pirates 
were lying in wait. In this episode, Rochelais merchants had laden a Span-
ish ship in La Rochelle with eighty-four tuns of wine, eighteen bales of 
tallow and ten bacons to be taken to Calais for trade. Offf Dover, the ship 
was attacked by two barges from Somerset and Dorset. They plundered 
the ship and took the goods to Weymouth, where the goods were divided 
amongst the pirates. The same year, merchants from Saint Omer com-
plained that their ship with 120 tuns of wine, also going from La Rochelle 
to Calais, was intercepted near the Island of Guernsey by pirates from 
Kent (most probably from the Cinque Ports) who took their goods to 
Winchelsea for partition.28 The Channel Islands in general seem to have 
been a favoured spot for Anglo-Gascon pirates to lie in wait, since much 
trafffĳic passed these islands en route to the trade emporia of England, 
France and Flanders.
Another example of pirates lying in wait is found in a petition from 
1320, when a London merchant had charged a Winchelsea ship to take 
ninety-four tuns (price £8 per tun, that is, £752 sterling) of wine from Bor-
deaux to Antwerp. Between Wolpen and Walcheren, the confĳined strait 
in the estuary by the Zwin and Sluis, Flemish pirates attacked, and the 
ship and its crew were taken to the Zwin and detained for seven weeks. 
After some deliberation the ship was fĳinally released, albeit empty, to the 
shipmaster.29
While piracy could in principle happen anywhere along the coast, cer-
tain places seem to have been especially well suited for it. For instance, 
a number of piracies occurred at the Humber estuary. In 1316, merchants 
from Bazas in Gascony had chartered an Ipswich ship at Bordeaux to bring 
eighty-four tuns and four pipes of wine to Kingston-upon-Hull. The ship 
was attacked and plundered by pirates at the entrance to the Humber—
just opposite the town.30 These examples show a preponderance of piracy 
in the straits where it was easy to survey the trafffĳic and pick offf prey. 
Indeed, the straits and estuaries along the French and the English coasts 
were favourite places for attack. The Gironde estuary, the Breton west 
coast by Saint Mathieu, the pertuis between the Charente estuary and 
27 See, for instance, CPR 1292–1301, pp. 215–216 and CPR 1317–1321, p. 472.
28 CPR 1321–1324, p. 371.
29 CCR 1318–1323, pp. 256–257.
30 CPR 1313–1317, p. 580.
 the anatomy of medieval piracy 41
the islands of Oléron, Ré and Aix, the Seine estuary, the Straits of Dover, 
the Humber and Thames areas and fĳinally the Zwin estuary seem espe-
cially dangerous, since these confĳined waters made it easier for pirates 
to out-manoeuvre and surprise their prey.31 These confĳined areas were 
particularly attractive, as the sailing ships’ manoeuvrability was severely 
hampered here, and by lying in wait, and perhaps by using oar-sail ships, 
the pirates could surprise and quickly intercept their prey. If the attacker 
could get into a position where he was windward of the prey, chances of 
success were even better, since this permitted the pirates to choose posi-
tioning, mode and timing.32 Since all ships of either type had only one 
mast and sail, these manoeuvres had great importance in combat situa-
tions, as
With a square sail set on a single mast, necessarily on or very near the centre 
of resistance, the only force available to turn the ship is the weak efffect of 
the rudder. Oared vessels probably used some oars to push the ship’s head 
round when tacking, but merchantmen must have been unhandy, especially 
in confĳined waters.33
The Breton Raz was an especially good spot to conduct piracy, since the 
waters offf western Brittany were dotted with small, often uninhabited, 
islands which were ideal for ambushes.34 In his book on the Bretons and 
the sea in the Middle Ages, Jean-Christophe Cassard has stated that piracy 
offf the coast of Brittany would usually only concerned the fĳishing ves-
sels or merchant ships in distress. According to Cassard, the local Breton 
pirates were opportunistic fĳishermen, and some of their actions seem 
related to wreckers. They were not actively cruising for victims but rather 
took advantage of others’ unfortunate situations.35
Hence, claims Cassard, large ships such as Mediterranean galleys or big 
sailing ships would have little to fear from pirates, since the galleys by 
defĳinition had a very large crew that was able to fĳight back. Furthermore, 
the Italians tended to avoid the Breton Raz altogether. The smaller ships 
were the main victims, and these were generally disinclined to armed 
resistance, but chose either to flee in the lighters or to simply surrender. 
Cassard concludes that at least around 1300, Breton piracy was merely 
31  James, Margery K., Studies in the Medieval Wine Trade (Oxford, 1971), pp. 119–125, 
Russon, Côtes, p. 65.
32 Friel, Good Ship, p. 141.
33 Rodger, Safeguard, p. 64.
34 Cassard, Jean-Christophe, Les Bretons et la mer au Moyen Âge (Rennes, 1998), p. 152.
35 Cassard, Les Bretons, p. 156. See also CCR 1318–1323, p. 209.
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opportunistic and occasional. It was dependent on favourable maritime 
conditions, it was not premeditated, it was risky and the gains were uncer-
tain. Thus, the piracy was of an impulsive and hazardous character rather 
than a coherent project carried out by maritime adventurers.36
However, the assumption that pirates would not target large ships and 
galleys is not solid. Under certain conditions, pirates seem to have been 
more than capable of conducting attacks on big ships as well, as shown by 
the French Admiral Berenger Blanc’s patrols in 1315–16 on the southeast 
coast of England. These patrols were offfĳicially to enforce an embargo of 
Flanders, but they often attacked neutral or even friendly shipping. Thus 
in 1316, Admiral Blanc and the Calaisien mariners captured a Genovese 
galley called the Dromund, a huge 60-oar galley laden with victuals and 
wheat for Edward II’s men in Berwick, to the value of £5,716 sterling. This 
assault was allegedly carried out by twenty-nine French ships, probably 
smaller than the Dromund, while the Dromund was anchored and being 
unloaded at Les Dunes in the port of Sandwich.37 The tactics used on these 
occasions were apparently to overpower the big ship by sheer numeri-
cal superiority, combined with an ability to confĳine and block the ship’s 
further advancement. While this was an operation offfĳicially sanctioned 
by the French king and thus had a naval or a privateering aspect, the 
actions were akin to those of pirates. In an incident in 1317, twenty-four 
or more ships from Great Yarmouth, probably sailing in convoy, captured 
a Winchelsea ship on the English coast.38 While the ships from Yarmouth 
may well have been a banding together for protection against Scottish and 
Flemish pirates, these mariners were not above exploiting their numerical 
superiority to conduct piracy themselves.
Contrary winds often played a decisive role in piracy, both to the ben-
efĳit and to the detriment of pirates. In 1304, merchants from Bayonne 
were sailing from Lisbon to London with a load of wine and spices to the 
value of 312 marks. These were plundered by Flemish pirates in the sea 
near Sandwich, and the crew was held captive for ten days on the ship. 
However, contrary winds drove the Flemings to Faversham, where they 
were apprehended by the authorities. Yet in order to maintain the peace 
with Flanders, Edward I released the pirates on condition that the count 
of Flanders would put them on trial and ensure restitution to the English. 
36 Cassard, Les Bretons, p. 157.
37 The Dromund case is documented in CCR 1313–1318, pp. 291, 341, 345–346 and 475–476, 
CCR 1318–1323, pp. 496 and 692, CPR 1313–1317, pp. 501–502 and 571–572, Foedera 1307–1327, 
pp. 292, 455–456, 502–503 and 517.
38 CPR 1313–1317, p. 694.
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However, the trial did not take place, nor was restitution provided.39 This 
would not be the only time when the English authorities apprehended 
Flemish pirates who had been blown offf course. In 1302 the Lombard mer-
chant, William Servate, sent a servant to Provence to buy spices to be 
taken to London for the king’s consumption. The goods were laden onto 
the Flemish shipmaster Lambert Lebote’s ship, but on the sea-coast near 
Winchelsea, the mariners seem to haven mutinied (or perhaps it was the 
plan all along) and seized the goods. Unfortunately, contrary winds blew 
the ship to Winchelsea, where the shipmaster and crew were arrested by 
the bailifff. However, before the trial, Lambert and some of the mariners 
managed to break free and escape with the ship, the goods (to the value of 
£445 2s. 10d.) and the 12-year-old son of William Servate. The case appar-
ently ended well for Servate, with the pirates paying a fĳine of 2400 l.p. and 
presumably also the return of Servate’s son, for in 1303 he claimed that he 
had been fully satisfĳied for his losses. This led to Edward I acquitting the 
Flemings from further blame.40 In another unfortunate incident in 1320, 
Gascon merchants chartered a Norman ship in Bordeaux to take wine to 
the value of 200 marks to Dieppe. However, a tempest drove the ship to 
the Scilly Islands. Here it was boarded by pirates, the crew was killed and 
thrown into the water, and the cargo was taken to Falmouth and Fowey.41 
Thus, winds could sometimes blow the victims directly into the arms of 
pirates.
Often, ships were attacked in the ports,42 or just outside the ports when 
anchored for trade with the locals or waiting for good wind.43 These pira-
cies were either conducted by locals, people from neighbouring ports or 
39 CPR 1301–1307, p. 210.
40 CCR 1302–1307, pp. 3, 8–9 and 48–49.
41  CPR 1317–1321, p. 538.
42 I use two defĳinitions of ports, Gillian Hutchinson: “those settlements whose econ-
omy depended on the operation of ships.” Hutchinson, Medieval Ship, p. 104, and Mathias 
Tranchant: “Le terme de port renvoie en efffet à celui de porte. En ce sens, l’infrastructure 
portuaire est un passage entre la terre et la mer, une entrée et une issue permettant la cir-
culation des hommes, des marchandises et des matériels. Elle assure la commutation entre 
diffférents modes de transport, maritime, fluvial et terrestre. . . . Mais c’est aussi un havre, 
c’est-à-dire un abri pour des navires qui soit sont en péril, soit ont besoin de faire relâche 
sur l’itinéraire de leur destination, ou plus simplement stationnent dans l’attente d’être 
chargés ou déchargés. La sécurité assurée par le havre tenait à ses qualités naturelles, qui 
plaçaient les bâtiments hors de portée des brisants et des courants les plus violents, mais 
aussi aux dispositifs de défense et d’alerte mis en œuvre à ses abords.” Tranchant, Mathias, 
“Les ports maritimes en France au Moyen Âge,” in Ports maritimes et ports fluviaux au 
Moyen Âge (Paris, 2005), p. 25.
43 See, for instance, CPR 1307–1313, p. 243, CPR 1317–1321, pp. 304, 306, 360–361 and 365–
366, CPR 1321–1324, p. 160, CCR 1302–1306, p. 34.
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by foreigners lurking in the port. In 1303, an English merchant had loaded 
a cog in Fawyk (probably Fowey, Cornwall) with wine and salt (value 
£300) to be taken to Sandwich. The ship was forcibly taken in the har-
bour of Portsmouth by Flemish pirates who brought it and its navigators 
to Flanders.44 However, locals could also attack their fellow-citizens in 
port, as happened in 1313, when a Bristol man’s ship laden with wine was 
attacked in the port of Bristol by his fellow citizens.45
A variant of the surprise attack while the victim was lying anchored 
can be seen in an incident from 1308. That year, three merchants from 
Great Yarmouth had loaded their ship in Rouen with canvas, cables, gold 
and silver to the value £40 sterling to be brought to England. After sunset 
during Lent, while the ship was anchored near Chef de Caux by the Seine 
estuary, Norman pirates from Leure attacked the ship and took it far out 
to sea, where they plundered the mariners of everything including their 
clothes.46 While these types of attack are rarely documented, I suspect 
that they were quite frequent, since this was one of the easiest ways of 
identifying a potential victim and then plundering him. In any event, it 
is interesting that the Normans made the efffort of bringing the ship away 
from the coast to avoid detection. Furthermore, this incident shows that 
the Normans must have identifĳied their prey well in advance, either by 
personal observation or through local informants, since Chef de Caux lay 
just next to Leure.
While many assaults were ambushes where the victim was caught 
offf guard, sometimes the victim managed to flee, and a protracted hunt 
commenced. For instance, in 1322 the merchant William de Ebbeworth 
from Tavistock was sailing to Sutton, when he was attacked by pirates 
from Weymouth and Portland. The pirates pursued him for more than an 
entire day before at last they boarded his ship in the waters of Lyme. This 
resulted in the plunder and the sinking of the ship.47 In another episode, 
reported in 1303, a Florentine merchant had laden a ship from Sandwich 
with wool in London to go to the Continent (probably Flanders) to trade. 
Yet contrary winds blew the ship to Northmouth, where Flemish pirates 
from Damme, Nieuwpoort and Biervliet chased the ship into the port in 
their boats. Here, they boarded the ship and stole the wool. Surprisingly, 
44 CCR 1302–1307, pp. 38–39.
45 CPR 1313–1317, p. 134.
46 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 40. Another instance of such a night-time attack occurred in 
1323 or 1324. See CCR 1323–1327, pp. 156 and 171–172.
47 CPR 1321–1324, p. 151. See also CCR 1307–1313, p. 438.
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the pirates were apparently still residing in Northmouth when the com-
plaint reached the king, for Edward I ordered Robert de Burghersh, con-
stable of Dover Castle and warden of the Cinque Ports, to inquire into 
the case and make the necessary arrests if the goods were found.48 These 
incidents show the persistence of pirates but also the (potential) rapid-
ity of the government in responding to complaints. It furthermore shows 
the caution exercised by the authorities in the complaints over piracy. 
Like historians today, royal offfĳicials had difffĳiculty telling the truth in these 
complaints. The arrest of disputed goods was a standard procedure in 
claims of piracy, as well as of regular commercial fraud, until the offfĳicials 
had had time to investigate further.
Some pirates were especially notorious. During the thirteenth century, 
the Cinque Ports fĳigured as one of the pillars of the naval potential of 
the English kingdom. In this period, the port of Winchelsea seems to have 
risen to prominence in regard to piracy as well as naval service. In the fĳirst 
three decades of the fourteenth century, one prominent Winchelsea fam-
ily in particular fĳigures in the sources, the Alards (together with Robert 
Batayle).49 In the 1320s, several cases show the Alards as pirates and as 
admirals as well. On 16 May 1322, a commission of oyer et terminer was 
appointed to settle the complaint of a German merchant that Portsmen, 
including Gervase Alard (the younger) and the two Henries (sic) Alard,50 
had assaulted and plundered him in the port of Harwich.51 Interestingly, 
a few days before, on 6 May, Stephen Alard, Robert Alard and Robert 
Batayle had been pardoned for all offfences on land and at sea, that is, 
piracy.52 Robert Batayle had served Edward II against the Scots in 1319,53 
and on 13 May, a week after the pardon, he was appointed admiral of 
the ships of the Cinque Ports serving the king against the Scots.54 Robert 
Batayle apparently continued to trade while he was in royal service, for 
48 CCR 1302–1307, p. 5.
49 Sylvester, “Communal piracy,” p. 168. For the Alard family, see Dressler, Rachel A., Of 
Armor and Men in Medieval England (Aldershot, 2004), pp. 45–50. She argues convincingly 
that the Alards were not nobles, but that they tried to portray themselves as such in their 
efffĳigies. See also Salzman, L.F., “Some notes on the family of Alard,” Sussex Archaeological 
Collections, 61 (1920), 126–141.
50 CPR 1313–1317, p. 509. Salzman, “Family of Alard,” p. 140.
51  CPR 1321–1324, p. 160. Possibly the same year, Gervase Alard and other Portsmen were 
accused of two other piracies on the east coast of England. See TNA SC 8/99/4912 and 
SC 8/99/4913.
52 CPR 1321–1324, p. 107.
53 CCR 1318–1323, p. 58.
54 CPR 1321–1324, p. 119.
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on 9 March 1323, he and Stephen Alard were granted a one-year protec-
tion for their ship and men to trade abroad.55 Later that year, on 18 April, 
he was appointed admiral again, and on 23 December, a commission was 
appointed to inquire, through the legal process of oyer et terminer, into 
the case of the assault of Robert Batayle, John Batayle, Stephen Alard, Ger-
vase Alard, Reginald Alard and other Portsmen on a Bayonnais merchant, 
Bertrand de Vylar (Villiers), who had laden a galley in Sluis with goods 
destined for Spain when he was pursued by pirates and sought refuge in 
Sandwich. However, while the galley was anchored at Stonor, the above-
mentioned men assaulted it, took the galley to Sandwich and divided the 
goods amongst themselves.56 When this attack took place is unknown, 
but since England in May 1323 had agreed to a thirteen-year truce with 
Scotland and was at peace with Flanders as well, it is most likely that the 
assault was an act of pure piracy rather than a protection of the coast 
(Batayle is, for instance, not addressed as admiral at this point), even 
though they might have tried to claim this.
The above-mentioned Stephen Alard is especially illustrative of the 
type of merchant-cum-pirate who roamed the seas in this period.57 In 
1317, he was subject to Flemish piracy and complained vigorously to 
Edward. In 1321, he had obtained at least partial restitution for his losses 
by arrests conducted by royal offfĳicers of Flemish merchants’ goods. Peti-
tions from 1319 indicate, however, that he may have taken matters into his 
own hands and carried out piracy / reprisals on his own, since in 1322 he 
was pardoned along with Batayle of offfences committed at sea. In 1323, 
he took part in the piracy against de Vylar. Nevertheless, the next year 
he was appointed admiral.58 These examples show how difffĳicult it is to 
distinguish between pirates, merchants and admirals (that is, agents of 
crime, of trade and of war).
Another good example of the diversity of the background of the pirates 
is John Perbroun. He was a merchant from Great Yarmouth, but he served 
as bailifff of Great Yarmouth four times, held the offfĳice of admiral in 1322, 
1323 and 1327 and acted as judge in maritime cases (amongst them at least 
one piracy case) in 1325 and 1327. In piracy, he had fĳirst-hand experience, 
55 CPR 1321–1324, p. 262.
56 CPR 1321–1324, pp. 264 and 385.
57 For another example, see Lucas, Henry S., “John Crabbe: Flemish pirate, merchant, 
and adventurer,” Speculum, 20 (1945), 334–350.
58 For the incidents involving Stephen Alard, see CCR 1313–1318, p. 461, CCR 1313–1318, 
pp. 258, 283, 400. CPR 1321–1324, pp. 107, 262 and 385, TNA: SC 8/233/11625, SC 8/233/11631, 
SC 8/192/9557, Salzman, “Family of Alard,” p. 134.
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for in 1316 he had assisted in the piracies on the ships from the Cinque 
Ports (from which he was pardoned), and in 1317 he and other men of 
Great Yarmouth assaulted a Winchelsea ship chartered by Rochelais mer-
chants while it was coasting at Shorham.59 These few examples show 
how piracy was in no way a hindrance to respectability and royal offfĳice. 
In fact, it may have been a benefĳit.
Some merchants seem to have been particularly unfortunate. In 1320, 
the London merchant Stephen Aleyn had loaded his ship, La Margarete, 
in Normandy for trade in England (he did not participate in the journey, 
however). The ship was pursued by Flemish pirates, and since the English 
feared that they would be caught if they continued to England, they pulled 
into Caux, which was under the abbot of Fécamp (whom they might have 
trusted, since the abbey owned lands in England). Here, they took the 
goods from the ship and deposited them for safety in the abbot’s cell of 
Saint-Valéry-en-Caux. However, the abbot’s men proceeded to confĳiscate 
the goods once they had been deposited.60 And Aleyn’s troubles contin-
ued. In 1321, while travelling from Sandwich to Berwick-upon-Tweed with 
victuals for the king’s men there, La Margarete was captured by pirates on 
the sea-coast near Saltfleetby and taken to Zeeland.61 Thus, in two years 
Stephen Aleyn had been the victim of two diffferent “piracies”.
The predicament of fĳive Rochelais merchants, who had chartered a 
Bayonnais ship to take 200 casks of white wine from Tonnay Charente 
to Calais, displays another unfortunate circumstance in maritime life. 
En route, the ship was attacked by Scottish pirates, who killed some of 
the crew and presumably took the rest captive. Possibly on the way to 
Scotland, the surviving crew members managed to retake the ship which 
they brought to Great Yarmouth. However, fortune did not smile on the 
merchants because at Great Yarmouth, pirates from Norfolk and Sufffolk 
boarded the ship and took the wine.62 However, this account of events 
could also be a Bayonnais cover-up for a defrauding action of their own 
against the Rochelais. Indeed, cases like these demonstrate the problems 
of identifying exactly what had happened in the reported complaints over 
piracy.
59 CPR 1313–1317, pp. 576 and 694, CPR 1321–1324, pp. 119, 143, 228 and 325, CPR 1324–1327, 
pp. 87, 136 and 354, CPR 1327–1330, p. 101.
60 CCR 1318–1323, p. 259.
61  CCR 1318–1323, p. 398.
62 CPR 1317–1321, p. 186.
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Another case of perfĳidious mariners is an incident from 1317, where Por-
tuguese merchants had chartered a ship from Great Yarmouth in Leure 
to be taken to Flanders. Yet the shipmaster and the mariners cheated the 
merchants and set sail for Great Yarmouth instead. They put some of the 
merchants ashore at Dover, but took the others with them (probably as 
hostages) to Kirkley. Here the pirates went ashore, leaving only two mari-
ners and a boy to look after the ship. These apparently could not manage 
the ship, which meant that it was lost (“se perist par defaute de eux”—
presumably wrecked). The locals subsequently plundered the remains.63
The Fate of Plundered Goods and the Victims of Piracy
In the following I shall present cases illuminating the fate of the plun-
dered goods, how pirates worked actively together with local residents, 
as well as authorities, and fĳinally some reflections on the lethality of a 
pirate assault.64
A recurrent feature in the complaints over piracy is that the goods 
were taken to a port and divided or that it was dispersed over a num-
ber of ports. This raises the question of how goods were identifĳied by the 
authorities when inquiries were initiated. The identifĳication of wine is of 
special interest in this book. In at least one source the tuns were marked, 
and Robin Ward states that goods were marked by colour65 when shipped 
out and when imported and sold on land. Furthermore, the local customs 
must have registered what came into the port, and the shipmasters or mer-
chants sometimes had a written charter of what goods they had loaded 
onto the ship.66 Finally, mariners, stevedores and sometimes the alleged 
pirates could be questioned by the authorities as to the amount carried 
on the ships. Nevertheless, trade in contraband and plundered goods still 
seems rather extensive.
A case illustrative of the confusion over the values stolen, the compo-
sition of the cargo of plundered merchants and the unreliability of the 
recorded losses can be seen in an episode from 1317. In this case, two 
Gascon merchants, Gauselin Pagani and his brother Reymund, had laden 
63 TNA SC 8/238/11866.
64 See also Russon, Côtes, pp. 77–80.
65 CPR 1313–1317, p. 630 concerns a case of fraud, where it is mentioned that the tuns 
were marked “with the usual mark”, Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, pp. 59–60.
66 Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, pp. 229–234.
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a Goseford ship with forty-fĳive tuns of wine and twenty-two barrels of 
wheat to the stated value of £300 sterling to be taken to England. While 
the ship was anchored at Les Dunes near the port of Sandwich, Flemish 
pirates attacked, plundered and took the ship with them to Sluis, where 
both ship and goods were sold. However, when the warden of the Cinque 
Ports, Robert of Kendale, inquired into the case, it turned out that the ship 
had in fact carried 109 tuns and fourteen pipes of wine at the price of £696 
sterling (each tun at £6), seventy-seven quarters of wheat at the price of 
£77 (each quarter 20s.) and sixteen quarters of wheaten flour, price £16. 
In addition, the total cargo of the ship did not belong exclusively to the 
Pagani brothers but was instead divided thus: forty-fĳive tuns and one pipe 
belonged to the brothers, sixty-two tuns to Grimoard Cardon’, the wheat 
to Laurence de Molyn, and the rest of the wine, the wheaten flour, and 
other goods belonged to the master and the mariners. Furthermore, the 
total composition of the cargo and losses were in fact: ship with tackle, 
value £100; the beds, robes, armour, cofffers, silver cups and jewels of 
the merchants and the mariners, value £20 sterling. The compensation 
for the damages awarded to the merchants was estimated at £80 in addi-
tion to the losses. The restitution due to the Pagani brothers was in the 
end: forty-fĳive tuns appraised at £273 and £30 14s. of their portion of the 
compensation of the £80.67 So, even though what the Pagani brothers 
claimed in compensation was not all that diffferent to their actual cargo on 
the ship, this case shows the limitation of the source material in identify-
ing the size of the ships used, as well as the uncertainty of the total value 
of its cargo, since each merchant could or would petition to the English 
king individually for restitution of their losses. Even when it looks as if 
the merchants complained collectively—which was not unusual—we still 
do not know how much of the cargo and valuables belonged to the crew. 
Thus, the records are flawed, because we cannot be certain that any given 
complaint contained all the losses sufffered, or sometimes even how much 
of the cargo belonged to the petitioner.
Another way of identifying the stolen goods was the following: In 
1308, an English merchant from Winchester had bought cloth at Ghent 
and Douai to take to England. As his ship made its passage to England, 
Flemish pirates attacked it by the sea-coast near Gravenyng (Gravelines?). 
They stole goods to the value of £1200, which they put into their two ships 
and then proceeded to Hulst. Apparently, the English had the nerve to 
67 CCR 1313–1318, pp. 385 and 456–458.
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follow the pirates to Hulst, where they found their goods and demanded 
 restitution.68 Thus, the victims actually made the efffort themselves to fĳind 
and identify the goods immediately after the assault. However, this case 
must be considered quite unusual, since normally the crews were prob-
ably too scared to pursue the pirates.
Pirates rarely worked alone, yet the details of the relationship between 
pirates and fences on land are seldom mentioned in the sources. We 
do have evidence for two cases, however, detailing collusion between 
authorities on land and pirates. In 1312, Bartholomew de Welle, a mer-
chant and mariner of Lynn complained that John le Clerk, a mariner and 
merchant of Goseford, had boarded a ship of Bartholomew’s charged with 
wine.69 In December 1311, the ship was anchored because of tempestu-
ous weather at the Paleis de Reith near the Island of Oléron. John and 
his armed associates twice entered the ship,70 violently took some goods, 
three anchors and the cables of the ship,71 and then with their own ship 
broke and wrecked Bartholomew’s ship, causing the loss of the wine and 
cargo to the value of £600. Batholomew immediately complained to the 
provost of La Rochelle, and he had several shipmasters and mariners who 
had witnessed the assault to testify and by oath assure that Bartholomew 
spoke the truth. The provost made a sealed deposition of the event and 
the witnesses, which he then gave to Bartholomew so that he could take 
John to court when he located him. Then Bartholomew searched for John 
along the Breton and French coast, but he did not fĳind him until he came 
to London. Here Bartholomew summoned John to court with the sherifff 
Richard of Welleford. The ship was located and identifĳied by the stolen 
cables and anchors, and the sherifff detained it. During the initial hear-
ings, it was apparent that John had committed a crime against Bartho-
lomew and that, according to the rules of the Law Merchant,72 he should 
68 CCR 1307–1313, p. 130. The merchants were granted partial restitution later, pp. 358–359.
69 This case is documented in TNA SC 8/149/7441, The Parliament Rolls of Medieval 
England, eds Chris Given-Wilson, et al. (Scholarly Digital Editions, Leicester, 2005), parlia-
ment of August 1312, SC 9/17, item 6, CPR 1313–1317, pp. 147–148, 231–232 and 323–324.
70 On the 20th and then during the night of the 25th of December.
71  Ward notes that it was an absolute necessity to have two or more anchors for the 
ships to be able to anchor safely. Accordingly, the anchors were extremely valuable, and by 
taking them, the ship was de facto unable to trade and had to be run aground with all the 
risks and damages to the ship this entailed. Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, pp. 167–170.
72 Law Merchant—or Lex Mercatoria as it was known in the Middle Ages—was a 
body of customs and regulations for commercial transactions. It was furthermore inter-
national in scope and thus not subject to the jurisprudence of a particular kingdom or 
 principality.
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pay compensation to Bartholomew. Nevertheless, the sherifff refused to 
pass judgment. Instead, he led John go and stalled the case for twenty-
one weeks. When the day of trial arrived and Bartholomew showed up, 
he was told that there would be no trial that day since the sherifff was 
occupied elsewhere.73 However, when the sherifff was certain that Bartho-
lomew had left, he ordered his clerks to go to the London Guildhall and 
tell the notary of records that, due to Bartholomew’s absence on the day 
set for court, John was quit of the charge and that Bartholomew was to be 
amerced for nonsuit. When Bartholomew found out what had happened, 
he complained to the mayor of London, who refused to help him. Con-
sequently, Bartholomew appealed to Edward II, and the case continued 
until at least 1315 before Bartholomew fĳinally obtained justice. While the 
exact details of the case elude us, it shows how a man like John le Clerk, 
who was on good terms with the sherifff, could be protected by those in 
power (probably in return for some of the loot). It seems clear that we 
are dealing with a case of corruption. While it was probably not uncom-
mon, we unfortunately cannot tell how widespread this collusion between 
pirates and local authorities was.
Another incident further illustrates the fate of stolen goods, as well 
as collaboration between port offfĳicials and pirates. In or before 1318, La 
Swalewe of London, charged with goods by London merchants, was cap-
tured by Flemish pirates while it was anchored at Margate. The pirates 
slew the whole crew, except for a boy who was brought with the pirates 
and kept in Flanders for a year. The ship and its cargo was taken to the 
Zwin. Previously, the count of Flanders had promised justice and punish-
ment if the pirates were found in his lands, but later inquiries into the 
case showed that the pirates, some of whose names were familiar to the 
English authorities, were in league with John le Gos, who at that time was 
the count’s bailifff at Leschufe. Furthermore, it transpired that the wine 
had been delivered to the count’s household by a middleman. Apparently 
John had also appropriated a dog found in the ship and the charter of the 
freight. One of the pirates (?), Quintin Lampescue, had sold the ship to his 
brother, John Lompesone, who “repaired” it so that it could not be recog -
nised again (perhaps by repainting it?).74 Apparently, however, the  refĳitting 
73 The 20th of July, 1312.
74 “repaired it otherwise than it was before in order that it should not be recognised”, 
CCR 1313–1318, p. 593. For a similar case of collaboration between pirates and Flemish bai-
lifffs, see CCR 1323–1327, p. 175 and Jones, Michael, “Roches contre Hawley: la cour anglaise 
de chevalerie et un cas de piraterie à Brest, 1386–1402,” Mémoire de la Société d’histoire et 
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of the ship did not work, or perhaps the English recognised the dog and 
drew their conclusion regarding John’s role. In any case, they seem to have 
had evidence enough for their complaint. John Lompesone’s “repairing” of 
the vessel is quite interesting, since it is the only time that I have come 
across this description of the fate of the taken ships. Despite this single 
reference, I suspect that it probably was not unusual for captured ships 
to be treated in this way, since ships were quite valuable. By “repairing” 
it, the shipmaster could sail out again and continue trading with a dimin-
ished risk of identifĳication of the ship by the former owners.
An example from 1318 shows that it was not only port offfĳicials who ben-
efĳitted from collaboration with pirates. In this case, German merchants 
sailing to Boston were attacked at sea near Ravenser. The pirates killed 
the shipmaster and the crew and threw the corpses into the sea. The 
pirates, who were later identifĳied, took the ship and the goods to the land 
near Ravenser, where they divided the goods and sold part of them to men 
privy to the trespass. Thus, the royal order to the English offfĳicials was to 
prosecute not only the pirates but also the receivers of the goods.75
This last case raises another signifĳicant issue in these piracy cases, 
namely how lethal pirate attacks might be. Popular as well as scholarly 
perception, founded on the Ciceronean paradigm, has it that pirates are an 
especially blood-thirsty breed of criminals.76 While the above-mentioned 
example indeed supports this notion,77 the picture is more nuanced in 
the end. After all, armed robbery is one thing, but wholesale slaughter is 
quite another, and usually pirates do not seem to have been remorseless 
killers.78
d’archéologie de Bretagne, 64 (1987), 53–64. In a research note, Francis Davey has investi-
gated who bought the pirates’ wine in fĳifteenth-century Cornwall. He notes that the clergy 
of Exeter seem to have received large parts of the wine. Davey, Francis, “Who bought the 
pirates’ wine?”, Devon and Cornwall Notes and Queries, 39 (2005), 242–250.
75 CPR 1317–1321, pp. 284 and 364–366.
76 See, for instance, Grufffydd, “Piracy, privateering,” pp. 24–25, Rodger, Safeguard, 
pp. 115–116.
77 Another example of this can be seen in 1327, when a Flemish ship was boarded 
by pirates at Whitby. The master, the mariners, nine Scottish merchants, sixteen Scottish 
pilgrims and thirteen women were killed. This case is exceptionally brutal though. CPR 
1324–1327, p. 354.
78 Indeed, Barbara Hanawalt’s and A.J. Finch’s research indicate that use of deadly vio-
lence was rare amongst the commoners in the Middle Ages. Hanawalt, Barbara, “Violent 
death in fourteenth- and early fĳifteenth-century England,” Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, 18 (1976), 297–320, Finch, A.J., “The nature of violence in the Middle Ages: An 
alternative perspective,” Historical Research, 70 (1997), 249–268.
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This represents something of a paradox. The logical expectation would 
be that the pirates killed offf the entire crew in order not to leave wit-
nesses. However, a good number of the pirate attacks described in the 
sources was relatively non-lethal. It seems as if those killed in a regular 
attack were defending themselves in the initial combat, but once the crew 
had surrendered, they were often either held captive or simply set free.
But this begs the question of why pirates did not kill the crew. First of 
all, the occasional pirates-cum-mariners were mostly just looking for easy 
gain. Furthermore, they apparently did not seem to be too worried about 
repercussions, either by offfĳicials or from the friends, families or guilds 
of their victims. What seems to have prompted the killing of crews was 
less the fear of identifĳication and prosecution but rather that the crews 
were the enemy, either of one’s country, or more narrowly, one’s port. 
Thus, many of the killings happened in times of war, such as during the 
conflicts between the Anglo-Bayonnais and the Normans in the 1290s or 
between the English and the Flemings in the 1310s and early 20s, when 
Flemish pirates in league with the Scots harassed English shipping.
Pirates sometimes also took prisoners, presumably to obtain ransom. 
For example, in 1318, the ship of a group of London merchants, anchored at 
Kingsdown near the port of Sandwich, was plundered by Flemish pirates, 
who killed the entire crew except for three and then sank the ship.79 In 
this example, it appears that the Flemings only spared those whom they 
thought would be able to pay a ransom. This, at least, was what happened 
in the case of a pirate attack in 1319, when Lynn merchants, sailing from 
Lynn to Gascony to trade, were plundered by Flemish pirates near Sher-
ingham (co. Norfolk). The crew was slain except for two, who were taken 
prisoner and brought to Scotland. Here they were imprisoned in Berwick-
upon-Tweed, and one of them was sold to a Zeeland merchant for £20 
sterling, while the other crew member was still detained in prison at the 
time of the petition.80
There was an obvious fĳinancial interest in the taking and ransoming of 
hostages, but this practice also shows that pirates were not always blood-
thirsty monsters. In 1311, Edmund de Trevelwythe complained to the king 
that one of his ships was boarded in the port of Fowey by the co-owner, 
John Stonhard of la Welle, and some mariners. Edmund was expelled from 
79 CCR 1313–1318, p. 594.
80 CCR 1318–1321, p. 216. A case from 1324 further clarifĳies the identity of the imprisoned. 
Here it is stated the merchant and his son were imprisoned for some time (presumably 
until ransom was paid). CCR 1323–1327, p. 175.
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the ship, wounded and then taken to Lostwithiel, where he was impris-
oned. Then John sailed away to the Continent to sell his goods.81 It seems 
as if he did not have the heart to kill his former partner.
The indiscriminate killing and total destruction mostly occurred in the 
vicious maritime wars waged by the Portsmen, the Normans, the Bayon-
nais and the Castilians. These wars will be dealt with more thoroughly in 
chapter 4, but it is worth noting that the savagery of these wars was due 
to other concerns besides immediate enrichment.
This chapter has demonstrated the numerous problems with research-
ing piracy. First of all, there is the problem of identifying the ships used. 
While it would seem that much piracy was conducted by the population 
along the coasts in small vessels using sails as well as oars for propulsion, 
the sources show that all kinds of vessels could and were used in these 
endeavours.
The sources also show that the pirate assaults seem to have occurred 
mainly along the coasts and the straits where the confĳined waters gave 
an advantage to the pirate, since their prey would be easier to apprehend 
here. Furthermore, the sources indicate that pirates seem to have favoured 
a swarming tactic, where they aimed at overwhelming and capturing their 
prey by numerical superiority combined with geographical conditions 
which favoured surrounding tactics. However, much piracy also occurred 
in or just outside the ports, since potential prey was easier to locate here 
than on the open sea. While these pirate attacks often seem premeditated, 
many mariners and merchants were not above a little occasional piracy 
when they went on trading voyages abroad. Simply put, if they saw poten-
tial prey and felt confĳident that they would be victorious, little seem have 
stopped them trying to capture the ship and its cargo.
The chapter further demonstrates that pirates often worked with the 
local coastal and port communities. The exact details of this relationship 
often elude us, but some signifĳicant examples show the collusion between 
local offfĳicials and pirates.
81 CPR 1307–1313, pp. 424 and 537.
CHAPTER THREE
PORTS AND WINE
Medieval piracy was often opportunistic, as sketched in the previous 
chapter. However, some mariners and ports were especially bellicose, 
and their piracies quickly developed into maritime wars irrespective of 
the state of afffairs between the kingdoms that they were part of. Several 
maritime communities were often engaged in “collective” pirate wars. 
The Normans, Bayonne and the Cinque Ports, which I shall describe in 
this chapter, were frequently involved in such wars. While it is beyond 
the scope of this book to conduct an analysis of every bellicose maritime 
community in the northwestern maritime theatre, I will remark that the 
Flemings are abundantly represented in the complaints over piracies, and 
the Castilian ports waged several maritime wars against Anglo-Gascon 
mariners. Likewise, the mariners of the West Country, who in the follow-
ing centuries acquired a reputation for piracy, are increasingly present in 
sources in the fourteenth century.
For the period from c. 1280 to c. 1330, these wars seem in part motivated 
by the expansion of wine exports from Bordeaux. Accordingly, the latter 
part of the chapter is devoted to the wine trade and the installations of the 
merchants from the bellicose maritime communities along the coast to 
facilitate that trade. However, these installations also meant that mariners 
and merchants continually came into contact and conflict with each other, 
and they might also have functioned as a communications network which 
could have a stimulating efffect on the escalation of maritime war, since 
the news of piracies against fellow-citizens could travel far and fast.
Bayonne
The town of Bayonne is located in the southwestern part of the Duchy 
of Gascony at the foot of the Pyrenees in Labourd. The town centre was 
founded on a Roman castrum on the hill, which overlooked the conflu-
ence of the rivers Nive and Adour, the latter terminating in the Gulf of 
Gascony, near Capbreton, thereby giving access to the Atlantic. This cas-
trum presumably gave Bayonne an edge over the neighbouring coastal 
towns of Capbreton, Biarritz, and Saint-Jean-de-Luz, all founded on sandy 
56 chapter three
ground which made erection of fortifĳications difffĳicult. From at the least 
the twelfth century, this allowed Bayonne to dominate these towns, which 
were efffectively to be seen as Bayonnais subject towns. In the twelfth to 
the fourteenth centuries, the estimated population of Bayonne was 7,000–
10,000 inhabitants, who were Gascon, not Basque speakers. While their 
dialect was influenced by the dialect of Béarn, the maritime language 
included words from Langue d’Oïl, Flemish and perhaps even some Scan-
dinavian, an indication of the influence of maritime trade on the town.1
The Labourd region was rather poor in terms of local produce. Not 
much wheat was produced there, and the local wines and ciders were of 
a rather low quality. Initially, this meant that the region could not claim 
a high population or riches of any signifĳicance. It was, however, rich in 
wood (and to a certain extent iron), and combined with the protected 
position near the Bay of Biscay, this meant that from an early date the 
Bayonnais seemed destined to take to the seas to make their fortune.
Bayonne was ruled by a council founded on the town charter used in 
Rouen and in northern France. In the Bayonne town charter from 1215, it 
was established that Bayonne was to be governed by the cent-pairs or the 
jurati, consisting of a mayor, twelve magistrates, twelve councillors and 
seventy-fĳive peers. These men were elected for one year at a time in April, 
and the residing peers chose their successors. As for the appointment to 
the mayoral offfĳice, the jurati presented three candidates to the English 
king, who then chose the mayor. Upon entry to offfĳice the jurati swore alle-
giance to the king of England. The jurati had judicial and administrative 
powers, but the key fĳigure in the local government was the mayor, who 
alone presided in the daily communal court. The mayor (who often had a 
military background) was furthermore the chief of the local law enforce-
ment and the militia, and he handled the town fĳinances together with 
the councillors. The citizens of Bayonne had a right to be judged by the 
mayor and the jurati, but the English king was not absent in Bayonne. The 
provost of Bayonne was the king’s representative, and apart from being 
the executor of the judgements of the council, he handled the royal fĳiscal 
rights in Bayonne, even though every year he was obliged to take an oath 
to the town. Furthermore, there was a castellan in charge of the castle. At 
the end of the thirteenth century, this offfĳice was merged with the offfĳice 
of provost. The royal presence in the town served to maintain the peace 
1 Goyheneche, Eugène, Bayonne et la région bayonnaise du XIIe au XVe siècle (Bilbao, 
1990), p. 178.
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between the diffferent oligarchic factions in the town and in part served to 
reward particularly loyal subjects from the factions.2
From at least the 1270s, local politics was governed by two rival parties 
or factions. The fĳirst was called the “aristocratic” faction by Jules Balasque. 
It consisted of merchants, land-owners and jurisconsults. Until 1295, the 
leader of the faction was the de Manx family headed by the bishop of 
Bayonne, Dominique de Manx. The second faction, called the “popular” 
party by Balasque, was made up of shipmasters, mariners and craftsmen, 
headed by the de Viele (or Biele) and the d’Ardyr families.3 These three 
and several other magnate families had been running Bayonne throughout 
the thirteenth century, and while Balasque uses the terms “aristocratic” 
and “popular”, the leaders of factions were more precisely the richest and 
most powerful men of the town. While the de Viele and D’Ardyr fami-
lies seem to have made a signifĳicant part of their wealth from maritime 
commerce, the so-called aristocratic faction also contained mariners and 
shipmasters like Miqueu de Manx (the bishop’s relative who came to be a 
trusted naval offfĳicer of Philippe le Bel).
Throughout the thirteenth century, Bayonne faithfully supplied impor-
tant naval support (ships and galleys), as well as valued crossbowmen, 
to the English kings’ wars in France and Wales. Bayonne also functioned 
as a royal ship wharf where the English king ordered ships and galleys to 
be built for himself and his allies.4 This service continued until the fĳirst 
phases of the Hundred Years War, but after about 1350 the signifĳicance of 
Bayonne in naval terms inexplicably declined.5 The quality of the Bayon-
nais warriors and their bellicosity and predilection for retaliation was a 
product of the numerous private wars in Gascony.6
As a consequence of the maritime war with the Normans in 1292–93, 
the French confĳiscation of Gascony and the ensuing Gascon War,  Bayonne 
was occupied by French forces from February 1294. The occupation led to 
an alliance between the French and the de Manx family and others of 
the aristocratic faction, while Pascal de Viele and several mariners had 
2 Hourmat, Pierre, Histoire de Bayonne (Bayonne, 1986), pp. 58–65.
3 Balasques, Jules, Etudes historiques de la ville de Bayonne, 3 vols (Bayonne, 1862–75), 
II, 206 and 436, Hourmat, Histoire, p. 69.
4 Goyheneche, Bayonne, pp. 304fff.
5 Rose, Susan, “Bayonne and the king’s ships, 1204–1420”, The Mariner’s Mirror, 86 
(2000), 143–145.
6 Vale, Origins, p. 211. Rodger claims that Bayonne, rather than the Cinque Ports, 
was the backbone of the English navy in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Rodger, 
“Naval Service,” p. 647.
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to flee to England, because they were implicated in the maritime war 
between Bayonne and the Normans and especially in an attack on La 
Rochelle in 1293.7 In December 1294, Bayonnais mariners under Pascal de 
Viele launched a surprise attack on French-occupied Bayonne.8 In a few 
days, the French forces and their allies in the aristocratic faction were 
forced to evacuate the town, and Bayonne became the only strongpoint 
for Edward I in French-occupied Gascony. This liberation at the hands of 
de Viele and the mariners meant that the aristocratic faction was more or 
less destroyed, as several prominent members had to flee with the French, 
and the remaining members sufffered repercussions (loss of property and 
imprisonments for their suspected collaboration with and sympathy for 
the French) at the hands of the victorious popular faction under Pascal 
de Viele.
For this liberation, the de Viele family, the popular faction and the 
mariners were awarded privileges by Edward I. Pascal de Viele was made 
mayor, provost and castellan of Bayonne for the duration of the war, and 
he and others implicated in the attack on La Rochelle (that is, before the 
Gascon War broke out) were promised protection against possible future 
French suits in relation to this.9
Another sign of the close relationship between the Bayonnais and 
Edward I was that Bayonnais merchants loaned Edward £45,763 sterling, 
a much needed sum of money in the Gascon War which cost Edward 
£400,000 sterling. What is even more remarkable is that Edward actually 
repaid the Bayonnais between 1299 and 1304, using revenues from the 
English customs, one of the few loans that he ever repaid.10 From this 
point on, the de Viele and d’Ardyr families ruled Bayonne continuously 
till 1312 and indeed continued to play a signifĳicant role in local politics 
throughout the fĳirst decades of the fourteenth century.
However, while the Bayonnais were loyal subjects of the kings of Eng-
land, their actions during and in the wake of the War of Saint Sardos show 
that their loyalty to the king was not iron-clad. In 1325, Edward II urged 
the Bayonnais to arm for war and promised them the right to keep all 
spoils taken from the king’s enemies at sea for themselves.11 Neverthe-
less, the mobilisation never materialised before the truce in autumn 1325, 
 7 Hourmat, Histoire, p. 74, Goyheneche, Bayonne, p. 309.
 8 Goyheneche, Bayonne, p. 269.
 9 Champollion, I, 422–423.
10 Vale, Origins, p. 194, Prestwich, Michael, Edward I (London, 1988), p. 399.
11  Hourmat, Histoire, p. 80, Goyheneche, Bayonne, p. 305.
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even though the Bayonnais must have been in a state of vigilance since 
at least 1323 (see chapter 7), as a maritime war with the Normans was 
threatening to break out again. In fact, in 1326, Bayonnais mariners trans-
ported Queen Isabella and her forces to England. Thus, they actively aided 
in the coup d’état which deposed Edward II. Consequently, they assured 
themselves a prominent place in the new regime, and the mariners who 
transported Isabella were rewarded accordingly.12
The statutes of the Bayonnais mariners’ association also express loyalty 
to the English Crown. The statutes of the Societas Navium Baionensium, 
probably from between 1206–13,13 stated in detail the rules of commerce 
and freight for the mariners of Bayonne. It was essentially an association 
for mutual aid and assistance intended for common freight charges and 
convoys for those voyaging to La Rochelle, Bordeaux, Royan and Oléron. 
Its statutes did not extend to those going further north to Flanders, the 
English Channel or England, however.14 The association swore allegiance 
to the king of England, rather than the town of Bayonne, even though 
another obvious goal was to work equally for personal profĳit as well as for 
the good of Bayonne. The association comprised two kinds of members, 
rectores and naute, that is, shipmasters and mariners.15 Upon entry into 
the association, the mariners had to swear allegiance to the shipmasters, 
and the masters to the custodes of the association. These custodes func-
tioned as the fĳinancial and judicial authority of the association.
The Societas was open to all English subjects, not just Bayonnais and 
voisins. A voisin (or vesin as it was called locally) was the term for citizen-
ship of Bayonne obtained either by birth, marriage with a Bayonnais(e) or 
by staying for a year and a day in Bayonne. In fact, if a person had stayed 
in Bayonne for this length of time, he was obliged to become a citizen 
and to swear allegiance to the mayor, the town and the king of England. 
The voisin was obliged to be ready to protect and defend Bayonne and 
never to betray a fellow voisin to a jurisdiction other than the munici-
pal one. In return, the voisin was to enjoy the franchises and privileges, 
like toll-exemptions, conceded by the duke of Gascony to Bayonne.16 This 
had implications for trade and Bayonnais influence, as I will show below, 
12 Hourmat, Histoire, p. 80.
13 The only known copy of the statutes is, however, from after the death of King John 
of England, 19 October 1216. Goyheneche, Bayonne, p. 314.
14 Rose, “Bayonne,” p. 140.
15 Goyheneche, Bayonne, p. 222.
16 Hourmat, Histoire, p. 60, Balasques, Etudes historiques, II, 370–371.
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and it meant that the maritime conflicts in which the Bayonnais mariners 
were engaged cannot be seen as “ethnic” conflicts. This also corresponds 
to the general picture of the multi-ethnic character of the international 
mariners’ community.17
The primary purpose of the association was mutual assistance and divi-
sion of profĳits for trade in convoys, which was probably the initial reason 
for creating the association. The Bayonnais ships were obliged to sail in 
convoys, usually of four to six ships, serving the purpose of protecting the 
members from undercutting each other’s business. However, the hazards 
of storms and piracy also seem to have been an important impetus for the 
creation of the association, and the members had an obligation to help 
each other in case of both storm and piracy.18
The association also had a clause for military aid to the kings of Eng-
land. In the preamble it is stated that mariners and shipmaster were to 
aid the English king against his enemies.19 Furthermore, in articles 6 and 
16 it is stated that the Bayonnais should help each other valiantly on sea 
as well as on land, and with force when necessary, wherever they are, to 
the honour of the king of England.20 Finally, article 20 stated that the 
mariners and the masters should be armed at all times to defend against 
the enemies of the English kings and should be able to deliver military 
support to the king in war.21 While these statutes obliged the Bayonnais 
mariners to be ready at all times to fĳight the English king’s enemies, it 
17  Kowaleski, Maryanne, “ ‘Alien’ encounters in the maritime world of medieval Eng-
land,” Medieval Encounters, 13 (2008), 96–121. I do not, however, agree with Kowaleski’s 
picture of the peaceful international mariners’ “confraternity”. The piracy cases treated in 
this book abundantly demonstrate ardent hatred and rivalries.
18  Goyhenche, Bayonne, pp. 317–319.
19  “rectores et naute navium Baionensium constituerunt inter se societatem, que dici-
tur Societas navium, de assensu et voluntate tocius populi Baionensium, ad honorem Dei 
et beate Maria et omnium sanctorum, salvo jure et fĳidelitate domini sui, Regis Anglie, et 
suorum heredum, et, cum fuerit, ad eorum inimicos infestandos.” Recueil d’actes relatifs à 
l’administration des rois d’Angleterre en Guyenne au XIIIe siècle, ed. Charles Bémont (Paris, 
1914), p. 149.
20 “§6 Porro, naves Baionenses, ubicumque fuerint, debent se juvare et auxiliare adin-
vicem in suis negociis et necessitatibus pro cujusque comodo et honore, ac exaltacione 
domini sui, regis Anglie, et suorum, viriliter et potenter. §16 Debent quoque se coadunare 
ubique, tam in mari quam in terra, pro suo comodo et honore domini sui, regis Anglie, 
sublimando, bona fĳide et pro bona intencione.” Bémont, Recueil, pp. 150–151.
21  “Quicumque poterit, habeat immunicionem ferram; et quilibet marinarius, qui-
cumque fuerit, custos vel . . . [three quarters of the line is blank in the manuscript] domi-
nus duodecime partis navis, habeat imunicionem ferream, et alii, quicumque poterunt 
bono modo, vel ad minus, perpunctum et capellum de ferro, ut possint defendere [se] ab 
inimicis et efffugare hostes domini sui, Regis Anglie, si tempus guerre ingruerit.” Bémont, 
Recueil, p. 151.
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also meant that they were armed for pursuing personal quarrels, piracies 
and wars.
In the 1310s and 1320s, signifĳicant changes in the association took place. 
The traditional Societas Navium was composed of independent individuals 
who had an obligation of mutual aid and sharing of profĳits. The Societas 
was independent of the municipal authorities of Bayonne and, formally, 
the town had no power over it and did not receive any direct income 
from it. Furthermore, at least initially, the shipmasters were also the own-
ers of the ships, and all regulations on freight were solely the issue of 
the masters and were regulated amongst them. However, the economic 
prosperity of the thirteenth century allowed the former shipmasters to 
become landlocked merchants who did not have to run the risks of tak-
ing to the seas themselves any more. This meant that by the fourteenth 
century, the shipmasters owned an ever-diminishing part of the fleet and 
were reduced to the status of employees of the merchants who did not 
take to the seas any more. These landlocked ship- and cargo owners were 
subject to communal jurisdiction. Political reforms from 1317 to 1326 com-
pletely changed the status of the association. Under diffferent mayors and 
the provost- castellan, the association was changed so that the shipmasters 
now pledged loyalty to the mayor of Bayonne, not to the kings of England. 
The owners now took two-thirds of the proceeds of the profĳits, and the 
masters were obliged to go where the owners demanded. While the ship-
master still ruled the mariners, he, in turn, was to answer to the mayor. 
The fĳines which before went to the Societas were now wholly or in part to 
be paid to the town of Bayonne, with the shipmasters as the immediate 
executor, rather than the former custodes. Upon arrival in Bayonne, the 
shipmaster had to give account to the mayor by sermon of fĳines incurred 
and crimes committed during the voyage. When a person became a 
shipmaster, he had to swear allegiance to the mayor. Furthermore, the 
mayor extended the jurisdiction of the communal court to encompass the 
Bayonnais vessels wherever they were, and the town received half of all 
fĳines.22 These reforms also seem to have reduced the Bayonnais mariners’ 
inclination to engage in piracy and maritime war (see chapter 7).
The fĳinal changes were expressed in 1326 in the decrees of mayor Jean 
d’Ardyr. The Societas had now efffectively come under the rule of the mayor 
of Bayonne.23 A possible consequence of these changes is that piracy and 
22 Goyheneche, Bayonne, pp. 323–326.
23 Printed in Balasques, Etudes historiques, III, 522–529.
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the will to pursue maritime quarrels by violence became diminished, as 
the owners, in a cost-benefĳit perspective, saw less attraction in piracy and 
an increase in the risks. In a sense, piracy did not pay any more, and this 
may be the fĳinal cause for the decline in Bayonnais naval importance and 
service after 1350.
The Cinque Ports
The confederation of the ports of southeastern England, known as the 
Cinque Ports, had its origin in the eleventh century. Originally, it con-
sisted of the ports of Dover, Hastings, Hythe, Romney and Sandwich, but 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the confederation expanded to 
encompass more than thirty ports in Kent and Sussex. These later-added 
ports were attached to one of the original fĳive and their privileges. How-
ever, they did not enjoy all the privileges of the “mother-port”, but rather a 
selection of them, though later in the thirteenth century, Winchelsea and 
Rye were granted an intermediary status almost equal to the one enjoyed 
by the original fĳive.24
It is difffĳicult to tell how big these ports were. Sandwich has been esti-
mated at 5,000 inhabitants in 1300.25 However, Sandwich was one of the 
bigger towns of the confederation; most of them were probably smaller.
The purpose of the confederation was to provide defence of the coast, 
mainly through the supply of ships and men to the king, and to prevent 
invasion of England. However, the ports themselves also had an interest 
in association in order to protect their privileges and their common eco-
nomic interests, mainly in trade and fĳishing.26
The relationship of the Ports with the Crown in the thirteenth century 
was characterised by unruly behaviour and outright rebellion. In 1216, 
when the French invaded England, the Ports did nothing to stop them. 
Not until four months after the death of King John did they fĳinally rally 
to the cause of King Henry III, and in 1217 they defeated a French fleet 
bringing vital reinforcements and supplies to the French forces in Eng-
land. During the baronial unrest in 1260–65, they wavered in whether to 
support the  rebels under Simon de Montfort or King Henry III. In 1264, 
24 Brooks, Frederick W., “The Cinque Ports,” The Mariner’s Mirror, 15 (1929), 143.
25 Clarke, Helen et al., Sandwich. The “Completest Medieval Town in England” (Oxford, 
2010), p. 61.
26 Murray, K.M.E., The Constitutional History of the Cinque Ports (Manchester, 1935), p. 1.
 ports and wine 63
they decided for the rebels, and even after the royal defeat of the Montfor-
tians, the Ports continued in their defĳiance of the king by indiscriminate 
piracy. When Henry III attempted to fĳine them for their support of de 
Montfort, they proceeded to attack and burn Portsmouth in retaliation. 
In March 1266, a settlement with the Ports was fĳinally reached, but scant 
punishment was meted out for their support of the rebels.27 Ironically, 
while it is quite difffĳicult to determine what privileges the Ports enjoyed 
in the twelfth and fĳirst part of the thirteenth century and when they were 
conceded,28 it seems as if it was exactly these acts of unruly behaviour 
which were the reason for the confĳirmation and expansion of the privi-
leges of the Ports, especially expressed in the royal charter to the Ports 
from 1278. This was most probably a royal initiative to buy the loyalty of 
the Ports.
Constitutionally, the charter of 1278 was important, since contrary to 
earlier charters records, it was given to the fĳive original ports and Winchel-
sea and Rye collectively, and not individually. The charter granted the 
Ports a number of privileges due to their naval service in Edward’s war 
against Wales the previous year.29 In the charter of 1278, which listed the 
rights and exemptions of the Ports, three outstanding clauses were noted. 
The fĳirst was the right of the Portsmen to carry a canopy over the king at 
his coronation. The second was the right to “den and strand” at the annual 
herring fair in Great Yarmouth,30 which also meant the administration 
of justice over the Portsmen’s “territories” during the fair. Third, these 
privileges were given by the Crown in return for a fĳixed annual quota of 
fĳifty-seven ships fully armed and manned for fĳifteen days’ royal naval ser-
vice with no charge.31 This charter represented the combination of local 
and royal interests, which essentially served to secure the confederation 
and its institutions offfĳicially. These liberties were repeated in 1290 and 
extended in 1298.32 In 1282, the Portsmen served again against the Welsh, 
27 Murray, Constitutional History, pp. 34–40.
28 Murray, Constitutional History, pp. 16 and 28–29.
29 Murray, Constitutional History, p. 29.
30 On Great Yarmouth, see, Saul, Anthony, “English towns in the late Middle Ages: The 
case of Great Yarmouth,” Journal of Medieval History, 8 (1982), 75–88, Saul, Anthony, “The 
herring industry at Great Yarmouth c. 1280–c. 1400,” Norfolk Archeology, 38 (1981), 33–43, 
Saul, Anthony, “Great-Yarmouth and the Hundred Years’ War in the fourteenth century,” 
Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 52 (1979), 105–115.
31  Printed in Brooks, “The Cinque Ports,” pp. 190–191.
32 Murray, Constitutional History, pp. 7 and 29.
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and in the fourteenth century they fought in the campaigns of Edward II 
against the Scots.
While there was a diffference in the specifĳic privileges enjoyed by 
the individual ports in the confederation (because these depended on 
the terms on which they had been made afffĳiliated members), all Ports-
men could enjoy the general privileges of the confederation, especially 
the lucrative rights at the Yarmouth fair, the freedom from toll and the 
immunity from being judged at any other court but their own, the court of 
Shepway (see below). Furthermore, it gave a sense of unity and security, 
as infringements of the privileges of one Portsman essentially meant the 
infringement of the privileges of the whole confederation. Consequently, 
people would think twice before they crossed a Portsman, since poten-
tially they could incur the wrath of the whole confederation.33
Despite the unruliness of the Ports, the kings were not without control 
over them. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, several judicial and 
administrative duties were carried out by local royal offfĳicers. The Cinque 
Ports’ support of Simon de Montfort, however, made it clear that the royal 
presence in the ports was inadequate. Therefore, in 1268, a superior royal 
offfĳicer of the Cinque Ports was appointed. This was the warden. This title 
was furthermore merged with the offfĳice of constable of Dover Castle, in 
that the person appointed warden was also appointed constable of Dover. 
While these titles in theory were distinct, in practice they were united. 
For ease of reference, I shall henceforth call these offfĳicers the Warden-
Constable. The duties of the warden were essentially those of a sherifff 
(that is, judicial and administrative). He had little influence in maritime 
afffairs. The purpose of the offfĳice of warden was to satisfy the needs of 
both the kings and the Portsmen. For the king, he functioned as a direct 
channel of communication and organisation of the confederation. The 
Portsmen, for their part, benefĳitted from the warden by having an offfĳicial 
leader who could confer unity to confederation, and while the warden 
was royally appointed, he had to swear to uphold the liberties of the Ports 
before exercising his offfĳice. In itself, the commission of the warden was 
somewhat weak, but by combining it with the constabulary and castle of 
Dover,34 he obtained a fortifĳied base in the middle of the confederation 
and a military force to back up his authority. Furthermore, by residing 
33 Murray, Constitutional History, pp. 49–52. For an example, see CPR 1317–1321, p. 557.
34 The Castle of Dover lay outside the county and the Cinque Ports’ liberty. It disposed 
of its own residential court, initially only for conviction of people in the constable’s ser-
vice. However, this court was often used by the Warden-Constable for jurisdiction in suits 
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in Dover, it was easier for the Warden-Constable to control and monitor 
communication with the Continent.35 Thus, the offfĳice of Warden-Consta-
ble was essentially a compromise between the Ports and the king. On the 
one hand, it provided the king with a reliable offfĳicer with a wide range of 
powers at his disposal, and on the other, it provided the Ports with unity 
and a royal offfĳicer charged with protecting their privileges.
One of the most important charges of the Warden-Constable was his 
role as judge at the Court of Shepway. One of the privileges of the Ports-
men was the right to be judged by their peers (that is, fellow Portsmen) 
at their own court.36 The court served three diffferent interests. Firstly, it 
served those of the king, as it was presided over by the Warden-Constable, 
thus providing the king with a measure of control over the court. Sec-
ondly, the court was a source of unity for the Ports themselves, and it 
assured their privileges by removing them from other courts of appeal. 
Furthermore, the offfĳicers (that is, mayors) of the Ports were judges at the 
court, and the Warden-Constable could not pass judgement without their 
assent. Thirdly, the court served the Warden-Constable in maintaining his 
role as an intermediary between the Ports and the king, since as judge 
he strengthened the unity of the Ports by appearing as a spokesman and 
advocate of their claims. However, as head of the court he also preserved 
a measure of power for himself over the Portsmen.37 The Shepway court 
was primarily concerned with the interests of the king, or suits against or 
involving the Ports collectively. In the thirteenth century, many Portsmen 
claimed and received the right to plead their cases in Shepway and not 
at the location where they were indicted. In efffect, they would only be 
judged by their own, and claimed immunity from being judged by exter-
nal judges. In 1314, according to K.M.E. Murray, it was decided in Par-
liament “that the liberty [of the Shepway court] might be claimed only 
when Portsmen were impleaded outside their liberties for intrinsic pleas, 
and not in foreign pleas. This was a necessary reform as the Portsmen 
were using their liberties to provide shelter to criminals, and especially 
pirates”.38
which had taken place outside the castle area, even though this mixture of the offfĳices was 
in principle prohibited. Murray, Constitutional History, pp. 102–103.
35 Murray, Constitutional History, pp. 77–93.
36 The Portsmen also disposed of the courts of Brodhull and Guestling, but we know 
very little about their functions in the thirteenth century. Murray, Constitutional History, 
p. 138.
37 Murray, Constitutional History, pp. 60–61.
38 Murray, Constitutional History, pp. 70–71.
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The citizens of the Cinque Ports were often termed “barons”. In the early 
twelfth century, the title “baron” meant little more than mature men of 
afffairs and had nothing to do with a claim to nobility. Indeed, the leading 
citizens of London were also called barons. However, in the latter part of 
that century, the term began to change to denote a socially elite group of 
men around a prince, even though it would not become a title of nobility 
until a hundred years later.39 While the Portsmen were not nobles, they 
maintained and defended the title throughout the Middle Ages. Murray 
speculates that they might have maintained this title because the position 
of the Portsmen was similar to that of the feudal tenant-in-chief holding 
his land in return for knight service, thus an indirect reference to the mili-
tary service that they owed the Crown. However, she also argued that the 
Portsmen, in the legal and diplomatic records in the thirteenth century, 
were judicially associated with the magnates and clergy of England in that 
they, like this elite, were only to be judged by their noble peers of the Eng-
lish realm.40 According to Rachel Dressler, “baron” referred to the fact that 
the citizens held property directly from the king,41 and it is furthermore 
likely that the honour conferred on the Portsmen at the royal corona-
tion bolstered at least the Portsmen’s own view of themselves as akin to 
nobility. Thus, like the Bayonnais, they enjoyed a special and privileged 
judicial relationship with the English kings.
Murray and Frederick W. Brooks claimed that the Portsmen were origi-
nally fĳishermen, and the Portsmen’s initial and primary concern was to 
protect their rights at the Yarmouth herring fair. Indeed, Murray assumed 
that this was the initial impetus for the ports to federate. Only later, in the 
thirteenth century, came the wine trade and freight to play a role in the 
economy of the Ports. Brooks, for his part, asserted that this wine trade 
was never very signifĳicant in the economic life of the Ports, and both claim 
that piracy was a signifĳicant source of wealth for the Portsmen.42 How-
ever, to my knowledge, no collective study of the economy of the Cinque 
Ports has been conducted, and in abundant sources documenting the 
activities of the Portsmen, they often seem to have been on their way to, 
for instance, Gascony to buy and freight wine when they conducted piracy 
(or were accused of it). Indeed, one of the best indications that Murray 
39 Crouch, David, The Birth of Nobility (Harlow, 2005), pp. 241 and 247.
40 Murray, Constitutional History, pp. 20–21 and 30–31.
41  Dressler, Of Armour, p. 45.
42 Murray, Constitutional History, pp. 11, 17–18, 26–28, Brooks, “Cinque Ports,” pp. 175 
and 185.
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and Brooks have underestimated the importance of the wine trade for the 
Ports is the petition of defence over Norman piracy issued by the Cinque 
Ports in 1293 (see chapter 4). In this document, the Portsmen explained 
how they had defeated a large Norman fleet offf Brittany, but they claimed 
that they had acted in self-defence and that the Normans had harassed 
them for years when they went to Gascony to pick up wine.
Concerning the military service provided by the Ports for the king, it 
has usually been assumed that the ships supplied to the Crown by the 
Cinque Ports were the backbone of England’s naval forces in the High 
Middle Ages. However, Rodger has convincingly argued that the ships of 
the Cinque Ports were not the most important part of the naval forces 
which the English kings could muster.43 This raises the question of why 
the Ports were granted such extensive privileges. According to Rodger, 
this had nothing to do with the number of ships provided. Instead, it 
rested on a number of practical circumstances. First of all, through their 
extensive piracies the Portsmen were experts in predatory actions at sea. 
Thus, they provided valuable service as naval experts and advisors to the 
kings in maritime matters.44 Furthermore, the geostrategic location of the 
Ports on the English coast closest to the Continent meant that the Ports 
were vitally important for the security of the realm, since they could efffec-
tively control the Narrow Seas. Furthermore, the Ports were the fĳirst line 
of defence in case of an invasion of England, and without reliable control 
over the Ports the enemy could land unhindered and commence devas-
tating attacks on the English countryside. Thus, it was of vital importance 
to stay on good terms with the Ports, since their benevolence to the king 
could obstruct an invasion. The Portsmen knew this, and in large part it 
accounts for their unruly and self-serving actions at sea.45
As has been implied by the historians’ writing on the Cinque Ports, 
piracy was an activity that they were continually engaged in, no doubt 
because of the relative judicial immunities conferred by the Court of 
Shepway. Indeed, according to Murray, the privileges conferred on the 
Portsmen were in part founded on their fĳierce reputation as pirates, which 
incidentally worked to the benefĳit of the English kings by discouraging 
naval operations against the island.46 Nevertheless, while there seems 
43 Rodger, “Naval Service,” p. 636.
44 Rodger, “Naval Service,” pp. 644 and 646.
45 Rodger, “Naval Service,” pp. 648–651, Rodger, Safeguard, pp. 124–126, Brooks, “Cinque 
Ports,” p. 174.
46 Murray, Constitutional History, pp. 31–33.
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little doubt that the Portsmen were prone to piracy, we have to remain 
somewhat prudent as to the representativity of the sources documenting 
suits over piracy committed by the Portsmen. Sylvester has argued that 
a likely reason for the dominance of the Portsmen’s piracies in the pre-
1348 sources is exactly the confederate status. This facilitated the victims 
in reprisals or suits of law against the Portsmen for the recovery of their 
ships and goods. Indeed, the victims would have a higher chance of suc-
cess in the recovery of their goods if they impleaded the Ports  collectively.47 
Sylvester notes, however, that there was a marked diffference between 
the piracies of the Ports and those of other maritime communities. The 
diffference was the willingness of the Portsmen to act cooperatively, not 
just for individual goals but also to advance the interests of confederate 
members as well as the confederacy as a whole. Indeed, he writes that 
the Portsmen’s duplicitous behaviour and often tumultuous relationship 
with the Crown is the best evidence of “port town residents who put 
self-interest before patriotism and the concerns of their own community 
ahead of those of the king”.48 The best researched and most notorious 
instance of the Portsmen’s collective piracies against a common foe is 
their maritime war with the mariners of Great Yarmouth. The peak of 
this conflict took place in 1297. Edward I had commissioned ships of the 
kingdom to sail his army to Flanders to confront the French. However, 
once the army had disembarked, the mariners of the Cinque Ports and 
those of Great Yarmouth manned the ships and engaged in a presumably 
pre-arranged naval battle. Out of the 273 ships used for the transport of 
the army, seventy-three came from the Cinque Ports and fĳifty-nine from 
Great Yarmouth. Thus, the battle must have been rather big. Later royal 
inquisitions estimated that at least 165 men were killed, seventeen ships 
were burned and another twelve was looted. The total damages exceeded 
£5,000.49 According to Sylvester, the “incidents that set offf the violence 
were but the pretext for the deep-seated communal hatred rooted in eco-
nomic competition”.50
This conflict with Great Yarmouth had been going on for a long while 
by the time the two sides clashed offf the coast of Flanders. It seems as if 
the conflict began with the Portsmen’s rights at the Yarmouth fair at the 
47 Sylvester, “Communal piracy,” pp. 166–167.
48 Sylvester, “Communal piracy,” pp. 168–169.
49 Prestwich, Edward I, p. 392.
50 Sylvester, “Communal piracy,” p. 172.
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beginning of the thirteenth century.51 Throughout the fĳirst part of the thir-
teenth century, they continually clashed, although never on the scale of 
what happened later in the century. During the Montfortian revolt, Great 
Yarmouth sided with Henry III against the Ports and the rebels. Edward I, 
on the one hand, gave privileges to the Ports, but on the other hand, he 
increasingly supported Great Yarmouth against them. In the 1280s, con-
flict between the Ports and Yarmouth grew, but the maritime war with the 
Norman mariners and the Gascon War put offf the diffferences for a time. 
However, by 1296 conflict was about to erupt again, as Yarmouth mari-
ners complained over being attacked by pirates from the Cinque Ports. 
This was in all likelihood the reason for the naval battle in 1297. After this 
battle, despite royal prohibitions, the maritime war continued.52 A seri-
ous impediment to the settlement of these conflicts was the Portsmen’s 
privilege of only being able to be judged at Shepway, a place where it was 
unlikely that the Yarmouthmen would obtain justice. Thus, a settlement 
was not reached until 1305. The settlement included a confĳirmation of 
the Portsmen’s rights at the fair and a general pardon for all trespasses, 
injuries and damages prior to 3 March 1305. The most important point 
was, however, that the right to trial at Shepway presumably no longer 
extended to Portsmen charged with accusations of piracy.53
While the maritime war between the Cinque Ports and Great Yarmouth 
has been the primary focus in the studies of the Ports martial history, it 
should be noted that they were continually at odds with other maritime 
communities like the Bayonnais, the Flemings, the French, the mariners 
of the West Country and the Castilians.
Normandy
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Normandy was a wealthy and 
prosperous province directly under the French kings’ authority. It was, 
however, characterised by an administrative system, a customary law 
and a number of privileges created by the Norman dukes and later the 
kings of England. In 1204, when Philippe Auguste conquered the province, 
he swore to respect the privileges granted to the Normans by the dukes 
of Normandy. While alterations and to a certain extent a  deterioration 
51  Brooks, “Cinque Ports’ Feud,” p. 30.
52 Brooks, “Cinque Ports’ Feud,” pp. 36–43 and 45–48.
53 Brooks, “Cinque Ports’ Feud,” pp. 33 and 49–50, CPR 1301–1307, p. 329.
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of these privileges occurred during the thirteenth century, as a whole 
the French kings respected the Norman institutions and privileges, and 
the Normans reciprocated by staunch loyalty to the French Crown. An 
example of the French kings’ leniency with the Normans can be seen, for 
instance, in Philippe Auguste’s pardon of Norman pirates after the French 
conquest, even though these had fought the French.54
The royal administration of Normandy was handled not by one central 
seneschal in Rouen, but rather a number of smaller bailiwicks through-
out the province which made it easier for the Capetians to control the 
province. After 1220, Normandy was administratively divided into the bai-
liwicks of Rouen, Caen, Cotentin, Caux, Gisors, and Verneuil (which was 
abolished in 1302). The bailifffs had vicomtes under them, and these in 
turn were served by sergeants.
The Normans, however, maintained their own supreme court, the 
Échiquier, to administer the customary law and privileges of the province. 
Nevertheless, this court was presided over by the Capetian kings’ trusted 
men, and the bailifffs were to answer to the Échiquier. For the most part, 
the Échiquier obeyed orders from the Parlement de Paris, and in essence 
it had the role of a jury which could conduct inquiries, but which usually 
could not pass judgement.55
However, the exigencies of Philippe le Bel and his sons’ continual wars 
with Flanders and the consequent demands for military forces, as well 
as extra taxes and devaluations of the coinage in the fĳirst decades of the 
fourteenth century, brought changes to the power structure in Normandy 
(as well as in the rest of northern France). In 1315, Louis X agreed to the 
demands of Norman insurgents and granted them the Charte aux Nor-
mands, which limited royal rights to military service, its continual usurpa-
tion of jurisdiction in Normandy and the fĳiscal exigencies of the Crown in 
the province. One of the most important gains for the Normans seems to 
have been the reafffĳirmation of the status of the Échiquier, which hence-
forth was recognised as Normandy’s Supreme Court, thereby barring the 
option of appeal to the Parlement de Paris, which had been the norm.56
54 Russon, Côtes, p. 23.
55 Neveux, François, La Normandie royale (Rennes, 2005), pp. 71–73 and 83–88.
56 Jouet, Roger, . . . et la Normandie devint française (Paris, 1983), pp. 118–119. How-
ever, Poirey argues that these claims were primarily judicial, not fĳiscal. Poirey, Sophie, 
“La Charte aux Normands, instrument d’une constetation juridique,” in C. Bougy and 
S. Poirey, eds, Images de contestation du pouvoir dans le monde normand Xe–XVIIIe siècle 
(Caen, 2007), p. 95.
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The Normans also supplied a rather large military force, both terres-
trial and naval, to the Capetians, in addition to taxes. This naval service 
is the primary concern of this book. Between 1284 and 1293, Philippe le 
Bel constructed the Clos des Galées in Rouen to supply the Crown with its 
own galleys for operations in the Channel and in the Atlantic. The Clos 
des Galées was more of a shipyard and an administrative centre than an 
actual naval base (though in 1315 and 1316 fleets were assembled in Rouen 
and Dieppe), and while the intentions of Philippe le Bel were to build a 
royal fleet under the Crown, in efffect it never seems that the French kings 
were able to build a substantial fleet of their own, not least because of the 
huge expenses that not only the construction but also the maintenance of 
a fleet entailed. In 1295, the Norman ports alone furnished approximately 
150 ships, galleys and galiots of their own, thus making up more than half 
of the French fleet, which according to the accounts of Gyrart le Barillier 
was fĳifty-seven galleys and galiots and 223 ships.57 This is both an indica-
tor of the large number of ships available to the Normans and their naval 
importance to the kings of France.
Rouen was the nexus of the province. Politically and commercially, 
Normandy was completely dominated by Rouen, with its massive popu-
lation and position on the Seine. Rouen boasted roughly 30,000–40,000 
inhabitants, and via the Seine it had contact with Paris, with its popula-
tion of 80,000–120,000 inhabitants. The Seine area was thus a rich trade 
nexus, and was visited by numerous merchant ships every year. While 
the Normans after the French conquest seem to have oriented them-
selves increasingly towards terrestrial afffairs, the Norman coast and ports 
remained vibrant, animated by fĳishing, maritime trafffĳic and trade. The 
Seine estuary especially was a dynamic area, and several small and large 
towns clustered around it and profĳited from trade.58
This network of towns was dominated by the two biggest, Rouen and 
Caen, which had as their satellites Harfleur and Dieppe, which belonged 
to the archbishop of Rouen, and smaller towns like Cherbourg, Barfleur, 
57 Documents relatifs au Clos des Galées de Rouen, ed. Anne Chazelas, 2 vols (Paris, 
1977–78), I, 27 and 36, Jal, Archéologie navale, II, 301–19. Royal shipyards in Rouen may 
have an older origin, however. At least in the last years of the 1190s, Richard I seems to 
have built galleys in Rouen. Gillingham, John, “Richard I, galley-warfare and Portsmouth: 
The beginnings of a royal navy,” in M. Prestwich, R. Frame, and R. Britnell, eds, Thirteenth 
Century England VI (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 7–8.
58 Russon, Côtes, pp. 15–16.
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Port-en-Bessin, Touques, Fécamp, Saint-Valéry-en-Caux and Le Tréport.59 
Rouennais maritime commerce was based on three axes; namely England, 
north-eastern Flanders and the Parisian hinterland,60 but Rouennais trade 
also reached Iberia and the French Atlantic sea-board trading in salt, 
wheat and wine from Ile-de-France, Burgundy and Languedoc.61 Politi-
cally, Rouen increasingly became the centre of Normandy. From 1268, the 
seat of the Échiquier alternated between Rouen and Caen (population 
10,000), but from 1296 Rouen became the sole seat for this court.62
Rouen was most probably run by the richest merchants in the Ghilda 
mercatorum of the town. During the thirteenth century, the number of 
these oligarchic families diminished continually, while corruption and 
nepotism grew. Thus, in 1292 the Rouennais rioted against the oligarchy.63 
The riots were put down by the royal government, and some of the privi-
leges of the towns were temporarily suspended, but not until 1315–20 was 
a more durable solution provided to what increasingly seemed like a cor-
rupt and abusive town government. Thus in 1321, Rouen obtained a new 
town constitution. The governance of the town still rested with the mayor 
assisted by thirty-six elected pairs, but serving three-year terms instead of 
for life, as previously. Furthermore, the municipality was put under the 
surveillance of twelve prud’hommes. The mayor lost control over urban 
fĳinances, which were to be managed henceforth by two pairs and two 
prud’hommes. This new constitution permitted the mid-level bourgeoi-
sie to participate in the municipal government.64 Thus, in contrast with 
 Bayonne, Rouen experienced a weakening of the mayoral powers.
I will now consider the Norman ports manifestly involved in piracy and 
maritime wars. Here, Rouen is curiously absent in the sources on piracy. 
Rather, the piratical ports were those located on the coastline from the 
Cotentin peninsula (including Saint-Malo, even though this was not a Nor-
man port per se) to Picardy, although there seems to have been a concen-
tration around the Seine estuary where Harfleur, Leure (today more or less 
59 Neveux, François, “La constitution d’un réseau urbain en Normandie,” in P. Bouet, 
and F. Neveux, eds, Les villes normandes au Moyen Âge (Caen, 2006), p. 59.
60 Sadourny, A. “Les grandes familles rouennaises au XIIIe siècle et leur rôle dans 
la cite,” in P. Bouet and F. Neveux, eds, Les villes normandes au Moyen Âge (Caen, 2006), 
p. 271.
61  Hérubel, M.A., Le port de Honfleur (Paris, 1926), p. 18.
62 Neveux, “Réseau urbain,” pp. 56–57.
63 Mollat, Michel, ed., Histoire de Rouen (Toulouse, 1979), pp. 94–95, Sadourny, 
“Grandes familles,” pp. 276–277.
64 Neveux, La Normandie royale, p. 467.
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Le Havre), Honfleur and Chef de Caux65 were located. In contrast with 
Bayonne and the Cinque Ports, it is difffĳicult to ascertain exactly what kept 
the Norman ports acting in unison. One explanation may be that they were 
associated in general, as through the specifĳic laws that had governed the 
Duchy of Normandy. Nevertheless, it may also simply be an informal coin-
ciding of interests at sea that kept them united in the face of, for instance, 
the Cinque Ports and Bayonne, and bolstered by their naval services to the 
kings of France. Likewise, it seems at times as if Picard and Artesian ports 
like Calais united with the Normans against the Anglo-Gascon mariners.66
In a peace treaty between Bayonne and the Normans from 1282, the 
Norman ports mentioned specifĳically were Dieppe, Fécamp, Étretat, 
Chef de Caux, Leure, Harfleur, Touques, Ouistreham (the port of Caen), 
Caen (proper), Barfleur, Cherbourg and Régneville, although apparently 
more ports than just these were implicated in the maritime war.67 In a 
Norman raid against the English and Bayonnais up the Charente River, 
it was stated that at least some of the pirates came from Barfleur and 
perhaps also Leure.68 While no offfĳicial leadership of these mariners is 
apparent, the town leaders must have known about the actions of the 
mariners—both to defend against accusations and to agree to peace trea-
ties. The organisation of these ports is unknown. We do not have any 
documents stating any sort of a confederation like the Cinque Ports. 
If anything, it seems as if the “ringleaders” were probably Dieppe and 
Harfleur, but Fécamp, Le Tréport and Honfleur may also have played prom-
inent roles.69 Compared with Bayonne, there is a considerable drought in 
sources concerning the organisation of the ports of Normandy. Thus, we 
have no information about their merchants’, fĳishermen’s and mariners’ 
guilds, even though in all likelihood these ports also had maritime organi-
sations for the freighting of goods, especially from the Ile-de-France and 
Burgundy, which travelled from Paris by the Seine River to Rouen and 
from there to be freighted by the mariners, particularly of the Seine estu-
ary. One association is known, however, from the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries, namely the Sociatas whalmanorum, which had stations in 
65 Today Sainte-Adresse near Le Havre. Bois, Guy, Crisis of Feudalism (Cambridge, 
1984), p. 317.
66 See, for instance, the Normans’ and the Calaisiens’ attack on Dover. Langtoft, p. 225.
67 TNA C 47/29/2/40.
68 TNA C 47/31/5/1.
69 Neveux, La Normandie royale, p. 480.
74 chapter three
Le Tréport, Quillebeuf, Conteville, Dives and Port-en-Bessin.70 It is unknown 
if these had any hand in piracy, but it seems as if Norman mariners and 
fĳishermen in general were involved in the piracies and maritime wars. In 
addition, the Norman coastline was ideal for piracy, as traders from the Bay 
of Biscay would often follow the Norman coast en route to Flanders.
In the following I will briefly examine three of these “pirate” ports, 
namely Harfleur, Dieppe and Regnéville.
Harfleur and Dieppe (and St. Malo) were the primary ports for pirates 
to dispose of their booty, and in the thirteenth and the beginning of the 
fourteenth century Harfleur seems to have been the primary pirate and 
privateer port.71 From the fourteenth century, Harfleur disposed of a forti-
fĳied annex to the Clos des Galées for construction and repair of ships, and 
it served as a centre for Admiralty command and the assembly and depar-
ture of fleets from the Seine area. In 1295, Harfleur was the single largest 
contributor of ships for the royal fleet, fĳifty-one ships, compared to the 
forty-four supplied by Dieppe and the fĳive ships and thirty-three galleys 
of Honfleur (however, these galleys most probably were not from Hon-
fleur alone, but rather included a contingent of enlisted foreign galleys and 
possibly also some royal ones).72 The Harfleurais mariners were primarily 
mariners engaged in trade and freighting, whereas the Dieppois were pri-
marily fĳishermen.73 Harfleur and Honfleur served as transit ports for Rouen 
and Harfleur, which trafffĳicked in salt, wine transit, and coastal trade.74
Like Harfleur, Dieppe (a town of perhaps 7,000 inhabitants) was directly 
under the archbishops of Rouen, who had important interests in the mari-
time commerce of the town. The town grew rapidly in the twelfth century, 
and under Archbishop Eudes Rigaud (from 1247) the commercial and mari-
time power of Dieppe was allowed to expand. However, the port was pri-
marily engaged in herring fĳishing and transport to and from England, and 
Dieppe seems to have been almost exclusively a port for transbordement of 
merchandise, that is, a safe haven and a place for reloading, provisioning and 
going to the big trade emporia like Bruges or London. One of the reasons for 
this was that the harbour was quite inaccessible and was  characterised by a 
70 Hérubel, Honfleur, p. 21. See also Musset, Lucien, “Quelques notes sur les balei-
niers normands du Xe au XIIIe siècle,” in L. Musset, Nordica et Normannica (Paris, 1997), 
pp. 307–321. 
71  Russon, Côtes, pp. 79 and 487.
72 Hérubel, Honfleur, p. 22.
73 Russon, Côtes, p. 485.
74 Hérubel, Honfleur, pp. 19–20.
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treacherous current.75 Since at least the start of the thirteenth century, the 
Dieppois also supplemented their income by piracy.76
Regnéville, guarded by a castle, was somewhat smaller than Harfleur 
and Dieppe, and like Dieppe, the port was difffĳicult to access. The water 
level was low, and big ships never went directly to the port but laid 
anchored a few miles out in the sea by the Îles Chausey. From here goods 
were transported in smaller boats to Regnéville with the rising tide. None-
theless, Regnéville constituted a safe port in Basse-Normandie for mari-
ners from the west.77 The somewhat poor port of Regnéville was not the 
reason for this maritime activity. Rather, it was the proximity half a mile 
south of the town of Montmartin-sur-Mer, which hosted the biggest fair 
in Basse-Normandie, and which lay on the road to the biggest Norman 
towns and Paris. Together, these two towns made this part of the Cotentin 
peninsula a commercial centre with a permanent community of Gascon 
wine merchants.78 Regnéville exported primarily wheat from the Breton 
and Caen plain and imported Spanish iron, English lead, tin and wool, and 
especially Gascon wine. The resident Gascons sold some wine locally or 
blended the wine there before sending it offf to other markets. The wine 
customs were handled by two local citizens of Coutances, and seemingly 
a lot of fraud was involved in the handling of these and their fraudulent 
confĳiscations of wine to be sold offf at their own profĳit. Thus, it seems as if 
wine import was quite important for the local economy, even though the 
Gascons presumably also came to Regnéville to buy fĳish.79
In contrast with Bayonne, as part of the inherently bellicose Gascony 
where nobles and towns enjoyed ancient rights to wage private war, since 
the twelfth century Normandy had been a duchy where feuds and private 
wars between nobles were outlawed. On the whole, this was obeyed by 
the Norman magnates and towns.80 Nevertheless, the hostile climate of 
the sea lanes makes it clear that the Norman mariners in no way held 
back in comparison with their Bayonnais and English colleagues when 
75 Lardin, Philippe, “L’activité du port de Dieppe à travers la comptabilité de l’archevêque 
de Rouen,” in Ports maritimes et ports fluviaux au Moyen Âge (Paris, 2005), p. 171, Lardin, 
Philippe, “Les transformations de la ville de Dieppe pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans,” in 
P. Bouet and F. Neveux, eds, Les villes normandes au Moyen Âge (Caen, 2006), pp. 75 and 
87–91.
76 Russon, Côtes, p. 486.
77 Le Pesant, M., “Le commerce maritime de Regnéville au Moyen Âge,” in Annales de 
Normandie, 8eme année (1958), pp. 323–324, Russon, Côtes, p. 180.
78 Le Pesant, “Commerce maritime,” pp. 330–331.
79 Le Pesant, “Commerce maritime,” pp. 325–329.
80 Cazelles, “Réglementation royale,” pp. 542–543, see also Yver, Jean, L’interdiction de 
la guerre privée dans le très ancien Droit Normand (Caen, 1928).
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it came to violently defending and expanding their trade at sea. On the 
uncontrolled sea lanes, the Normans were probably just as quick as their 
English colleagues to resort to violence and lucrative plunder by piracy.81 
Russon remarks that some ports like Saint-Malo, Harfleur and Dieppe, 
with a strong tradition for autonomy and a signifĳicant maritime engage-
ment, preferred to settle their scores with rivals by violence rather than 
by appealing to the somewhat inefffĳicient judicial authorities.82 How-
ever, unlike the Bayonnais or the Portsmen, the Norman mariners were 
not continually engaged in conflicts with other maritime communities. 
Indeed, the struggles seem to be confĳined to wars with the Bayonnais and 
the Portsmen, and in one instance against the Flemings in the 1310s.
The lack of any clear organisation and defĳinitive leaders of the Norman 
maritime wars leads one to speculate if the powerful Rouennais merchant 
families or the archbishop had a hand in these activities, or possibly even 
backed them up. While the English merchants of Barton’s complaint from 
1327 of the attack by the Abbot of Fécamp’s men on their ship in Fécamp 
and their plunder of the ship and the killing of the brother of one of the 
merchants seems to indicate an involvement by authorities like that of 
the abbot, it is difffĳicult to determine whether this was an attack of oppor-
tunity, or rather an operation of arrest of goods in reprisal for damages 
sufffered by Fécampois mariners, which is the claim on the dorse of the 
document.83 Thus, we cannot exclude an involvement in the piracies 
by authorities like the Rouen merchants, the higher clergy or indeed the 
French kings, but not much evidence suggests that operations like mari-
time wars was directed from the top of French society.
Indeed, what unites Bayonne, the Cinque Ports and Normandy in rela-
tion to piracy was that they were directly under the king’s authority, 
which could support the notion that they were carrying out the secret 
orders of the kings. However, the sources suggest that they were in fact 
more than capable of pursuing private goals and wars themselves without 
any help or incitement from the kings. Indeed, most of the time, the wars 
and piracies were more of an embarrassment and a problem, especially 
for the English, than the front line of clandestine royal ambitions. Evi-
dence of this is that the maritime war between Bayonne and Normandy in 
81  Russon, Côtes, p. 472 “la vengeance est souvent à l’origine de ces engagements semi-
privés dans la guerre sur mer. [. . .] la mer offfre un terrain privilégié à la prolongation de 
la vieille tradition nobiliaire de la guerre privée, avec son lot de violences et de pillages 
lucratifs.” 
82 Russon, Côtes, p. 296.
83 TNA SC 8/258/12890A1327.
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1316–18 came at a time when neither the French nor the English king had 
any interest whatsoever in such a conflict, because their resources were 
tied up in wars with Flanders and Scotland. Thus, the Normans, like their 
Anglo-Gascon colleagues, seem to have disposed of a will of their own to 
pursue personal as well as collective goals and grievances, whether their 
royal overlords approved of them or not.84
Wine Trade
A signifĳicant stimulant and incitement to the use of piracy in the years 
1280–1330 was the boom in the wine export from Bordeaux to northern 
Europe. It seems as if at least the maritime wars between Bayonne and the 
Normans (but indeed also between many other maritime communities) 
were founded on the quarrels between the mariners and merchants when 
they met in the ports and on the profĳit to be made by preying on the valu-
able wine cargoes, both locally when these ships passed on the coast and 
on long-distance trading voyages.
The wine export from Bordeaux seems to have increased steadily in the 
thirteenth century. Thus, in 1227, Bordeaux wine was exported to Harfleur, 
in 1243 to Brittany and in the years 1250–75 it gained ground in Ile-de-
France.85 However, not until the last quarter of the thirteenth century and 
the beginning of the fourteenth century did the wine export from Bordeaux 
really expand (see fĳigure). For instance, in 1308–9, approximately 850,000 
hectolitres of wine were exported from Bordeaux, equivalent to the export 
volume of wine out of Bordeaux in 1938.86 It is important to stress, though, 
that we do not possess data documenting the exact volume of this export 
until 1303. It is possible that growth in the export was not exponential, but 
instead was sudden due to other circumstances, amongst them a desire on 
the part of Edward I to invigorate trade after the Gascon War. However, as 
will be apparent in the following chapters, even before 1303 many mariners 
from northern France and England went to Bordeaux each year to freight 
wine north to England, Flanders and France. Thus, while we do not know 
the exact volume of the export for the thirteenth century, the activities of 
the mariners suggest that it was already in rapid expansion by that point.
84 Russon, Côtes, p. 439.
85 Renouard, Yves (Bernard, Jean ed.), Histoire de Bordeaux, (Bordeaux, 1965), vol. 2, 
247. See also Renouard, Yves, “Le grand commerce des vins de Gascogne au Moyen Âge,” 
Revue historique, 221 (1959), 261–304.
86 Cassard, Jean-Christophe, “Les marins bretons à Bordeaux au début du XIVe siècle,” 
Annales de Bretagne et des Pays de l’Ouest, 86 (1979), 380.
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Year Tuns of wine Year Tuns of wine
1305–06 97,848 1350–51 —
1306–07 93,452 1352–53 19,629
1308–09 102,724 1353–54 16,328
1310–11 51,531 1355–56 14,411
1323–24 — 1356–57 20,200
1328–29 69,175 1357–58 27,838
1329–30 93,556 1363–64 18,280
1335–36 74,053 1364–65 43,869
1336–37 16,577 1365–66 36,207
1348–49 5,923 1366–67 37,103
1349–50 13,427
Figure 3.1 Wine exports from Bordeaux, 1305–67, 
including wine from the Haut Pays.87
In the fĳirst three decades of the fourteenth century, the trade in wine 
was almost the complete monopoly of the Gascon merchants, specifĳically 
those from the Bordeaux area, whose trade was furthermore protected 
by English royal privileges. The wine exported from Bordeaux was not 
just from that area, however. Over half of the wine came from the Haut 
Pays and from Languedoc. Ironically, the biggest wine exporter in Bor-
deaux in 1303–4 was the French king, who since 1271 had direct control 
over Languedoc. However, the Bordelais merchants discriminated against 
these wines. Thus, there were two “winefleets” a year. The fĳirst was the 
autumn fleet freighting the autumn harvest with the young and most pre-
cious wine, which was almost exclusively Bordelais. This fleet departed 
from September to November. The second fleet left after 11 November and 
consisted mostly of Haut Pays wine. In theory, this second fleet could leave 
from November on, but most had to wait till Easter the following year or 
even until May or June before departing due to the sailing conditions. The 
voyage from Bordeaux to London presumably took about two months, 
even though it was possible to do it faster.88 While this was the principle, 
James remarks that we should not understand this as only two departure 
times a year. Rather, in peace time, the trade was not overly organised, as 
several departures of singular or small groups seem to have been the norm 
87 James, Wine Trade, p. 32.
88 Renouard, Histoire, pp. 247–256, James, Wine Trade, p. 123, Ward, Medieval Ship-
master, p. 232.
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throughout the year. Not until 1336 did convoy sailing become obligatory 
and permanent because of Norman and Scottish piracies.89
An indicator of the importance of the Bordeaux wine trade and its 
economic signifĳicance is that Bordeaux wine made up 31% of England’s 
import and 25% of the Flemish import.90 The Gascon and primarily Bor-
delais quasi-monopoly on the trade made them send commissioners 
to the English ports, especially London, but Sandwich and Winchelsea 
also had big settlements of Gascons who enjoyed the same privileges as 
the “barons” there, and Bordelais merchants had residences in Caen in 
 Normandy.91 Thus, every year England was visited by several hundred 
Gascon merchants.92 At the beginning of the fourteenth century, only a 
few English merchants resided permanently in Gascony,93 and while the 
wine trade was stabile and prosperous in the fĳirst three decades of the 
fourteenth century (though marked by brief declines during the Anglo-
French wars), the privileges and Gascon quasi-monopoly created resent-
ment amongst the English merchants, and Gascons periodically sufffered 
attacks in the English ports by envious locals. At one point, in 1315, the 
attacks became so severe that the Gascons threatened a total boycott of 
England. This resentment gradually led to more and more royal privileges 
for English wine merchants, and in 1327 London merchants brought into 
the country and sold as much Gascon wine in England as the Gascons 
themselves. In the 1330s, the English merchants increasingly went to Bor-
deaux themselves to buy and freight the wine, to the detriment of the 
Gascons. The result was that the Gascons gradually diverted their trade 
to the Continental market, primarily northern France and Flanders, and 
from 1330 a decline began in the wine export from Bordeaux from which 
it would never really recover in the Middle Ages.94
In the fĳirst decade of the fourteenth century, the zenith of the Bordeaux 
wine export, several hundred ships visited Bordeaux each year.  According 
89 James, Wine Trade, pp. 16, 124 and 133. However, during wars and truces, convoys 
were ordered, as in 1301, when the king ordered all English ports, but especially the Cinque 
Ports, that when they sailed to Gascony for wine and other merchandise, the ships should 
continually be kept in the form of a fleet and in such depth of water at sea or in the river 
that they could not be attacked, taken or arrested by enemies conducting surprise attacks. 
When the mariners were on land, they should be cautious and behave themselves, thus 
making sure that further travel would be untroubled. CCR 1296–1302, pp. 499–500.
90 Renouard, Histoire, p. 257.
91  Dupont, Gustave, Histoire du Cotentin et de ses iles (Caen, 1873), p. 220.
92 James, Wine Trade, pp. 73–74. 
93 Renouard, Histoire, pp. 262–264.
94 Renouard, Histoire, p. 264, James, Wine Trade, pp. 9–15, 70–76 and 81–83.
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to Cassard, 982 ships in 1303–4, 610 in 1306–7, 552 in 1307–8 and 747 in 
1308–9.95 For 1303–4, Renouard has calculated the tonnage and origin of 
these ships. 81% of the ships had a carrying capacity of under 150 tons, 
16% could carry between 150–200 tons and 3% could take more than 
200 tons.96 On the origin, he writes that only six of the 982 ships that left 
the Gironde charged with wine were from Bordeaux, that is, 0.50%. The 
others were English (40%), Basques (9%), Breton (22%), Oleronais (3%), 
Rochelais (0.5%), Norman (10%) or Cantabre (5%).97 This calculation is, 
however, somewhat faulty. Cassard points out that the ships identifĳied 
by Renouard as “oleronais” is based on Renouard’s reading of de Loyre as 
denoting Oléron. According to Cassard, this should rather be understood 
as the Pay Nantais, thus as the Loire estuary.98 For my part, I have doubts 
as to both these interpretations as Loyre or Loyra sometimes fĳigures in 
the sources as an alternative spelling of the Norman port, Leure.99 Thus, 
the number of Norman ships might be slightly higher than assumed by 
Renouard and Cassard. Likewise, it is not clear what the term basques cov-
ers. Presumably, it refers to ships from ports like Bayonne, Fuenterrabìa 
and San Sebastian, but Renouard gives no explanation, and we are left in 
the dark. In the same vein, it is also unclear what cantabres covers, and 
how he distinguishes between basques and cantabres. These uncertainties 
are not insignifĳicant, as it makes it hard for us to assess the number of 
Bayonnais and Norman ships involved in the freighting of the wine. Due to 
the Gascon monopolies, most of these visiting ships were engaged primar-
ily in freight of wine and not trade. This was in essence what the mariners 
of Bayonne, Normandy and the Cinque Ports had in common, namely that 
they were primarily freighters and only secondarily merchants.100
The voisinage “system” protected the Bayonnais abroad and gave secu-
rity not only to Bayonnais by birth, but also those associated with voi-
 95 Cassard, “Marins Bretons,” p. 381.
 96 Renouard, Histoire, p. 255.
 97 Renouard, Histoire, p. 242: “6 seulement des 982 bateaux qui sortent de la Gironde 
chargés de vins sont bordelais, soit 0,50%; les autres sont anglais (40%), basques (9%), 
bretons (22%), oleronais (3%), rochelais (0,5%), normands (10%) ou cantabres (5%).” 
Interestingly, this only amounts to 90% something which Renouard does not account for. 
This could be due to negligent notaries and general deterioration of the documents. Cas-
sard writes on these numbers: “Le fonctionnaire ducal a omis de préciser certains noms; 
d’autres ont été efffaces par l’humidité; certains enfĳins n’ont pas encore été determines 
avec precision: il s’agit surtout de ports anglais.” Cassard, “Marins Bretons,” p. 396, n. 12.
 98 Cassard, “Marins Bretons,” p. 381.
 99 Saint-Sardos, pp. 7–10, no. 9.
100 Goyheneche, Bayonne, pp. 320–321.
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sin status, making the Bayonnais maritime enterprises bigger than what 
a medium-size town in Gascony would suggest. For instance, in 1307, a 
Bayonnais decree established that if a foreigner committed a wrong 
against a voisin at sea, on the rivers or on the islands (probably the archi-
pelago centred around Oléron), his goods would be confĳiscated, and if the 
voisin was wounded or if he killed a foreigner, the town would protect 
the voisin if he had acted within his rights.101 While it is difffĳicult to prove 
from the treaties and the petitions who the voisins were, it remains clear 
that the Bayonnais were actually a rather big group in maritime matters. 
Consequently, the conflicts with other maritime communities could have 
geographically wide-ranging consequences.
The extensive, international trade conducted by the Bayonnais led to 
installations of Bayonnais merchants more or less permanently on the 
coasts from Spain to Flanders. The biggest of these installations were 
probably in London and Bruges, where at the end of the thirteenth cen-
tury eighty Bayonnais merchants resided.102 The northern Spanish ports, 
Bordeaux, La Rochelle, the Breton ports, the Channel Islands, Sandwich, 
Winchelsea and some Norman ports as well had installations of merchants, 
which must have swollen in the summertime when Bayonnais and Gascon 
mariners and merchants went abroad to conduct trade. On the French 
coasts, the account of a Norman attack on a Bayonnais in La Rochelle 
in 1324 indicates that some Bayonnais at least were temporarily settled 
there.103 The installations on the Channel Islands and Brittany seem to 
have been of vital importance to the Bayonnais, and they were central 
for their international northern trade, essentially constituting the “crank” 
between the Bayonne and the markets in Flanders and England. These 
areas were also important for the catching and drying of fĳish, especially 
conger eel and hake. The most important area was the drying areas in 
Brittany north of Saint-Mathieu, to which Bayonnais merchants acquired 
exclusive rights from the Duke of Brittany in 1279.104 This should be seen 
in connection with certain drying areas on the Channel Islands given 
to the prominent Bayonnais, Amat de Saubaignac, in 1278 by Edward I. 
Despite the ferocious war between the Bayonnais and the Normans in the 
101  Goyheneche, Bayonne, p. 329. The Ancient Customs of Bayonne from 1273(?) are 
printed in Balasque, Etudes historiques, II, 594–679.
102 Hourmat, Histoire, p. 78.
103 Goyheneche, Bayonne, pp. 529–530.
104 Recueil d’actes inédits des ducs et princes de Bretagne (XIe, XIIe, XIIIe siècles), ed. 
Arthur de la Borderie (Rennes, 1888), pp. 264–267.
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1290s where the Normans apparently attacked the drying areas (accord-
ing to Goyheneche), in 1296 several Bayonnais merchants were still living 
peacefully in the northern Breton ports and had no identifĳiable connec-
tion with the Bayonnais accused of piracy, as shown by the report made 
by the Vicomte d’Avranches for Philippe le Bel. In this report, the resident 
Bayonnais were acquitted of accusations of hostile activities.105
We know less about the Norman installations on the trade routes, but 
they had a permanent presence in Bordeaux and presumably also in La 
Rochelle and Tonnay-Charente. Likewise, they also used the Channel 
Islands as an entrepôt to ship wine on to England.106 It is, however, pos-
sible that they, like the Bretons, had fewer installations than the Bayon-
nais, for while the Bretons had a permanent “colony” in La Rochelle in 
the early part of the thirteenth century, they had no presence in Bordeaux 
apart from the freighting of wine in particular for foreign merchants.107
The reason for the specifĳic conflict with the Bayonnais may well be 
that the Normans, apart from a general interest in plunder, also wanted 
to hinder the Bayonnais in transporting wine to the continental markets, 
whereas the English mariners (though still rivals) predominantly went to 
England with their wine. However, even during times of hostility between 
the kingdoms and the maritime communities, individual merchants con-
tinued to trade in the enemies’ ports, and the exact nature of the conflict 
lines are quite difffĳicult to establish.108
There are thus two caveats to the study of the maritime wars, namely 
that they were not between the ports as united political entities, but rather 
that it was a conflict between their maritime communities. Even then it 
was not a “total” war, since commerce still continued during the wars; 
apparently some mariners and merchants were able to remain neutral in 
the conflicts, as indicated by the report of the Vicomte d’Avranches.
105 Goyheneche, Bayonne, pp. 373–377, Borderie, Arthur de la, “Nouveau recueil d’actes 
inédits des ducs de Bretagne et de leur gouvernement (XIIIe–XIVe siècles)” Bulletin et 
mémoires de la Société Archéologique du département d’Ille-et-Vilaine, XXI (Rennes, 1892), 
152–162.
106 Dupont, Histoire du Cotentin, p. 220.
107 Cassard, “Marins Bretons,” pp. 379–380.
108 Russon, Côtes, p. 439, CPR 1292–1301, p. 106.
CHAPTER FOUR
GUERRA MARITIMA
In 1292, a Norman and a Bayonnais mariner allegedly got into a quarrel 
over who was to draw water fĳirst from a freshwater source on the Island 
of Quéménès offf the west coast of Brittany. One of the mariners was killed 
(most probably the Norman), and the Normans retaliated by attacking 
Anglo-Gascon shipping in the Atlantic and the English Channel. The quar-
rel thus developed into a maritime war characterised by rampant piracy, 
which in the end led to the Philippe le Bel’s confĳiscation of the Duchy of 
Gascony and to the Gascon War (1294–97). Therefore, the maritime war 
between Anglo-Gascon and Norman mariners brought thirty-fĳive years of 
peace between England and France to an end.
This quarrel was, however, neither the fĳirst nor the last time that the 
Norman and the Bayonnais mariners clashed. Indeed, in 1282 they had 
entered a peace treaty, and in 1316–18 and in 1323–25, they waged mari-
time war against each other. These conflicts will be dealt with in chapter 7. 
In this chapter I shall only deal with the 1292–93 war, since it represents 
a good case study of how maritime wars were primarily waged through 
piracy. The maritime war between the Anglo-Gascons and the Normans 
is especially well suited for this investigation, because of all the maritime 
wars in the period from 1280–1330, it contains the most detailed accounts 
of how and why these wars were waged. The purpose of the chapter is to 
examine how a maritime war started, what the martial practices of this 
kind of war were, and how contemporaries understood the conflict and 
its causes.
My approach to the study of maritime wars is inspired by Georges 
Duby’s in his book on the Battle of Bouvines, 1214. Duby wrote:
I attempted a sort of ethnography of the military practice in the beginning 
of the thirteenth century. I approached the combatants of Bouvines like an 
exotic people, noting the strangeness and the singularity of their acts, of 
their cries, of their passions, and of the mirages that dazzled them.  Similarly, 
to situate the battle in the context of the war, the truce, and the peace 
seemed to me a means of circumscribing more precisely the fĳield which 
we call politics . . . Finally, I attempted to investigate how an event was made 
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and unmade since, in the end, it exists only because one speaks of it, since 
it is, strictly speaking, made by those who tell its story.1
The murder of the mariner and the subsequent events leading up to the 
citation in autumn 1293 of Edward I at the Parlement de Paris to answer 
for the actions of his subjects, the French confĳiscation of the Duchy of 
Gascony and the outbreak of the Gascon War are described in several 
sources, legal and diplomatic records as well as chronicles. Even though 
we have to remain cautious as to the descriptions of the events, combined 
they give, at the very least, a plausible course of events.
I shall now present the course of the events as they appear in the English 
and French legal and diplomatic records. I will then follow up by present-
ing the views of the chronicles concerning what had happened. These are 
coloured by the patriotism of the writers, but they contain several impor-
tant details about the agents involved, the practices in maritime conflict 
and the way in which the writers retrospectively understood the causes 
of the mariners’ conflict and the Gascon War. Finally, I shall analyse three 
specifĳic practices of maritime war, all related to the noble private war and 
private enforcement of justice.
The Cinque Ports’ Account of the Norman Piracies
The Portsmen’s account of the piracies and the damages done to the 
Anglo-Gascons by the Normans in 1292–93 is expressed in the Portsmen’s 
petition of defence for their actions during the maritime war. This writ 
in the extant version furthermore includes a list of damages done exclu-
sively to Bayonnais mariners and merchants. These accounts of the events 
can be found in three almost identical versions in the English National 
Archives, C 47/27/15/1, C 47/31/5/2 and C 47/31/6. The C 47/27/15/1 further-
more includes a report by the seneschal of Saintonge, Rostand de Soler, 
concerning a Norman raid up the Charente in 1293 (which I analyse in 
1 “je tentai une sorte d’ethnographie de la pratique militaire au début du XIIIe siècle: 
je m’approchai des combattants de Bouvines comme d’une peuplade exotique, notant 
l’étrangeté, la singularité de leurs gestes, de leurs cris, de leurs passions, des mirages qui 
les éblouissaient. Parallèlement, situer la bataille par rapport à la guerre, par rapport à 
la trêve, à la paix, me parut un moyen de circonscrire plus exactement le champ de ce 
que nous appelons le politique . . . Enfĳin, je tâchai de voir comment un événement se fait 
et se défait, puisque, en fĳin de compte, il n’existe que par ce qu’on en dit puisqu’il est à 
proprement parler fabriqué par ceux qui en répandent la renommée.” Duby, Georges, Le 
dimanche de Bouvines, in G. Duby, Feodalité (Paris, 1996), pp. 830–831.
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the third part of the chapter). This account of this Norman raid is also 
separately recorded in C 47/31/5/1. We are thus dealing with three distinct 
accounts of Norman maritime depredations against Anglo-Gascon mari-
ners, but as C 47/27/15/1 demonstrates, these depredations were clearly 
interrelated and part of the same overall conflict between Norman and 
Anglo-Gascon mariners in 1292 and 1293.2 It should be noted that these 
documents are not the originals issued by the Portsmen, the Bayonnais or 
Rostand de Soler. Rather, they seem to be later copies of the Portsmen’s 
account, the list of damages and the seneschal’s report, compiled together 
no doubt for use in negotiations with the French at the end of the Gascon 
War, or possibly even during the numerous Anglo-French negotiations 
during the fĳirst three decades of the fourteenth century. The dating of 
the documents has been subject to some confusion. Champollion-Figéac 
dated the Portsmen’s petition and the list of damages done to the Bayon-
nais to c. 1292; Rodger and Rose, in English Naval Documents 1204–1960, 
date them to 1293; and Marsden dated them to 1299.3 Marsden’s dating 
is untenable however, as the Portsmen’s account at one point mentions 
that the damages were done in the twentieth and twenty-fĳirst years (of 
Edward I’s reign), that is, 1292, but Champollion’s transcription dates one 
of the Norman attacks in the Cinque Ports petition to 1298. This, how-
ever, rests on a false reading of the year by Champollion. In C 47/31/5/2, it 
says the xxi year of Edward’s reign and not xxvi as Champollion assumed. 
Neither Champollion-Figéac nor Marsden seem to consider that we are 
in fact dealing with two accounts of separate origin. Based on the other 
sources available and especially the chronicles, it seems to me that the 
Portmen’s account was, in all likelihood, written in or shortly after 1293.4 
The Bayonnais account of losses sufffered because of Norman piracies is 
undated, but presumably it hails from the same period. In any case, the 
extant documents in the National Archives suggest that the report by Ro-
stand de Soler (which neither Champollion-Figéac nor Marsden seem to 
have considered), the Portsmen’s account and the Bayonnais list of dam-
ages were initially three diffferent documents, but that they were written 
together to be presented during the peace negotiations and discussions 
of restitution due to the diffferent mariners—perhaps even as early as the 
2 I have provided transcriptions of these accounts in Appendices 3 and 4.
3 Champollion, I, 392–400, British Naval Documents 1204–1960, eds John B. Hattendorf, 
et al. (Aldershot, 1993), p. 20, Marsden, Law and Custom, p. 50.
4 This assumption is supported by EMDP, I, 395.
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autumn of 1293—to be presented at the Parlement de Paris in connection 
with the citation of Edward I.
The Portsmen’s account5 runs accordingly: During Lent of 1292 at the 
source of St. Kymenois, convincingly identifĳied by the historian Hubert 
Michéa as the island of Quéménès offf the west coast of Brittany (see 
below), some Norman and Bayonnais mariners got into an argument about 
who was to draw water fĳirst from the freshwater source on the island. The 
argument developed into a fĳight where a Bayonnais was killed (this con-
tradicted both the internal logic of the course of events presented by the 
Portsmen and most other sources recounting the incident). This murder 
started a series of ferocious Norman attacks on Anglo-Gascon mariners. 
First, the Normans attacked a Bayonnais ship which was destroyed, plun-
dered and the crew was killed. Then the Normans headed south for their 
initial destination, Bordeaux, to buy and freight wine, but on the way 
they attacked and sank four Bayonnais ships at Royan-sur-Gironde. These 
actions led to the assembly of the English, Irish, Bayonnais, Norman and 
Breton mariners in Bordeaux by the constable of that town, and he made 
them swear to refrain from further conflict. The English and the Bayon-
nais then left Bordeaux in groups of four to six ships, but they were soon 
pursued by eighty Norman ships not only laden with wine, but also fĳitted 
for war, with castles and hoist banners signalling hostile intent. On the 
way back to Normandy, the Normans attacked ships from Bayonne and 
Ireland. During the spring and summer of 1292, the Norman depredations 
continued as they attacked English, Bayonnais and Irish ships offf the coast 
of Normandy and in Norman ports, with widespread plunder and killing 
as the consequence. For instance, the crew and pilgrims (in total forty 
persons) on board ships from Winchelsea and Hastings allegedly had their 
feet, hands and fĳinally heads cut offf in Dieppe.6 In the summer, Philippe 
le Bel sent a knight to Bordeaux to proclaim peace and punishment of 
life, limbs and all possession to anyone who harmed the English and the 
Irish. Indeed, both Philippe le Bel and Edward I issued several orders to 
5 I have primarily used the original charter, (see Appendix 4), rather than Champol-
lion’s somewhat faulty transcription of the Portsmen’s account. I will, however, give refer-
ences to his edition for ease of reference for the reader.
6 This passage has not been transcribed by Champollion in full. In TNA document C 
47/31/5 it says: “biens robberent a la vailance de v c livres les mariners couperent les piez 
e les poynz a prez pur meuz aseurer leur besognes(?) couperent les testes a la moun-
taunce de xl homes qe mariners qe peleryns e les neefs enfundrerent en la mer.” See 
Appendix 4.
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their mariners to keep the peace.7 Nevertheless, the Norman piracies con-
tinued, and this led to a growing feeling of insecurity amongst the Anglo-
Gascon mariners. They consequently carried only half the usual cargo in 
their ships so as to be able to better escape or fĳight offf attackers.8 Thus, 
the result was human as well as economic loss for English subjects.
The following year, in 1293, the English sailed undisturbed to Bordeaux, 
but upon return, the Normans lay in wait offf Brittany and attacked the 
English, plundered seventy ships and killed the crews and the merchants. 
Furthermore, in Saint-Malo, two Bayonnais ships were attacked by the 
Normans, and seventy mariners were either flayed or hanged in their 
skins with dogs.9
In response, the English mariners assembled a great fleet of merchant 
ships—for the protection that greater numbers confer—in Portsmouth 
and left on 24 April for Gascony to trade. However, due to contrary winds, 
they lay still for a long time offf Saint-Mathieu. When the Norman wine 
fleet, armed for war, came sailing from the south, charged with only half a 
cargo to be able to better fĳight the English, a naval battle offf Saint-Mathieu 
commenced. In this battle, the English were victorious, and the Normans 
sufffered tremendous losses, allegedly 200 ships.10
It is important to note here that I fĳind it hard to believe that the bel-
licose Portsmen only had peaceful intentions. I rather assume that this 
fleet was assembled for a well-planned ambush, and that it had vengeance 
as its objective, not trade. Whether the Norman fleet was indeed manned 
for war is not known, but they might very well have been, if nothing else 
then for self-defence. To this account by the Portsmen, the list of thirteen 
individual incidents of Bayonnais losses in valuables and lives due to Nor-
man piracies is added, which elaborates on the already detailed account 
of losses in the Portsmen’s petition of defence.
 7 Edward I forbade on at least four diffferent occasions his subjects from attack-
ing the French at sea. CPR 1292–1301, pp. 16, 18, 29, 30 and 31. CCR 1288–1296, p. 284. On 
29 May 1293, Edward wrote to the Cinque Ports, their warden, Great Yarmouth, the ports 
of Norfolk and Sufffolk, Southampton, Dorset, Somerset, Devon and Cornwall. He prohib-
ited them from causing damage to the French, but allowed them to continue peaceful 
trade, except for the Cinque Ports who had not obeyed the king’s commands. Accordingly, 
the Portsmen were prohibited from going to France until a settlement had been reached. 
Likewise, Philippe le Bel prohibited his subjects from harming the English mariners. 
ANF J 631, no. 8, Champollion, I, 394. See also Powicke, F.M., Thirteenth Century, 1216–1307, 
2nd edn (London, 1962), p. 645.
 8 This was normal procedure in wartime. See James, Wine Trade, p. 17.
 9 Champollion, I, 395.
10 TNA C 47/31/5/1, Champollion, I, 396.
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The primary goal of the Cinque Ports’ account was to show that the Nor-
mans started the war and that the Normans had acted against the French 
king’s prohibitions of continuing the war. The Normans therefore had no 
right of vengeance or restitution. In contrast, the English were merely act-
ing in self-defence. In addition, the Portsmen threatened Edward that if 
he agreed to extradite them to French courts of justice or if they felt that 
an English court would treat them unfairly (that is, declare them guilty), 
they would take their families, leave the kingdom and earn their liveli-
hood at sea by indiscriminate piracy (as they had done in 1265–66).
This account is, however, a very one-sided presentation of the course 
of events. For instance, it omits the Bayonnais attack on La Rochelle fol-
lowing the naval battle offf Saint-Mathieu in 1293, and the rather graphic 
and horrifying details of the Normans’ ferocious treatment of English 
mariners makes the document circumstantial. While the Normans may 
or may not have committed these outrageous acts, the portrayal of it 
supported the English case of self-defence against the monstrosity of the 
Normans. Thus, it follows a model for vendetta narratives described by 
Trevor Dean, where what “we are left with is not an objective account of 
a crime, but a tale spun within the limits of contemporary credibility”.11 
However, the French complaints and the chronicles do support the core 
of the Portsmen’s account, and overall it gives a plausible image of the 
Normans’ actions. Yet it remains inconceivable, to my mind at least, that 
the bellicose Cinque Ports would have tolerated Norman hostilities for so 
long without retaliating, but of course the Portsmen omitted this in their 
account.
Philippe le Bel’s Citation of Edward I to Appear in Court in 1293
Philippe le Bel’s citation of Edward I to answer charges in the Parlement 
de Paris for his subjects’ actions in the maritime war was not specifĳically 
oriented on the actions of Anglo-Gascon mariners against French mari-
ners. Rather, the focus of the complaint was the Bayonnais’ and the Gas-
cons’ acts of rebellion against the French Crown and the English king’s 
failure—as the French king’s vassal—to punish them. Thus, en gros the 
French complaints against the Anglo-Gascons tacitly confĳirm the course 
11 Dean, Trevor, “Italian medieval vendetta,” in J.B. Netterstrøm and B. Poulsen, eds, 
Feud in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Århus, 2007), p. 137. 
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of events as portrayed by the Cinque Ports and other English sources 
treated below.
In the autumn of 1293, Philippe le Bel thus complained of the Bayon-
nais’ and other English subjects’ crimes against the French. Generally, he 
claimed that the Bayonnais had demonstrated their disdain and their evil 
intentions by the plundering, the capturing and the killing of Normans 
and other French subjects, in contempt of the French king’s prohibi-
tions against further acts of violence. Since Edward had done nothing to 
stop their actions, nor had he given restitution to the victims, the blame 
accordingly fell on him.
The Bayonnais’ attack on La Rochelle was particularly stressed, but nei-
ther the Normans’ piracies nor the naval battle was explicitly referred to. 
The reason that the attack on La Rochelle was one of the main charges of 
the citation was that it constituted an attack on the French king’s prop-
erty and hence on the kingdom of France, since La Rochelle and Poitou 
had been royal territory since 1271. Thus, this attack transformed a war 
between regional maritime communities into an attack on the French 
king. For these actions, Philippe demanded that the Bayonnais and other 
criminals were delivered into French custody for imprisonment and trial 
in France. When the Bayonnais refused12—and since Edward seemingly 
did not want to carry out the French demands—Philippe saw no other 
alternative but to threaten to confĳiscate the Duchy of Gascony. Edward 
had failed in his feudal obligation to his liege lord for the Duchy, the king 
of France, by omitting to correct or answer for his subjects’ crimes. How-
ever, this threat of confĳiscation and the initial actions of French royal offfĳi-
cers in the Duchy led to a Gascon rebellion with maltreatment, beatings, 
hostage-taking or outright killing of the royal offfĳicers and other French 
subjects. For instance, it was claimed that Normans, who for ten years had 
lived peacefully in Bordeaux and Bourg, were killed for speaking French in 
public, and in Fronsac, French customs offfĳicers were decapitated. Philippe 
summarised the problem in the following manner: since Edward had done 
nothing to stop the Bayonnais’ and the Anglo-Gascons’ crimes, rebellion 
and killings of the French—especially the royal offfĳicers—Edward was 
indicted at the Parlement de Paris in January 1294.13
12 The Bayonnais and Anglo-Gascons claimed that Philippe le Bel had never taken 
an active role in stopping or punishing the Normans, who, despite his prohibitions, had 
continued their piracies. ANF J 631, no. 8.
13 Olim, II, 3–8.
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Thus, the French king was more preoccupied with the general crimes, 
the rebellion and the disdain for the royal offfĳicials than the preceding acts 
of war at sea. This preoccupation was something which the French kings 
increasingly took very seriously, as exemplifĳied by the fate of the Gascon 
lord Jourdain de l’Isle Jourdain, who was executed in Paris in 1323 for the 
killing of royal offfĳicers.14
In response, Edward I sent his brother, Edmund of Lancaster, to France 
to negotiate, and the English accepted the surrender of Gascon hostages 
and a temporary French occupation of Gascony, presumably for forty 
days,15 agreed upon verbally and in secret. During the spring and summer 
of 1294, however, it became clear to Edward that Philippe had no inten-
tions of giving up the occupation, as Philippe maintained the citation of 
Edward to appear in the Parlement in Paris. Since no safe-conduct was 
granted and no delay was allowed, Edward failed to show up in Parlement 
and was condemned as a defaulter on 19 May, and Gascony was declared 
confĳiscated. This prompted Edward to renounce his homage to the king 
of France on 24 June. England and France were now at war.16 The war 
was relatively short without any major battles or losses, and it ended in 
October 1297 with a truce so that the English could deal with a rebellion in 
Scotland and the French with a rebellion in Flanders. However, a formal 
peace treaty was not concluded until 1303. It ended with the restoration 
of Gascony to Edward.
The Chroniclers’ Portrayal of Maritime War and Its Causes
Several English annals and chronicles described this maritime war and its 
causes. It is difffĳicult to determine the level of interdependence of most of 
these accounts, or indeed even how much they relied upon the Portsmen’s 
account (the chronicles seem ignorant of the individual Bayonnais losses 
and Rostand de Soler’s report). However, even when interdependence is 
clear, the chroniclers often supply additional and original material to the 
accounts. Thus, while in many cases they seem to be based on rumours 
and hear-say, they provide details of events which are not completely 
unlikely to have happened, or which, at the very least, seemed credible 
14 Vale, Origins, pp. 133–139, Kaeuper, War, p. 226.
15 Langtoft, p. 200.
16 Powicke, Thirteenth Century, pp. 646–648, Trabut-Cussac, J.P., L’administration 
anglaise en Gascogne sous Henry III et Edouard I de 1254 à 1307 (Geneva, 1972), pp. 107–109.
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to the authors and their audience. In the following, I have striven to use 
only chronicles written in the 1290s and the fĳirst decade of the fourteenth 
century. Thus, I have used only those accounts which are closest to the 
events.
The Chronicle of Bury St. Edmunds, which for this incident may well 
have been written not long after the maritime war,17 notes that in 1293, 
two naval battles took place where the English, the Irish and the Bayon-
nais defeated the Normans. Both occurred offf Saint-Mathieu, the fĳirst on 
15 May 1293, and the second on 26 May. In these, the Normans were alleg-
edly aided by Germans, Flemings and Lombards but to no avail, and the 
Anglo-Gascons were victorious in both.18
Likewise, the Flores Historiarum wrote about the war in 1293 that a great 
discord had arisen between the English and the Normans. The Normans 
in their fury and folly had massacred several English mariners and hanged 
them from the yard-arm with dogs. Accordingly, the Portsmen mustered 
a fleet to avenge the injuries caused to the English. They defeated the 
Normans and plundered their ships, but Edward I refused to have any of 
the spoils, since he had not permitted this retaliation. This prompted the 
terrifĳied French to appeal for help to Philippe le Bel, and the kings sent 
negotiators to make peace. This failed, however, because of the schemes 
of the French king’s brother, Charles de Valois.19
The Annales Londoniensis wrote that the Portsmen set out to avenge 
themselves against the Normans, and in this account, the Normans had 
commenced their depredations at the instigations of Charles de Valois.20 
The Annales Oseneia noted that English were subject to attacks by the 
French because of the fury and insanity of the French. Consequently, 
the Irish, the men of Portsmouth and the Portsmen assembled a fleet 
in secret (since Edward had prohibited retaliation), and defeated and 
plundered the French at sea. This led Philippe le Bel to forbid trade with 
England.21 The Annales Dunstaplia supplies the interesting piece of infor-
mation that the cause of the war was the Normans’ killing of a Bayon-
nais nobleman. This started a series of reciprocal killings, burnings and 
plundering between the English and the French, with the Portsmen as 
17  Bury St. Edmunds, p. xl.
18  Bury St. Edmunds, pp. 116–117.
19  Flores, III, 85–86.
20 Annales Londonienses, p. 101. The Annals of Worcester has a similar account, though 
it omits the mentioning of Charles de Valois’ role in the war. Annales Wigornienses, 
p. 512.
21  Annales Oseneia, pp. 335–336.
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 prominent participants. As in the Annales Oseneia, Charles de Valois 
played a leading role in fuelling French hostilities against the English.22
The Augustinian canon Walter of Guisborough, who wrote his chroni-
cle at the latest in 1305, though possibly before, provided a more detailed 
account of the war in 1293. He wrote that an Englishman and a Norman 
mariner met at a freshwater source in Normandy. They got into a fĳight 
over who was to draw water fĳirst, and the Norman was killed. The Eng-
lishman fled, but the Norman’s comrades pursued him and his fellows. 
The Normans then sent messengers to the Cinque Ports to demand the 
surrender of the guilty party. The Normans asserted that failure to comply 
would result in acts of vindictive violence against Portsmen in general. 
Apparently nothing came of this, and the Normans took matters into their 
own hands. The Normans attacked six English ships at sea and captured 
two of them, and they hanged the English from the yard-arms with dogs 
and sailed around with them to show their contempt for the English. 
Thus, the Normans continued plundering and killing English mariners, 
for instance at the Zwin. The Portsmen swore vengeance and assembled 
a fleet, whereupon they commenced a war (certamine) with the Normans 
which culminated in a naval battle in the English Channel, where English, 
Irish and Dutch mariners defeated a fleet of Normans, French, Flemings 
and Genovese. Guisborough goes on to say that this battle was orches-
trated by Charles de Valois, and that the Norman aggression should be 
understood as being backed by the French king. Nonetheless, the defeat 
resulted in Charles de Valois complaining to Edward I, and in demanding 
punishment of the English and restitution for the Normans for the dam-
ages perpetrated by the English.23
The chronicler Peter Langtoft also described the conflict (at the latest 
in 1305). He relates that in 1293 there was a war between English and Nor-
mans at sea, but he does not mention any royal involvement on either 
side. Rather, he states that the Cinque Ports, Yarmouth, other English and 
Irish ports, and Bayonne scored a great naval victory against the Normans, 
but that Edward I only desired peace.24 However, he continues by saying 
that since Philippe le Bel and Charles de Valois coveted Gascony, they 
summoned the Normans and the Picards and had them accuse Edward I 
of secretly ordering the attack on the Norman mariners. Furthermore, the 
Normans accused the English of having assembled a navy under the false 
22 Annales Dunstaplia, pp. 374 and 384–385.
23 Guisborough, pp. 240–241.
24 Langtoft, p 196.
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pretence of going on a crusade when the real purpose of the English fleet 
was to attack the Normans. Thus, Langtoft assumed French royal ill will 
towards and treachery ( fausine) against the English.25
The Dominican friar, Nicolas Trevet, also remarked on the maritime 
war. He wrote that after the English merchants sufffered losses at sea, they 
appealed to Edward, who then sent Henry de Lacy to France to ask for 
restitution. However, while de Lacy waited for an answer, the Normans 
assembled a fleet of 200 ships or more to attack the Anglo-Gascons, but 
they were repulsed, defeated and plundered in Gascony. This led to French 
royal anger, and Philippe sent envoys to England to demand restitution 
for the Norman ships and goods if Edward wanted to keep Gascony. The 
non-compliance by of the French to submit to negotiations to settle the 
maritime war led to the Gascon War.26
Trevet’s account was probably the source of at least some of the infor-
mation about the maritime war used by the Benedictine monk William 
Rishanger. Rishanger wrote that two mariners, an Englishman and a Nor-
man, met in Gascony at a freshwater source where they both wanted to be 
fĳirst to draw water. This led to an argument and fĳinally to a fĳight in which 
the Norman tried to stab the Englishman with his sword. The English-
man grabbed the Norman’s hand that held the sword and, while trying 
to gain control, the Norman accidentally stabbed himself and died. When 
the Normans learned of the stabbing, they immediately attacked the Eng-
lish to avenge the death of their comrade, but the English resisted and 
escaped. The Normans then complained to Philippe le Bel, and to arouse 
his anger they said that a failure to punish the English would bring 
dishonour and shame on the king and on the French in general. Thus, 
the king ordered his mariners to avenge the murder wherever they met 
the English. Rishanger continues his account by giving an example of a 
Norman pirate attack. He tells how the Normans were lying in wait on 
the trading routes and soon observed an English ship, which they quickly 
intercepted. The Normans used hooks to pull in the English, and they 
commenced a naval battle in which some English mariners were taken 
captive and hanged from the highest mast of the Normans’ ship. As a 
result, Rishanger writes that fear and hatred grew in the people of both 





Thus in general, the English chronicles supply details of the commence-
ment of the war which in some instances seem credible, even though the 
location of the initial killing is confused. Furthermore, most of them stress 
that the war was masterminded at its inception—or soon afterwards—by 
Philippe le Bel and especially Charles de Valois.
Unsurprisingly, the French chroniclers did not share this view of events. 
In his chronicle dated to before 1300, Guillaume de Nangis, chronicler of 
the Abbey of Saint-Dénis, indicated that the cause for the maritime war 
was Edward I’s evil intentions. The treacherous English king had assem-
bled a fleet, particularly from Bayonne, under the pretence of going on a 
crusade. In reality, however, he ordered the fleet to attack French ships 
and land, especially Normandy; the Anglo-Bayonnais mariners attacked, 
killed or took the French prisoners, and they plundered and destroyed the 
French ships. The English attack on La Rochelle and Edward’s defĳiance of 
the Philippe le Bel’s rightful summons for him to stand trial in Paris were 
particularly stressed, and the account justifĳied the French confĳiscation of 
Gascony.28 In c. 1306, the French sergeant and poet, Guillaume Guiart,29 
followed Guillaume de Nangis’ account. He also mentioned Edward I’s 
pretence of going on crusade in order to attack French shipping, but he 
added original material to Nangis’ account by stating that Edward sent 
his fleet to Guernsey where it lay in wait and attacked the Normans as 
they returned from Gascony. The Normans were killed and their ships 
plundered, whereupon the Bayonnais proceeded to the Bay of Biscay and 
sacked La Rochelle.30 Interestingly, the Chronica Sancti Bertini states that 
the war had its origin in the quarrel between two mariners near Saint-
Mathieu, which led to bloody naval fĳights in which Spanish, Normans, 
English and Flemings participated. Thus, this chronicle does not suggest 
that the evil will of the kings was the cause of the war, but the mariners’ 
quarrels. Moreover, it confĳirms the place of the killing to be in  Brittany.31 
A curious and interesting source in this regard is the Chronographia Regum 
Francorum,32 which has Flemings, not Normans, as the initial  victims of 
28 Nangis, p. 574.
29 Rose, Naval Warfare, p. 62. For Guiart’s sources, see: Wailly, Natalis de, “Notice sur 
Guillaume Guiart,” Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes, 2nd series, III (1846), 1–17, and Paris, 
Paulin, “Guillaume Guiart,” Histoire littéraire de la France, 31 (Paris, 1893), 104–134.
30 Guiart, ll. 12730–12821, pp. 265–66.
31  Iohannis Longi Chronica S. Bertini in Monumenta Germaniae Historiae, SS 25, ed. 
Oswald Holder-Egger (Hannover, 1880), p. 864.
32 This part of the chronicle was probably written in the fĳirst decades of the fourteenth 
century. Chronographia, III, pp. v–vii.
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English aggression. In 1290, some Flemish merchants were returning from 
Gascony to Sluis. In La Rochelle, they entered into a quarrel with Ba-
yonnais merchants, and one of the Bayonnais was killed. The Flemings 
then sailed on, and in the port of Saint-Mathieu they met other Bayon-
nais and English merchants. Here, a battle commenced, and many were 
killed. In the battle, the Flemings were supported by Norman, French 
and Picard mariners, and together they defeated the Anglo-Bayonnais, of 
whom only few escaped back to England. The Cinque Ports complained 
of this to Edward I and asked for help, and he granted them the right to 
take revenge on the Flemings, the French, the Normans and the Picards. 
This action started a war at sea which greatly damaged the French. The 
summoning of Edward to Paris and the invasion of Gascony followed, but 
no connection between the maritime war and the Gascon War is made.33 
Nevertheless, here Edward was indirectly implicated in the English retali-
ations, but the incident and the story are diffferent. We cannot entirely dis-
miss the account, and it is quite possible that there were several incidents 
involving French mariners against the English leading up to 1292 which 
might explain why the conflict escalated so quickly.
In these accounts of the events at sea which led to the Gascon War, 
it is interesting to note that many of the medieval chroniclers blamed 
Philippe le Bel, Charles de Valois or Edward I for masterminding the 
maritime war.34 Few of them seem to accept the notion that the kings 
only became involved belatedly and were simply reacting to a war which 
had started between the mariners. They thus dismiss the possibility that 
the war had its origins in quarrels over maritime matters, rather than in 
the carrying out of secret royal plans.
Modern historians have traditionally analysed this maritime war in the 
context of the kings and their policies rather than from the perspective of 
the mariners. While all recognize that the maritime war was the precursor 
to the Gascon War, some have accepted the chroniclers’ argument that 
Philippe le Bel and Charles de Valois incited the Normans’ aggression.35 
Furthermore, Jean Favier gave some credence to Edward I’s role in the 
33 Chronographia, I, 39–40.
34 See Offfenstadt, Nicolas, Faire la paix au Moyen Âge (Paris, 2007), pp. 135–145.
35 Trabut-Cussac, L’administration anglaise, pp. 108–109. This view echoes of the one 
proposed by Langlois, Charles V., Saint Louis, Philippe le Bel, les derniers Capétiens directs 
(1226–1328) (Paris, 1978), pp. 304–305, Nicolas, Nicolas H., A History of the Royal Navy (Lon-
don, 1847), pp. 267–270, Roncière, Charles de la, Histoire de la marine française, (Paris, 
1899), I, 326–328. Russon speculates that Philippe might have orchestrated this war. Rus-
son, Côtes, pp. 353 and 412.
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escalation of the conflict,36 but most historians are simply at a loss in 
explaining how—in their view—a relatively insignifĳicant quarrel between 
mariners could develop into a full-scale war between the kingdoms.37 
Only Frederick M. Powicke seems to have taken the mariners’ personal 
conflicts seriously, but even he refrained from a more detailed analysis of 
the causes of the maritime war.38 These historians’ portrayals are impor-
tant because they demonstrate what has been considered essential in the 
research on medieval piracy and maritime wars, namely that it was an 
extension of royal policy with little importance in and of itself apart from 
the influence of the general relations of the kingdoms.39 However, none of 
the historians doubt that the fĳinal reason for the escalation of the killing 
of a mariner into a full-scale war lay with Philippe le Bel alone, as he was 
ultimately the only one of the actors in this drama who had the power 
to stop the escalation of events. However, while there seems little doubt 
that the fĳinal decision for war was Philippe’s, we cannot simply assume 
that this was completely based on secret and long-harboured plans 
for the conquest of Gascony, nor on erratic behaviour by Philippe le Bel 
as assumed by Strayer.40 The attacks on La Rochelle and on the royal offfĳi-
cers seem to have been the crucial moments in the escalation of events. 
It forced Philippe to take an aggressive stance, since failure to address 
and punish these attacks by the subjects of a powerful vassal would have 
signalled royal weakness to the magnates of France in general. In any case, 
from a juridical point of view, Philippe was justifĳied in his actions against 
Edward, not only for the attack on La Rochelle, but also for the attacks on 
French offfĳicers and Gascon appellants at the Parlement de Paris.41 So, it 
36 Favier, Jean, Philippe le Bel (Paris, 1978), p. 210.
37 Déprez, Eugène, Les préliminaires de la Guerre de Cent Ans (Paris, 1902), p. 11, Favier, 
Philippe le Bel, p. 209, Strayer, Reign, p. 317, Prestwich, Edward I, p. 377, Vale, Origins, 
pp. 176fff.
38 Powicke, Thirteenth Century, pp. 644–645.
39 See, for instance, Rodger, Safeguard, pp. 78–79.
40 Strayer, Reign, p. 319.
41  “such tactics [French royal support in court of appellants against ducal offfĳicials] 
paradoxically increased the threat of French authority in the duchy. Indeed, the abuse of 
Gascon appellants provided the French with an excellent justifĳication for war against the 
English. When in 1293 Philip IV ordered Edward I to the French court to answer charges 
against him, the Capetian noted that the Gascon government had imprisoned appel-
lants, extorted their property and homes, driven out their heirs, and even killed some 
litigants. All this was done, Philip declared, in contempt ‘of the reverence owed us, in 
great and grave prejudice to our superiority and disdain of our jurisdiction’ . . . Although 
there were a number of other French grievances, the abuse of appellants alone would have 
provided Philip IV ample reason to confĳiscate Edward I’s Gascon fĳief.” Kicklighter, J.A., 
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seems that both Edward and Philippe were being forced by the escalation 
of events and the actions of their subjects to engage in a war that they—at 
least initially—did not want.
The Breton Context
Many of the above-mentioned historians correctly claim that the exact 
chain of events at sea is unknown to us, since most of the claims and 
counter-claims in the sources cannot be verifĳied. However, the analysis by 
Hubert Michéa of sailing conditions offf the western coast of Brittany in 
the Middle Ages makes at least some portions of the accounts credible.
Based on two contemporary diplomatic documents which mention 
that the island of Kyvenoys or Keveneys was located on the Breton 
west coast near Le Conquet, Michéa convincingly demonstrates that the 
Kymenois mentioned in the Cinque Ports’ account was probably the 
Island of  Quéménès.42 Michéa shows this in the following way: The travel 
time between England and Bordeaux could take anything from seven to 
thirty or more days depending on the circumstances. When going to and 
from Bordeaux, one would normally sail by the Raz du Four and Raz de 
Sein, and one would often have to stop for provisioning, especially fresh 
water, and safe haven in case of bad weather at Saint-Mathieu, l’Aber du 
Conquet, Camaret, Morgat near Crozon or Bertheaume.43 However, here 
the mariners had to pay sea taxes to the counts of Léon which, unsurpris-
ingly, were detested. So, in good weather the mariners tried to circumvent 
these straits by sailing around the Island of Ouessant or by anchoring and 
provisioning for water at the archipelago of Molène, specifĳically the Island 
of Quéménès, where there was a freshwater source and where they would 
be out of the immediate reach of the toll collectors from Le Conquet. The 
mariners had to hurry in taking on water, however, for the tide changed 
every six hours. If they arrived at low tide at the end of the day, they could 
“French jurisdictional supremacy in Gascony: One aspect of the ducal government’s 
response,” Journal of Medieval History, 5 (1979), 132. For a similar argument, see Firnhaber-
Baker, Justine, “Seigneurial war and royal power in later medieval southern France,” Past 
and Present, 208 (2010), 63–64, See also Favier, Philippe le Bel, p. 211. 
42 Michéa, Hubert, “L’île des Quemenes et les relations entre Bayonnais et Bretons 
1292,” in J. Bourgoin et al., eds, L’aventure maritime, du golfe de Gascogne à Terre-Neuve 
(Paris, 1995), pp. 288–289.
43 Michéa, Hubert, “L’abbaye de Saint-Mathieu, la mer, la guerre, la ville (XIII–XVIe 
siècle),” in B. Tanguy and M.-C. Cloître, eds, Saint-Mathieu de Fine-Terre à travers les âges 
(Plougouvelin, 1995), p. 196.
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leave six hours later at high tide and thus cross the dangerous Breton west 
coast in the minimum of time. If, however, they remained for too long on 
the island, or if they missed the tide, they ran the risk of being charged 
by the toll offfĳicers and being stranded on the island for a longer period 
of time. Michéa estimates (based on the amount of water taken in on an 
eighteenth-century ship in this area) that a person needed two litres of 
water per day. If one had a crew of thirty men, which seems usual for the 
ships at the time, and one would take on water for ten days, this would 
add up to 600 litres of water. Michéa assumes that it took one hour to fĳill 
twelve fĳifty-litre barrels with water and then some time to transport the 
barrels to and from the source. Accordingly, the crews could quite easily 
get into a struggle over who was to draw water fĳirst, since the changing 
tides forced them to hurry if they wanted to avoid being stranded on the 
island. Under these stressed conditions, and perhaps further stimulated 
by an already existing animosity between diffferent groups of mariners, 
conflict was liable to break out.44 From this perspective, the quarrel at the 
freshwater source seems plausible and even understandable.
Dogs, Baucens and a Raid Up the Charente
The sources for the maritime war between the Anglo-Bayonnais and the 
Normans in 1292–93 contain three interesting practices of war which 
I will analyse in the following section. These are the hanging of mariners 
with dogs, the use of the red banner, the baucens, as a sign of a special 
kind of war and a Norman raid up the Charente River in 1293. Collectively, 
I consider these practices as signs of a maritime war or a guerra maritima, 
but I reserve the explanation of this term for the end of the chapter.
It should be pointed out here that only Anglo-Gascon sources are con-
sulted for these events. To my knowledge no Norman account of events 
exists. Nevertheless, even if the Norman mariners did not do the things that 
they were accused of here, these actions were still within the credible limits 
of contemporary beliefs. Thus, these sources describe credible practices for 
maritime war, whether the Normans had recourse to them or not.
The Hanging of Mariners With Dogs
The hanging of the mariners with dogs is mentioned in several of the 
sources. In the Cinque Ports’ account, it was claimed that when the 
44 Michéa, “Quéménès,” pp. 290–291.
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Malouins and the Normans attacked the Bayonnais at Saint-Malo, “they 
hanged some and others they flayed and hung by their skins, and they 
hung dogs next to the Christians despite the Christianity of you [Edward I] 
and your men”.45 This is the only time when the document states that 
the Normans hanged men with dogs, but the theme of hanging defeated 
mariners from the ship’s yard-arm is repeated throughout the text. In the 
attack on an Irish vessel offf Cherbourg, the Normans “took the ship and 
killed the mariners and hanged a boy from the yard-arm, and they took 
the 500 pounds and took the ship to the harbour of Caen with the boy 
still hanging from the yard-arm”.46 The document also mentioned how 
a London merchant was attacked at the Seine estuary and the mariners 
were hanged from the yard-arm of their ship.47 However, these descrip-
tions do not dominate the accounts; the usual model is that the Normans 
attacked the vessels, plundered them and killed all or part of the crew, 
took the survivors prisoner, held them for ransom and fĳinally sunk the 
ships. These descriptions of hanging seem to be included in the document 
to display the extreme savagery of the Normans. Nevertheless, that these 
horrible descriptions do not dominate the account could be an argument 
for their veracity, since one would assume that in a genuine vilifĳication 
campaign this savagery would have been exaggerated and expanded to 
include all the Norman attacks. Accordingly, a tentative rendition of at 
least some of the Normans’ procedures would be that they hanged the 
defeated mariners from the yard-arms, at least on one occasion with dogs. 
This depiction is supported by fĳive English chronicles. Guisborough writes 
that the Normans on one occasion “hanged men with dogs on the masts of 
their ships and by sailing thus they did not diffferentiate between dog and 
Englishman”.48 In the Flores Historiarum, the story is repeated: “A very 
great discord broke out between the English and the Normans. Indeed, 
the Norman mariners in their furious [and erroneous] assaults massacred 
some Englishmen in various ways while others were hanged from the 
45 “ ‘les uns pendirent, e les autres escorcherent e les pendirent par leur quirs de mesme 
e pendirent mastins juste les cristiens en depit de la cristiente et de vous [Edward I] e de 
vos homes.’ ” TNA C 47/31/5/1, Champollion, I, 395. 
46 “e la neef pristrent e occistrent les maryners e un garcoun pendirent a la verge del 
tref e les cinck cent livres pristrent e menerent la neef en le havene de Caan a tut le gar-
coun pendu.” TNA C 47/31/5/1, Champollion, I, 393.
47 TNA C 47/31/5/1, Champollion, I, 395.
48 “suspendentes homines cum canibus in trabibus nauium suarum, et sic per mare 
nauigantes nullam faciebant diffferenciam inter canem et Anglicum.” Guisborough, 
pp. 240–241. 
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ship’s yard-arm with dogs”.49 The Annales Wigornienses states that: “The 
Barons of the Cinques Ports [are] grieving their associates [who were] 
maimed by the Normans, hanged between dogs and flayed. In the same 
[month of] May, they engaged in naval battle with the killers and, 246 
warriors and mariners having been killed, the victorious English returned 
with much booty”.50
Rishanger also mentioned the hanging of men from the yard-arm, how-
ever without the mentioning of dogs.51 The somewhat later Chronicon de 
Lanercost mentions that Charles de Valois “subjected pilgrims and schol-
ars to many affflictions, even putting some poor people to death on the 
gallows and hanging beside them live dogs to which he likened them”.52 
In the English translation, the editor noted that in the margin of the man-
uscript “is sketched a gallows whereon hang some Englishmen, alternated 
with dogs”.53 It should be noted, however, that this was not the treatment 
sufffered by mariners, but by English pilgrims and scholars in France.
It should come as no surprise that these English accounts would 
emphasize the savagery and ruthlessness of their adversaries. Initially, 
one might understand these allegations of hanging men with dogs as a 
charge invented to vilify the opponents, garner sympathy for the Eng-
lish mariners and consequently consider their retaliation as self-defence. 
However, the hanging of the men from the yard-arms seems to have been 
a traditional maritime custom for dealing with criminals and enemies in 
the Middle Ages, as for instance shown by the French chronicler, Gefffroi 
de Paris,54 and it was a practice that continued well into the modern era. 
49 “Orta est discordia magna nimis inter Anglicos et Normannos. Maritimi etenim Nor-
mannorum in impetus furoris sui [sive erroris] quosdam de Anglicis diversis mortibus 
trucidarunt, alios super virgam mali navis cum canibus suspenderunt.” Flores, III, 85.
50 “Barones Quinque Portuum dolentes socios suos a Normannis truncates, inter canes 
suspensos, et excoriates, id. Maii cum homicidis naval prælium commiserunt, et interfectis 
bellatoribus et nautis navium ducentarum et xlvi, cum præda maxima victores Anglici 
redierunt”, Annales Wigornienses, p. 512.
51  Rishanger, p. 131. “quemdam Anglicum trahentes de navi sua, mox in summitate mali 
navis Normannici suspenderunt.”
52 “quosdam etiam pauperes suspendio trucidavit, et canes vivos, eorum ut reputabat 
similes, lateribus eorum appendit.” Chronicon de Lanercost, ed. Joseph Stevenson (Edin-
burgh, 1839). p. 150. The Chronicle of Lanercost, transl. Herbert Maxwell (Glasgow, 1913), 
p. 96.
53 Chronicle of Lanercost, p. 96, n. 2. I have not been able to locate this sketch, however. 
To my knowledge it is neither to be found in the manuscript in the British Library nor in 
the legal and diplomatic records in the TNA.
54 Gefffroi de Paris, ll. 7593–7598, p. 163. “Cel temps, Flamens par mer aloient;/ Avec 
Baonnois se routoient;/ Blez et vins assez par mer prirent;/ Et moult granz damages fĳirent/ 
Aux Anglois, et moult en occirent,/ Et d’autres plusors en pendirent.”
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In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in the Caribbean, captured 
and executed pirates’ bodies were hoisted on the yard-arms when enter-
ing a friendly harbour to display a successful pirate hunt.55 The hanging 
of pirates or defeated enemies next to dogs, however, seems especially 
demeaning. Nevertheless, the charge of hanging men with dogs might 
actually be true. In the following, I will explore the symbolic meaning of 
the dog, and why it was so demeaning to be hanged with one. This will 
render credibility to the impression that the Normans might actually have 
done this.
In the Middle Ages, the perception of the dog was ambiguous. Some 
historians have stressed the overall positive view of the dog in the Middle 
Ages, since its function in the hunt (the sport of nobles) and as watch-
dogs led it to be praised, especially for the virtue of loyalty.56 Others, 
however, stress the negative symbolism of the dog equally. An example 
of this opposing view can be seen in the interpretation of a ritual of pun-
ishment in twelfth-century Germany, which entailed that a rebellious 
nobleman begging forgiveness of his liege lord should crawl on all fours 
through the village with a dog on his back (the so-called Hundetragen). 
Bernd Schwenk claims that this ritual was a way of redeeming oneself, 
as the carrying of the dog was a demonstration of one’s renewed loyalty, 
since the dog was the symbol of this virtue. Far from being a degradation 
of the rebellious nobleman, according to Schwenk this should be seen as 
a return to honour, since the dog was not an ignoble beast but rather one 
of the most praised animals in the Middle Ages.57 Opposing this view, 
Mariëlle Hageman has stated that the carrying of a dog in a medieval judi-
cial ritual could never be perceived as anything other than a degradation. 
Drawing on, for instance, the description of the dog in the Revelation of 
John, where dogs are compared to the sexually immoral, murderers, idola-
ters and everyone who loves and practices falsehood,58 Hageman presents 
the dog as a symbol of disloyalty, infĳidelity, laziness, dirtiness, greed, lack 
55 Earle, Pirate Wars, p. 145.
56 See Janotta, C.E., “Der Hund im Mittelalter,” Innsbrucker Historische Studien, 14/15 
(1994), 13–32, and Figg, K.M., “Froissart’s ‘debate of the horse and the greyhound’: Com-
panion animals and signs of social status in the fourteenth century” in T.S. Jones and 
D.A. Sprunger, eds, Marvels, Monsters and Miracles (Kalamazoo, 2002), pp. 85–107.
57 Schwenk, Bernd, “Das Hundentragen: Ein Rechtsbrauch im Mittelalter,” Historisches 
Jahrbuch, 110 (1990), 298–299.
58 Revelation 22:15 “foris canes et venefĳici et inpudici et homicidae et idolis servientes 
et omnis qui amat et facit mendacium”, Biblia Vulgata: http://www.fourmilab.ch/etexts/
www/Vulgate/Revelation.html accessed 31 January 2012.
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of self-control and madness due to rabidity. Hageman concludes that far 
from being an animal with which one associated positive traits overall, 
the dog was more likely a symbol of fundamental flaws.59 This view is sup-
ported by Galbert of Bruges’ description of the execution of the provost of 
Ypres. He wrote: “the people of Ypres, thirsting for the death of the pro-
vost, twisted the viscera of a dog around his neck, and placed the muzzle 
of a dog next to his mouth, now drawing its last breath, thus likening him 
and his deeds to a dog”.60
Hageman’s view of the dog’s role in rituals of degradation is supported 
by Joyce Salisbury. In The Beast Within she writes:
The mental images that caused people on the one hand to claim superior-
ity over the animal world and on the other to note the reality that they 
were joined to their animals in liability for their animals’ behaviour was 
expressed in some laws that punished people by reducing them to a bestial 
level, an ultimate humiliation.61
Aleksander Pluskowski has reached the same conclusion in regard to the 
dog’s status in the early and High Middle Ages. He notes that “in north ern 
Europe, the wolf (alongside the ‘servile’ dog) was more often than not sin-
gled out as an animal referent for the bestial degradation of humanity”.62 
While he concedes that Christianity seems to have introduced a difffer-
ence between wolves and dogs, where dogs were seen as the protector of 
the flock against the wolf, in the vernacular Marie de France’s lais “canine 
loyalty is only praised in a single tale—all the others represent dogs as 
greedy, litigious and garrulous. Wolves, though cruel and rapacious, stand 
for fallen nobility, but nobility nonetheless”.63 Thus, in Pluskowski’s view, 
there seems to have been a gradual transition of the dog’s symbolic role 
59 Hageman, Mariëlle, “De gebeten hond? Het gebruik van honden in rituelen van 
vernedering,” Madoc: Tijdschrift over de Middeleeuwen, 12 (1998), 270.
60 Galbert of Bruges, De multro, traditione, et occisione gloriosi Karoli comitis Flandri-
arum, ed. Jefff Rider (Turnhout, 1994), p. 109: “Iprensium igitur turba, furens in mortem 
praepositi, canis viscera contorserat circa collum ejus et os canis ad os ejus jam vitalem 
spiritum expirantis opposuerunt aequiparantes cani ipsum et facta ipsius.” Translation: 
Galbert of Bruges, The Murder of Charles the Good, ed. and transl. James B. Ross (Toronto, 
1993), pp. 211–212. I am indebted to Stephen D. White for bringing this passage to my 
attention.
61  Salisbury, Joyce E., The Beast Within: Animals in the Middle Ages (New York and Lon-
don, 1994), p. 39.
62 Pluskowski, Aleksander, Wolves and the Wilderness in the Middle Ages (Woodbridge, 
2006), p. 173.
63 Pluskowski, Wolves, p. 88.
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during the Middle Ages, and while it was praised for its loyalty, it was also 
despised for it servility.
In his treatment of the holy greyhound Guinefort, Jean-Claude Schmitt 
notes the connection that people made between the canicule (an annual 
Mediterranean heat wave) and rabid dogs. While this connection applies 
to the association between meteorological and astrological phenomena 
and animal behaviour, the belief connects dogs’ madness (rabidity) with 
the forces of nature at the same time as also expressing a general view of 
dogs being prone to madness.64
This view of the dog’s inherent madness was expressed by Peter Langtoft, 
who wrote about the Scots’ attack on England: “Which the mad dogs have 
worked in their folly”.65 Langtoft furthermore stressed the lowness of the 
dog. Thus, when he wrote about the Gascon War: “The proud French-
man would bring us so low/ And cause us to be honoured no more than 
dogs”.66 Another example of the value attributed to dogs can be found in 
Froissart’s account of the Jacquerie and their massacres of French nobles 
in 1358. He wrote: “these evil people assembled without the direction of a 
leader or armour and they robbed and burned everything and killed all the 
noblemen they could fĳind and they restrained and raped all ladies and vir-
gins without pity and without mercy like mad dogs. Indeed never among 
Christians or Saracens were there those who would commit such mad 
acts as these evil people committed”.67 On the Battle of Roosebeke, 1382, 
Froissart likewise wrote that the French footsoldiers, armed with daggers, 
slaughtered the Flemings and that they showed them no more mercy than 
would have been shown a dog.68 This quotation clearly shows the low 
status of the dog—that is, as a being to which one would not show mercy. 
Being called a dog (chien) was also a terrible insult. Nicole Gonthier notes 
that the insults of dog and excommunicated were often combined, and 
concerning the dog, she writes that “the dog is an animal which one kills 
64 Schmitt, Jean-Claude, Le Saint Lévrier (Paris, 1979), pp. 200–213.
65 “Ke les fols mastyns ount bracé par folage.” Langtoft, pp. 232–233.
66 “Li Fraunceys orgullous à [si] bas nus menerait/ Et nent plus ke mastyns honurer 
nus frayt.” Langtoft, p. 214.
67 “ces méchans gens asamblés sans chief et sans armures, roboient et ardoient tout et 
tuoient gentils hommes qu’ils trouvoient, et effforchoient et violoient touttes dames aet 
pucelles sans piteé et sans merchy, enssi comme chiens enragiés. Certes oncques n’avint 
entre crestiens, ne Sarrazins telle forsenerie que ces méchans gens faisoient.” Froissart, VI, 
45–46. See also p. 49, n. 8 and p. 51.
68 “A paines estoient Flament cheu, quant pilliart et gros varlès venoient, qui se boutoi-
ent entre les gens d’armes, portoient grandes coustilles dont il les parochioient, ne nulle 
pité il n’en avoient non plus que che fussent chien.” Froissart, X, 171.
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as a public health measure to eradicate the danger of wandering packs. 
It is evident how this comparison can wound; it implies that the person 
to which it applies is not worth more than one of these pestilent beasts 
which one dispatched of in a rather inelegant fashion”.69
The use of dogs in judicial procedures for torture and punishment is 
documented in the punishment of a Jew in Paris in 1391:
Salmon de Barselonne, Jew and then convert. He was condemned to be 
hanged by the feet with a big dog on each side. Then he was encouraged to 
convert to Christianity and to be baptised to save his soul. And under the 
crenelation of the Chatelet he was baptised by the chaplains of St. Germain 
and his godfathers were an offfĳicer of the court, a mounted sergeant and the 
jailer. And when this was done he was hanged by the neck.70
It is interesting that while Salmon was executed, his companion was only 
beaten and banished from the kingdom. Thus, it was in some way a pun-
ishment for a crime committed by the Jews but which for Salmon’s part 
fĳirst entailed a shaming “ritual” by hanging him with dogs from his feet, 
probably to force him to convert so that the French could execute him 
with a clear conscience, confĳident that his soul would be saved. This was 
a recording of a true occurrence which, however, had been put into a 
hapax (a manual establishing the guidelines of how diffferent crimes were 
to be treated. It was almost certainly written on the orders of the Provost 
of Paris, Jean de Folleville). Thus, the entry was not a singular occurrence,71 
but rather an example of a cultural custom of punishment for these types 
of crimes.
On a fĳinal note, in Mad Blood Stirring Edward Muir draws the atten-
tion to the connection between dogs and revenge in late medieval Fri-
ulian vendettas. In the language used to describe these vendettas, the 
enemy was styled as or likened to dogs or pigs because of their peceived 
69 “Le chien est l’animal que l’on tue par mesure de salubrité publique, afĳin d’écarter 
le danger des meutes errantes. On sait en quoi la comparaison peut meurtrir; elle sous-
entend que la personne à qui elle s’applique ne vaut pas plus qu’une de ces bêtes, con-
sidérées comme nuisibles, dont on se débarasse, en general, de façon peut élégante.” 
Gonthier, Nicole, “Sanglant Coupoul!” “Orde Ribaude”. Les injures au Moyen Âge (Rennes, 
2007), p. 108. See also Muir, Edward, Mad Blood Stirring (Baltimore, 1998), p. 142.
70 “Salmon de Barsolonne juif et depuis convers. Il fut condamné a estre pendu par 
les piez et deux (gros) chiens d’un costé et d’austre et apres fut envorté de soy faire cres-
tien et batisiez pour sauvez son ame. Et sus les quarreaulx de Chastellet fut betisé par les 
chapelains de Saint-Germain et furent ses parrains ung examinateur, sergent à cheval et 
la geoliere. Et ce fait fut executé et pendu par le col.” Gauvard, Claude “Compter le crime,” 
in C. Gauvard, Violence et ordre public au Moyen Age (Paris, 2005), p. 31.
71  Gauvard, “Punir le crime,” p. 59.
 guerra maritima 105
 fĳilthiness, promiscuity, senseless aggressiveness and indeed the profanity 
of these animals. Accordingly, the enemies were sometimes—as a fĳinal 
act of disgrace—fed to dogs or pigs. For instance, a defamatory sonnet 
circulated in Venice “ended with a vision of the traitor hanging by his foot 
from the gallows while dogs and crows pulled apart his body”.72
With this analysis of the view of the dog in the Middle Ages, I return to 
the Normans and their treatment of the defeated English. As was apparent 
even in the English chronicles, the Normans (erroneously in the English 
opinion) felt they had been deprived of justice and consequently took 
action themselves to obtain restitution and revenge. Indeed, denial of jus-
tice was one of the defĳining reasons for waging a guerra—a noble private 
war.73 In fact, both Rishanger and Guisborough stated that the Normans at 
fĳirst tried to get restoration through the normal channels, that is, through 
an appeal to Philippe or Edward I. While several of the English chronicles 
described the fury and madness of the Normans, they still maintained the 
notion that this was a Norman act of private justice.
It is in this light that the hanging of men with dogs from yard-arms 
becomes credible, for as an act of degradation it expressed the criminality 
of the English for their killing of a Norman. It also expressed the Normans’ 
consideration of the Anglo-Bayonnais as a greedy, rapacious and litigious 
lot with no more honour than dogs. Accordingly, this was the treatment 
that they merited. While it is uncertain how widespread this treatment 
was (it might indeed have happened only on one occasion, which the 
chroniclers picked up, since it expressed the savagery of the Normans), 
given the circumstances it certainly seems credible. Thus, the motives of 
the Norman aggression difffer from the primarily profĳit-oriented piracies 
described in chapter 2.
Justine Firnhaber-Baker has analysed the techniques of seigneurial war 
in the fourteenth century. Concerning these wars, she writes that they
almost invariably involved acts of violence and domination that produced 
no direct material benefĳit for the attackers, but which humiliated their 
enemy, resulting in the loss of prestige for the opposition and reinforcing 
bonds of solidarity within the attackers’ own group. . . . Certain noblemen 
erected gallows and performed executions in enemy territory during a 
war in order to claim jurisdiction and demonstrate dominance . . . No one 
can really have thought that these performances represented the normal 
72 Muir, Mad Blood, p. 141.
73 Keen, Maurice, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (London & Toronto, 1965), 
pp. 73 and 226.
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functioning of seigneurial justice, but they served to demonstrate publicly 
the lord’s claim to jurisdiction, his (or occasionally her) ability to enforce 
that claim and his opponent’s impotence in the face of this violence.74
The hanging of mariners with dogs should be seen in the same vein as 
what was done by nobles on land, namely a demonstration of power over 
the sea, the criminality of the Anglo-Gascons and that justice had been 
served. It was thus more akin to the noble private war than mere piracy 
for profĳit.
The Baucens
The second practice evoked by the Portsmen was the Normans’ alleged 
use of the baucens. The Cinque Ports petition states the following regard-
ing the Norman fleet which returned from Bordeaux in 1293:
with 190 ships well manned with men-at-arms, castles erected fore and aft 
and on each masthead. They wore banners of red silk [cendal] each 2 ells 
broad and 50 long, called baucans, what the English call ‘streamers’, which 
among mariners everywhere signify war to the death [guere mortele] . Thus 
in peacetime and without warning the Normans wickedly attacked your 
people. . . . And all these things were done as acts of warfare begun and con-
tinued by the Normans as is known by all . . . thus, we are not held to make 
restitution nor amends since it is the usage and law of the sea that things 
done or taken at sea in war where the said baucens are hoist do not warrant 
restitution nor amends by one party to the other displaying this banner. It is 
furthermore the usage and law of the kingdom of England that if a man kills 
or does a similar act in self-defense he is not held to cause either in times 
of peace nor in times of war.75
74 Firnhaber-Baker, Justine, “Techniques of seigneurial war in the fourteenth century,” 
Journal of Medieval History, 36 (2010), 98.
75 “c lxxxx [the TNA C 47/31/6 has ’cc’] neefs bien eskipees de gent de armes chasteus 
hordys devaunt e derere, chasteus au somet de chescun mast banere despleis de ruge 
cendeal chescun banere de ii aunes de large et xxx aunes de long lesqueles banere sount 
apele baucens et la gent de Engletere les apeles stremeres e celes baneres signifĳient mort 
saunz remede et mortele guere en touz les lious ou mariners sount et en cele fourme et en 
cele manere Normaundz vindrent sur vos gentz e les asailirent fffeluneusement en cuntre 
la pees avaunt crie . . . Et tutes cestes choses sunt fetes par fet de guere comencee et con-
tinuee par Normaundz e notories sunt e apertes . . . nous ne sumes tenu fere restitucions 
ne amende si nule chose eit este fete, ou prise par nous en la dire guere kar il est usage et 
ley de mer qe des choses fetes, ou prises sur mer en guerre meimement ou le dit Baucan 
seyt leve ne doit estre fete restitutioun ne amende del une partie a le autre qi tele banere 
leve Cest usage et ley del reaume de Engletere, qe si home feist une mort ou autre fet 
semblable en soi defendaunt il nest tenus de ceo ne en tens de pees, ne de guerre.” TNA C 
47/31/5/1—see Appendix 4, Champollion, I, 396–97. Marsden, Law and Custom, pp. 53–54, 
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Several interesting things are stated in this document, which describes 
how war and aggression at sea were perceived. The immediate purpose 
of this description was obviously to exculpate the Portsmen for the plun-
der of a Norman fleet. Accordingly, they would refer to commonly recog -
nised signs for war and piracy at sea. Thus, fĳirst of all they stated that the 
Normans had erected castles on both sterns and on the mast, like men of 
war. While life at sea in the Middle Ages was always a risky afffair because 
piracy abounded, the raising of castles and the manning of the ships with 
warriors were unusual because the castles would slow the ships down. 
Furthermore, by manning the ships with additional warriors and by only 
charging half a load it clearly indicated that they had ill-intent. Thus, to all 
intents and purposes, the Normans were on the war-path. Peaceful trad-
ing was just a pretext for sailing south. One could argue, however, that, at 
least in 1293, the raising of castles, the manning with extra warriors and 
charging half a load could just as well be seen as safety precautions in hos-
tile waters. Indeed, in the same source, the English stated that they, too, 
at one point only charged half a load, stating that this was out of fear of 
Norman pirates. What really justifĳied the Anglo-Bayonnais attack was the 
display of the baucens. By unfurling the baucens, the Normans efffectively 
declared the harshest type of war in the Middle Ages, la guerre  mortelle, 
literally a merciless war to the death,76 which efffectively put aside all other 
conventions of conflict at sea, namely reprisal and restitution. Frederic 
Cheyette commented that the baucens signalled the maritime equivalent 
of chivalric warfare and that this most probably denoted an old maritime 
custom; Robert Jones has argued that the unfurling of banners before a 
battle was the traditional way of legitimising the ensuing acts of war.77 
Likewise, Maurice Keen noted that the display of banners had a consid-
erable legal signifĳicance, since actions taken under these circumstances 
were performed “in actu belli”.78
There are two components to the analysis of the baucens, the name and 
the symbolism of the colour red on banners.
English Naval Documents, p. 20 states the Norman fleet counted 190 ships, not 200 or 290 
as Champollion and Marsden assumed. The translation is partially based on the one given 
in English Naval Documents.
76 Keen, Laws of War, pp 104–6, Kaeuper, War, p. 227.
77 Cheyette, Frederic L., “The sovereign and the pirates, 1332,” Speculum, 45. (1970), 
58, Jones, Robert W., Bloodied Banners (Woodbridge, 2010), pp. 53–54. See also Firnhaber-
Baker, “Seigneurial war,” p. 46.
78 Keen, Laws of War, pp. 106–107.
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The name itself is somewhat rare in the sources, at least when it comes 
to maritime conflict. Banners clearly played an important role at sea, 
enabling ships to recognise each other, not least to determine friend from 
foe, as an agreement between Flanders and England stipulates in 1297.79 
In addition, banners could clearly deter and scare offf pirates, as the Eng-
lish king’s and the admiral’s banners did in 1314 against Flemish pirates.80 
Nevertheless, to my knowledge, the name baucens is only encountered 
twice elsewhere between 1280–1330, namely in 1296 in the account for 
the expenses of the French fleet by Count Jean d’Arrode and Miqueu de 
Manx, and in 1324 when Edward II ordered that the galleys which were 
being built should be supplied with baucens.81
According to both Frédéric Godefroy’s Dictionnaire de l’ancienne langue 
française and Algirdas Julien Greimas’ Dictionnaire de l’ancien français, 
the name baucens means “spotted with clearly separated black and white 
colours”, and it was usually used to describe the appearance of horses.82 In 
Glossaire Nautique, Augustin Jal was at a loss to explain the origin of the 
name baucens and how it was connected with the red banner described 
by the Portsmen in 1293. However, he noted that the Knights Templar had 
a black-and-white banner called baucens.83 The Templars’ banner and the 
red banner of the mariners only had the name in common, though.
In La Règle du Temple (probably from between 1257 and 1265),84 the 
baucens is described in article ninety-nine as a black-and-white banner 
used by the seneschal and signifying command. The editor, Henri de 
 Curzon, noted that:
This word signifĳies simply a division of two coulours, here the black and 
white. . . . The term baucent . . . was mostly applied to horses, etc. It is a cor-
ruption of the original meaning of the term that resulted in the naming 
of the banner itself as the baucent, and so the new meaning was not con-
fĳined to the Knights Templar as one is sometimes led to believe. Rather 
it was used by Christians and pagans alike from the Orient as well as the 
West. . . . Often, it is that which we called the flamme, a long and straight 
two-pointed pennon flying from the top of the mast of a ship.85
79 Marsden, Law and Custom, p. 46.
80 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 262.
81  Jal, Archéologie, II, 323, Marsden, Law and Custom, p. 50, n. 1.
82 Godefroy, F. Dictionnaire de l’ancienne langue française, 10 vols (Paris, 1937–38), I, 
602, Greimas, A.J. Dictionnaire de l’ancien francais (Paris, 2001), pp. 56 and 60.
83 Jal, Augustin, Glossaire nautique (Paris, 1848), pp. 277–278.
84 La Règle du Temple, ed. Henri de Curzon (Paris, 1886), pp. iv–v.
85 “Ce mot signifĳie simplement mi-parti de deux couleurs; ici le noir et le blanc. . . . 
le qualitatif baucent . . . s’appliquait surtout aux chevaux, etc. C’est une corruption du 
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This last remark leads us away from the Templars, whose influence, 
despite their exploits as sea-warriors in the Mediterranean, seems rather 
unlikely in regard to a practice by mariners in northern Europe. Rather, 
it seems as if the Templars had adopted the general term baucens and 
applied it to their specifĳic banner, since the meaning corresponded to 
their heraldic colours.
However, Henri de Curzon’s reference to the flamme corresponds rather 
well with the Cinque Ports’ account. The signifĳicance of a red banner used 
in warfare is probably best seen in the French kings’ Oriflamme, which 
was precisely a long, purely red banner. The Oriflamme was (at least ide-
ally) only to be used against infĳidels and rebels, because it signifĳied guerre 
mortelle. Guiart described the Oriflamme in the following manner: “The 
Oriflambe is a banner, somewhat bigger than a pennon. It is a plain ban-
ner of red silk and it is unadorned by any motif ”.86
Samuel Cohn has remarked that the Oriflamme was used, at least in the 
fourteenth century, not only by the kings of France but also by the count 
of Foix, the duke of Orléans and the captal de Buch against the Jacques 
in 1356. However, Cohn states that until the battle of Roosebeke in 1382, 
the banner was theoretically only to be used against the infĳidels.87 On 
the other hand, Duby seems to think that it was displayed at the battle of 
Bouvines in 1214,88 in which the Flemings and the English could be seen 
as rebels against the divinely anointed king, thus in a sense as enemies 
of the Christian divine order. This interpretation is supported by Keen’s 
reflections on the signifĳicance of red banners. He remarks that it only 
seems to have been unfurled in moments of dire necessity and when no 
quarter was to be given. Accordingly, it was unfurled at the Battle of Crécy 
(1346), the Battle of Poitiers (1356) and at the Battle of Roosebeke (1382). 
Concerning the use of the banner at Roosebeke, Keen notes that, accord-
ing to Froissart, the Oriflamme was only unfurled after much deliberation 
sens primitif qui a appelé l’étendard même le baucent, et alors le nouveau sens primitif 
n’appartient pas au seul ordre du Temple, comme on le croit quelquefois, mais à tous chré-
tiens ou païens, de l’Orient et même de l’Occident. . . . Souvent, c’est ce que nous appelons 
la flamme, long et étroit pavillon à deux pointes, fĳixé au haut des mâts des navires.” La 
Règle du Temple, p. 87, n. 3.
86 “Oriflambe est une banniere/ Aucun poi plus forte que guimple/ De cendal roujoiant 
et simple,/ Sanz portraiture d’autre afaire.” Guiart, Guillaume, La Branche des Royaus lig-
nages, ed. J.A. Buchon, 2 vols (Paris, 1828), vol. 1, v. 1151.
87 Cohn, Samuel K. Jr., Lust for Liberty (Cambridge & London, 2006), pp. 190 and 307, 
n. 76.
88 Duby, Feodalité, pp. 869 and 983.
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and because the Flemings were considered no better than enemies of the 
faith.89
In his analysis of the history of the Oriflamme, Philippe Contamine 
has several important observations. Like the baucens, the Oriflamme 
was, at least until the reign of Philippe VI, a plain red banner. Also, 
like the baucens, the signifĳicance of the Oriflamme was victory or war to 
the death.90 Contamine notes some medieval authors’ focus on the blood 
thirst of the banner. Indeed, Richer de Senones writing between 1255–1267 
on the Battle of Bouvines claimed that: “This Oriflamme thirsts for human 
blood as many are witnessing. Thus today with the help of God I [Gale, 
the knight who carried the Oriflamme] shall let it drink heavily of the 
blood of the enemies.”91 He thus argued that the Oriflamme literally drank 
the blood of the adversaries. The purpose of the baucens as well as the 
Oriflamme seems to be to strike terror in the adversary, exactly because 
of the merciless warfare that it entailed. According to the chansons de 
geste, the Oriflamme was not only used by Charlemagne and the kings 
of France, but also by more lowly barons which indicate the more gen-
eral use and signifĳicance of the red banner.92 Interestingly, the English 
chronicler Geofffroi le Baker wrote on the Battle of Crécy that once the 
Oriflamme was raised
it was not allowed on pain of death to take prisoners for ransom. I should tell 
you that it was called the Oriflamme, as showing that when French mercy 
was set on fĳire, it was not able to spare the life of any man for ransom, just 
as oil, when set alight, cannot spare anything that is inflammable.93
Thus, like Richer he stressed the insatiable bloodlust which the Oriflamme 
waked in the French.
89 Keen, Laws of War, pp. 105–106.
90 Contamine, Philippe, “L’Oriflamme de Saint-Denis aux XIVe et XVe siècles,” Annales 
de l’Est (Nancy, 1975), 193 and 218.
91  “quia auriflamma ista humanum sitit sanguinem, Deo mihi praesante, multis viden-
tibus, hodie eam sanguine adversariorum potabo.” Quoted in Contamine, “L’Oriflamme,” 
p. 194, n. 1.
92 Contamine, “L’Oriflamme,” pp. 187 and 195–196, Duby, Feodalité, p. 983.
93 “vexillum quod vocatur Oliflammum, quo erecto, non licuit sub poena capitis 
aliquem capere ad vitam reservandum. Vocabatur inquam Oliflammum, signans mise-
ricordiam Francorum incensam aliquem mortalem posse reservare ad vitam non posse, 
sicut nec oleum inflammatum alicui cremabili posse parcere.” Geofffrey le Baker, Chroni-
con Angliæ, ed. John A. Giles (London, 1847), p. 164. The Chronicle of Geofffrey le Baker, eds 
David Preest and Richard Barber (Woodbridge, 2012), p. 73.
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While the Oriflamme seems ideologically only to be used against infĳi-
dels (that is in crusades),94 the continual use of it against especially the 
Flemings, but also against the English in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, suggests that it would likewise be used in wars against rebels 
and enemies in general of the realm.
Thus it seems that the Oriflamme and the baucens had a common origin 
as a red banner signalling war to the death, but from at least the twelfth 
century the French kings adopted the Oriflamme as their special banner. 
It was then imbued with a religious and ideological symbolism, which 
initiated a divergence from the common “red banner”. Accordingly, these 
two banners had the same overall symbolism and reference to the same 
military conventions, but from the twelfth century onwards they should 
be seen as two related, but not symbolically identical, banners.
The use of a red banner for conflict at sea seems to have been a con-
stant in naval warfare until the eighteenth century. In The Pirate Wars, 
Peter Earle writes that the fĳirst time the Jolly Roger was flown was by the 
French pirate Emmanuel Wynn in 1700.95 The historian David Cordingly 
remarks in Life Among the Pirates that:
By 1730 the skull and cross bones on a black flag seems to have edged out 
the other symbols and been adopted by English, French and Spanish pirates 
operating in the West Indies. Before that date, however, there are exam-
ples of plain red or plain black flags being used according to a generally 
understood colour symbolism: black for death and red for battle. . . . Basil 
Ringrose’s account of his voyage with the buccaneers led by Captain Bar-
tholomew Sharp includes an incident in January 1681. The buccaneers, 
in their captured prize the Trinidad, encountered three Spanish warships offf 
the islands of Juan Fernandez. ‘As soon as they saw us, they instantly put out 
their bloody flags, and we, to show them that we were not as yet daunted, 
did the same with ours.’ There was an alternative meaning to the plain red 
and black flags. A French flag book of 1721 includes hand-coloured insignia, 
and a plain red flag alongside a red pennant. Under the red flags is written 
‘Pavillon nomme Sansquartier’ (‘Flag called No Quarter’). The idea that a red 
flag could mean no quarter is confĳirmed by Captain Richard Hawkins, who 
was captured by pirates in 1724. . . . ‘When they [pirates] fĳight under Jolly 
Roger, they give quarter, which they do not when they fĳight under the red 
or bloody flag.’96
94 In a sermon by Guillaume de Sauqueville, dated to the beginning of the fourteenth 
century, the red colour of the Oriflamme was claimed to symbolise the furor legis of Christ. 
Contamine, “L’Oriflamme,” p. 232, n. 1.
95 Earle, Pirate Wars, p. 154.
96 Cordingly, David, Life Among the Pirates (London, 1995), pp. 140–141.
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Thus, the red banner seems to have a medieval origin and to have been a 
constant in combat at sea and in war to the death well beyond the Middle 
Ages. While it was used on land as well, the signifĳicance cannot have been 
restricted to the Oriflamme, which in this case must be seen as merely the 
most illustrious example of this ill-portended banner.
What the Portsmen thus argued in their account was that the baucens, 
by usage and the law of the sea, was the sign of war to the death, that the 
usual system of reprisal and restitution was annulled and that they were 
free of guilt and charge. This is referred to as a matter of fact by the com-
munity of the sea, but it also appears as an explanation or perhaps rather 
a reminder to King Edward of the rules of war at sea. This is interesting, 
since it signals a right to engage in maritime war governed by the customs 
of the people of the sea, rather than by any royal law.
Leaving aside the one-sided and dubious portrayal of the chain of events 
in the Portsmen’s account, it is remarkable that if one looks at the actions 
performed by the Norman mariners, they did not difffer signifĳicantly from 
the way in which nobles waged war by plunder, killing, destruction and 
prisoner-taking. The only diffference was that it happened at sea.
So in the end, it remains to be determined if the Normans did unfurl 
the baucens or not. There are good reasons for both believing and doubt-
ing it. What speaks against the account is, fĳirst of all, that it clearly served 
the purpose of exculpating the Portsmen of their killing of the Normans 
by stating that it was an act of war. Furthermore, it is initially doubtful 
that a trading fleet or convoy would unfurl such a banner and actively 
seek a confrontation, since the Normans, unlike their opponents, ran the 
risk of losing their valuable cargo. However, in favour of the unfurling of 
the baucens is that the Bayonnais at least, but probably also the Portsmen, 
clearly saw this as a war, not as a minor quarrel, a skirmish or an isolated 
act of piracy. Furthermore, given the course of events and the escalation 
of a latent conflict between the mariners seemingly brewing for a long 
time, it is not impossible that the Normans might actually have sought 
out a fĳinal confrontation, confĳident in their numbers and perhaps fuelled 
by their hatred, despite the fact that the battle may have started with a 
carefully prepared Anglo-Bayonnais ambush. This notion, however, rests 
on the size of the Norman fleet, as stated in the Portsmen’s account. In 
the end, while we will never know whether the Normans actually unfurled 
the baucens, we are here made aware of the fact that it seemed to be an 
indisputable martial sign with a specifĳic meaning, not only at sea, but also 
on land.
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A Raid Up the Charente
A third account of the Normans’ depredations is to be found in the report 
of the seneschal of Saintonge, Rostand de Soler, dated to 1293 and con-
cerning a Norman plundering spree up the Charente River.
Apart from Bordeaux and the Gironde area, the Charente River was one 
of the primary locations for picking up wine to be taken north.97 Since the 
Treaty of Paris, 1258–59, Saintonge had been divided between England (or 
more properly, the Duchy of Gascony) and France.98 The dividing line was 
the Charente River, which efffectively cut Saintonge in two. The left side of 
the river was English and the right side was French.
On the English side lay the nominal capital of Saintonge, Saintes. This 
had been the seat of the former comital power, and it was from here that 
the English (sous-)seneschal, Rostand de Soler, ruled in the English king’s 
name. The Saintes Bridge over the Charente divided Saintes into an Eng-
lish and a French town.99 This division was important, because, in their 
raid, the Norman mariners used the French side as a safe haven for opera-
tions against their adversaries and as a means of keeping their backs cov-
ered in case of retreat.
The following account and analysis is based on Rostand de Soler’s 
report.100 He accounted for the violence and terror practised by Norman 
mariners on the English side of the Charente River from Easter to Ascen-
sion, 1293. Some of this information is confĳirmed by the French royal offfĳi-
cers’ letters to Philippe le Bel.
In this period, a number of Norman mariners went to Gascony, as they 
did every year to freight wine. This time, however, there was a further 
purpose to their voyage, to strike a blow against their Anglo-Bayonnais 
adversaries in their own backyard. Armed with crossbows, swords, fal-
chions and lances, and clad in haketons and bascinets, they entered the 
Charente River and soon started wreaking havoc. The Normans worked 
their way along the English side of Saintonge by attacking the areas from 
the estuary of the river to the area around Saintes. The neighbourhoods 
of Saint-Agnant, Saint-Nazaire-sur-Charente and Soubise seem especially 
 97 Renouard, “Le grand commerce des vins,” p. 269.
 98 Glenisson, Jean, “L’application de la ‘paix’ de Paris (1258) en Saintonge, de 1273 à 
1293,” in R.H. Bautier, ed., La “France anglaise” au Moyen Âge (Paris, 1988), p. 194.
 99 Glénisson, “L’application,” pp. 196 and 204–205.
100 The following analysis relies mainly on Rostand’s report from TNA C 47/31/5/1. See 
Appendix 3.
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hard hit, and the Norman bases of operations were probably Tonnay-
Charente and Saint-Savinien (on the French side). In a manner reminis-
cent of their Scandinavian ancestors, they engaged in a riverine raiding 
campaign of violence, plunder, killing, rape, destruction and desecration 
of churches, culminating in an alleged threat to attack and burn the town 
of Saintes,101 presumably to punish Edward I for not bringing the English 
and Bayonnais mariners to justice.
Several things in this account are enlightening as to the nature of the 
mariners’ war and their martial practice. The Norman mariners targeted 
churches and mansions, and their victims always seem to have been civil-
ians and especially clergy. The defĳining feature of these targets were the 
relatively low risk of armed opposition and the large amount of valuables 
left with little efffective defence and opposition. Thus, for instance, the 
church of Saint-Nazaire-sur-Charente was visited and plundered fĳive 
times by various groups of Normans.
Indeed, the Normans (apart from two occasions) always operated in 
small groups, possibly to avoid too much attention, but also because their 
organisation was based on the ship’s crews. The exact numbers of Nor-
mans implicated in the raids are unknown, but Rostand mentioned three 
named shipmasters, namely Gaufridus Gossa, master of the ship La Rose 
de Leure (presumably from Leure), Godefredus Cormean and Nicolas de 
la Mere, both masters of unnamed ships from Barfleur. These three ships 
carried twenty-two mariners (with masters), but it is clear from the report 
that more were involved in the assaults. These small groups may also 
explain their preferred method of assault. The Normans employed difffer-
ent tactics of subterfuge, surprise, breaking and entering—sometimes at 
night—and outright violent robbery.
The Normans stole practically everything they could lay their hands 
on. Obviously, they stole money and jewellery, but they also stole cheese, 
grain, bread, capons, chickens, cattle, weapons, tools like ploughs, utensils 
and garments like shirts and boots. This plunder was part of a general 
strategy, namely one of destruction and humiliation of the enemy, which, 
however, is better illustrated by some signifĳicant examples: the desecra-
tion of certain churches, the destruction of mills and wine barrels, and 
the acts of rape.
The fourth time that the church of Saint-Nazaire was attacked, the 
Normans came in force, 150 or more according to the report. They broke 
101 Confĳirmed by ANF J 631, no. 8.
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open ten barrels of wine and poured it on the ground and then proceeded 
to destroy chests, clothes and other household goods. The real travesty, 
however, was their plunder of the church itself. They stole the altar cloth, 
the candles, the ornamentation of the church including an image of the 
Virgin, and they took down the cymbals for the church bells and fĳinally 
stole the Eucharist. Rostand remarks in the report than when they left the 
church, Gaufridus Gossa contemptuously chewed on the holy Eucharist to 
the detriment of his soul.102 In another assault, they stole the baptismal 
gowns for boys from the church, presumably to sell them on.
While this may be construed as a one-sided vilifĳication of the Normans 
and their utter un-Christian and monstrous nature, it must be pointed out 
that the desecration was actually in retaliation for armed resistance in a 
previous Norman assault, where some of the Normans had been wounded. 
This resistance had forced the Normans to flee, and when they returned 
and thoroughly plundered the church, it was probably as revenge for this 
resistance.
The Normans also destroyed the mills of the priory of Soubise. A more 
telling act of devastation is, however, the consequent destruction of wine 
barrels by smashing them and pouring the contents on the ground instead 
of bringing them along. Although this initially seems idiotic, in all prob-
ability it was a calculated action. The Normans probably smashed the bar-
rels because they had already fĳilled their ships with wine on the French 
side of the river. One could argue that it was irrational to buy wine on the 
French side when they could take it “for free” from the English side, but 
by buying from the French and thus paying customs to the French royal 
offfĳicers, they in a sense “paid offf ” the offfĳicers and bought their protection, 
or at least their benevolence. The purpose was thus to destroy the liveli-
hood of their enemies and to humiliate and terrorise them by deliberately 
demonstrating that they did not even want to take their wine.
Finally, on two occasions the Normans engaged in the rape of local 
women. Once again I propose that these actions of destruction and ter-
ror should be seen as part of the nobles’ guerra, in which coordinated 
destruction and rape was an integrated part.103 Firnhaber-Baker writes 
about this:
102 “Gaufridus Gossa magister navis vocati Larosa sancta eucharistia usus fuit ipsam 
ut dicitur et fama refert corporaliter in sue detrimentum anime corporaliter masticando.” 
TNA C 47/31/5/1.
103 Firnhaber-Baker, “Techniques,” p. 98.
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The purpose of raiding was to not simply to take things, but also to dem-
onstrate dominance by creating fear and humiliation in both the subject 
population and one’s principal enemy. . . . Wars almost invariably involved 
acts of violence and domination that produced no direct material benefĳit 
for the attackers, but which humiliated their enemy, resulting in the loss 
of prestige for the opposition and reinforcing bonds of solidarity within the 
attackers’ own group.104
The Normans also employed other means of violence. In their attacks, they 
employed a combination of threats, torture and beatings, all with the pur-
pose of extorting money from the victims. In one incident, they tortured 
a certain Jean Peilhe’s daughter by laying a table on top of her, and then 
two Normans sat on top of the table in order to make her tell them where 
her father kept his treasure chest. However, as she was unable to tell them 
this, they fĳinally let her go and resolved to just plunder the house. This 
incident is very typical of the Normans’ actions, and while it was in no 
way a pleasant experience for the Saintongeois, possibly only one of the 
Norman attacks had a deadly outcome. This also speaks for the overall 
veracity of the account, since an unalloyed attempt to vilify the Normans 
would certainly have resulted in more exaggeration and accounts of a 
general campaign of slaughter and merciless killing. In fact, the report 
contains many incidents where the Normans failed in their endeavours 
and had to flee. When all is said and done, however, it must be stressed 
that, until the threat to attack Saintes, the Normans always seem to have 
avoided direct armed confrontation with the authorities. Thus, the basic 
actions of the Normans in Saintonge do not difffer from those of other 
malefactors and violent robbers, like the infamous Folville and Coterel 
gangs in England.105
However, a particular hatred was reserved for any English and Bayon-
nais residing in Saintonge. A recurrent feature in the report is the Nor-
mans’ active search for Englishmen. In the priory of Montier Neuf, the 
Normans looked for Robin Anglicus and other Englishmen. In the priory 
of Sainte-Gemme, six Normans entered with drawn swords and, if the 
prior refused to give up English fugitives, threatened they would damage 
the priory. In Saintes, the Normans attempted to break into the house 
of the wealthy English merchant Galterus Anglicus. The worst action of 
the Normans, and incidentally the one that brought the richest booty by 
far, was the attack on two Navarrese merchants going from La Rochelle 
104 Firnhaber-Baker, “Techniques,” p. 97.
105 Musson, Crime, pp. 75–79. See also Bellamy. “Coterel”, and Stones “Folvilles”.
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to Bordeaux. The Normans mistakenly took these merchants for Bayon-
nais, and in Saint-Savinien, they killed and plundered the merchants of 
8,000 florins. Then the Normans chopped them up, and one of them put 
the entrails of one of the merchants on the tip of his lance and paraded 
it through Saint-Savinien crying, “Who wants to buy entrails from Bay-
onne? I am selling”,106 while another Norman took the head of the other 
merchant and fĳirst chewed on the ear and then fĳinally ripped it offf and 
ate it. This happened, wrote Rostand, without the intervention of the 
local authorities. This act seems to haven taken the character of a pub-
lic execution (or perhaps rather lynching), since the display of entrails 
and head showed the disrespect and heinousness of the crimes of the 
deceased. Thus, it can be seen as a mock execution and as part of the 
Norman private enforcement of justice. Taken together, these accounts 
show the hatred which the Normans felt towards their adversaries, since 
they were either killed or intended to be killed, whereas the locals were 
“only” beaten and tortured. This demonstrates that the real target of the 
raids was the Anglo-Bayonnais, and as the fĳinal example will show, ulti-
mately the king of England.
The culmination of the raids occurred when the Normans entered 
Saintes and allegedly declared several times in public that they would burn 
and destroy the town to punish the King of England, presumably for the 
lack of justice for the actions of the Anglo-Bayonnais against the Normans. 
The attack on the house of Galterus Anglicus resulted in a fĳight, in which 
some of the Normans were captured, interrogated and taken offf to the 
castle of Saintes. This apparently led the Normans to mobilise 4,000 (sic!) 
armed Norman mariners and threaten to attack and burn Saintes.107 Ro-
stand promptly put the town on alert for a potential siege, and soon after-
wards envoys of the Norman mariners and French royal offfĳicers showed 
up to ask for the release of their imprisoned comrades. Rostand—after 
having conferred with his council—refused, since the envoys did not have 
a mandate from the French king to demand the release. The Normans 
then proceeded to threaten to attack Rostand’s properties, and he even-
tually let the Normans go because the French royal envoys promised to 
compel them make restitution for the damages against the English king’s 
subjects. The infrequent arrest of Norman ships by English constables in 
106 “quis vult emere Trypes de Bayona ego vendam.” TNA C 47/31/5/1.
107 This was also reported to Philippe le Bel by his offfĳicers in Bordeaux. They added, 
furthermore, the accusation that the Normans had attacked the Ile d’Oléron during this 
campaign. ANF J 631, no. 8.
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response to some of the Normans’ depredations which resulted in the 
Normans making restitution, and the actions of Rostand’s men against 
the Normans in Saintes, were the only times when the Anglo-Saintongeois 
authorities directly intervened.
Clearly this report attempted to exculpate Rostand from his failure 
to stop the Normans, and indeed for his release of them from custody. 
But apart from certain details, especially the alleged number of Nor-
mans threatening to attack Saintes, I consider it a credible account, given 
the number of named witnesses; the precise, detailed and infĳinitesimal 
amounts of valuables stolen; the details of wine poured out instead of 
being brought along; the relatively non-lethal nature of the assaults when 
a vilifĳication campaign was obviously desirable; and fĳinally, the disparity 
between the treatment of locals and the Anglo-Bayonnais. Furthermore, 
the report did not contain any self-promoting descriptions of Rostand 
himself, quite the contrary actually.
This would not be the last time Saintonge was visited by maraud-
ing mariners engaged in a maritime war with the Bayonnais. Between 
1306 and 1309, Castilian mariners from Santander, Castro Urdiales and 
Laredo assembled a fleet and raided up the Charente River in a manner 
 reminiscent of the Normans in 1293.108 Furthermore, it seems as if dur-
ing this raid, as with the Normans, the Castilians were especially on the 
look-out for any English, thus testifying to a particular hatred reserved for 
this group.
Guerra
Thus, what I have described here is the way in which the Norman mari-
ners fought their rivals in 1292–93. I propose that it should be understood 
as a war, or perhaps rather a guerra, in the same way as war was waged 
on land between kings and noblemen. Indeed, Philippe le Bel’s envoys 
called the conflict a guerra maritima, and the peace treaties of both 1282 
and 1318 between Bayonne and the Normans use that word, amongst oth-
ers, to describe their conflicts.109 In 1282, one of the words used for the 
conflict was guerra, both in the treaty itself and by the English authorities 
on the dorse (De guerrarum materia in terra et mari). In the truce of 1318, 
the conflict was called, amongst other things, dissensionibus & discordiis 
108 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 89.
109 ANF J 631, no. 8.
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guerrinis,110 and in 1331(?) Edward proposed a settlement of the dissencion 
et guerre between English and French mariners.111 Likewise, in 1317 the 
Bayonnais described their conflict with the Castilians as a guerra.112
The notion guerra entails what Justine Firnhaber-Baker has described 
thus:
raiding in later medieval local war invariably involved surprise; the violence 
of armed men against unarmed people; and the destruction or appropria-
tion of productive resources, like cattle, ploughs, and food. Repeatedly, the 
sources tell of sudden, unadvertised attacks, of peasants murdered or muti-
lated in their fĳields, of women raped, of vines and trees cut down, of tools 
destroyed or taken, and of livestock stolen. Not every raid was part of a 
larger war, but so consistently are these activities associated with guerrae 
that local warfare and serial raiding might almost be thought of as inter-
changeable terms for the same phenomenon.113
The Saintonge raid and the acts of piracy in 1292–93 fĳit this description 
perfectly. It is in this way I interpret the piracy of the Norman mariners, 
whose actions, seen in isolation, were acts of piracy, but the overall frame-
work within which this occurred was a guerra, that is, a large scale conflict 
between two political and economic communities.
This shows that even the kings recognised that the ports waged wars 
despite the fact that they, unlike the French nobility, did not have an offfĳicial 
right to do so, as described in the jurisconsult and nobleman Philippe de 
Beaumanoir’s Coutumes de Beauvaisis. In the chapter on war, Beaumanoir 
circumscribed the way war between nobles should be conducted. Numer-
ous regulations served to limit the scope of the war and its legitimate 
participants. While Beaumanoir recognised the noblemen’s right to settle 
their diffferences by arms, provided they declared this publicly and openly 
defĳied an adversary, he continuously stressed the possibility of settling 
the conflict in court and through the arbitration of the nobles’ overlord, 
rather than by war.114 However, such (already severely regulated) warfare 
was the sole prerogative of the nobles. Beaumanoir explicitly denied the 
bourgeois and the commoners the right to wage war. Instead, he referred 
them to the courts of law for the settlement of conflicts.115 On a practical 
110 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 376.
111  EMDP I, 390.
112 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 332.
113 Firnhaber-Baker, “Techniques,” p. 94.
114 Philippe de Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, ed. Amédée Salmon, 2 vols (Paris, 
1899), II, pp. 354–365.
115 Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, Articles 1671 and 1672, pp. 356–357.
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level, however, this recourse does not seem to have been respected nor 
punishment meted out as a result.
The regulations of the Coutumes de Beauvasis are also reflected in con-
temporary royal attempts to regulate and indeed prohibit noble guerra in 
France. By this time, the French kings had tried, for a long time and with 
little success, to prohibit the noble guerrae. Based on a reading of the 
sentences of the Parlement de Paris, Louis de Carbonnières has recently 
argued that the royal French prohibitions in the later Middle Ages were 
more successful than previously assumed; however, evidence from the 
thirteenth century and the fĳirst decades of the fourteenth century does 
not support this interpretation. While the Parlement condemned and pro-
hibited guerrae, these wars still persisted, and the sentences do not seem 
to conform to a general royal policy or indeed even a successful efffort in 
prohibiting noble wars.116 Thus, in 1296, 1304, 1311 and 1314 Philippe le 
Bel issued various prohibitions of guerrae while he was at war, and he 
prohibited tournaments and restricted the carrying of arms. However, his 
successors, Louis X, Philippe V and Philippe VI, were forced to moder-
ate these prohibitions and give concessions to regions like Gascony to 
continue the practice of guerra, provided it did not take place when the 
king was at war.117 These prohibitions do not seem to have succeeded for 
any of these kings, including Philippe le Bel, and as Raymond Cazelles 
wrote, they seem essentially to have served as a royal claim to power and 
a bargaining chit in the royal expansion of power in the fĳirst decades of 
the fourteenth century. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the French 
kings do not seem to have had any success in this period (apart from 
with Normandy where the prohibition was, however, the creation of the 
Anglo-Norman and Angevin kings in the twelfth century)118 with actively 
carrying out such a prohibition of noble guerra. The one possible excep-
tion was perhaps when the French kings were at war themselves and 
consequently needed the military forces of the noblemen for his wars, as 
well as for peace to hold sway domestically while the kingdom itself was 
engaged in war with an external foe.119
116 Carbonnières, “Pouvoir royal,” pp. 3–17. For a convincing refutation of this argu-
ment, see Firnhaber-Baker, “Seigneurial War,” pp. 40–43.
117 ORF I, 56–58, 328–29, 392–94, 429–93, 538–40, 557–60, 564–71, 655–56, II, 61–63.
118 See Yver, L’interdiction.
119 Cazelles, “Reglementation royale,” pp. 545–547, Gauvard, “Pouvoir de l’État,” 
pp. 342–344.
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The situation in England was a little diffferent to that in France. Since 
the eleventh century, efffectively noble wars had been prohibited in Eng-
land, and the English nobility did not wage open wars amongst them-
selves. The situation was a bit diffferent in some places, though, especially 
in the Welsh March where the Anglo-Norman kings had encountered 
difffĳiculties in the Welsh highland. Consequently, the lords in this march 
were allowed to maintain private armies, offfĳicially to protect the kingdom 
but the privileges and rights granted to these lords meant that in practice 
they also waged wars amongst themselves—just like their French coun-
terparts (See chapter 6 for a treatment of the marches of England and 
France). However, the English kings also tried to restrict these wars, and 
in 1290–92 Edward I intervened in a war between Earl Gilbert of Clare 
of Gloucester and Earl Humphrey de Bohun of Hereford. These marcher 
lords were fĳighting over Morlais Castle, among others, in a region claimed 
by both. They were determined to settle the dispute by arms. Edward, 
however, intervened and prohibited the war. When these marcher lords 
did not adhere to the prohibition, because they felt this was a violation of 
their rights, Edward, by legal action and imprisonment of the earls, forced 
them to accept that he could prohibit war amongst the marchers, and that 
royal orders took precedent over the laws of the march and the privileges 
of the nobles. In the following years Edward came down hard on other 
defĳiant marcher lords and asserted ultimate royal judicial supremacy over 
Wales.120
Nevertheless, the studies conducted by Stones, Bellamy and Hanawalt 
show that while open warfare between nobles in England was prohibited 
in principle, in practice the English nobility did not refrain from using vio-
lence against their rivals and to achieve their aims. However, since open 
war was prohibited, they had recourse to armed gangs and thus waged 
wars by proxy. While the nobles were not always directly implicated in 
these actions, it seems that everybody was aware of their involvement and 
the use of proxies. Nevertheless, the members of these gangs and their 
employers were rarely punished.121 Thus, while the English kings initially 
seem better equipped to and more successful in stopping these noble 
120 Morris, J.E., The Welsh Wars of Edward I (Oxford, 1901), pp. 220–239, Altschul, 
Michael, A Baronial Family in Medieval England: The Clares, 1217–1314, (Baltimore, 1965), 
pp. 145–154. Davies, R.R., Lordship and Society in the March of Wales, 1282–1400 (Oxford, 
1978), pp. 259–269.
121  See, for instance, Hanawalt, Barbara, “Fur-collar crime: The pattern of crime among 
the fourteenth-century English nobility,” Journal of Social History, 8 (1975), 1–17.
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guerrae, the success of these initiatives were wholly dependent on the 
strength of the king. Even a strong king like Edward I does not seem to 
have been able to quell this completely, and his actions in the Hereford-
Gloucester dispute seem to have been more a statement of his sovereign 
power over the English nobility than an actual pursuit of a royal policy of 
zero-tolerance of noble violent conflict.122 It seems that the English kings 
had to tolerate noble feuds as long as they were not waged as open war-
fare. Accordingly, while the kings did not like this “private” use of collec-
tive violence and prohibited it, in practice they had to accept a certain 
leeway for nobles to settle their conflicts with violence. But as Philippe 
de Beaumanoir stressed, this acceptance was not juridically extended to 
commoners.
Nevertheless, the claim to self-defence by the Portsmen and the clan-
destine operations of the Normans in Saintonge seem to denote that while 
the Portsmen and the Normans found that their actions were justifĳied 
from their point of view, they knew that they were acting against the royal 
prohibitions and that their actions were not legitimate in a wider sense.
The components in these guerrae resembles what other historians have 
termed as feud. On the term guerra, Paul Hyams notes that:
Old French guere . . . registers violence imminent or already begun. Stephen 
White’s analysis of its usage in certain chansons de geste of the twelfth 
and early thirteenth centuries usefully begins by noting that every such act 
assumes wrongs to justify the action and stories by which each side justifĳies 
its own position. The semantic fĳield covered by guere is not quite as clear 
as a philologist might wish. It seems to cover conflicts not covered by Latin 
bellum, which essentially denotes the kinds of war started by a recognized 
authority like king or pope that can be justifĳied along the lines of just war 
theories. In the twelfth-century schools, and the courts they influenced, 
these were beginning to be conceptualized as public wars. In consequence, 
the modern Continental secondary literature describes as private war most 
situations where Anglophone scholars habitually talk of feud.123
There is nothing odd in the fact that mariners waged wars akin to those 
of the nobles: many mariners cum merchants were rich people with con-
trol of ample resources; the mariners already seem organised and to a 
certain degree endowed with an esprit de corps; they ran a low risk of 
122 Davies, Lordship and Society, pp. 254–269.
123 Hyams, Paul, “Was there really such a thing as feud in the High Middle Ages?,” in 
S.A. Throop et al., eds, Vengeance in the Middle Ages (Farnham & Burlington, 2010), p. 166. 
A somewhat similar view is expressed in White, Stephen D., “Un imaginaire faidal,” in 
D. Barthélemy et al., eds, La Vengeance, 400–1200 (Rome, 2006), pp. 175–198.
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getting caught and punished (see chapter 8); and they were probably 
motivated by a sense of honour and an interest in defence of their com-
mon economic interests. Kaeuper’s studies support this interpretation. 
He shows that while chivalry and the use of violence to the protection 
of one’s honour were of central importance to the aristocracy, the upper 
ranks of townsmen aped this chivalric code. This bourgeois knightliness 
was primarily found in the French kingdom due to the greater measure of 
independence of towns and bourgeois from royal control, yet it was also 
present in some English towns. In France at least, the bourgeois claimed 
the rights of the chivalric classes to wage war.124 Kaeuper writes:
these towns were also collective lordships which entered into private war 
and took vengeance in the best style of the day. Knightly society often wished 
to increase its social distance from the bourgeoisie and chose to measure 
and emphasize that distance by elaborations of the code of chivalry. Yet 
the distance can easily be exaggerated and the important point for thinking 
about the issue of public order is that a code of honour recognizable to all 
stretched across the ranks of privileged society; whatever refĳinements ambi-
tious townsmen might lack in the eyes of their knightly betters, they shared 
with them a keen appreciation of the defence of honour through prowess.125
While historians like Hyams, Howard Kaminsky and Hillay Zmora claims 
that the guerra or private wars can be characterised as “feuds”,126 Firn-
haber-Baker distinguishes between the two. She writes:
The sources usually use the same word for seigneurial wars that they do for 
royal wars: guerrae. These wars, fought by the hereditary nobility, ecclesias-
tical lords, and even municipalities, generally arose over claims to lordship: 
conflicts over inheritance, over the possession of a castle or, over the mar-
riage of an heiress, over the right to execute justice or to collect taxes, and 
so forth. They were not ‘feuds’ in the sense of cyclical, vindicatory violence 
waged by kin groups, but rather political struggles pursued through military 
means. Vengeance entered the picture in that one had to preserve one’s 
rights and save face if attacked, and no doubt there was emotional satisfac-
tion in defeating one’s opponent and getting one’s way.127
124 Kaeuper, War, pp. 189–190 and 246.
125 Kaeuper, War, p. 192.
126 Zmora, Hillay, State and Nobility in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge, 1997), 
pp. 14–15, Kaminsky, Howard, “The noble feud in the later Middle Ages”, Past and Present, 
174 (2002), 55–56.
127 Firnhaber-Baker, “Techniques,” p. 91. See also Firnhaber-Baker, “Seigneurial War,” 
pp. 41–42, for a critique of Gauvard’s focus on wounded honour as a legitimate source for 
war and violence.
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Thus, what Firnhaber-Baker stresses here is that the guerra was initially 
more concerned with material values than insults and emotional damages, 
even though these of course also played a role. The same is detectable in 
the mariners’ wars. While emotions of anger and hatred must certainly 
also have been present, the immediate cause for hostility in the sources 
appears to be material, not emotional. In the end, while the discussion of 
what exactly constitutes a feud is beyond the scope of this book,128 I fĳind 
it useful to distinguish on a theoretical level between conflicts motivated 
by recovery or defence of material values and those motivated by insults 
to one’s honour.
One factor, however, separated the maritime wars from those of the ter-
restrial nobility, clergy and towns, namely the centrality of the sea and the 
waterways for the combatants’ living. Gonçal López Nadal has studied ports 
engaged in piracy between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries and 
has made some interesting observations which also seem applicable to 
medieval ports. He notes that alternative methods of commerce—namely 
trade in neutral vessels, smuggling and corsairing129—were not subversive 
strategies employed in times of need by mariners or merchants, but that 
they were simply a cheap and convenient (if alternative) way of conduct-
ing their traditional activity, trade.130 However, he adds that not all ports 
were engaged in, nor had any interest in, corsairing and piracy. Nadal 
stresses that corsairing appeared “mainly in societies that found them-
selves thwarted by an unchallengeable commercial competitor. Not sur-
prisingly, the ports that were most prone to turn to force were the strictly 
second-rate trading centers, while major trading centers sufffered the most 
from raiding”.131 This idea seems to fĳit the medieval ports, as a dispropor-
tionate number of pirates came from “minor” ports engaged primarily in 
freight such as the Cinque Ports, the Norman ports and Bayonne.132 This 
notion seems supported by the similarity in the Middle Ages and the early 
modern period in the relationship between ports and pirates, and Nadal 
notes that the pirate ports derived profĳit from the mariners’ activities, and 
accordingly they were defended and honoured by their fellow-citizens.133 
128 Indeed, the various articles in Netterstrøm, Jeppe B. and Bjørn Poulsen, eds, Feud 
in Medieval and Early Modern Europe demonstrate that no clear and coherent defĳinition 
of feud exists.
129 Nadal seems to use this term to describe acts of piracy as well as privateering.
130 Nadal, “Corsaring,” p. 127.
131  Nadal, “Corsaring,” p. 129.
132 See Vale, Origins, pp. 149–150, for Bayonne.
133 Nadal, “Corsaring,” p. 130.
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This also seems to be the case in the few instances when we have access 
to records of medieval pirates (for instance the Alards).
In conclusion, the maritime wars of the mariners from 1280–1330 
resembled the noble guerra in its form, objectives and symbols. For all 
intents and purposes, it was a war, but the war was fought with methods 
which on the surface resembled merely violent robbery at sea. However, 
contrary to the singular instances of piracy, these wars waged by serial 




THE LAWS OF THE SEA AND THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRISAL
According to the Roman Corpus Juris, the sea was a res nullius or a nullius 
territorium by natural law. This meant that it was free from any claims 
of ownership, and instead belonged to all.1 However, even though much 
medieval law was founded on the principles of the Corpus Juris, it did 
not mean that actions taken at sea took place in a judicial void and by 
default were permissible. How actions at sea were perceived judicially is, 
however, a delicate question. In this chapter, I shall analyse what laws 
regulated behaviour at sea, and how they failed to address the issues of 
piracy and reprisals. These reprisals were the common manner in which to 
justify piracy, and they took place in a juridical grey area where the king, 
on an ad hoc basis and strongly influenced by foreign as well as domestic 
policies of the realm, decided what reprisals should be authorised by him 
and when. This authorisation was expressed in two types of government-
authorized seizures: arrest and marque. An analysis of these aspects is 
important, for it expresses the peculiar legal status of piracy in the Middle 
Ages and provides a further framework for the understanding of the status 
of piracy in an era characterised by weak central governments.
The Law Merchant
Many historians have made assumptions about the laws of the sea and 
how maritime, especially commercial, life was regulated. It is a matter of 
debate what exactly constituted the law of the sea and commercial law 
in regard to piracy. The fundamental problem is whether piracy consti-
tuted a special kind of crime, separate from crimes of theft and violence 
committed on land, or whether the place of the crime was irrelevant in 
regard to the law. Marsden claimed that common law was inadequate 
to judge cases of piracy, since the jurors were seldom witnesses to the 
1 Corpus Juris Civilis, Dig. I, viii. 2: “naturali iure omnium communia sunt illa: aer, 
aqua profluens, et mare, et per hoc litora maris”, cited in EMDP, I, 369, n. 34. Cheyette, 
“Sovereign,” p. 53, Heller-Roazen, Enemy of All, pp. 57 and 61–62, Ward, Medieval Ship -
master, p. 9.
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crime and since one often ran the risk that they were neighbours of or 
in some other way afffĳiliated with the offfenders. Consequently, the jurors 
were more likely to sympathise than to convict the indicted. Accordingly, 
the laws on piracy, reprisal and war were vague, and the situation at sea 
tended de facto to be characterised by lawlessness.2 The historians have 
generally organised their studies of the legal status of the sea in the early 
fourteenth century around two legal institutions of maritime law, that is, 
the merchants’ law, or Lex Mercatoria which mainly dealt with commer-
cial transactions, and the Rôles d’Oléron, which mostly was occupied with 
freight and the relationship between shipmaster, crew and merchants.
One of the fĳirst obstacles that one encounters when studying piracy 
cases in the English legal and diplomatic records is that the plaintifffs or 
their lawyers argued that the case should be settled according to the Law 
Merchant, the laws of the sea, or the laws of Oléron. These laws are evoked 
as a matter of fact, and no details are given as to their contents or how 
they should be applied.3 In The History of English Law from 1898, Pollock 
and Maitland wrote that from the thirteenth century the Lex Mercatoria 
as a law code stood apart from the common law. It was a special law for 
merchants and commercial transactions and therefore did not concern 
itself with issues which fell under criminal law. Apparently, the merchants 
were familiar with the general tenets of this law, and it was used during 
markets and fairs where the merchants assembled. Furthermore, this law 
was not an exclusively English law. Rather, it was a ius gentium known 
to merchants throughout Christendom. However, Pollock and Maitland 
stressed that the Law Merchant was less a law for a class of men, but 
rather a law for specifĳic kinds of transactions.4 This sums up the basics 
of Law Merchant, but recently Robin Ward has elaborated somewhat on 
the contents and development of this law. He stresses that Law Merchant 
had developed from the Roman Corpus Juris and was international in its 
nature. As such, it was well suited for adjudication in maritime quarrels. 
Ward claims that problems between mariners which arose on board ships 
and between one ship and another were subject to maritime law, which 
in someway was related to Law Merchant (probably to the Rôles d’Oléron, 
even though Ward does not state this specifĳically). On the whole, Ward 
2 Marsden, Reginald G., “The vice-admirals of the coast,” English Historical Review, 22 
(1907), 468.
3 See, for example, CPR 1301–1307, p. 286.
4 Pollock, F. and Maitland, F.W., The History of English Law, 2nd edn., 2 vols. (Cam-
bridge, 1968), I, 467.
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claims that in England very few legal decisions in maritime cases ran con-
trary to the precepts of common law, Law Merchant or maritime laws.5 
Ward explains the connection between Law Merchant and maritime laws 
thus: 
all types of plea could be heard including trespass, debt and contract, but 
not those concerning land nor serious crimes which were reserved for royal 
justices. The law the courts administered was derived from the customs of 
English and continental merchants and in the fourteenth century was still 
relatively unevolved. It reflected enough of the continental lex mercato-
ria to be acceptable to both native and foreign litigants, stood apart from 
common law, was specifĳically for mercantile transactions rather than for 
merchants . . . Although the law merchant was of such importance to mer-
chants and appears to have had a considerable efffect on the law practised in 
local courts, direct reference to it by name is strangely absent from borough 
custumals.6
While this seems to be a fairly reliable portrayal at fĳirst glance, it is actu-
ally rather problematic. First of all, at least for the thirteenth and the fĳirst 
part of the fourteenth century, our knowledge of local courts and their 
decisions concerning matters at sea is very limited. Ward in fact exacer-
bates the confusion by referring to a case in Bristol in 1351, where a discus-
sion of whether a shipmaster was responsible for the actions of his crew 
took place. Unfortunately is not clear whether the verdict was passed in 
accordance with maritime law or the law of the country. Furthermore, 
the case was appealed, but its conclusion is unknown, which further com-
pounds the confusion over what law was applied in local courts in quar-
rels involving mariners.7 Concerning piracy, at one point Ward assumes 
that the judgements of the English courts followed the “law and customs 
of Oleron and similarly the law merchant. Both were seen as species of 
jus gentium available across frontiers”.8 However, rather puzzlingly, Ward 
claims elsewhere that there was a noticeable absence of the mention of 
piracy in the maritime laws, and he argues that felonies presumably were 
dealt with ashore. In other words, felonies like piracy were perceived of as 
not being any diffferent to crimes on land, and they were dealt with thus.9 
This contradiction admirably sums up the historiographical problem of 
determining how piracy was dealt with in the courts.
5 Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, p. 9.
6 Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, p. 16.
7 Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, p. 18.
8 Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, p. 16.
9 Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, p. 23.
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The Rôles d’Oléron
The specifĳic problem with the laws of the sea up to at least the middle of 
the fourteenth century is that there really is only one known law-code on 
maritime matters. This law is the Rôles d’Oléron, which seem to have been 
accepted and followed by all mariners in Northern Europe.10 The Rôles are 
linguistically dated to around 1200 and were reputedly formulated by King 
Richard the Lionheart,11 even though the veracity of this statement is con-
troversial and uncertain to say the least.12 Furthermore, Ward and other 
historians assume an origin for the law in the Mediterranean sea laws, the 
Lex Rhodia, and the Consolate del Mare. The earliest two extant versions 
of the Rôles are, however, from manuscripts from 1315 (the Liber Horn 
and the Liber Memorandum), and both Ward and Karl-Friedrich Krieger 
assume that these are copies, directly or indirectly of an Anglo-Norman 
original.13 However, the possibility remains that either the Rôles are not 
that old, or, more likely, that they were a product of the francophone 
ma ritime communities of the thirteenth century, and that over time mari-
time practice manifested in the twenty-four articles of the Rôles d’Oléron, 
thus making them more of a dynamic document of customary law.14 It is 
clear that from the outset the Rôles must have been primarily concerned 
with the wine trade, given the number of references to this in the articles 
of the law. The articles in the extant version also support the notion of 
the law not being confĳined to the Anglo-French Atlantic, since numerous 
articles refer to England, Flanders, Brittany, Normandy and Scotland and 
the mariners from these areas.15
In Ursprung und Wurzeln der Rôles d’Oléron, Krieger discussed why the 
Rôles were created and why they were named after the island of Oléron. 
10 Printed in Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, pp. 183–205, The Black Book of the Admiralty, 
in Travers Twiss, ed., 4 vols. (London, 1965), I, 89–133, Collection des lois maritimes, in Jean 
Marie Pardessus, ed., 6 vols. (Paris, 1828–45), I, 323–354.
 11 Runyan and Ward date the Rôles d’Oléron to around 1200 based on the language. 
Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, p. 20, Runyan, Timothy J., “The Rolls of Oleron and the Admi-
ralty Court in fourteenth century England,” The American Journal of Legal History, 19
(1975), 98.
12 See Frankot, Edda, Medieval Maritime Law and its Practice in the Towns of Northern 
Europe: A Comparison by the Example of Shipwreck, Jettison and Ship Collision (Unpublished 
PhD. thesis at the University of Aberdeen, 2004), p. 20. 
13 Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, pp. 20–22.
14 Krieger (and Frankot) assumes it was written down around 1286. Krieger, Ursprung, 
p. 71, Frankot, Medieval Maritime Law, p. 20.
15 Krieger, Ursprung, pp. 23–30.
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While Ward assumes that the Rôles were named after the island because 
its magistrates were presumably reputed to be reliable jurists,16 Krieger 
more prudently believed that the Rôles perhaps initially referred to an 
Aquitainian maritime association rather than specifĳically to the island. 
Furthermore, he refused to accept a royal English origin for the text, based 
on, amongst other things, the rather late offfĳicial English royal approval of 
the law in 1351. Instead, Krieger assumed its creation was based on the 
diffferent merchants’ and mariners’ guilds of northwestern Europe in the 
thirteenth century. Despite being under diffferent kings, these guilds ral-
lied together when their privileges were threatened by, for instance, taxes 
on the wine trade. However, whether the Rôles were fĳirst formulated by 
one trading community and then adopted by the others, or whether it 
was a collective custom created by the diffferent communities in unison, is 
unknown.17 This perception of mariners and merchants banding together 
against royal aggression and pretentions is tempting and seems more 
credible than the creation of the Rôles by the English king, especially since 
the king was barely mentioned in them. Furthermore, it is worth noting 
that, in regard to maritime conflict, Krieger focused more on the Anglo-
French royal conflicts than on those between the maritime communities. 
He essentially saw an opposition between the mariners’ interests and 
those of the kings. This means that all conflict was handled and regulated 
by the kings, and that the mariners and merchants were only interested 
in and concerned with peaceful trade.
This is the natural consequence of the contents of the Rôles in regard to 
conflicts. Piracy and maritime war are simply not mentioned in the law. 
Instead, the Rôles were concerned with the relationship between ship-
master and crew, and between the shipmaster and the merchants who 
either owned or just freighted their goods on board the ships. Dorothy 
Gardiner assumed that this was because ordinances concerning maritime 
conflict were only written up in emergencies and thus were related to 
individual cases of conflict and were not in any way universal principles. 
This was because the kings lacked a permanent naval force and thus royal 
maritime warfare was based on the contributions of individual ports and 
occurred in distinctive and unique circumstances for each war.18 Thus, 
Krieger implicitly followed Gardiner’s initial argument that kings made 
16 Ward, Medieval Shipmasters, p. 24.
17 Krieger, Ursprung, pp. 112–119.
18 Gardiner, Dorothy A., “The history of belligerent rights on the high seas in the four-
teenth century,” The Law Quarterly Review, 48 (1932), 521.
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war and mariners sailed and traded. However, as we saw in the last chap-
ters, mariners were more than willing to take up arms to realize personal 
and collective gains.
The issue of the Rôles d’Oléron’s application to conflict has been further 
complicated by the diffferent names of the Rôles d’Oléron in the sources 
and the historiography. Thus, one can fĳind references to maritime law as 
rôles, ley, lois, lex, jugemens, consuetudines and costumes—all of Oléron. 
While these may well be diffferent versions of the same text with minor 
variations, none of the existing versions deal with conflict at sea. However, 
some of the legal and diplomatic records which use the above-mentioned 
variations of the name “d’Oléron” have references to the Rôles’ applica-
tion during maritime war and piracy. Unfortunately, in these references, 
it is rather unclear what is meant. Krieger tried to deduce what the Rôles 
covered and what should be assumed covered by other maritime and mer-
cantile laws called “d’Oléron”, but of which we do not know the exact 
contents. He assumed that the Rôles should be seen as a completion of 
the Lex Mercatoria, but nevertheless a law apart from those dealing with 
reprisals.19 He thus supposed three diffferent yet complementary sets of 
laws for the sea, that is, Lex Mercatoria, the Rôles d’Oléron and a set of 
rules concerning reprisal. On the right of reprisal, Krieger assumed that 
the Rôles d’Oléron was the commonly agreed law for the regulation of 
maritime trafffĳic. In this regard, the letters of marque served as the reali-
sation of outstanding legal claims. However, marque was only to be seen 
as a supplement to the law, which permitted the realisation of a claim in 
a given case.20 Thus, the rules of reprisal should be seen as the completion 
of the Rôles in regard to conflict and piracy jurisdiction.
The English Fasciculus de superioritate maris from 1339,21 which refers 
to King Richard the Lionheart as the giver of the Rôles d’Oléron and the 
laws of reprisal in la ley Olyroun, poses a particular problem for Krieger. 
Contrary to the editor of the source, Pardessus, Krieger refused to accept 
that King Richard formulated this law. He argued that the Fasciculus 
should instead be viewed as part of the Hundred Years’ War and there-
19 Krieger, Ursprung, p. 35.
20 “Während die Rôles d’Oléron das zwischen den am Seeverkehr Beteiligten geltende 
Recht feststellen, dienen die ‘letters de marque’ der internationalen Durchsetzung von 
Rechtsansprüchen. . . . Im Verhältnis zu den Rôles d’Oléron konnte demnach das Recht 
der ‘marque’ nur als eine Ergänzung herangezogen werden, soweit die Verwirklichung 
eines nach dem Seerecht festgestellten Anspruches in Frage stand.” Krieger, Ursprung, 
p. 36. 
21 Pardessus, Collection des lois, I, 289.
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fore had nothing to do with the origin of the Rôles. It was an invention 
to enhance English independence from the French Crown. Krieger writes 
that the ley Olyroun referred to in the Fasciculus concerned the protection 
of the peace and justice between people sailing the English Channel and 
was formulated as a promise to protect shipping, to punish pirates and to 
assure restitution to the victims. However, as Krieger stressed, the Rôles 
d’Oléron was a civil law, not a criminal law. Thus, in Krieger’s opinion, 
the origin of the Fasciculus of 1339 was rather a Gascon petition of 1331. 
While Krieger assumed that the lay Olyroun was diffferent from the Rôles 
d’Oléron, his view is backed up only by a mention of this in a Bayonnais 
petition from 1337–39, which indicates that the Bayonnais’ reprisals and 
marque were apparently in accordance with the lay Olyroun. Krieger there-
fore concluded that the ley Oliroun which mentioned a direct relation-
ship between this law and reprisals/marque, the Rôles d’Oléron and Ley de 
Oliroun could not be the same law.22 In support of Krieger’s argument is 
that the conflict regulation mentioned in the Fasciculus is not covered by 
any of the known versions of the Rôles, and it is possible that the Bayon-
nais were applying a local, Gascon understanding of conflicts in general to 
conflict at sea (see chapter 6). In any case, Krieger and Gardiner acknowl-
edged that reprisals were a part of the judicial maritime system and that 
they were congruent with the Rôles in the sense that both were commonly 
acknowledged institutions by the seafarers. Nonetheless, they could not 
be seen as a law per se, since they invariably were “international” and thus 
concerned the safety of the kingdoms and diplomacy rather the interests 
of the mariners and merchants. Ward, however, argues against the notion 
that reprisals should be perceived as a part of the offfĳicial judicial system 
of maritime law. Nevertheless, he provides a good reason for why repris-
als, whether legitimate or not, were a necessary recourse in maritime and 
commercial transactions. This recourse rested on a defĳiciency in Law Mer-
chant. Ward writes:
In common law, proof of purchase in good faith merely relieved the inno-
cent third party from the possibility of punishment for theft, and the goods 
had to be returned to the true owner without restoration of the purchase 
money. In the law merchant, with the interests of commerce in mind, the 
true owner had to refund the purchase price to the bona fĳide purchaser on 
the return of the stolen goods, in efffect a repurchase by the owner of his 
own property.23
22 Krieger, Ursprung, pp. 43–46.
23 Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, pp. 16–17.
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In other words, the merchant was liable to sufffer a loss because of piracy 
whether he won the trial or not. In order to cover his losses, he thus had 
to rely on other means, and the anger and frustration that this system 
produced must have been a powerful urge to commit reprisals and indeed 
to wage war amongst ports.
In the end, we must conclude with Klaus Friedland that: “In truth, the 
Rôles d’Oléron are essentially concerned with ship law—the security 
of the ship, crew and cargo. Piracy does not fĳigure in the Rôles. Piracy 
only became criminalised much later when it began to be regarded as a 
threat to the maritime community”.24 While merchants appealed to Law 
Merchant and maritime law for restitution, or even to some form of the 
Oléron law for goods stolen by pirates, quite often the actual measure 
which was applied was arrest and marque carried out either by the royal 
authorities or by the merchants and their compatriots themselves. I will 
now turn to an analysis of the principles of reprisal in the Middle Ages.
The Principles of Reprisal
In the legal and diplomatic records, reprisal was described by the follow-
ing words in Latin: Marca, Represaliæ, Pignorationes, Pignora, Queminæ, 
Cambium et Laudes and Gagium, and in French, Marque, Représailles and 
Laud.25 According to DuCange’s Glossarium Mediæ et infĳimæ latinitatis, 
represalium was the right to recover your belonging from a person who 
had taken them from you by force. Furthermore, DuCange stressed that 
reprisal was the power to seize goods for injustices and damages not just 
from a debtor from a foreign country but also from his countrymen.26
Here it is clear that reprisals could be against plunderers and debtors. 
DuCange also noted the synonymy between represalium and pignoratio 
24 Friedland, Klaus, “Maritime law and riracy: Advantages and inconveniences of ship-
ping in the Baltic,” in MacInnes et al., eds, Ships, Guns and Bibles in the North Sea and the 
Baltic States, c. 1350–c. 1700 (Phantassie, 2000), p. 32.
25 Mas Latrie, René de, “Du droit de marque ou droit de représailles au Moyen Âge,” 
Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes, 6e series, II (1866), 537.
26 “Jus recipiendi, quod cuipiam per vim ablatum fuerit” and “Auctor Breviloqui: Repræ-
salia est potestas pignerandi contra quemlibet de terra debitoris data creditori pro injuriis 
et damnis, Idem: Repræsaliæ dicuntur, quando aliquis oriundus de una terra spoliator, 
vel damnifĳicatur ab alio oriundo ab alia terra, vel etiam si non debitum solverit ei; tunc 
enim datur potestas isti spoliator, quod ei satisfaciat contra quemlibet in terra ille, unde 
est spoliator vel debitor.” DuCange, Glossarium mediæ et infĳimæ latinitatis, 6 vols. (Paris, 
1840–1846), V, 713. 
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(seizure). For instance, he referred to Philippe le Bel’s initiatives in this 
direction. According to the French king, seizure as described above was 
the means by which a prince could obtain justice for a subject who had 
been denied his right. The prince could concede to the subject the right to 
take by force anything from the subject of another prince to obtain restitu-
tion for an injustice or a robbery which he had sufffered.27 While the kings 
allowed this practice, the Church offfĳicially condemned it and threatened 
excommunication of those conceding reprensalias sive marchas against 
clergy and their goods. For instance, in 1314 the Council of Paris issued a 
prohibition of “Pignorationes, quas vulgaris elocutio repræsalias nominat” 
(pledges which in vulgar parlance are called reprisals), as it ran counter to 
law and natural equity.28 The word prisia (and contraprisia), which was 
the act of carrying out a reprisal, was defĳined by DuCange as an enforce-
ment of a debt or a tax, where the offfĳicers of a lord took (temporary) 
custody of goods or persons.29 DuCange defĳined marc(h)a with almost the 
same words as pignoratio, that is, a denial of justice whereupon the prince 
could concede a marque to the aggrieved so that by personal means he 
could obtain justice.30 Interestingly, another of the synonyms for reprisals, 
gagium, was explained as pignus, that is, a pledge and a fĳidejussio. Thus, 
all these words in one way or another entailed taking back property ille-
gitimately seized by another person, including cases of debt.
The main principle behind justifĳied attacks on and seizure of property 
at sea was collectively called reprisals. When people were subject to piracy 
or any other seizure of their ships and goods (or claimed to have been the 
victim of such), they could resort to private action in order to recuperate 
their goods or cover their losses by attacks on the seizers’ countrymen. 
The object of reprisals was to obtain compensation for injuries or losses 
sufffered by people who could not be brought to justice. They were in prin-
ciple only licensed when legal redress for various reasons could not be 
obtained, and they could be levied on account of injuries to the right of 
an individual, to obtain restitution for spoliation, for imprisonment and 
for outstanding debts. The reprisal levied permitted the aggrieved, by his 
27 “Facultas a Principe subdito cui jus denegatum est, concessa sibi jus faciendi atque 
Pignori capiendi etiam per vim quicquid poterit ab alterius Principis subdito, a quo injuria 
afffectum se vel spoliatum queritur.” DuCange, Glossarium, V, 251–252. 
28 DuCange, Glossarium, V, 251–252.
29 “Exactio, malatolta, jus capiendi ex subditis ea quæ domino sunt necessaria; item 
sub custodies manum positio, 2. Captura, Prise: item Jus reos capiendi et in carcerem con-
jiciendi.” DuCange, Glossarium, V, 451–452.
30 DuCange, Glossarium, VI, 279–280.
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own means, to recover his goods or persons to the value of the loss he 
had sufffered. In relation to theories of just war, reprisal permitted the 
taking of spoil, but this spoil was to be seen as repayment of an amount 
outstanding to the aggrieved and thus not as regular spoils of war.31 While 
in principle it seems that reprisals were only legitimate if conceded by a 
prince, de facto, the mariners often seemed to take matters into their own 
hands rather than wait for royal authorisation.
It is necessary to stress an important distinction here, namely the one 
between reprisal and retaliation. Today we see these two concepts as more 
or less synonymous, but from a legal point of view they are quite distinct. 
As the name suggests, reprisal is the taking back of something, normally 
some sort of property, unjustly taken from the person without payment. 
Reprisal is thus remedial and a compensation for a loss unjustly incurred. 
Retaliation, however, transcends the materiality of reprisal in that it is an 
aggressive response to a wrong sufffered, whether materially or emotion-
ally. It is at its core a vindictive infliction onto a foe of the same damage 
one has sufffered.32 In the Oxford English Dictionary, retaliation is defĳined 
as a retributive form of justice whereby an offfender’s punishment resem-
bles the offfence committed in kind and degree.33 However, a core element 
of both reprisal and retaliation was the concept of collective liability. An 
illustrative example of this can be seen in Marc Bloch’s La Société Féo-
dale. In a trial at the Parlament de Paris in 1260, the knight Louis Defeux 
demanded compensation from the squire Thomas d’Ouzouer for having 
wounded him. The accused did not deny that he had wounded Louis, but 
he explained that he himself sometime before had been attacked by Louis’ 
nephew. Thomas thus defended himself by stating that he had done noth-
ing wrong since he—in accordance with the royal decrees of a period of 
fair warning—had waited forty days before carrying out his vengeance. 
Louis replied that he was not liable for the actions of his nephew, but with 
no luck. The court decided that the act of an individual made his relatives 
liable for his actions.34
Thus, the reprisal or retaliation was permitted not only against the 
transgressor, but also against his family, friends and associates. In this 
31 Keen, Laws of War, p. 218.
32 Nefff, Stephen C., War and the Laws of Nations (Cambridge, 2008), p. 123.
33 Oxford English Dictionary http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50204656?single=1& 
query_type=word&queryword=retaliation&fĳirst=1&max_to_show=10. Accessed on 25 Feb-
ruary 2011.
34 Olim, I, 472–73, ORF, I, 56–58, Actes du Parlement, I, 38, no. 436, Bloch, Marc, La 
société féodale (Paris, 1994), pp. 187–188.
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regard, the maritime war between the Anglo-Bayonnais and the Nor-
mans was retaliatory. However, there was a diffference between war and 
reprisals/retaliation. Keen presents the diffference thus:
Theoretically justice was claimed for such reprisals, on the ground that 
injured and innocent both were subject to the judge who had refused 
redress, and so all were party to the crime. The case with feudal war was 
a little diffferent. It was levied for the same end, to protect the right of an 
injured individual, but for defĳiance only entitled the defĳier to take revenge 
on his opponent personally, or on his relatives and direct dependents.35
Reprisals were thus not arbitrary or anarchic but rather followed a sort of 
regulated custom or convention for conflict and dispute settlement. For 
maritime offfences, the procedure was usually the following: If a merchant 
or a shipmaster was attacked and plundered by foreign mariners, he would 
fĳirst complain locally in the nearest port, as for instance Bartholomew de 
Welle did. If nothing came of this, or if the accused could not be located 
and apprehended, the victim would appeal to his king to gain restitution 
by having him advance the case to the foreign king and his court. If the 
victim’s king—after adequate inquiries in the case—chose to plead it 
with the foreign king (or possibly port authorities) and demand restitu-
tion for the aggrieved, the latter would consider the case, hold his own 
inquiries, and report back to the victim’s king. Often a case like this could 
take years if not decades before any restitution or fĳinal refusal had been 
made, and stalling the cases seems to have been the preferred royal tactic 
in these matters. In time, the king of the aggrieved would often threaten 
to and ultimately carry out arrest of the opposing king’s merchants’ goods 
in his ports up to the lost value, perhaps augmented by the expenses that 
the victim had sufffered by pursuing the case (but no more), to be held 
until the foreign king made restitution. Alternatively, the aggrieved could 
appeal for a letter of marque and if his plea was accepted, the letter would 
authorise him personally or with the help of royal offfĳicers, to confĳiscate 
goods from the foreign king’s merchants and mariners. However, even the 
concession of arrest or letters of marque could take years, and all other 
means of restitution and recovery of the lost goods had to be tried before 
reprisals were authorised. If arrest was initiated by the royal offfĳicers, the 
arrested goods were put under custody of the royal agents until a fĳinal 
settlement had been reached, either by the foreign ruler granting restitu-
tion or by the victim’s ruler deciding to deliver the arrested goods to the 
35 Keen, Laws of War, p. 230.
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aggrieved and then consider the case closed. What could happen, how-
ever, was that the foreign ruler would issue counter-reprisals and arrests 
for his innocent subjects, to the efffect of a drawn-out series of arrests and 
counter-arrest until some larger settlement where all outstanding claims 
and counter-claims were solved, or possibly by permitting the victims free 
process in the pirate’s homeland. The historians usually claim that only 
arrest of goods was permitted, not people, and that the use of force was in 
theory prohibited,36 yet how arrests and reprisals were expected to hap-
pen in practice without the application of some sort of force is unclear. 
Indeed, contrary to the principles presented by the historians, the Eng-
lish “keeper of documents”, Ellis Joneston, asserted that recourse to the 
detaining of people was a recognized and acceptable (though lamentable) 
practice in reprisal and marque procedures.37 The same is amply present 
in the complaints over piracy where the arrest (actually hostage-taking to 
guarantee restitution) was a common practice.38
It was only the ruler in his capacity as prince with no superior who 
could issue arrest and letters of marque, since the laws which permitted 
reprisals were the same as those permitting public war, namely the ius 
divinum and ius gentium, which were the only war-actions permitting 
the taking of spoils. Some mariners and merchants like the Normans, the 
Portsmen or the Bayonnais found this unacceptable and thus took mat-
ters into their own hands, as is exemplifĳied in 1292–93. Such a reprisal 
over a perceived wrong would most often cause the innocent compatriots 
of the alleged pirates/the accused to desire reprisal of their own against 
the initial reprisal-takers or their compatriots, and events could quickly 
escalate if the kings or other higher authorities did not intervene to medi-
ate in the conflict. So, essentially, reprisal was based on group liability and 
semi-private revenge, and the transition from reprisal to retaliation was 
a sliding one.39
36 Timbal, Pierre-Clément, “Les lettres de marque dans le droit de la France médiévale,” 
Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin, X, L’Étranger, vol. II (Bruxelles, 1958), 130–131. See also the 
procedure applied in the case of Bartholomew de Welle in chapter 2.
37 “corporum et bonorum arrestaciones, que mark’ in terra Vasconie vulgariter nomi-
nantur.” EMDP, I, pp. 365–366. 
38 See, for instance, EMDP, I, 398–401 and Foedera 1307–1327, pp. 89–92.
39 For the reprisal procedure, see Mas Latrie, “Droit de marque,” pp. 530–31 and 540, 
Chavarot, Marie-Claire, “La pratique des lettres de marque d’après les arrêts du parlement 
(XIIIe—début XVe siècle),” Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes, 149 (1991), 79–86, Gardiner, 
“Belligerent rights,” pp. 538–539, Keen, Laws of War, pp. 219–222.
  the laws of the sea and the principles of reprisal 139
While this model in principle looks straightforward, numerous prob-
lems were de facto the result of it. The relationship between reprisals 
and war in particular put a strain on the relationship of the rulers. These 
small-scale injuries and private actions constituted a rather peculiar prob-
lem for the kings, in that they were too small to call for military action on 
the part of the rulers, but on the other hand they were big enough that 
they could not be ignored. In a sense, reprisal was akin to war and police 
actions, only it was carried out by private persons and not the offfĳicers 
of the king.40 Thus, “Reprisals were . . . really an exercise of domestic law 
enforcement albeit delegated law enforcement—rather than a resort to 
war properly speaking”.41
Since piracy entailed the killing and brutalisation of the victims, it 
must have engendered strong feelings of animosity towards the pirates, 
as well as their countrymen, who might justly be seen as accomplices. In 
this light, reprisal functioned as a controlled form of vengeance justifĳied 
as restitution and debt recovery. Indeed, the language of the legal and 
diplomatic records seems to down-play what was at stake by describing it 
in terms akin to economic transactions.
The private actions of reprisals constituted a juridical as well as diplo-
matic problem in the late Middle Ages. In practice, the principle of col-
lective liability meant that one offfence could spread out to engulf a whole 
community, since actions against the innocent countrymen of the pirates 
by the aggrieved in turn called for counter-reprisals.42 Thus, the risk of an 
escalation from reciprocal reprisal to outright war or at least diplomatic 
crisis for the kings was always latent.
However, reprisals also benefĳited the rulers. Apart from the limitation 
of private retaliation and reprisal, Emily Sohmer Tai argues, on the basis 
of maritime politics in the Mediterranean in the fourteenth and fĳifteenth 
centuries, that it was a conflict-reducing medium. On the one hand, the 
princes wanted to acquire justice for their subjects, but on the other hand, 
they did not want to go to war for single cases of maritime theft. It was 
therefore better for the princes to control the means of private restitu-
tion than not to interfere at all, since the aggrieved might be tempted 
to have recourse to private acts of reprisal and unauthorised acts of con-
fĳiscation and violence, which could lead to an escalation of conflict and 
40 Nefff, War, pp. 50 and 76.
41   Nefff, War, p. 80.
42 Keen, Laws of War, pp. 213–214.
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drag the princes into the struggle anyway. Tai calls this a safety valve on 
an often combustible maritime situation. However, the control of repris-
als also had another benefĳit for rulers. By controlling the right to decide 
what was legitimate reprisal and when it could be carried out, the princes 
afffĳirmed their control over vessels and individuals and permitted them to 
defĳine what constituted crimes and what was justifĳied reprisal. Thus, on 
the one hand the prince appeared as the defender of their subjects’ rights, 
and on the other he reinforced his position as the supreme power of the 
realm with a sovereign right to defĳine right and wrong.43 A similar view is 
advanced by the legal historian, Alfred Rubin, who states that the issuing 
of letters of marque and reprisal was not an attempt to control or curb 
piracy but rather to control and limit private legal remedies without hav-
ing to commit royal military resources to the dispute. Rubin argued that 
by granting right to reprisal, the rulers seemed to give in to their subjects’ 
pleas but in fact strengthened their power over their subjects by limiting 
and controlling their use of private force.44 However, as we shall see in 
next chapter, this safety-valve could also have the opposite efffect, namely 
to question or challenge the king’s right to jurisdiction over the sea.
Arrest and Seizure
While Edward I promised foreign merchants in 1303 in the Carta Merca-
toria that they would be exempt from prise and arrest,45 the kings often 
had recourse to this measure. I shall begin with the king’s order for arrest 
of foreigners’ goods in their ports, since this is the fĳirst step in the reprisal 
and restitution procedure. The order of arrest was usually issued to royal 
English offfĳicers in one or more specifĳic ports where fellow-countrymen of 
the pirates plied their trade. However, in wartime the kings would issue 
a general order of arrest of the enemy’s subjects’ goods in all his ports, 
a procedure the English used against the French and especially against 
the Scots and the Flemings in the period from 1280 to 1330.46 Restitu-
tion for individual victims of piracy was most often only addressed to a 
select few ports (even though sometimes the kings would bundle com-
plaints together, and threaten and sometimes carry out a general arrest). 
43 Tai, “Marking Water”.
44 Rubin, Law of Piracy, p. 34.
45 Early English Customs System, p. 261 (“nullam prisam vel arrestacionem seu dila-
cionem occasione prise”).
46 For instance, Foedera 1307–1327, p. 562.
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In France, the same system was applied, but as the reprisal in the form 
of arrests and letters of marque was a tiresome and sometimes fruitless 
procedure, starting with Philippe le Bel in the fourteenth century, a pro-
cedure of mandatory taxes on foreign merchants trading in France was 
created. However, it seems exclusively to have been used in southern 
France in dealings with Italian merchants. Furthermore, while this tax 
was levied as a surety to pay for incidents of theft as well as debt evasion 
and other “fĳinancial” crimes committed by Italians, the levying of the tax 
was dependent on treaties between France and the foreign power in ques-
tion. Thus, it was not a universal French royal policy but rather something 
applied in relation to specifĳic groups or polities.47
One example of a French maritime arrest dates to 1322, when the Parle-
ment de Paris ordered a reprisal in the form of arrest of goods of Spanish 
merchants from La Coruña. The order read accordingly:
Order to the bailifff of Caux to arrest the person and the goods of inhabitants 
of La Coruña which he fĳinds in his jurisdiction in reprisal of the crimes of 
the inhabitants of the said town as they have provided sanctuary for robbers 
and murderers guilty of having attacked near Belle-île a ship charged with 
wines from Bordeaux which belongs to merchants from Dieppe.48
An English example of an arrest order is comprised of the proceedings 
in the restitution for English ships taken and plundered by the French 
admiral, Berenger Blanc, and his Calaisien mariners in 1315 and 1316 dur-
ing the French war against Flanders. Since England and France were at 
peace in this period, and indeed collaborated in their struggles against the 
Flemings and the Scots, negotiations over the restitution of these goods 
commenced. Despite the state of peace between the two kingdoms, in 1318 
and 1319 the English proceeded to counter-prises (that is, arrests) against 
French merchants, specifĳically of Rouen and Amiens, by confĳiscating 
their goods in London, Norfolk, Sufffolk and Southampton up to a specifĳic 
amount in order to obtain restitution for the English merchants. In this 
case, on several occasions Philippe V wrote to Edward to have him post-
pone or cancel the declared reprisal (marcham seu contraprisiam), often 
47 Chavarot, “Lettres de marque,” p. 87.
48 “Mandement au bailli de Caux d’arrêter la personne et les biens des habitants de La 
Corogne (de Croigne) qu’il trouvera dans le ressort de sa juridiction, en représailles des 
méfaits des habitants de la dite ville qui avaient donné asile à des voleurs et meurtriers, 
lesquels avaient attaqué près de “Bel-lille” un vaisseau chargé de vins de Bordeaux, appar-
tenant à des marchands de Dieppe.” Actes du Parlement, II, no. 6916, p. 474.
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with success.49 These proceedings were not a cause of enmity between 
England and France, and while the case did not please either of the mon-
archs and the negotiations and restitution were a complicated afffair, no 
severe damage to the relationship seems to have come out of it. How-
ever, this did not mean that the tone could not be harsh at times. On 15 
October 1311, Philippe le Bel complained about a piracy committed against 
Rochelais merchants. Philippe le Bel informed Edward that he had refused 
to issue a letter of marque (marcham . . . concedere) to the Rochelais, but 
the mere mentioning of this constituted a veiled threat that this would 
be Philippe’s next step if restitution was not obtained. In 1313, restitution 
was obtained, which was remarkably fast for the period,50 but it should be 
noted that Philippe’s letter was sent a few months after the breakdown of 
the Anglo-French negotiations of Périgueux (12 January–2 June 1311) over 
Gascon disputes,51 and the risk of further French involvement in Gascony 
may have been the cause for the swift closure of the case.
A person could, however, obtain immunity from arrest and marque by 
having the king issue a letter of safe conduct. For instance, in 1314 Edward 
II granted a letter of safe-conduct for life in the Duchy of Aquitaine to 
Pierre de la Posterle of Oléron. This meant that his goods were free from 
arrest or marque except for his own debts or for those where he was a 
guarantor.52
Debt
These arrests were not confĳined to the monarchs and their offfĳicers, how-
ever, and it seems as if arrest for debts was one of the motives for having 
recourse to piracy and maritime war. Thus, in the peace treaties between 
Bayonne and the Cinque Ports, and Bayonne and Great Yarmouth from 
1277 (renewed in 1310), one of the clauses was to regulate the recovery of 
debt. The clause states that 
49 For the whole case, see: CPR 1313–1317, pp. 501–502, 545–546, 571–572, CCR 1313–1318, 
pp. 291, 341, 345–346 and 475–476, CCR 1318–1323, pp. 13–14, 52, 496 and 692. Foedera 1273–
1307, p. 961, Foedera 1307–1327, pp. 272, 279, 280, 281, 292, 342, 350, 373, 455, 502–3 and 517. 
Champollion, II, 71–73. Calendar of Chancery Warrants 1244–1326, pp. 427–428. For other 
examples of arrests and counter-arrests, see TNA SC 8/258/12890A and TNA C 47/28/1.
50 Foedera 1307–1327, pp. 146 and 149, CCR 1307–1313, pp. 445, 486–487 and 565.
51 Chaplais, Pierre, “Règlement des conflits internationaux franco-anglais au XIVe 
siècle,” Le Moyen Âge, vol. 57 (1951), pp. 282–283.
52 EMDP, I, 387–388.
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if a man from either party owes debts to persons of the other party, if the 
debt is know it must be paid as soon as possible or the debtor shall be 
denied company of either of the parties, and he shall be denied entrance in 
towns of either party as well as ships, galleys or vessels belonging to either 
party until the debt is paid. And for unknown debts, let either party make 
justice as it is due.53
In the treaty between Bayonne and the Normans from 1282, it was stressed 
that: “In turn, should dispute arise again because arrests which are called 
marches, we command that no master or mariners arrest anything of the 
countrymen of the debtor because of debt or offfence of the principal 
arrest if the debtor or his fĳidejussor can be found”.54
Here the words of arrest and marque were used in direct relation to the 
issue of outstanding debts and piracies and war between these marines.
Pollock and Maitland’s study of English medieval law expresses a proce-
dure of suits and collection of debts which resembles the arrest and reprisal 
procedure. Like the cases of arrest, the issue was that the lender or sellers 
had parted with property and demanded a return through legal action. 
Furthermore, as in arrest cases, the plaintifff not only demanded restitu-
tion for the sum lost but in addition damages for unjust detention.55 This 
relationship between debt and arrest is shown in various English sources 
concerning Law Merchant. For instance, in 1310 the sherifff of Yorkshire 
arrested goods of merchants of Groningen for outstanding debts to an 
English merchant.56 In his studies of the medieval shipmaster, Ward has 
shown that there was a widespread use of credit in maritime commercial 
transactions and that several ingenious methods were employed to mask 
53 “tutz les hommes qi sont des parties e deyvent dette as autres, si la dette est conue, 
soit paie tant tost si le deitur ad dount paier la dette, et sil ne ad dont paier, adonk ne soit 
le dettur resceu en compaignie ne en commune en nule des villes que sont d’une part ou 
d’autre, ne en neef, ne en galeie, ne en vessel, si la que la dette soit paie; et pur les dettes 
que ne sont pas conues, que face chescon de les parties le foer ou droit que devera faire.” 
Printed in Goyheneche, Bayonne, p. 534. 
54 “Rursum quia ex arrestacionibus que vocantur marches quandoque dissencionis 
occasio reviviscit, ordinamus quod ad instantiam aliquorum magistrorum vel nautarum 
nullus ipsorum arrestetur nisi pro debito vel delicto [quo—Chaplais] de arrestatus princi-
palis debitor vel fĳidejussor existat.” TNA C 47/32/22/2. See also EMDP I, 387. 
55 Pollock and Maitland, English Law, pp. 212–216.
56 Select Cases Concerning the Law Merchant A.D. 1239–1633, ed. Hubert Hall (London, 
1903), pp. 81–83. This collection of sources contains several accounts of debt and arrest, 
see, for instance, pp. 7–9, 11–12, 72–73, 73–76, 81–83, 83–85, 90–93 and 96–98. Most of these 
cases are somewhat ambiguous as to whether the arrest was justifĳied. The fact remains, 
though, that the arrests by royal offfĳicers were often carried out for the recovery of debts.
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interest, which it was illegal to demand in the Middle Ages,57 but which 
might have been a source of strife among the mariners nevertheless.
However, cases of robbery or any type of violent acquisition, which 
arguably is at the core of the unjust detention through piracy, were not 
treated by Pollock and Maitland. They only considered debt and arrest in 
a civil and strictly commercial context. Nevertheless, French historians 
have recently explored this aspect. In her studies of marque in France 
in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Marie-Claire Chavarot has 
pointed out that the victim of a theft or the creditor of an unpaid debt 
could be obliged to use violence to recover his money, not only from 
the delinquent himself but also from his countrymen.58 An early case of 
French arrest was in 1263, when a Rouenais merchant was accorded an 
arrest of goods belonging to Germans because the king of Germany had 
an outstanding debt to him; another case occurred in 1270, when Robert 
d’Artois was accorded arrest against the commune of Saint-Valéry for a 
debt. In relation to piracy, however, the case of Montpelliérain merchants 
who were plundered by Genovese pirates is especially illustrative. These 
merchants were accorded a marque against the Genovese merchants in 
Nîmes, since that town had an especially large population of Genovese 
merchants. Thus, the concept of collective liability was invoked, and inno-
cent Genovese merchants were to answer for crimes committed by their 
countrymen. Furthermore, the Montpelliérains did not have to take to the 
sea to obtain restitution.59 Indeed, Chavarot stresses that the justifĳication 
for the issuing of a marque was a tort unjustly committed by a foreigner. 
This tort could be a theft, plunder, non-payment of a debt, a promise 
which was not kept or the deprivation of a right.60
Julie Claustre’s studies of debts in the later Middle Ages further illu-
minates how debt could bring enmity between people. Claustre dem-
onstrates that the use of debt was by no means confĳined to merchants 
and the upper levels of society. Rather, credit and loan-giving/-taking was 
57 Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, pp. 69–70.
58 Chavarot, “Lettres de marque,” pp. 53–54, “la victime d’un vol ou le créancier impayé 
pouvait être entraîné à reprendre son dû sur les biens des compatriotes du déclinquent par 
les moyens les plus violents et irréguliers.”
59 Chavarot, “Lettres de marque,” pp. 56–59.
60 Chavarot, “Lettres de marque,” p. 79, “Le point de depart [for a marque] est un tort 
injustement cause par un étranger, quelle que soit la nature de ce tort, vol, pillage, non 
paiement d’une dette, promesse non tenue ou encore privation d’un droit.”
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present throughout all layers of society.61 Debt and credit most often took 
place within familial or professional relations and was governed by the 
logic of reciprocity and solidarity. Accordingly, she states that debt was 
a “convention”, meaning that it was an arrangement or an understanding 
between persons already connected through other relationships. It was 
in no way a formal transaction between a person and a credit institution, 
but was instead a transaction which relied on already existing bonds of 
acquaintance. However, this initially peaceful understanding also had a 
darker side to it, namely that it established a relationship of dominance 
and dependency, expressed in legal terms as an “obligation” (obligatio). 
Obligatio in the Middle Ages defĳined less a kind of contract than a method 
of executing a contract. The medieval expression for debt thus insisted 
on the restraining bond which it imposed on the debtor in relation to the 
creditor, rather than on the amount owed, that is, the object of the con-
tract.62 In other words, it gave the creditor a measure of power over the 
debtor, and made the debtor a dependent of the creditor. This dependency 
and the troubles of outstanding debts and the disruption of the hitherto 
reigning relationships of power amongst, for instance, neighbours in Paris 
led to festering anger, desperation and hatred. This is found in numerous 
cases of aggression and murder in fourteenth-century France perpetrated 
either by the creditor or the debtor (for instance, for gambling debts). In 
a society devoid of the impersonal bonds of modern credit institutions, 
the pursuit of an outstanding debt appeared as a means to humiliate 
an enemy, which in turn could result in the debtor seeking vengeance 
for this humiliation.63 The fundamental cause for this development was 
the absence of unifĳied credit institutions and fĳinancial transactions, like 
loan-giving, which were at the same time difffuse, multilateral and devoid 
of the impersonal character which is present in modern society with a 
institutionalised credit market. Since these institutions were absent, the 
loan rested in terms of security on the personal relationship between the 
creditor and the debtor. Consequently, the relationship of credit was also 
an emotional one fĳilled with social and cultural signifĳications which went 
beyond a mere relationship of economic dominance. It entered into the 
61 Claustre, Julie, “La dette, la haine et la force: les débuts de la prison pour dette à la 
fĳin du Moyen Âge,” Revue Historique, 644 (2007), 799.
62 Claustre, “La dette,” pp. 800–802.
63 Claustre, “La dette,” pp. 802–809. For an example, see Confession et jugements de cri-
minels au Parlement de Paris (1319–1350), eds Monique Langlois and Yvonne Lanhers (Paris, 
1971), pp. 111–114.
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defĳinition of a social identity which was publicly constructed and recon-
structed by conversations, rumours, reputation, and fama, which in turn 
called for the use of force for its defence.64 Indeed, a creditor of outstand-
ing debts which were not forthcoming could and would stigmatise the 
debtor as a thief. This permitted the creditor to apply private force to 
obtain the amount due if no public offfĳicers could be persuaded to exercise 
it for him.65
It seems more than likely that at least some of the piracy cases, as well 
as the maritime wars, had started with debts which the debtor perhaps 
had tried to evade or which the creditor, his kinsmen or fellow citizens 
decided to claim by private arrest, honestly or fraudulently. This seems to 
be the essence of at least some of the cases of reprisal, namely taking back 
one’s due, but needless to say, and as was already apparent in the medi-
eval as well as our understanding of the word “reprisal”, this must often 
have led to conflict, in court or by violence. No one could be expected 
to hand over goods for outstanding debts to a private third party who 
claimed to exact the debt on behalf of their fellow citizen. However, in 
legal terms, it still meant that what was described in the sources as lawful 
debt collection or reprisal was tantamount to theft and robbery.
Henry de Oreford of Ipswich and the Procedure of Restitution
Medieval kings were very reluctant to grant letters of marque. Instead they 
preferred arrest carried out by public offfĳicers after careful inquiries into 
the case. It seems as if these letters of marque, at least in the thirteenth 
and fĳirst quarter of the fourteenth centuries, were very much an instance 
of last resort, entered into only reluctantly when all other methods had 
failed. The reason for this was the obvious and almost inevitable series of 
reprisals between the merchants and mariners of the realms. An illustra-
tive example of this course is the case of Henry de Oreford, merchant 
of Ipswich. In 1305 at the latest, Henry’s ship, La Lyon de Herewyk, was 
attacked by Breton pirates (malefactores) from Le Conquet, presumably 
on the Island of Quéménès (“in insula de Kenevoys in Britannia”). The 
Bretons violently took the ship, valued at £200 sterling, and its cargo, also 
valued at £200 sterling, and imprisoned the crew for a long time, all to 
64 On fama, see Akehurst, F.R.P. “Good name, reputation, and notoriety in French cus-
tomary law,” in T. Fenster and D.L. Smail, eds, Fama—The Politics of Talk Reputation in 
Medieval Europe (London, 2003), pp. 75–94.
65 Claustre, “La dette,” pp. 809–811.
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the severe destitution of Henry. Furthermore, this occurred at a time of 
peace, meaning that the piracy probably happened sometime between 
1303 and 1305.66 In 1312, Edward II wrote to his seneschal of Gascony stat-
ing the above-mentioned and adding that the duke of Brittany had freed 
the mariners but had refused to do Henry justice. Edward continued that 
when he had ascended the throne, he had ordered the seneschals of Gas-
cony, John of Hastings and Guy Ferrers, that they should begin legal pro-
ceedings against the Bretons and (presumably) arrest their goods if they 
came to the duchy in order to do justice to Henry de Oreford: “completely 
in accordance with the legal statements of the said regions”.67 Despite 
several letters to the duke of Brittany, Arthur II, demanding restitution, 
nothing had happened; the king now ordered the arrest of all Breton mer-
chants’ goods in the Duchy of Gascony. Apparently, no reply came from 
the duke, and Edward ordered John Salmon, bishop of Norwich in the 
county of Richmond (a fĳief under the duke’s uncle, Jean), and two royal 
offfĳicers that if the Bretons and their goods came to Gascony, they were to 
summon them, hold court and to do speedy justice to Henry.68
In a letter from 12 September 1317, from Edward II to the duke of Brit-
tany, now Jean III, we fĳind the continuation of the case. Apparently, the 
arrested goods of the Breton merchants were released by the commis-
sioners without any restitution to Henry, but Henry seems to have been 
allowed to try the case at a court in Brittany. Nothing came of this, how-
ever; rather, Henry was beaten and grievously wounded by the duke’s men 
while prosecuting the case there. Therefore Edward II ordered the new 
seneschal of Gascony, Gilbert Pecche, to make a new examination of the 
case. This clearly proved the aggrieved status of Henry, and Pecche and 
his council granted Henry (at his request) a letter of marque (marcham, 
lettre de marche) against the Bretons and their goods until Henry could be 
satisfĳied to the amount of £1860 sterling (sic!)—that is, the initial loss plus 
compensation for further damages to Henry. However, at the intervention 
of the Breton duke’s proctor, Pecche suspended the execution of the letter 
of marque. This was a mistake, however, for instead of granting restitu-
tion to Henry, the duke tried to have Henry’s suit annulled by presenting 
66 The whole case is documented in: RG, IV, no. 689, pp. 193–194 and CCR 1313–1318, pp. 
566–567 and 617. TNA SC 8/241/12028, SC 8/262/13085, SC 8/132/6564, SC 8/132/6566, TNA 
C 61/32/29. 
67 “complementum secundum foros et consuetudines parcium predictarum,” RG, IV, 
no. 689, p. 194.
68 RG, IV, no. 689, p. 194.
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it at the Parlement de Paris, thereby circumventing and undermining 
Edward’s judicial authority by appealing to his liege lord for Gascony.69 
Now, Edward wrote the duke that before he reissued the letter of marque 
to Henry, he would for one (last?) time ask the duke to grant Henry resti-
tution as Edward preferred the matter to be solved “in a friendly manner 
rather than that his damages should be levied from non-consenting par-
ties (ab invitis), as is usual in such cases”.70 The duke was given until 30 
November to certify that he had undertaken the restitution, or else the 
marque would be reactivated.
In a memorandum from 1318, it seems that Henry had fĳinally obtained 
a partial restitution. Here it is stated that the letter of marque (marchia 
quedam) was awarded to Henry and that apparently a Reymund del Mays 
was appointed—with the consent of the Bretons and Henry—to levy the 
marque (that is, Henry would not enforce it himself ) of the £1860 sterling. 
The memorandum stated that Reymund had received from the goods of 
Bretons in Bordeaux 234 “livres de petits tournois noirs”,71 which he had 
paid to Henry without Pecche or his men having received any of this. This 
was confĳirmed by the chancellor, the bishop of Winchester. However, in 
December 1318, the marque was again activated as Henry still had not 
been provided full restitution.72 This is the last that we hear of this case, 
which in 1318 had been going for at least thirteen years. It also seems as 
if the Bretons, with or without the duke’s consent, in the end accepted to 
grant restitution to Henry. This example shows how difffĳicult it was to get 
restitution through the judiciary system, the hazards of pursuing the case 
abroad (the beating of Henry in Brittany) and the nature of the letter of 
marque, which, at least in the memorandum, appears to have been con-
ceived of as an act carried out by a “neutral” middleman and confĳirmed 
by royal authorities. It also shows the confĳiscatory nature of the marque, 
even though the letter to the duke from 1317 seems to imply that Henry 
could carry out the marque personally and with force. Moreover, the case 
shows how hard it was to be granted a letter of marque and how easily it 
could be revoked. Furthermore, the statement that Edward preferred it to 
69 For appeal to the French kings, see Cheyette, Frederic L., “The royal safeguard in 
medieval France” in J.R. Strayer and D.E. Queller, eds, Post Scripta: Essays on Medieval Law 
and the Emergence of the European State in Honor of Gaines Post (Rome, 1972), p. 650.
70 CCR 1313–1318, pp. 566–567.
71 According to TNA C 47/27/7, there were ten livres de petits tournois noirs per £1 ster-
ling. Thus, Henry was only recompensed of £23.4 sterling, a far cry from the claim of £1860 
sterling.
72 CCR 1313–1318, p. 617, TNA C 61/32/29.
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be carried out in a friendly manner refers to the risk of a chain of reprisals 
which, in general, no ruler had any interest in. Finally, it shows the dirty 
tricks applied in suits like this one, as the duke of Brittany tried to appeal 
to the Parlement de Paris which often judged in favour of parties friendly 
to the French king.
The case of the piracy against Henry de Oreford is therefore an excel-
lent example of the weakness of the procedure. It explains why some 
merchants and mariners seem to have preferred to take matters in their 
own hands, not least because the rigidness and uncertainty of the pro-
cedure could mean the destitution and poverty of an otherwise well-offf 
merchant.
Reprisals and Letters of Marque
The coincidence between the words used for letters of marque and those 
for the march, that is, a region with no clear jurisdiction, or rather overlap-
ping jurisdictions characterised by frequent recourse to private actions of 
reprisals and retaliation, has led some historians to see the etymology of 
the expression, letter of marque, as a signifĳier of the sea being a marcher 
area (see chapter 6). In the nineteenth century, in Glossaire nautique 
Augustin Jal assumed that the “marque” was directly connected to the 
meaning of march as a border or a frontier,73 and that letters of marque 
consequently should be read as frontier letters, that is, commissions for 
actions of private justice on the fluid borders of the medieval kingdoms.
This notion was supported by René de Mas Latrie. He argued that the 
reprisal system was Germanic in origin, since it was unknown to Roman 
Law. Indeed, the only mentions in Roman Law of reprisal was the prohi-
bition of this practice. Thus, in the fĳifth century, with the breakdown of 
the Western Roman Empire and the advent of the Germanic kingdoms, a 
fundamental change in the law system occurred. Mas Latrie argued that 
the Germanic tribes’ coherence was based in particular on family and 
tribal solidarity, which ran counter to the Roman Empire’s formal focus 
on juridical universalism. As Mas Latrie put it: “The spirit of collective lia-
bility went well beyond [the family] amongst these people. All the mem-
bers of a hundred, or rather of the same march, were held responsible 
73 Jal, Glossaire Nautique, p. 925. 
150 chapter five
for an offfence or a crime committed by one of their commarchati”.74 Con-
sequently, family members were obliged to defend their relatives, and col-
lective liability in reprisals was the cornerstone of the system. In practice, 
however, this act could only lead to escalations of conflicts and in princi-
ple exacerbate the problem rather than alleviate it. Around the eleventh 
century, the Mediterranean cities were the fĳirst to put formal limitations 
on reprisals by having governments regulate it by letters of reprisal and 
marque.75 Thus, Mas Latrie concluded that there was a direct connec-
tion between the march and the right to reprisals expressed in letters 
of marque.
However, in the twentieth century this connection between “marque” 
and march area has been refuted by Pierre-Clément Timbal and Cha-
varot. They questioned the etymological connection between the words 
and considered it a mere coincidence that many of these reprisals took 
place in frontier areas. Timbal argued that “marque” came from marcare 
or marchiare, used in the same sense as pignorare in the medieval texts.76 
Chavarot stressed the synonymy with pignus, that is, pledge and an eco-
nomic transaction, but she refrained from explaining the word’s origin.77
In efffect, what Timbal and Chavarot argued was that no linguistic con-
nection could be made between marque and march. Instead, they referred 
to the meaning of one of marca’s synonyms, pignus and pignoratio, which 
were well known concepts in Roman property law. However, while marca 
presupposes seizure by way of reprisal, pignoratio, but especially pignus, 
are more abstract terms that simply denote distraint for non-payment 
of goods or for a service rendered and pledge of valuables. The words 
say nothing about the way in which this money or these goods were 
recovered contrary to marca, which presuppose a direct action on part 
of the aggrieved or the “creditor” to obtain his due. This further seems to 
have negated the direct connection to Germanic customary law. How-
ever, while pignoratio indeed seems to have expanded the meaning of 
marque considerably, the coincidence that marque was applied especially 
in marcher areas is still left unexplained.
74 “L’esprit de la responsabilité commune s’étendait encore bien plus loin chez ces 
peoples. Ainsi tous les membres d’une même centaine, ou plutôt d’une même marche, 
commarchati, étaient tenus du délit ou du crime commis par l’un d’eux.” Mas Latrie, “Droit 
de marque,” p. 534.
75 Mas Latrie, “Droit de marque,” p. 537.
76 Timbal, “Lettres de marque,” pp. 113–114.
77 Chavarot, “Lettres de marque,” p. 52.
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Thus, while “letters of marque” and “march” etymologically seem to 
have diffferent origins and indeed did not presuppose one another, they 
were related as a practice. In the march, private action to obtain restitu-
tion was permitted, something which the letters of marque conceded by 
princes also allowed under special circumstances.78 So, in both cases, the 
heart of the matter was restitution and satisfaction legally obtained by 
private persons and by private means. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
the method for settling conflicts at sea was the method applied in the 
marches, that is, by arbitration and negotiation rather than strict judicial 
action on the part of a prince.
I therefore argue that while in its various forms the expression “marque” 
and “march” did not initially seem to be etymologically related, the letter 
of marque fĳitted rather well with the procedure for pursuing claims by pri-
vate means (as well as with governmental support in some cases) against 
the offfender, as well as his compatriots, in a march.
If the procedure of arrests failed, the ultimate resort was, as we saw with 
Henry de Oreford, to issue a letter of marque. Chavarot’s analysis of the 
development of the letter of marque in the Middle Ages in the documents 
of the Parlement de Paris shows that it—as a codifĳied governmental meas-
ure for restitution of goods—spread progressively in the thirteenth century 
from the Mediterranean cities in Italy and Aragon to France. From the last 
third of the thirteenth century, the concept of marque was clearly present 
in the decisions of the Parlement de Paris, even though the term itself 
was not used until later. In the thirteenth century, the Parlement de Paris 
(but also the bailifffs and seneschals) ordered reprisals akin to marque, but 
the fĳirst case where the term “marque” was used was not until the case 
mentioned above between the Montpelliérains and the Genovese in 1308.79 
The marque cases in the Parlement de Paris are dominated almost exclu-
sively by Mediterranean cases. This seems to signify that the approach to 
matters in northern Europe followed another line, most probably because 
the English kings were the French kings’ vassals for the Duchy of Gascony. 
Consequently, the French kings considered the quarrels that could result 
in reprisals and marque to be domestic afffairs where they were the ulti-
mate judges, whereas the cases with the Italians and the Aragonese were 
clearly of an international character between sovereign authorities. From 
1313, the issuing of letters of marque became a purely royal prerogative, 
78 Keen, Laws of War, p. 219.
79 Chavarot, “Lettres de marque,” pp. 56–64, Olim, III, no. LXXXIX, pp. 342–345.
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as Philippe le Bel tended to control and discourage this recourse in order 
to avoid the escalation of conflicts which could prove detrimental to the 
kingdom’s foreign policies.80
In England, reprisals between towns were prohibited in 1274, but 
the practice persisted at least in London.81 The English use of the term 
“marque” probably came from either France or Spain, perhaps through 
Gascony where reprisals were a time-honoured action in disputes. The 
English letters of marque in maritime afffairs in the 1290s seem to support 
this origin in Gascony, since the marque in the sources from this period 
was granted solely to Gascons. In some ways this seems to have been a 
desperate measure and proved detrimental to English foreign policy, as 
reprisals between Bayonnais and Castilians apparently got out of hand 
(see chapter 7).82
Before commencing an analysis of the letters of marque, I will briefly 
clarify the meaning of marque in relation to reprisals and war. Auguste 
Dumas argued that there were several categories of rightful reprisal in the 
Middle Ages. First of all, Dumas, distinguished between prises in peace-
time and during war.
In times of peace, the right of reprisal or marque was a right to take 
prises, either to avoid an imminent damage or threat or to obtain resti-
tution for a damage already proven. Thus, if a ship was attacked, it had 
a right to defend itself and to capture the attacking ship if possible. For 
this, there was no need for any offfĳicial authorisation. Reprisal and marque 
were:
the right, when one had been aggrieved by a foreigner, to take by force one’s 
due or the equivalent of one’s due from the fellow-citizens of this foreigner. 
From the fourteenth century, to have recourse to this action one had to 
be furnished with government authorisation: it was thus necessary to have 
obtained letters of marque or reprisals by one’s prince before carrying out 
these actions.83
In wartime, one could legitimately take prises if it was from the subjects 
and allies of the enemy, and in civil war against the opposing party, or 
80 Timbal, “Lettres de marque,” p. 122, Chavarot, “Lettres de marque,” pp. 63–64.
81 Gardiner, “Belligerent rights,” p. 538, n. 39.
82 Rodger, Safeguard, p. 128.
83 “le droit, quand on avait été lésé par un étranger, de reprendre par la force son bien, 
ou l’équivalent de son bien, sur les concitoyens de cet étranger. Dès le XIVe siècle, pour 
y recourir, on devait s’être muni auparavant d’une autorisation de son gouvernement: il 
fallait avoir obtenu de son prince des lettres de marque ou de représailles.” Dumas, Étude, 
pp. 3–4. 
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against the enemies of one’s particular allies even though one’s ruler was 
not at war with the ally’s enemy. The example given by Dumas for the 
latter was the French mariners’ operations in the 1330s to help the Scots 
against the English.84 This distinction between reprisal and war was also 
stressed by Mas Latrie, who sharply distinguished between privateering 
and reprisals. The right to privateering (“le droit de course”) was the right 
that a sovereign could concede to his subjects to arm ships to attack the 
vessels of the enemy’s merchants in times of open war. This right was dif-
ferent from the right to reprisals, which could only be accorded in times of 
peace to obtain individual restitution after a denial of justice by the other 
party. During the actions of reprisal, the aggrieved was only allowed to 
take goods from the foreign party up to the loss that he had sufffered but 
no more than that, and he was not permitted to commit actions which 
would endanger the peace between the kingdoms.85 Nevertheless, while 
Mas Latrie and Dumas considered it a right, Chavarot asserts that it did 
not as such have a legal foundation until the sixteenth century and con-
sequently should be considered an act ( fait).86
The letter of marque in the Middle Ages was thus diffferent to those 
commissions of the same name issued in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The medieval letter of marque was purely a peace-time meas-
ure to be issued by the government to private persons for them to obtain 
restitution from the pirate or his countrymen up the sum lost. Later, 
however, with the advent of state armies where private persons acted as 
auxiliaries to the already existing navy, the letters of marque became a 
privateering commission.87
In the marque (as indeed in reprisals and arrests), three factors were 
stressed: it was a strictly peace-time measure; it was based on collec-
tive liability for the crimes of one’s countrymen; and it was a quasi-legal 
measure to obtain restitution by private or public means when all acts 
of diplomacy had failed. While marque was related to retaliation, it was 
controlled and never led to war between the kingdoms, according to Cha-
varot88—even though other historians have pointed out that at the very 
84 Dumas, Étude, pp. 3–4.
85 Mas Latrie, “Droit de marque,” p. 531, see also Chavarot, “Lettres de marque,” 
pp. 52–53, Timbal, “Lettres de marque,” p. 111, Jal, Glossaire, p. 925.
86 Chavarot, “Lettres de marque,” p. 52.
87 Nefff, War, p. 109, Thomson, Mercenaries, pp. 22–23.
88 Chavarot, “Lettres de marque,” pp. 52–53, see also Timbal “Lettres de marque,” p. 111, 
Jal, Glossaire, p. 925.
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least it posed a potential risk of war if the concession of marque was not 
controlled.
However, the problem with reprisal in general was that, as Timbal 
noted, it had to be controlled, in order that people with letters of marque 
did not abuse this “limited license” against specifĳic targets for a specifĳic 
amount to commit indiscriminate piracy. Furthermore, marque was a nui-
sance to the international trade, as one action of reprisal / marque was 
liable to be answered by a counter-marque, since most often the victim 
was innocent and therefore in turn considered himself entitled to a let-
ter of marque. Thus, marque could set offf a chain reaction of reprisals to 
the detriment of trade in general. Nevertheless, acts committed by hold-
ers of letters of marque were not piracy, but were legitimate due to the 
authority which had conceded them. In other words, it was legitimate but 
restrained piracy recognised by all kingdoms in Europe.89
How the governments imagined that this would work without recourse 
to violence is unspecifĳied in the sources, but it must have been clear to 
all that an assault by a person with a letter of marque on an innocent fel-
low countryman of a pirate could not be seen by the victim as anything 
else but a pirate assault, and consequently this would lead to physical 
confrontation. In other words, gratuitous violence and general plunder 
were prohibited by the governments, as this constituted vengeance and 
unlicensed plunder. In reality, however, this proved extremely hard to 
control and nobody could be expected to hand over their goods volun-
tarily. Nonetheless, by prohibiting violence the government could wash 
its hands of future acts of violence. Thus, reprisals constituted a curious 
quasi-war between individuals, licensed but without the direct involve-
ment of the government. The letter of marque is therefore the clearest and 
most institutionalised version of reprisals. From these rules, it is apparent 
that reprisal (in the form of arrest without violence) was admissible, but 
retaliation was not. However, when reprisals were carried out, they easily 
ended up taking the form of retaliation.
What we are dealing with in the government-authorised reprisal was 
a purely economic measure of recovery of property. Here no room was 
left for emotions like hatred or vindictiveness. The reason the authorities 
handled the suits thus was probably that they could be reduced to a mere 
question of property, and once a plaintifff had been granted restitution, 
the case was closed even though the plaintifff might still be harbouring 
89 Timbal, “Lettres de marque,” pp. 119–120.
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hatred against the pirates. While this certainly was a sensible approach to 
the problem when “police” forces were lacking, it could not be counted on 
to quell hostility completely. Nevertheless, we can say that the system of 
reprisals authorised by governments was based on a system of fair warn-
ing to avoid escalation of the disputes. However, it was intended more 
to protect the kings and their subjects than to assure justice for the indi-
vidual, as shown in the case of Henry de Oreford.
Grossly stated, the execution of reprisal could be expressed in two ways. 
Either the kings ordered arrests of the goods of the pirate’s compatriots 
in their ports up to the amount of the losses sufffered, or a private remedy 
was given where the plaintifff was authorised by the king to seek justice via 
restitution by his own power over the pirate’s compatriots at sea. Both of 
these were called marque, even though the letters of marque seem to refer 
to the authorisation of the private restitution, whereas arrest was carried 
out by governmental agents.
The Bayonnais Letters of Marque
It was often rather hard to be accorded a letter of marque, and it was not 
something that the rulers would issue easily. An example of such a denial 
occurred in 1305(?), when the owner of the goods in a Bayonnais vessel, 
Bidau Brane, complained to Edward I that his ship was plundered by peo-
ple of Calais and Saint-Omer offf the coast of Dover. These pirates had in 
turn sold the goods (linen and wine) to a Spanish vessel in Winchelsea. 
Brane now asked the king for a marque (“doner marke sur les vins”) on 
the wines in the Spanish vessel so that by this marque (la marke) he could 
obtain recovery for his losses. He ended the request by stating that the 
piracy happened in a time of peace between England and France (“temps 
de la suffferance”). Edward I replied that for certain reasons (perhaps the 
ongoing negotiations with the Castilians or the negotiations with the 
French over the killing at Quéménès), he would not grant him a marque 
(la marke) but that he would be willing to grant a letter of request.90 The 
marque in question here must be an arrest of the goods of the Spanish 
merchant purchased from the French and not a licence to undertake a 
private attack on the French to obtain restitution. The manoeuvre here 
90 TNA SC 8/84/4185, Champollion, I, 368–69, assumes this took place around 1290, but 
the English National Archives more prudently date this to 1305, since a letter of protection 
presumable was given to Bidau on 6 April 1305. RG, III, no. 4917, p. 488.
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was essentially to pass the buck of restitution to the Spanish who had 
bought the wine from the French in good faith (?).
The fĳirst proper marque case in the Anglo-Gascon sources concerns a 
grant of a letter of marque to Jean de Lévignacq (Vinhiaco, Daubinhac), 
Guillaume Arnaud de Bielle (Viele) and Laurent de Piru. These were mer-
chants, mariners and citizens of Bayonne. In this letter, dated 4 June 1293, 
Edward I let all his offfĳicers know that the three had obtained a letter of 
marque (licenciam marchandi) against the subjects of the king of Castile 
up to the value of their losses. The reason for the granting of the marque 
was that their ships had been plundered of goods to the value of £2000 
sterling by Castilians under the orders of King Sancho IV of Castile. This 
was not an isolated incident, but rather the pinnacle of a series of pira-
cies, killings, imprisonments, plunders and tortures committed by Castil-
ians against the Bayonnais. Therefore, Edward I ordered his offfĳicers not to 
hinder but to aid these Bayonnais in any way in carrying out their marque 
up to the value of their losses, but he reminded them that the marque 
was only valid for two years.91 In 1296, Jean de Lévignacq petitioned for 
a renewal of the letter of marque (litteram marchandi) against the Span-
ish as well as the Portuguese, since he still had not obtained restitution. 
Edward replied to his lieutenant in Gascony, Edmund of Lancaster, that 
this request should be refused if peace with Castile was restored. If, how-
ever, peace was not concluded, Edmund was to grant the letter and help 
Lévignacq in any way possible in obtaining restitution for his losses from 
the Spanish and the Portuguese.92
Another example is the granting of a letter of marque (licenciam & licen-
tiam marcandi) to Bernard Dongressilli, merchant and citizen of Bayonne, 
against the Portuguese in 1295. Bernard had gone to Africa to buy fĳigs and 
grapes destined for England. While the ship was anchored offf the port 
of Lascoss (Cascaes or Lagos) in Portugal, in shelter from bad weather, it 
was attacked by pirates from Lisbon. They plundered the ship and carried 
the goods to Lisbon, where the king of Portugal allegedly received one-
tenth of the spoils. Bernard sufffered losses to the amount of £700 sterling 
and requested a letter of marque against the Portuguese on sea as well as 
on land. Through the mayor and the municipal government of Bayonne, 
Edward granted a letter of marque to Bernard, his heirs and successors to 
make reprisals (“possit marchare, retinere et sibi appropriare illa”) on the 
91 EMDP, I, no. 218, p. 382, RG, III, no. 2132, pp. 75–76.
92 EMDP, I, no. 219, pp. 382–383, RG, III, no. 4254, pp. 340–341.
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Portuguese, and especially those of Lisbon in the English king’s lands as 
well as outside them, until Bernard had received satisfaction for his losses 
plus the expenses incurred by him in this undertaking. The duration of 
this marque was for fĳive years or until it pleased the king. Therefore, the 
king ordered all his offfĳicers to help Bernard in obtaining satisfaction. 
However, the king stressed that Bernard was only allowed to take up to 
the lost values, the rest he had to answer for.93
An interesting document from 1317 lucidly points out the problems 
with marque and why the kings were reluctant to grant it. On 6 June that 
year, the mayor and jurati of Bayonne wrote to Edward II complaining 
that he had granted letters of marque (marcham) to Johannes de Bain-
hers and Arnaud de Saint-Martin against the Spanish. Apparently, this 
had caused Lady Maria of Biscaya to complain and ask Edward not to 
include the Biscayans in these acts of reprisals. The initial complaint from 
Maria was issued sometime in 1317. She asked Edward II to specify that the 
marque (marches, gage) pronounced against Castilians were not extended 
to the Biscayans, who were nominally under Castile but enjoyed semi-
independence from the Crown. Furthermore, they had been neutral in 
the conflict between Bayonne and Santander, Laredo and Castro Urdiales, 
and during the Gascon War they had aided the English. Probably some 
time later, on 12 April 1317, King Alfonso XI of Castile wrote to Edward on 
behalf of his uncle, Lord Johannes of Biscay, whose towns Bermeo, Bilbao, 
Placencia and Lequeitio, had sufffered seizure of their goods in Bordeaux 
by the hands of the seneschal. Alfonso asked that they were not to be held 
responsible for crimes done by other Castilian subjects and asked that 
they would be exempt from arrest.94 The Bayonnais, for their part, com-
plained that the Biscayans were the friends of Bayonne and that Johannes 
and Arnaud were not Bayonnais citizens at all.95 The Biscayans therefore 
had had no part in Bayonne’s maritime war with Santander, Laredo and 
Castro Urdiales, but had remained at peace with Bayonne. Johannes 
and Arnaud should thus not be allowed to drag the town into a conflict 
and sour relations with the Biscayans. The Bayonnais therefore asked 
Edward to revoke the marque (marchas). Furthermore, Johannes appar-
ently had taken goods from Flemings in Bordeaux under the pretext of a 
93 RG, III, no. 3892, pp. 292–94, Foedera 1273–1307, p. 828, Champollion, I, 418–20, 
Marsden, Law and Custom, pp. 38–40.
94 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 325.
95 “Qui Johannes & Arnaldus non sunt vicini nostri Baion”, ymo sunt totaliter extra 
partes, & a nostrâ viciniâ alieni’, Foedera 1307–1327, p. 332.
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reprisal (marchati), on account of a claimed Flemish arrest of Bayonnais 
goods in Flanders. Thus, by his “rogue” actions, Johannes was endanger-
ing the relationship between Bayonne and the Flemings. Therefore, the 
Bayonnais asked Edward to remunerate the victims of these two, so that 
Bayonne could trade in peace.96 However, it is doubtful if these two per-
sons were not in fact citizens of Bayonne after all. Arnaud de Saint-Martin 
certainly had been a citizen of Bayonne as late as in 1316, and he had a 
long history of quarrels with the Castilians originating in the 1290s, when 
he and other Bayonnais merchants were unable to obtain restitution for 
goods plundered by the Castilians. While Arnaud had received partial res-
titution by an arrest of Spanish ships by the royal offfĳicers in Dover and 
in Portsmouth in 1316, he was still lacking of 165 marcs and 20 deniers. 
Edward therefore ordered the seneschal of Gascony to arrest Spanish 
goods to this sum.97 It is possible that Johannes and Arnaud had lost 
their citizenship, but it is equally likely that the Bayonnais government 
repudiated them in order to avoid conflict. While it may be that Johannes 
was abusing his marque for indiscriminate piracy and fraudulent repris-
als, at least Arnaud de Saint-Martin had good reason for doing it. In any 
case, in 1315 and 1316, the Bayonnais mariners were embroiled in struggles 
with Flemish mariners. The actions of “rogues” like the above-mentioned 
were probably detrimental to the interests of the government in Bayonne, 
who, with the ongoing reforms of the Societas Navium, were tightening 
the municipal control over the shipmasters and mariners.
It is quite interesting that the letters of marque that we know of from 
the fĳirst three decades of the fourteenth century were primarily granted to 
Bayonnais. An explanation for this may have been the rarity of Castilian 
merchants going to Bayonne to trade, as argued by Goyheneche. Instead, 
96 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 332.
97 Arnaud de Saint-Martin is a somewhat nebulous character. In 1305, he was clearly a 
citizen and merchant of Bayonne, complaining with other Bayonnais of Spanish piracies 
and obtaining a marque against them (TNA SC 8/388/E1229). In 1308, he was called citizen 
of Bayonne in a document in the negotiations of settlement with Castile (Foedera 1307–
1327, p. 44), but the next time the name appears in the sources in 1313 he was implicated 
in Edward II’s prohibitions of tournaments in England. Here, he is called serviens ad arma 
of the king (Foedera 1307–1327, p. 196, 228). In November 1313, one Arnaud de Saint Martin 
was pardoned for the death (killing?) of Arnaud de Faure of Bonnegarde (RG, IV, no. 1151, 
p. 318), but the citizen and merchant of Bayonne, Arnaud de Saint Martin resurfaces again 
in the cases of unsettled restitution with the Castilians in 1315 and 1316 (Foedera 1307–1327, 
pp. 268 and 290–291), before he is fĳinally mentioned with Johannes de Bainhers. It may 
be that Arnaud de Saint-Martin at one point was a royal sergeant, but it equally might be 
that we are in fact dealing with two diffferent persons called Arnaud de Saint-Martin, a 
merchant and a sergeant-at-arms.
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these Castilian merchants generally met the Bayonnais in ports such as 
Bordeaux, La Rochelle, on the coast of Brittany and in Flanders.98 How-
ever, since these towns were not involved in the struggle and the English 
king held no power there (except for Bordeaux), arrest by the usual means 
would be impossible. Thus, the Bayonnais were obliged to seek the resti-
tution at sea and by their own private power, rather than relying on royal 
or municipal arrest.
While the kings tried to control reprisals, in the end their initiatives 
do not seem to have hindered private reprisals. Merchants sometimes 
seemed reluctant to plead to the king and courts their case for restitu-
tion, not least because arrest could take years to efffect and even then 
no positive result was guaranteed. Thus, sometimes the merchants and 
mariners preferred to take matters into their own hands and gain immedi-
ate restitution and restoration of honour at the possible expense of their 
compatriots. Likewise, if enmity had festered for a long time and sleights 
of honour (real or imagined) were involved, the mariners and merchants 
seem to have been likely to retaliate. Sometimes this, too, must have 
served as an excuse for outright piracy. In other words, the judicial system 
and the inherent problems of resolving questions of violence and rob-
bery committed at sea led to or sometimes forced the aggrieved to handle 
matters themselves to obtain restitution. A fĳinal example illustrates the 
indiffference to or inability of the princes in dealing with their subjects’ 
piracies. In a reply from the count of Hainault, Holland and Zeeland in 
1324 to Edward II as part of a correspondence over piracy against English 
merchants, the count wrote that even though he knew the Zeelanders had 
falsely claimed that their piracies were licensed by the count, Edward had 
to understand that many of his subjects from Zeeland had been robbed by 
English mariners and that his men could not refrain from recovering their 
goods by the only possible way, reprisals, since Edward had refused to do 
restitution.99 Thus, these reprisals were in essence personal and private 
wars waged by an individual against a community, with or without royal 
license and support.
In the end, it seems impossible to distinguish piracy from reprisals. 
Mariners rarely, if ever, would admit to having committed a maritime 
plunder based purely on opportunism and greed, since this would indeed 
be an admittance of robbery which was punished severely in the Middle 
98 Goyheneche, Bayonne, pp. 350–363.
99 CCR 1323–1327, p. 171.
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Ages (see chapter 8). Thus, while opportunistic piracy arguably did occur, 
it was only possible to defĳine it as such after the authorities had proclaimed 
a judgement in the case. However, in the complaints it is an indisputable 
fact that victims of reprisals claimed to be victims of piracy.
CHAPTER SIX
THE SEA, THE MARCH AND SOVEREIGNTY
In The Safeguard of the Sea, Rodger claimed that the northern seas in 
the Middle Ages were “a lawless domain beyond the borders of civilized 
society”.1 However, in this chapter I shall argue that this is too simplistic 
a way of seeing the politico-legal status of the sea in the Middle Ages. In 
the fourteenth century, there were numerous claims of sovereignty and 
control over this area, yet even beforehand, it seems as if conflicts were 
regulated by a custom of the sea expressed in a procedure of conflict set-
tlement akin to, if not identical with, the one used for conflict settlement 
in the march-areas of England and France.
As we saw in the previous chapter, private justice codifĳied into the let-
ters of marque and arrest was one way of solving conflict and piracy at 
sea by private persons as well as by the authorities. However, the English 
and French kings in the fĳirst four decades of the fourteenth century tried 
to reverse this situation by claiming sovereignty over the coastal areas 
and the immediate waters bordering their kingdoms. This chapter shall 
deal with the political and judicial status of the sea in relation to conflicts 
and their resolution. It will provide a framework for marque, reprisals and 
piratical maritime wars.
I will begin, however, with a tentative defĳinition of the “march” in 
the Middle Ages. Grossly stated, the expression “march” denoted a bor-
der or a frontier.2 The march was an old Germanic concept dating to a 
time of unclear frontiers between lordships and kingdoms.3 In France, for 
instance there were the Burgundy march on the borders with the Empire 
and the Gascon march in the southwest. In England, there were the Welsh 
and the Scottish marches. In their specifĳic customs, these marches were 
distinct from each other, yet they were characterised by certain common 
1 Rodger, Safeguard, p. 79.
2 Godefroy, Dictionnaire, p. 167.
3 John France calls the general political situation of dominance of land “mouvances, 
circles of influence based on landownership which rarely coincided with the geographi-
cal area of settlement of any nation or any particular geographical unity. Moreover, these 
circles of influence overlapped heavily”. France, John, Western Warfare in the Age of the 
Crusades 1000–1300 (London & New York, 1999), pp. 4–5. The marches were an even more 
accentuated version of this.
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features which lie at the core of the concept of the march. It was thus not 
a political void, but rather a politically and judicially contested area of 
overlapping and often conflicting lordships and privileges. Furthermore, 
it was territorially both distinct and at the same time a fluid area moving 
with the waxing and waning of seigneuries. In a sense, the march seems to 
encompass both the modern meanings of the English words “border” and 
“frontier” (in the American sense), since it was the border between two 
kingdoms or lordships and at the same time a legal and political frontier 
with fluid and customary rules subject to third-party arbitration rather 
than a single prince’s jurisdiction.4
In his treatment of homage in the French marches from the tenth to 
the twelfth centuries, Jean-François Lemarignier identifĳied the problem of 
what a march constituted:
What is thus the nature of the frontier? Is is precise or is it fluid? Is it a line 
or is it a region more or less difffĳicult to determine? In this regard, the word 
marca, marcha or marchia, which broadly means ‘limit’, covers both notions 
of the term. It sometimes signifĳies a precise limit, but more often a liminal 
region and it is in this latter meaning that one speaks of marches governed 
by a marquis, which are frontier regions organised for security. By extension, 
marca also signifĳies a liminal territory.5
Thus, we are dealing with a fluid but at the same time a clearly identifĳiable 
region distinguished by a high level of insecurity because of its contested 
geographical position. Consequently, the march is characterised by a high 
level of martial organisation and a will to use force over law in disputes.
The march concept was vital as long as the medieval kings remained 
not much stronger than their most powerful vassals. In the High Mid-
dle Ages, especially the thirteenth century, when the kings were increas-
ingly asserting their power, supremacy and indeed sovereignty over their 
4 Cambridge Dictionaries online. Border: “the line that divides one country from 
another”, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/border_1 Frontier: “a border 
between land used to grow crops where people live and wild land,” http://dictionary.cam-
bridge.org/dictionary/british/frontier Accessed on 25 February 2011. For a discussion of the 
terms “border” and “march” in the twelfth and early thirteenth century, see Benham, Jenny, 
Peacemaking in the Middle Ages: Principles and Practice (Manchester, 2011), pp. 31–32.
5 “Quelle est aussi sa nature [la frontière]? Est-elle précise ou est-elle floue? Est-ce une 
ligne, ou est-ce une région plus ou moins difffĳicile à déterminer? A cet égard le mot marca, 
marcha ou marchia, qui a, en gros, le sens de limite, recouvre les deux notions. Il signifĳie 
parfois limite précise, plus souvent région limite et c’est dans ce dernier sens que l’on parle 
des marches gouvernées par les marquis qui sont des régions-frontières organisées pour la 
sécurité. Par extension, marca signifĳie aussi territoire limité.” Lemarignier, Jean-François, 
Recherches sur l’hommage en marche et les frontières féodales (Lille, 1945), p. 5. 
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vassals and the collective territory that they identifĳied as their kingdom, 
the conflict between royal power and the denizens and lords of the marches 
was accentuated. In the words of Lemarignier, “the new political frontier 
would often coincide with those that had developed from custom which 
were developing in the tenth to the twelfth century within the frame-
work of the seigneurie. By modelling itself on the customary frontiers, it 
increases the opposition between the lands which they separate”.6
From a judicial point of view, what Lemarignier stressed here was the 
clash between royal law and seigneurial law or customs. This was really 
what lay at heart in the concept of the march from a politico-legal point 
view, that is, conflicting and overlapping jurisdictions.
Terrestrial Marches
This portrayal of the march as a region characterised by hostilities occurs 
in numerous sources. For instance, in 1313, the town of Is-sur-Tille in Bur-
gundy efffectively submitted to royal control and taxes, on the condition 
that Philippe le Bel supplied royal protection “By sending the king’s men 
to pursue the malefactors and the banished who, until now because of 
the proximity of the Empire, were pillaging with impunity the land and 
march of Burgundy near the Saône in the bailiwick of Sens”.7 While the 
situation on the eastern border of the French kingdom is interesting, the 
situation in England and Gascony has a greater relevance for the mariners’ 
conflicts. Therefore, I devote the rest of this section to a survey of the 
Welsh march, the Anglo-Scottish march and the Gascon march to achieve 
a condensation of the concept of the march.
As a region, the Welsh march was a result of the Norman Conquest 
in 1066 and the forced end to the expansion which the Norman invaders 
encountered in the Welsh highlands. For protection against Welsh hostili-
ties and to lead offfensives against Wales, the lords who came to rule the 
Welsh march were endowed with special privileges. Amongst these was 
6 “la frontière politique nouvelle va souvent coïncider avec celle du ressort de coutume 
qui s’organise, du Xe au XIIe siècle, dans le cadre de la seigneurie. En se modelant sur les 
frontières coutumières aggraveront l’opposition entre les pays qu’elles séparent.” Lemari-
gnier, Hommage en marche, p. 8.
7 “pour mettre les gens du roi à même de poursuivre les malfaiteurs et bannis qui, 
jusqu’alors et grâce à la proximité de l’Empire, désolaient impunément la terre et marche 
de Bourgogne, vers la Saône, au baillage de Sens.” Registres du Trésors des chartes, ed. 
Robert Fawtier, 3 vols. (Paris, 1958–1984), I, no. 1860, p. 374.
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the right, as the only lords in England, to maintain private armies and 
conduct wars at their own initiative, originally to protect against Welsh 
aggressions and to lead punitive operations against the Welsh. However, 
this quickly developed into a right to protect their territories, interests and 
privileges with armed might against all aggressors. These marcher lords 
were de facto semi-independent lordships in a region which was defĳined 
as separate from Wales proper, as well as separate from the kingdom of 
England. It was simply called the “Welsh March”, which efffectively con-
stituted a bufffer zone between England and Wales. The Welsh marcher 
lords were de facto princes of their own little “kingdoms”, with, however, 
a certain degree of dependence on and adherence to the kingdom of Eng-
land.8 According to Rees Davies, the nature of the law of the Welsh march 
“was a droit coûtumier in the fullest sense, unwritten body of custom 
whose keepers were the will of the lord, the precedents of the court, and 
the collective memory of the folk”.9
Since these lords were semi-independent, disputes and their settle-
ment were under the lords’ jurisdiction, yet at the same time they were 
subject to “international” negotiations like those between the European 
kingdoms. This problematic relationship, as well as the judicial situation, 
has been characterised by Davies thus:
The phrase ‘the law of the march’ was occasionally applied by contemporar-
ies to refer to the regulations, both offfĳicial and unofffĳicial, whereby marcher 
lords tried to settle the problems which were bound to arise between one 
lordship and another in the absence of a central authority. These marcher 
border regulations—including love-days [meetings for the settlement of 
disputes], mutual extradition arrangements, letters of march, the practice 
of disclaimer . . . were, the international rather than the internal law of 
march.10
This meant that the march of Wales resembled, in at least one regard, the 
Continental lordships more than their neighbouring English ones. Thus, 
we can confĳidently say that the increased hostility, the military organisa-
tion and the judicial status of this march conformed to the image given 
by Lemarignier for the French marches.
 8 Davies, R.R., “The medieval state: The tyranny of a concept?,” Journal of Historical 
Sociology, 16 (2003), 294, Lieberman, Max, The March of Wales 1067–1300 (Cardifff, 2008), 
pp. 3–4.
 9 Davies, R.R., “The law of the march,” The Welsh History Review, 5 (1970), 6–7.
10 Davies, “Law of the march,” p. 2.
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The Anglo-Scottish march was diffferent to the Welsh one in a number 
of respects. First of all, Scotland had a king and thus a unifying and legi-
timate ruler around whom the nobles could rally, something which the 
Welsh lacked. It was a kingdom like England, and it had to be dealt with 
in that way. Furthermore, unlike the Welsh march, the Anglo-Scottish 
march was defĳined by a written law or custom, agreed by the English and 
the Scots in 1249.11 Before this date, Anglo-Scottish relations and disputes 
were characterised by a legal vacuum, and settlements were based on ad 
hoc decisions. The core of the problem was that the kings could not decide 
on a legal system in an area where both parties claimed jurisdiction.12
The 1249 law was established by an Anglo-Scottish commission, and 
they agreed that marcher cases should be settled by mixed juries with an 
equal number of jurors from each side. These mixed commissions would 
convene at traditional border sites like the Priory of Carham to hear and 
try cases. The essence of the 1249 Marcher Law was the payment of com-
pensation to borderers in matters of homicide, which was provided for 
through fĳines, and for theft, full restitution. However, the assessment of 
damages was a serious difffĳiculty of March Law, and the fĳinal method of 
proof in contested disputes was wager of battle. This trial by combat was 
maintained throughout the Middle Ages, despite the fact that as a juridi-
cal solution it was becoming increasingly frowned upon by kings in the 
later Middle Ages.13 In wartime, however, this means of settlement was 
suspended. This method of proof meant that the role of the mixed jury 
in the marcher tribunals was ambiguous and without a formal executive 
power of decision.14 
The purpose of the march days and the march law was therefore pri-
marily concerned with redress, to recompense for damages in order to 
avoid an escalation of the conflict, since the raiding and counter-raiding 
over the border could eventually develop into open war.15 On the general 
nature of the Anglo-Scottish marcher laws, Henry Summerson writes:
11 Leges marchiarum, ed. William Nicholson (London, 1705), pp. 1–9.
12 Neville, Cynthia J., Violence, Custom and Law (Edinburgh, 1998), p. 4.
13 Nevertheless, as Vale has pointed out, trial by battle remained vibrant in the aristo-
cratic culture throughout the Middle Ages and eventually gave rise to the aristocratic duel-
ling culture. Vale, Malcom, “Aristocratic violence: Trial by battle in the later Middle Ages,” 
in R.W. Kaeuper, ed., Violence in Medieval Society (Woodbridge, 2000), pp. 159–181.
14 Summerson, Henry, “The early development of the laws of the Anglo-Scottish 
marches, 1249–1448,” in W.M. Gordon and T.D. Fergus, eds, Legal History in the Making: 
Proceedings of the Ninth British Legal History Conference (London, 1991), p. 32, Neville, Vio-
lence, p. 6.
15 Summerson, “Early development,” p. 36.
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the Law of Marches were essentially a set of regulations for the prosecution 
of offfences committed by the inhabitants of one country inside the terri-
tory of the other, and for the recovery of property stolen or lent across their 
common border. In theory all acts of theft or violence committed by Scots 
against Englishmen in the latter’s country, and vice-versa, were to be judged 
on the march in accordance with these laws. In practice, a Scot assaulted in 
London was unlikely to sue for redress on the Solway or at Reddenburn—
though robberies at sea continued to be so justifĳiable—and the jurisdic-
tion of the laws was efffectively limited to the border lands of England and 
Scotland.16
The settlement of marcher disputes mainly had as its focus restitution 
and compensation rather than punishment, however. Thus, the purpose 
of the march procedure was not to settle by judge and trial but rather to 
negotiate a settlement, possibly by compromise.17 As we shall see below, 
this was exactly the procedure for which the Gascons pleaded in 1293 and 
throughout the fĳirst decades of the fourteenth century.
A problem for the kings of England was that, contrary to the Welsh 
situation, they had to treat with a king, that is, an equal. However, with 
the imposition of John Balliol as king of Scotland in the 1290s, the situa-
tion changed, since in order to obtain English support for his claim to the 
throne, he had to swear an oath of fealty to Edward I for the kingdom of 
Scotland.18 This altered the status of the march law, which in essence had 
been based on a relation of equality between the king of England and the 
king of Scotland. From 1296 with the English military intervention in Scot-
land, march law was suspended, and English justice and law was imposed 
in the Scottish border-regions to make the conquest real and durable.19 
This created an Anglo-Scottish situation akin to the Franco-Flemish one 
with all its problems of rebellion and wars for independence. Thus, dur-
ing the Scottish wars of the fĳirst three decades of the fourteenth century, 
the march law was reinstituted, but now the English kings imposed royal 
wardens to guard the peace and assure the settlement of disputes.
This instituting of a warden is interesting, as the English had experi-
ence of this from the Cinque Ports, where the warden of the Ports acted 
as a controller of this strategically important area. Murray compares the 
situation of the wardens of the English southern coasts with that on the 
Scottish march. She notes that both areas were administered for security 
16 Summerson, “Early development,” p. 29.
17 Summerson, “Early Development,” pp. 32–33 and 39–40.
18 Brown, Michael, The Wars of Scotland, 1214–1371 (Edinburgh, 2004), p. 169.
19 Neville, Violence, p. 15.
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and jurisdictional purposes by wardens, whose functions were essentially 
those of a sherifff.20
While the two situations were diffferent, especially since the warden 
of the Cinque Ports enjoyed a good relationship with the Portsmen, an 
aspect which was absent in the relationship between the northern war-
dens and the locals, there is a coincidence in the situation of the politi-
cal geography of where these wardens were instituted. Both were on the 
extreme borders or frontiers of the English kingdom, signifying wardens 
as royal offfĳicers guarding border areas with special privileges conceded 
to them in return for ready and armed assistance in case of invasion or 
threat to the kingdom. Thus, in a sense, one could consider the warden 
of the Cinque Ports as a royal marcher-lord, and, as in the Anglo-Scottish 
march, the Portsmen also enjoyed the right to their own separate court 
of justice on the Isle of Sheppey. In this regard, the Portsmen were also 
marcher-men, only this time at sea in the march between England and the 
Continent. The offfĳicer of the warden of the Scottish march was instituted 
in 1296, but not until the fĳirst decades of the fourteenth century were the 
wardenship and its duties defĳined more precisely.21 
In relation to the piracies and maritime wars, the most important 
march was the Gascon one. Gascony had never really been controlled 
by the Capetians, and the control of Gascony by the English kings since 
1154 had further exacerbated this situation. Since Gascony, apart from 
the wine production, was a relatively poor and uncontrolled area which 
no lord had ever been capable of subduing, a culture of guerrae and the 
quasi-independent right to solve disputes by arms thrived. The dual sta-
tus of Gascony as a fĳief under the king of England in his role as duke 
of Gascony, and at the same time the nominal participation of Gascony 
in the kingdom of France, led to several and continuous border clashes 
in the region, with Gascon nobles seeking the aid of either king against 
their local enemies. Furthermore, a pauperisation of the local aristocracy 
in the thirteenth century, combined with a fĳierce martial culture, had led 
to a signifĳicant militarisation of the area. This created the problem that 
once the spiral of private war was set in motion, it was difffĳicult to halt or 
control.22
20 Murray, Constitutional History, pp. 80–81.
21 See Reid, R.R., “The offfĳice of Warden of the Marches: Its origin and early history,” The 
English Historical Review, 32, (1917), pp. 481–485.
22 Vale, Origins, p. 126.
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In 1293, before the outbreak of the Gascon War, the noblemen, prelates 
and town communities of Gascony sent a description of the custumes des 
marches au roialme de France to Edward I, clearly to defend themselves 
against Phillippe le Bel’s allegations and citation of them. It contained 
four articles on the march-procedure. It began with a reference to the pro-
cedure in the marcher areas between France and the Empire, the count 
of Bar, the duke of Lorraine and the count of Burgundy, all marcher-lords, 
thus attempting to establish a link to the common procedure for dispute 
settlement in the French marches.
The fĳirst article concerns the settlement when prise or trespas had 
occurred between marchers, especially the offfĳicers of the French king 
and the marcher-lords of the Empire (that is, the above-mentioned lords). 
Such settlement was to take place at a jour en marche, where one or more 
persons from each party were chosen as esgardeurs (adjudicators) to hear 
the complaints and to determine whether each action, prise or trespas, 
was lawful, that is, justifĳied (presumably as reprisal for some wrong com-
mitted by the other party), or whether it was faulty, and thus judge that 
the trespasser make restitution. This was to be done with all the cases 
presented, and if the esgardeurs could not agree amongst themselves, the 
process would be postponed to another day. This was to be conducted 
with the counsel of people knowledgeable in the marcher custom (“conseil 
de ceux qi scevent des custumes des marches”).23
The second article stated that in cases where the prises and trespasses 
were committed by private persons, that is, not by offfĳicers of the marcher-
lord, the marcher-lord was not obliged to come to the jour en marche, but 
instead he had to render justice to his subject. The third article was that if 
a prise has been committed and an assembly has been made at a jour en 
marche, the victim could not engage in counter-reprisals (countregagier) 
if the assembly decided on restitution. Fourth and fĳinally, if the marchers 
broke up without having reached an agreement, the procedure was post-
poned, and they were obliged to continue with this last unsolved issue 
before proceeding to treat a new one, unless something had occurred 
which altered the situation.24 This custom seems primarily intended for 
lords, but since not only the clergy but also the towns were co-authors of 
the Custumes, it seems more than likely that “lord” should be understood 
to include the towns as well as marcher nobles with the right to use force 
23 EMDP, I, 364.
24 EMDP, I, 364–365.
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to settle disputes with other marcher lords. This notion is confĳirmed by 
the frequent recourse to force by, for instance, Bayonne to settle difffer-
ences with its Gascon neighbours. The message of these Custumes was 
that the Gascons wanted the conflicts with the French king to be settled 
in this way and not by the king’s courts and the judgement by French 
royal law.
In the Custumes, the sea and maritime conflict is not mentioned, and 
the immediate interpretation is that this was only applicable to (march) 
conflicts on land. However, the context makes it probable that maritime 
conflicts could and should also be solved in this way. This notion is both 
supported by the process of Montreuil-sur-Mer, 1306 (see below), and the 
provisions in later Gascon declarations of march law.
Around 1331, the Gascons petitioned Edward III to uphold the ancient 
rights, customs and privileges of the Gascons in return for their loyalty 
(presumably against a settlement over their heads with the French king). 
The core of the argument was the right to be governed in conflict by com-
mon judges (esgardiatours), in the manner of elected arbiters at a jour 
en marche for all conflicts between Gascons and subjects of the king of 
France, the king of Castile, the king of Navarra or all other marcher lords 
for all trespasses, whether criminal or otherwise. For “the sea of England”, 
crimes were to be “governed by the laws and statutes made and ordained 
by the kings of England and published in the Island of Oléron which lies 
in the said seas of England and which guards the passage between all 
manner of people that pass those waters”.25 Here the Rôles d’Oléron and 
the march-law seem identical, yet there is nothing in the extant versions 
of the Rôles d’Oléron on conflict at sea, and we are thus left guessing. 
Between 1337 and 1339, the Gascons demanded once again that conflict 
with the French should be resolved on land according to march-law and at 
sea according to the Rôles d’Oléron. The mentioning of the Rôles d’Oléron 
in relation to march laws and conflict resolution seems to indicate that 
the same principles were in fact at hand, namely private arbitrage with 
royal mediators. The exact wording of the rule of the Rôles d’Oléron on 
maritime dispute mentioned in the original charter is unfortunately dam-
aged beyond readability, which means that we can only speculate about 
it. The only part that is legible is the following: “And according to the said 
25 “trespass fait en la mer Dengleterre, destre gouvernez par les leys et estatuz jadis 
faitz et ordeinez par les rois Dengleterre et puppliez en lisle Doliron esteant en la dite mer 
Dengleterre et gardes entre tote maner des gentz passaunz par la mer desusdite.” Chaplais, 
“Règlement des conflits,” p. 294.
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laws called the loy de Oliroun once given and made by your ancestors, the 
kings of England, in regard to goods taken and damages caused in the 
above-mentioned sea of England”.26 This seems to be some sort of institu-
tion for reprisal and restitution in the vein of that proposed in the march, 
and I fĳind it reasonable to assume that this was at the core of whichever 
of the Rôles d’Oléron applied in relation to conflict at sea. On the dorse it 
further says: “The ancient custom of Gascony called the marque, and in 
England, the arrest”,27 just like in the 1282 peace treaty between Bayonne 
and Normandy (see chapter 7). However, an alternative interpretation is 
that the adjudication of cases of maritime conflict was the prerogative of 
the kings of England, but as I will show below, this did not necessarily rule 
out the application of a march law procedure.
Two other documents from the early years of Edward III’s reign sup-
port this interpretation. In an anonymous commentary by one of Edward 
III’s advisors, Anglo-French disputes in Gascony could only be settled 
by bipartite commissions as stipulated in march law, that is, at a jour 
en marche by elected esgardiatores.28 This method had been agreed in 
the peace treaty of Paris in 1327 and was thus the offfĳicial way for conflict 
resolution in these areas. A further explanation of how the English under-
stood the practical application of this is supplied by the keeper of docu-
ments, Ellis Joneston, from the early part of Edward III’s reign. He named 
two ways of solving disputes in the Gascon march; cognicio communis 
(a bipartite commission) and cognicio consuetudinaria which was based 
on march law (that is, private retaliation and reprisals). In essence, Jone-
ston argued that the cognicio communis and the cognicio consuetudinaria 
were two sides of the same coin. The cognicio communis was to be applied 
for damages caused in peace-time, and the cognicio consuetudinaria was 
to follow march law and it applied to negotiations after wars, in time of 
truce and peace.29 Joneston maintained that the essence of the cognicio 
consuetudinaria was that it permitted “the arrest of bodies and goods 
26 “Et solonc les dites loys jadiz ordeinees et faites par voz auncestres, rois Dengleterre, 
appellees la loy de Oliroun, quant as biens pris et damages donnez en la mier Dengleterre 
susdite . . .” TNA C 47/28/5/52, partially reprinted in Chaplais, “Règlement des conflits,” pp. 
296–297. 
27 “Le auncien custume de Gascoinge appelle la mark et [en] Engleterre arrest,” EMDP, 
I, 365.
28 “diem in [con]fĳin[i]is et judices communes ad modum arbitri ellectos, esgardiatores 
vulgariter nuncupatos.” EMDP, I, p. 365. 
29 Chaplais, “Règlement des conflits,” p. 283.
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which in common parlance are called ‘marque’ in Gascony”.30 However, 
the result of this custom most often was the punishment of the innocent 
while the criminals walked free. This consequently opened up the risk 
of war between England and France, to the detriment of the crusade to 
liberate Jerusalem planned by Edward III and Philippe VI. Therefore, the 
cognicio communis was to be preferred and conducted before things esca-
lated to the use of cognicio consuetudinaria, which in efffect occurred as 
the result of failure to fĳind an amicable solution to a dispute.31
Despite the diffferences between these marches, I argue that they had 
traits in common and that these stem from the special legal and territo-
rial status of the march. This meant that settlement and the execution 
of sentences rested on the private persons implicated, with no clear and 
superior authority to which one could present the issues and expect both 
parties to respect that authority and recognise its legitimacy in relation to 
the settlement of the dispute.
So, apart from the conflicting jurisdictions and consequently the higher 
level of martial organisation to defend these jurisdictions, what further 
distinguished the march in terms of conflict and its resolution was that:
1. The lords—including towns—had the right to settle their diffference by 
arms without any direct interference from the kings.
2. Settlement of disputes should be handled by a few people chosen from 
each side, provided both parties agreed to this. They should adjudicate 
by equity rather than by law. These should form a commission with 
an equal number of arbiters from each side, and the commissioners 
should be people not directly involved in the dispute, and have sufffĳi-
cient integrity recognised by both parties. At the same time, however, 
they had to be confĳidantes of the party which appointed them for the 
commission so that they could protect against unfair decisions.
3. The marcher law or customs were actually more like a framework for 
the settlement of disputes than a body of law proper. The execution of 
sentences, however, rested with the plaintifff and the defendant. While 
royal offfĳicials could intervene, they were not authorised nor recog-
nised as an executive body, but rather functioned as a counselling third 
party. Thus, no single offfĳicial or sovereign could pass judgement. The 
30 “corporum et bonorum arrestaciones, que mark’ in terra Vasconie vulgariter nomi-
nantur,” EMDP, I, 366.
31 EMDP, I, 365–366.
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character of the court was more of a regulated meeting where the par-
ties could present and discuss the issues and reach a settlement.
4. These negotiations of settlement should take place somewhere in the 
march, commonly agreed upon.
5. The settlement should be unanimous in order to obtain a durable solu-
tion to the problem at hand and to avoid hatred and grievances fester-
ing. And, by entering upon a march procedure, the plaintifff and the 
defendant were expected to respect the decision of the commission.
6. To a certain extent the march was an area characterised by a perma-
nent state of truce (that is, latent, but not open war).
A Maritime March
The above-mentioned marcher areas were all on land, where physical and 
visible markers of borders, such as fortifĳications, could be erected and 
become a physical expression of the political status. However, for the sea 
this marking of water was more difffĳicult, given the inherently intangible 
and uncontrollable quality of the sea. The closest one could get to control 
over the seas was control over the ports, naval patrols of the sea-lanes and 
fĳinally claims to sovereignty over the waters bordering the coasts of the 
kingdoms. Yet, around 1300, the kings lacked the resources to make good 
any of these measures.
The view of the sea in the Middle Ages seems to follow the historian 
Jacques Le Gofff ’s distinction between culture and nature. On this distinc-
tion he wrote:
the fundamental dualism between culture and nature expressed itself 
through the opposition of that which is built, cultivated, and inhabited 
(town-castle-village) and that which is essentially wild (the sea and the for-
est, the Western equivalents of the oriental desert). It thus expressed the 
diffference between men who lived in groups and men who lived in 
solitude.32
This image of a wild and intangible territory can be seen in the portrayal 
of mariners in medieval literature. For instance, Kimberley Campbell has 
noted the chansons de geste’s depiction of the mariners’ superstition and 
32 Le Gofff, Jacques, “Le désert-forêt dans l’Occident medieval,” in J. Le Gofff, L’imaginaire 
médiéval (Paris, 1985), p. 74. The translation is partially based on the one in Le Gofff, J. The 
Medieval Imaginary, A. Goldhammer, transl. (Chicago, 1992), p. 58.
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only skin-deep Christianity in the face of danger at sea,33 and in his book 
on the people of the sea in the Middle Ages, Mollat quotes Nicole Oresme 
and Eustache Deschamps for the sea folk’s reputation of pride, unruliness 
and perfĳidiousness.34 Other more neutral depictions, yet still insisting on 
the influence of a life in a liminal area on the behaviour of the mariners, 
are found in the romance Eustache le Moine, where the trickster, run-
away monk and pirate Eustache le Moine had been taught black magic 
in Toledo by the Devil himself. He was therefore was able to manipu-
late bodies of water through magic.35 In another account of Eustache’s 
exploits, the Polistoirie de Jean de Cantorbéry, it was told that Eustache 
taught his former co-pirate and later slayer, Stephen Crabbe, magic, and 
that Eustache used magic to make his ship invisible.36 In the romance 
Fouke Fitz Waryn, as in many other chansons de geste, the sea, the islands 
and the countries surrounding the core of Christian Europe were inhab-
ited by monsters and infĳidels, thus underlining the opposition sketched 
by Le Gofff.37 Admittedly, this does not tell us anything about the mari-
ners’ perception of themselves, but it does signal the perception of the 
character of the space where they plied their trade and the assumed influ-
ence of this rough environment on their behaviour. This unruliness and 
inherently ungovernable nature of actions at sea accordingly connects to 
the march dispute and settlement procedure.
The sources stating that the areas of sea between England and France 
were a march are scarce, but in those that exist, the meaning is hard to get 
wrong. In the introduction to the Liber Horn version of the Lex d’Oleron 
from 1315, it is stated that “Insula de Olirun sita est in mari Austrino inter 
Cornubiam et Aquitanium. Et est Marchia inter Aquitanium et Peyto”, 
that is, the island of Oléron is in the march between Aquitaine and 
Poitou.38
In a petition from 1331, the Channel Islanders likewise identifĳied the 
position of their islands as being in the march of all nations (“la grant 
33 Campbell, Kimberley. A., “En haute mer: navire et marin dans la chanson de geste,” 
in M. Lacassagne, ed., Ce nous dist li escris . . . che est la verite (Aix-en-Provence, 2000), p. 46.
34 Mollat, Michel, La vie quotidienne des gens de mer en Atlantique IXe–XVIe siècle (Paris, 
1983), pp. 221–222.
35 Burgess, Glyn, Two Medieval Outlaws: Eustace the Monk and Fouke Fitz Waryn (Cam-
bridge, 1997), p. 75. 
36 Cannon, H.L., “Battle of Sandwich,” p. 668.
37 Burgess, Medieval Outlaws, pp. 166–172.
38 Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, p. 183. This statement is also found at the end of the 
Rawlinson MS and in the MS in the Liber Memorandorum. See Black Book of the Admiralty, 
I, p. lx, n. 2.
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mer en la marche de toutes naciones”) and that they therefore always 
had to be vigilant against assaults.39 This notion is repeated in the pro-
ceedings of a case of piracy in 1361, when the English Channel is once 
again described as a march (“en la meer, qest marche entre les deux 
roialmes”).40
In a letter to Philippe VI, probably from 1331, Edward asked for the ces-
sation of prises and counter-prises on sea and land so that trade could 
prosper unhindered. He stated that these measures should only be used 
by marcher lords to obtain justice for their subjects because of the dam-
ages done by other marcher lords’ subjects. This should be settled at 
peaceful jours marchis, as was agreed in 1303. These jours marchis were to 
be conducted by eight gardiens de la pees (four English knights and four 
French knights), who should always be ready to settle cases. Specifĳically, 
these guardians were to be two knights from Picardy and the seneschals 
of Dover and Ponthieu to guard the peace between the mariners of Ca lais 
and Winchelsea and the east of England, and two knights from Sain-
tonge and Poitou and two from Gascony to guard the peace between the 
Normans, the Bretons and the English of the western realms. However, 
Edward complained that the service of these (French) knights apparently 
had been negligible; they often failed to meet, and when they did meet, 
they did not have sufffĳicient mandate to settle the cases, and in fact they 
had often obstructed the settlement to the great damage of the English. 
Edward thus asked for a serious resumption of this practice by Philippe.41 
These knights were efffectively an Anglo-French equivalent of the Anglo-
Scottish wardens of the march, only they were supposed to deal with 
maritime conflicts, not those on land. Thus, these statements strongly sug-
gest that in terms of conflict, the sea should also be viewed as a march. 
However, the best example of the concrete use of march procedure in the 
adjudication of piracy suits is the process of Montreuil in 1306.
The Process of Montreuil, 1306
A thoroughly researched example of a jour en marche for the regulation 
of piracy is the process of Montreuil-sur-Mer in 1306. This process was the 
39 “pur ce qils sont enclos de la grant mer en la marche de toutes nacions, par quoi 
il covient qils soient toutz jours prestz ils ne seyvent quel hure pur defender eux et lour 
biens et sauver les chateaux et la terre.” EMDP, I, 369.
40 EMDP, I, 370.
41 EMDP, I, 389–392.
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result of the still-outstanding resolution of cases of piracy between Eng-
lish and French subjects from 1292 onwards. Despite the truce between 
1297 and 1303 and the peace treaty of Paris in 1303, the settlement of these 
cases was still pending. At the request of Pope Clement V, Edward I and 
Philippe le Bel agreed in 1305 to set up a commission to settle these claims 
once and for all.42
In May and June 1306, Edward I’s and Philippe le Bel’s commissioners 
met in the Castle of Montreuil, at that time a thriving port town on the 
English Channel, to settle by a bipartite arbitration commission the issues 
of piracy.43
Apart from the still-pending complaints over piracy, matters were fur-
ther complicated by the fact that since the peace in 1303, the French had 
been waging war to crush a Flemish rebellion. During this war, French royal 
vessels under the command of Admiral Renier Grimaldi, and French mari-
ners such as the Calaisien shipmaster Jean Pédrogue and the commander 
of the French forces in Calais, Oudard de Maubuisson, had been harassing 
Flemish maritime commerce by cruising along the Flemish coasts, The 
Narrow Seas and indeed the English east coast looking for and attacking 
Flemish ships or “neutral” ships trading with Flanders. These French naval 
operations entailed numerous attacks on English shipping. In the same 
period, the English had mobilised to crush the Scottish rebellion, which 
entailed naval actions against the Scots, but these actions apparently also 
touched French shipping. Furthermore, as a French vassal, Edward had 
conceded in secret to provide naval support for the French against the 
Flemish.44 The essence of the process was thus to settle the claims and 
counter-claims of English and French subjects against each other for pira-
cies in times of truce and peace.
The English and the French each appointed two commissioners for the 
process. The English appointed Philip Martel, king’s clerk, professor of 
civil law and keeper of processes of records of foreign relations, and the 
42 Cuttino, G.P., English Diplomatic Administration (Oxford, 1940), p. 51, Champollion, 
I, 404 and 424–29, Foedera 1273–1307, pp. 900, 936 and 940.
43 Numerous documents for this process exist in the National Archives, under the head-
ings TNA C 47/27/5, C 47/27/6, C 47/29/5, C 47/29/6, C 47/31/19. A list of all the documents 
with the old Public Record Offfĳice headings can be found in The Gascon Calendar of 1322, ed. 
G.P. Cuttino (London, 1949), nos. 616–665, pp. 57–61. I do not intend to do a thorough and 
detailed survey of the complaints in these fĳiles, since they do not difffer from the picture 
already presented in the chapter 2. I will restrict myself to an analysis of the procedure 
of the process and to the insurmountable problem of the relationship of power between 
the French and the English kings. To this end, I will mainly follow Cuttino’s, Chaplais’ and 
Cheyette’s analyses of the Montreuil process.
44 Foedera 1273–1307, p. 961.
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knight John Bakewell. The French appointed Etienne Bourret, sub-dean of 
Poitiers, and the knight Jean de Ver. They were to form a bipartite com-
mission with the purpose of inquiring into damages and losses sufffered to 
satisfy plaintifffs with a recognised claim and to refer questionable cases 
to the kings for settlement.45
As shown in the previous chapter, the normal way for merchants to 
obtain restitution were petitions to the king or, if all else failed, to demand 
the issuing of a letter of marque. This procedure was not a result of law, 
but rather diplomacy. In contrast, according to Cuttino, “The process of 
Montreuil was a series of legal cases involving maritime losses brought 
for hearing and settlement before what amounted to an international 
commission”.46 However, the commissioners were not to proceed by 
French or English law, but rather by equity agreed amongst them, and I 
agree with Pierre Chaplais that this was efffectively a procedure between 
two marcher-lords and not a trial by sovereign law.
In the process, the plaintifffs had to supply the name(s) of their ship(s), 
those of the shipmaster(s) and of the owners of the cargo, and the time 
when the ship left port. Furthermore,
Several facts were to be furnished regarding the actual depredation: the 
place, and whether it was in sight of others by whom the depredation could 
be proved; whether it was despoiled offf the coast in sight of men on land or 
of ships at anchor offf shore. If the merchandise was removed from one boat 
into another, sailors who were on board at the time had to testify to this fact. 
Witnesses were likewise to be produced if the cargo had been seized in port. 
The remaining information concerned the imprisonment of sailors and the 
conversion of seized goods into cash. In regard to the former, plaintifffs were 
to advise the commission of the duration of imprisonment, by whom it was 
efffected, and the means of delivery; that is, ‘whether any other merchants 
of England were in port by whom the seizure of goods can be proved, and 
whether through a public announcement of them rumour is common in 
England’.47
This procedure does not seem to have been used exclusively at the pro-
cess of Montreuil; it was probably the procedure applied in any trial over 
piracy.
There were four types of documents used in the process: general 
petitions, claims against the French, claims against the English and 
replications.
45 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, pp. 22 and 51.
46 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, p. 52.
47 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, p. 53.
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Of the fĳirst category there were only two documents. They were both 
written by the proctors of the commonalities of subjects of Edward I. 
These will be dealt with in detail in the last part of the chapter. Thus, I 
will confĳine myself here to a few remarks. In the fĳirst general petition, the 
English argued that since the Scots were allied with the French between 
1297–1303, the French were to pay for the English losses at the hands of 
the Scots. This amounted to a demand of several million pounds in resti-
tution, which the French were to pay by principle of collective liability 
(that is, the French were allied with the Scots, had helped them and con-
sequently had a responsibility for their allies’ actions). This claim must 
have seemed ludicrous to the French—not the least in comparison with 
the expenses of the Gascon War.48 The second general petition was an 
English declaration of sovereignty over the English Sea which de facto 
meant from the English Channel to the Pyrenees. The English argued that 
since time immemorial, the English had enjoyed an exclusive right to 
jurisdiction over maritime conflicts.
The individual English claims were presented in the form of a libellus, 
that is, a statement of the claim of the person, which followed the above-
described procedure and in addition to information about the ship, cargo 
and circumstances of the attack also named the despoilers and where 
these took the goods after the attack. The claim always ended with a 
demand for restitution of a certain amount. To this, the defendant almost 
always replied either by a contestatio negatiua (an alibi) or an exceptio 
dilatoria (a delaying action), or both. In constatio negatiua, the defen -
dant usually argued that he could not have committed the piracy, since 
he was somewhere else when the piracy had been committed. Therefore, 
the defendant pleaded quit of charges or at least the right to a further 
statement in the case. The exceptio dilatoria was a statement with the 
intent to delay or stall the process. An example of this would be that if the 
accused were out of the kingdom and could not be reached at the present 
time, the case had to be postponed until the accused were found and 
could come to stand trial. This usually resulted in the plaintifff proposing 
a repplicatio, which might be a contradiction of the defendant’s reply or 
48 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, p. 54. According to Cheyette, “Sovereign,” 
p. 52, this amounted to £4.2 million. To give an idea of the ludicrous amounts demanded 
in this complaint, the average English annual expenditure for the Gascon War, 1294–
1299, was 238,000 l.t. (£59,500), which amounted to 83.8% of the total estimated English 
annual income, while the average French annual expenditure in this war was 346,000 
l.t. (£86,500), that is, 61.5% of the total estimated French annual income. Vale, Origins, 
pp. 281–282.
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an offfer to bring forth further evidence to the accusation. However, most 
often the result was that the proctor of the plaintifff had to postpone his 
cause in order to inquire further into the matter.49
Only once did the French defendants come with a real reply. This was 
the case of the plunder of the ship Michel de Arwe. Pédrogue and Maubuis-
son admitted to have taken the ship but not in the way described by the 
plaintifffs. They stated that Edward I (correctly) had prohibited the English 
from aiding the enemies of France (including trading with them) and that 
they had entered the ship without use of violence where they had found 
letters proving that the ship had Bruges as its destination. Therefore, they 
promptly seized the ship on charges of smuggling and imprisoned the 
crew. All but one of the prisoners managed to escape from prison, how-
ever. According to the French, this proved their culpability, and the ship 
and goods had been forfeited to Philippe le Bel and not to Pédrogue or 
Maubuisson for their personal profĳit.
The French claims against the English followed the same line, but we 
do not have the replies of the defendants. All in all, the French claimed 
losses due to piracy for £19,537 6s. 10d. whereas the English only claimed 
£1,882 18s. While the English fĳigure is considerably lower than the French, 
we must remember that the total of English claims is unknown, since 
some of the records for this process have not survived,50 and it seems 
as if Cuttino omitted some documents in his account, amongst them the 
Gascon petitions, while others have been damaged beyond legibility.
The repplicatio were the English plaintifffs’ replies to the French defen-
dants’ statements. Only two of these are known, and they were addressed 
to Oudard de Maubuisson and to Renier Grimaldi. Oudard claimed that 
he acted under orders of the French admiral in the seizing of the ships 
and that he had surrendered the cargo to the French king. The English, 
however, would not accept this and instead accused him of plunder of 
English ships for his own profĳit. Accordingly, it was not legitimate war-
time seizures but common robbery.51 However, Oudard questioned the 
veracity of details of the claims and thus the validity of the claim itself, 
and he demanded extra proof. Renier Grimaldi simply questioned the evi-
dence of the claims and pleaded innocence.
49 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, pp. 56–57.
50 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, pp. 55 and 58.
51   Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, p. 59.
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These negotiations touched upon the central issue in the process: were 
the French actions at sea legitimate military actions where French mari-
ners in royal service did their duty and carried out royal orders to stop 
smugglers and enforce an embargo, or were they abusing their commis-
sion to indiscriminately attack all foreigners for their own profĳit? Obvi-
ously, the French claimed the former while the English the latter. The 
principal French offfĳicers indicted in this process were Renier Grimaldi, 
Jean Pédrogue, and Oudard de Maubuisson, but at least sixteen other 
French shipmasters were also accused. While these men were all in royal 
service against the enemies of France, the actions against the English were 
unmistakably (to the English) piracy, that is, robbery at sea for personal 
profĳit. Furthermore, the English complaints show that the French were 
not only cruising the Flemish coast but also as far north on the English 
coast as Scarborough,52 thus in no provable way near Flanders, and at 
least some of these actions unmistakably resembles piracy.
The process started out well, but on 15 June it came to a halt. The com-
missioners met and made a deposition regarding their diffferences to a 
public notary. The French stated that they were ready to continue the 
process but that they also needed to go to Normandy, Poitou and Brit-
tany to hear the complaints there to make sure that everyone was heard. 
They would then present these complaints to the English commissioners. 
Afterwards, they would go to England and Ireland to hear and receive 
complaints there. Only then could they proceed to a fĳinal settlement. This 
apparently came as a surprise to the English, who complained that they 
had already collected all English complaints, and in any case that they had 
to consult Edward I before they could proceed and accept the new French 
proposition. The process was left in status quo and the splitting up of the 
commission, but the commissioners were to reconvene on 15 October of 
the same year.53
This was efffectively the end of the process, because from then on 
Philippe le Bel insisted that the commission should review the whole rela-
tionship of the English kings’ vassalage to the French kings. For his part, 
Edward I wanted only to investigate the cases of damage between the sub-
jects of the two kingdoms and wanted to have two separate commissions, 
one for losses preceding the Gascon War and another for losses incurred 
from 1297 to 1306. Thus, Edward tried to restrict the case to the issue of 
52 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, pp. 160–168.
53 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, pp. 62–63. 
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piracy and restitution, while Philippe tried to use the cases as a lever to 
redefĳine and strengthen his authority over the English king. The English 
envoys then proceeded to complain to Pope Clement V that the French had 
been unwilling to award damages and had complicated manners unduly; 
that Philippe le Bel had in efffect protected the defendants; and that his 
commissioners were partial and had helped the French defendants. The 
conviction of the accused French was in efffect impossible. Furthermore, 
the English claimed that the French demand of hearing all complaints 
in France could not be seen as anything but a deliberate obstruction of 
the case, and the French defendants’ claims of alibis in many of the com-
plaints were insincere.54 By 15 October, Philip Martel had died, but John 
Bakewell went to Paris to resume the process, but he could not fĳind the 
French commissioners, and after having publicly announced the failure to 
convene he returned to England.
Two cases of the many presented at Montreuil display the problems 
that this breakdown raised for the victims of French piracy. In the fĳirst 
case, the merchants Geofffrey Turbok of Lynn and Walter de Gosewyk of 
Berwick-upon-Tweed complained to Edward I and his council in a peti-
tion dating to the autumn of 1306 or the winter of 1307 that Philippe le 
Bel had delayed and defaulted in doing justice to them for French piracy 
during the truce. Therefore, they asked Edward I to help them receive 
satisfaction for the goods lost and their expenses according to Law Mer-
chant.55 Some time later, their petition was presented at Parliament in 
January 1307, where the merchants stated that the piracy and the circum-
stances under which it had happened had been admitted by Pédrogue, 
who, however, claimed that the goods had been seized for the profĳit of 
the French king and not his own. Geofffrey furthermore stated that he 
had been in Paris in October, the same time as Bakewell, and like him 
he had not been able to meet the French commissioners either. The mer-
chants thus claimed restitution according to Law Merchant. Interestingly, 
however, the fĳinal English decision was that the petitioners could not be 
helped.56 At that point, the English had apparently realised that any sort 
of settlement of these out-standing claims was unlikely to take place in 
the foreseeable future.
54 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, pp. 65–66.
55 TNA SC 8/256/12792B.
56 TNA SC 8/256/12792C.
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This did not dissuade other petitioners. In 1300, Pey de Seint Pol, a 
Bayonnais merchant, had loaded a ship with wool at Lynn to be taken to 
Saint-Omer, when the ship was attacked by Pédrogue. The French killed 
the crew and took the ship with the goods to Haut in the county of Dreux. 
The total losses for Seint Pol were £350. Apparently, Pédrogue admitted 
to this and was presumably to make restitution to Seint Pol, but despite 
Pédrogue’s admission of the piracy, the French commissioners at Mon-
treuil denied restitution. The documents for Seint-Pol’s case range from 
the end of the 1290s to 1315, and nothing indicates that restitution was 
ever obtained.57 It is not surprising, however, that the French commis-
sioners refused restitution; if this had been granted in Seint Pol’s case over 
a French soldier and war-hero, it would have made the French actions at 
sea in general look like piracy and not like legitimate wartime operations. 
This point does not seem insignifĳicant in the fĳinal breakdown of the com-
mission. Thus, both of these cases clearly show that the French did not, 
in efffect, commit to the process.58
Cuttino observed that the procedure and the rules for arbitration were 
borrowed from Roman and canon law, and that furthermore the proce-
dure of the process of Montreuil was heavily influenced by the procedure 
the Parlement de Paris, where the arbitrators seem to have been merely 
referendaries of the Parlement, not judges. Indeed, some of the same com-
plaints were later heard in Parlement. According to Cuttino, this influ-
ence was confĳirmed by the composition of the commission. He noted that 
commissions of the Parlement de Paris in civil or a mixture of civil and 
criminal cases always had one cleric and one lay member. Strictly criminal 
cases, however, had two lay members and no clerics, since these could not 
order corporal or capital punishment.59
Chaplais, however, points out that the procedure adopted for the Mon-
treuil process was in fact an old and time-honoured way for the French 
and the English to settle their diffferences. From the twelfth to the four-
teenth century, when Anglo-French conflicts occurred in times of truce, 
they were amicably resolved according to the law of the marches. This 
57 TNA SC 8/289/14432, Champollion, II, 30, SC 8/273/13633, SC 8/287/14312, Cuttino, 
English Diplomatic Administration, p. 61, n. 4.
58 This case was still pending in 1321. At that time, Pey de Seint Pol had died while 
pursing the case. CCR 1313–1318, pp. 181–182 and CCR 1318–1323, pp. 390–391.
59 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, p. 51, n. 9.
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institution was known under the name of dictatores or conservatores treu-
garum.60
While this may also have been the procedure for the Parlement, it was a 
procedure predating the Parisian Parlement. Instead, Chaplais pointed to 
the similarities between marcher conflict settlement as described above 
and the procedure at Montreuil. The naming of a few persons with the 
power to negotiate a settlement based on equity rather than law was 
indeed the way in which conflicts and complaints were resolved in the 
marches of England and France. In defence of this interpretation of the 
process of Montreuil, Chaplais listed the similarity of procedure between 
the process and the journées de marche, the choice of the town of Mon-
treuil in lying on the Anglo-French march on land as well as on sea, and 
the title given the commissioners. The prevalence of reprisals in terres-
trial marches in particular, as well as in maritime quarrels, led Chaplais 
to argue that this was essentially the same thing.61
However, in regard to the French’s insincere commitment to a settle-
ment, Cuttino and Chaplais agreed. Both claimed that it was clear that the 
French obstructed the process and never really wanted it to work. Fur-
thermore, Chaplais stated that the French commissioners’ authority was, 
from the outset, more theoretical than practical, and they both stressed 
the fact that the Montreuil process was only an amiable conference on 
the surface, since the French commissioners were not neutral but acted 
more like lawyers for the accused French than as impartial judges.62 In 
this regard, the position of Cuttino and Chaplais seems a bit naïve, how-
ever, for it was quite unrealistic to assume that the commissioners from 
either party would actually be neutral. This is also why the English pro-
posals for a marcher process always contained the proposition that if the 
arbiters could not agree amongst themselves, the case was to be settled by 
the kings alone. Indeed, Dean and Gauvard have pointed out the common 
problem in the Middle Ages of corrupt and partial judges.63 This was an 
60 “Du XIIe au XIVe siècle cependant, les conflits franco-anglais, lorsqu’ils se produi-
saient en temps de trêve, étaient réglés à l’amiable suivant la loi des marches: c’était 
l’institution connue sous le nom de dictatores ou conservatores treugarum.” Chaplais, 
“Règlement des conflits,” p. 278.
61 Chaplais, “Règlement des conflits,” pp. 277 and 279.
62 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, p. 69, Chaplais, “Règlement des conflits,” 
pp. 279–280.
63 Dean, Trevor, Crime in Medieval Europe (London, 2001), pp. 34–41, Gauvard, Claude, 
“Les juges jugent t-ils?,” in C. Gauvard, Violence et ordre public au Moyen Âge (Paris, 2005), 
pp. 116–130.
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inherent weakness in the march dispute settlement institution, since, in 
order to function properly, it had as a prerequisite that both parties and 
judges were sincerely committed to a settlement. In practice, it was un -
realistic to expect impartiality. The French partiality was to be expected 
as the men accused were soldiers in the French king’s service. They could 
even argue that they were innocent for one reason or another. These men 
were French war heroes regardless of whether they had committed piracy 
against innocent neutrals or not.
This leads to the question of why the French were not really commit-
ted to the process and indeed sabotaged it? The resolution of maritime 
conflicts by the application of a march procedure was not unique to 
Anglo-French relations, nor was it a model destined to fail. Indeed, in the 
next chapter I will demonstrate how the English successfully applied this 
model for settlement of the maritime conflict between the Castilians and 
the Bayonnais. On the whole, it was a good and applicable model, and in 
principle the French were not opposed to it. Indeed, they followed it in 
negotiations with the Aragonese in 1312–13.64 What really was at stake, 
and the reason why the French refused to adhere to the model, were the 
issues of sovereignty and vassalage.
Sovereignty: The Duke of Gascony, the King of England 
and the King of France
The medieval idea of sovereignty65 derived from the authority of the 
Roman emperors, and through the Carolingians it was transferred to the 
Holy Roman Emperor. The notion of sovereignty entailed that the emperor 
had jurisdictional powers and authority over all other kings of Christen-
dom or, at the very least, those who had been part of the Roman and 
Carolingian empires. The core of the imperial notion of sovereignty was 
that: “this supreme authority was indivisible and inalienable: the emperor 
64 Strayer, Reign, pp. 26–30.
65 “The term sovereignty generally denotes the position of supremacy of somebody, 
or something, in respect of somebody, or something else.” Maiolo, Francesco, Medieval 
Sovereignty (Delft, 2007), p. 79. Thomson, Mercenaries, p. 13: “Sovereignty organizes global 
political space into territorially bound, ‘juridically mutually exclusive and morally self-
entailed domains’. It is based on ‘an ethics of absolute exclusion’.” 
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was ‘lex animata’, legality and justice personifĳied—every human creature 
was subjected to his will”.66
While this claim never seems to have been completely uncontested in 
the early and High Middle Ages, it was not until the thirteenth century 
that it really came under attack, starting formally with Pope Innocent III, 
who in 1202 declared that in temporal matters the French king had no 
superior. During the thirteenth century and especially in last quarter of 
the century, the French kings increasingly contested the emperor’s sover-
eignty. The issue was whether the French king was sovereign de jure or just 
de facto, the latter of which seemed increasingly indisputable. Against the 
imperial jurists, the French jurists stated with increasing insistence that 
the king enjoyed the same legal and political status within his kingdom 
as the emperor did in his territories, thus stating a de jure independence 
from imperial authority and making the king the equal of the emperor.67 
The French jurists asserted the French king’s status as imperator in regno 
suo, meaning that all the privileges and rights applicable to the emperor 
by virtue of his position were also enjoyed by the French king.68 One 
justifĳication for this was the defĳinite territorial limits of the Empire and 
the French kingdom: “The basic justifĳication for these territorial limita-
tions of empire and kingdom was found to be the French king’s peaceful 
enjoyment of his possessions [my italics]; the prescriptive acquisition of 
the king’s rights was claimed to be the title for his independence”.69 This 
formulation of the French king’s claim to sovereignty is important for the 
English declaration of sovereignty over the seas, as we shall see below. 
To conclude on the issue of sovereignty and the emperor, by the second 
decade of the fourteenth century, the royal claim to universal sovereignty 
fĳinally seems to have become a reality de facto as well as de jure, not just 
for the French, but for most other European kingdoms.
The medieval notion of sovereignty did not just refer to raw power 
(potestas), however, but more to authority (auctoritas). Indeed, the pre-
requisite for ruling and enjoying sovereignty was auctoritas, deriving either 
from a political community or from God (but in a sense both). Either way, 
66 Ullmann, Walter, “The development of the medieval idea of sovereignty,” The Eng-
lish Historical Review, 64 (1949), p. 3.
67 Ullmann, “Idea of sovereignty,” pp. 9–10.
68 Ullmann, “Idea of sovereignty,” p. 15.
69 Ullmann, “Idea of sovereignty,” p. 14.
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the prince was conferred with the authority to use his power by somebody 
else.70 Francesco Maiolo thus observes that:
A widely accepted hypothesis is that in medieval sources, the term iurisdic-
tio appeared as synonymous with dominium, as well as imperium, and that 
in both cases it denoted potestas. These heterogeneous terms are gathered 
in the semantic area of legal and political discourse that today is occupied 
by the idea of sovereignty. . . . In the Middle Ages, jurisdiction played the 
role of ‘synthesis of powers’, and, given the needs of feudal society, was one 
of the most versatile legal tools to exploit. This notion somehow reflected 
more general concerns, like the concern about the problem of hierarchies of 
power and their normative foundation.71
Technically, for the relationship between the French kings and their vas-
sals (including the duke of Gascony, that is, the king of England), the 
situation is best described by the argument promoted by Pierre de Mornay, 
bishop, jurist and advisor to Philippe le Hardi and Philippe le Bel. In 1278 
he argued concerning the king’s right to the ultimate court of justice 
that:
Because the king thinks himself a prince, he could grant a rescript to his 
subjects on whatever matter he wished, provided that the rights of any 
third party were not completely destroyed. Since the king did not subvert 
the rights of the barons or other subjects, he could take away their right of 
appeal.72
This clever argument left the nobility’s privileges and prerogatives formally 
intact, while at the same time giving the king the right to override these in 
his capacity as the supreme judge of any dispute in his kingdom.
I shall now take a closer look at the English declaration of sovereignty. 
The English claim to sovereignty over the sea of England (that is, the 
Channel and the French Atlantic coast) was presented by the proctors of 
the king of England, the nobles and the prelates, and the communities of 
England and all English royal subjects to the commission at Montreuil.73 
The claim was that the English kings had “since time immemorial been 
in the peaceful possession of the sovereign lordship of the Sea of England 
and the islands in that sea”.74 This claim to peaceful possession of the sea 
70 Maiolo, Medieval Sovereignty, pp. 70–71.
71 Maiolo, Medieval Sovereignty, p. 143.
72 Pennington, Kenneth, The Prince and the Law, 1200–1600 (Berkeley, 1933), p. 100.
73 EMDP, I, 367–369.
74 “du temps qil ny ad memoire du contraire, averoient este en paisible possession de 
la sovereigne seignurie de la meer Dengleterre et des isles esteans en ycele.” EMDP, I, 367. 
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was identical to the French king’s claim to sovereignty over his kingdom 
mentioned above, and furthermore was a recognised fact (according to the 
English) by Genoa, Catalonia, Spain, Germany, Zeeland, Frisia, Denmark, 
Norway and the Empire in general. In other words, it was recognised by all 
mariners sailing the northern seas—except, of course, the French. Thus, 
the English had the sufffĳicient auctoritas. However, the claim of sover-
eignty, while expressed as dating to time immemorial, actually had a very 
clear starting date, namely the reign of King Richard the Lionheart. This 
reference is important, because during his reign (and his father’s) the king 
of England actually controlled the whole of the territory along the French 
coast from Gascony to Flanders. Consequently, all policing and settle-
ment of disputes in this area naturally fell under English royal jurisdic-
tion through their offfĳicers. The fact that we can pinpoint Richard I as the 
king to whom the English referred is, however, because of the Gascons’ 
claim in 1331(?) that the Rôles d’Oléron were given by Richard I.75 Thus, 
the English could actually prove that the English kings had traditionally 
been the law-givers and in possession of jurisdiction over matters in these 
waters. The fact that this claim was thus applicable not only to the Eng-
lish Channel, but to the whole of the French west coast as well, is shown 
by this reference; furthermore, it seems supported by an agreement from 
1320 between Edward II’s council and the envoys of the count of Flan-
ders, where the waters offf Crozon, that is, Western Brittany, are called 
la mer Dengleterre, and the English king’s maritime sovereignty here was 
confĳirmed by the Flemings.76 While in the introductory comments to this 
document Chaplais stated that this was a reference to the English Chan-
nel based on the discussion above, I will maintain that the claim, at least 
from a theoretical point of view, encompassed the whole west coast and 
not just the Channel.77 The English further claimed that even the French 
75 While our earliest direct reference to Richard I as giver of the Oléron laws is from 
about 1331 (Chaplais “Reglement des conflits,” p. 294), most of the historians who have 
examined the subject of their origin agree this really seems to have been the case. See 
Ward, Medieval Shipmaster, p. 20, Chaplais, “Reglement des conflits,” p. 276, Krieger, Urs-
prung, p. 41, Pardessus, Collection des lois, I, 289.
76 Foedera 1307–1327, pp. 146 and 149, EMDP, I, 414. This document referred to English 
sovereignty over the seas, including the Breton waters (“il est seignur de la mer et la dite 
roberie fut fait sur la mer denz son poer”). It is unlikely that this was the general opinion 
in the northwest in the Middle Ages, however. The French most certainly contested it, and 
the only immediate reason for the Flemings to accept it was that it would provide them 
with restitution.
77 EMDP, I, 414. Interestingly, Chaplais states in “Reglement des conflits,” p. 271, that 
this sovereignty was claimed from the Pyrenees to Flanders.
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had recognised this sovereignty in the Treaty of Paris, 1259. The general 
petition of 1306 efffectively stated that, through their admirals, the English 
kings had the lawful right to high and low justice at sea, to ensure the 
peace at sea and to police it against prospective pirates.78
Apart from this claim to sovereignty, the petition contained three other 
points. The fĳirst was that the kings of England and France had entered an 
alliance (in 1303) of reciprocal support against all who would infringe upon 
their “franchises, liberties, privileges, rights, jurisdictions and customs”.79 
While this seems to have been derived from the English kings homage for 
Gascony to the kings of France, here it was presented as if the kings were 
equals, that is, two sovereigns and not a lord and a vassal.
The second point was a complaint over Renier Grimaldi, the admiral 
of France, for his actions at sea against English merchants during the war 
with Flanders. He had attacked English ships, taken their goods for the 
French king and had the mariners imprisoned. Not only had the admiral 
acknowledged this in writing, but he also claimed that it was part of his 
commission of admiralty. He thus asked to be acquitted. Since this was a 
usurpation of the English king’s juridical prerogatives and an infringement 
on the English king’s sovereignty, Grimaldi had caused great damage to 
the English. The procurators therefore demanded hasty liberation of the 
prisoners and their goods, and the prisoners were then to be presented to 
the English admiral, who had rightful jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Eng-
lish demanded that Grimaldi should be condemned to make satisfaction 
for all the damages he had caused, or, in case of default, the king of France 
was to cause it, since Grimaldi was his offfĳicer. After satisfaction had been 
made, Grimaldi should be punished for the damages, his contempt for 
the Anglo-French treaty and indeed for the usurpation. This punishment 
should be so severe that it set an example for the future.
Thirdly, in time of war against the Scots, no English mariner should 
answer to any authority other than the English admirals, and they could 
not be taken to court for actions against Normans and Bretons for any 
actions done at sea in time of the truce and the peace. In other words, 
78 “especialment par enpeschement mettre et justice faire et seurte prendre de la pees 
de tote manere des gentz usanz armes en la dite meer ou menantz neefs autrement appa-
raillees ou garniz qe nappartenoit au neef marchande et en tous autres points en queux 
homme peut avoir reasonable cause de suspicion vers eux de roberie ou de mefffaitz.” 
EMDP, I, 367–368.
79 “franchises, les libertes, les privileges, les droiz, les droitures et les custumes,” EMDP, 
I, 386.
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only English offfĳicers could judge English subjects—no matter what the 
French said.
In opposition to Cuttino’s and Chaplais’ assessment of the French as 
the ones solely responsible for the breakdown of the Montreuil process, 
Frederic Cheyette argues that the English were far from blameless. Focus-
ing on the outrageous demand for millions of pounds in reparations for 
the losses caused by the Scots, the assertion of English sovereignty at 
sea and the demand for punishment of Grimaldi, Cheyette claims that 
the English approach to the process and the claim of sovereignty over 
the seas was rather to assert that “the English claims against the French 
should be heard by an English court without the interference of the bi-
partite commission. The petition’s purpose was to deny the arbiters any 
competence”.80 Accordingly, Cheyette argued that the English claim of 
sovereignty was really just an action to disqualify the commissioners, and 
that it was in fact an English counterattack to the French claim of sover-
eignty. The problem was that while the kings of England and France were 
equals in times of war and truce due to feudal law, in peace time, the 
French king was the legitimate superior of his vassal, the duke of Gascony, 
and thus also the superior of the king of England.81
So, how should we understand these English claims of several million 
pounds in restitution, of sovereignty over the seas and of the punish -
ment of the French admiral? Were they a sincere demand or rather a 
bargaining tool in order to bring the kings of England and France to a 
level of equality? The fĳirst thing that we must bear in mind is that the 
demand was not actually put forward by Edward I himself but rather by 
his subjects. While this seems to have been a clever device to exculpate 
Edward of any deliberate obstruction of the process, and the demand can 
hardly have displeased the king, in all likelihood his jurists were behind 
the formulation. However, by having his subjects named as the authors 
of the document, Edward could permit himself to relinquish some of its 
demands and claim that he was acting on the will of the people. In that 
regard, it must be seen as a bargaining tool rather than a sincere demand. 
To the French commissioners and Philippe le Bel, however, the demands 
must have seemed so outrageous that they could hardly have been taken 
as anything but an extreme English overstatement of their demands and 
consequently an attempt to obstruct the process. While this may have 
80 Cheyette, “Sovereign,” p. 52.
81   Cheyette, “Sovereign,” pp. 52–53.
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fĳitted rather well with Philippe’s plans, it actually left little room for the 
French commissioners to negotiate, since by these demands the English 
were trying indirectly to circumvent the relation of power between the 
two kings, something that Philippe le Bel would not allow. The conclu-
sion must be that, in their attempt to gain a position of equality with the 
French, the English had overplayed their hand. Their demands were sim-
ply too exigent to work properly as a bargaining tool. Thus, while Edward 
seemed to be sincere in his wish for a settlement of the piracy cases by 
the process, these claims made the English lay just as much blame on the 
English as the French for the failure of the process. The English claims of 
sovereignty were not an expression of actual English control of seas or war 
on pirates, but a political response to French sovereignty. While piracy 
was the cause of the process of Montreuil, it was not the real objective of 
the English commissioners.82
In any case, the English declaration of sovereignty over the sea was 
obviously unacceptable to the French, and in a case of piracy against 
Rochelais merchants in 1311, Philippe le Bel declared that it had happened 
“in mari infra districtus nostros”, that is, in French controlled waters.83 
Consequently, Philippe demanded the extradition of the pirates so that 
they could be prosecuted at a French court of justice. This case shows 
that Philippe by no means accepted sole English maritime jurisdiction, 
nor for that matter that the sea was under English sovereignty. For his 
part, Edward II denied the extradition but promised to put the mariners 
before an English court. Only if the English laws were insufffĳicient would 
he allow extradition, but needless to say, Edward assumed them more 
than adequate.84
The reason why the process of Montreuil seemed doomed from the 
outset can be summed up thus: the English, supported by Gascon customs 
for marcher-law in the settlement of conflict in border areas and a version 
of the Rôles d’Oléron for conflict at sea, claimed settlement by marcher 
procedure, since this entailed that the kings of England and the kings of 
France would treat with each others as equals.85 The irreconcilability of 
these claims in terms of maritime conflicts was in no small part due to 
the French king’s tendency to assimilate crimes committed at sea by the 
English king’s Gascon subjects against French mariners to a purely feudal 
82 Rodger, Safeguard, pp. 78–79.
83 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 146.
84 Foedera 1307–1327, pp. 146 and 149.
85 Chaplais, “Reglement des conflits,” p. 273.
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conflict where the French king was the only and supreme judge.86 For the 
French, any claim of sovereignty pertaining to French afffairs was com-
pletely unacceptable. While the French kings were not opposed to the 
practice of handling conflict along the lines of marcher settlement, they 
were opposed to journée en marche with the English, since it would make 
the two kings equals, a prerequisite for a functioning march procedure. As 
long as the English king was the French king’s vassal, the French would 
never agree to treat with them on the same footing.87
This chapter has thus provided part of the reason why pirates were not 
prosecuted. Apart from the troubles of identifying whether the persons 
indicted had indeed committed the piracy or not, the Anglo-French piracy 
process of Montreuil was in the end more concerned with foreign policy, 
and the feudal relationship between the kings always took precedence 
over the individual cases of injustice. For the process of Montreuil, the 
procedure applied also makes it more than likely that what was used as 
legal procedure was the one of the marches, only now for the sea. This 
efffectively rendered the sea into a march. This meant that the maritime 
communities waging war in efffect were to be seen as marcher lords with 
the right to wage war like their Gascon counterparts.
86 Chaplais, “Reglement des conflits,” p. 271.
87 Chaplais, “Reglement des conflits,” pp. 278, 281 and 284.
CHAPTER SEVEN
PEACE AND PIRACY CONTAINMENT
In the previous chapter, we saw how adjudication of disputes at sea was 
handled by an arbitration system derivative of the procedure used for 
dispute settlement in the marcher areas. We also saw how the emergent 
application of theories of sovereignty disrupted this procedure. Because of 
the vassalage of the English kings to the French kings, the latter refused to 
make a sincere commitment to this method of dispute settlement, since 
it had as its prerequisite the equality of status of the negotiating princes. 
This was, however, an exception to an otherwise well functioning means 
of making peace between warring mariners in northern Europe. In this 
chapter, I will analyse the procedure of peace negotiations and settle-
ments in the period from the late 1270s to the 1320s.
The focus of this chapter is the English royal negotiations and arbitra-
tion in maritime disputes, domestic as well as foreign, with Flanders, Por-
tugal and Castile, and with the French before and after the Gascon War 
and the process of Montreuil.
It is no coincidence that England is the focus given her geopolitical 
position in the crossroads of the trade between northern and southern 
Europe. In addition, England’s rather large merchant marine made her 
party to more maritime disputes than any other northern European king-
dom in the period studied. This makes it easier to discern the patterns, 
as well as changes, in the handling of maritime wars. Finally, the English 
material provides the opportunity to follow especially bellicose ports: 
Bayonne, the Cinque Ports, Great Yarmouth and their various disputes 
and wars amongst themselves, as well as with especially the Normans and 
the Castilians of Castro Urdiales, Santander and Laredo.
In these peace negotiations and treaties there were two considerations 
which had to be reconciled in order for the peace treaties to come into 
efffect. The fĳirst was the wars between the two groups of mariners, the 
second was the relationship between the kings involved in the dispute 
as arbitrators for their subjects. The problem was that the interests of the 
kings and those of their subjects did not necessarily coincide. It was per-
fectly possible for the kings to reach a settlement that by no means satis-
fĳied the mariners, thus only in name quelling the conflict. These treaties 
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reveal not only how peace was concluded but also the character of mari-
time war and the independence of the mariners and ports.
Peace and Order in the Middle Ages
Medieval theories of peace—like those of sovereignty—were initially 
based on the idea of the condition of security in the Late Roman Empire, 
specifĳically the Christianized version of the Pax Romana. In the theories 
of the early and High Middle Ages, this worldly peace was a reflection 
of heavenly peace, but as the temporal world was inherently sinful, it 
could never attain the same level as the heavenly one. Nonetheless, heav-
enly peace was the ideal to strive for in the temporal world, and this was 
reflected in the objectives of the individual treaties.
Thomas Renna has argued about the development in the concept of 
peace in Western Europe from 300 to 1150 that there were initially three 
distinctive types of peace: monastic (a personal and utopian peace rest-
ing upon the deeds of the individual), ecclesiastical (true peace rests with 
the Church and the pope) and imperial (initially a Christianised form of 
the Pax Romana). Eventually monastic peace was discarded, and in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, the ecclesiastical peace of the Pax Dei 
movement, which argued for the defence of the Church for the establish-
ment of the reign of Christ on Earth, was fused with the imperial concept, 
where the emperor and the king were the fĳinal guarantors of the safety 
and defence of Christians. What these three approaches had in common 
was the return to the right order and the restoration of the proper har-
mony of God’s creation with the heavenly city as the model. From about 
1200, the ecclesiastical peace of the Pax Dei movement and the imperial 
Carolingian peace had fused into a concept of public peace promoted by 
the kingdoms of France, England, Germany and Spain.1 In this concept, 
peace was the restoration of harmony on the divine level, but it was also 
a state of justice and law. These two levels of peace, the divine and the 
temporal, were constantly associated in the later Middle Ages.2 This was 
guaranteed by the king as rex gratia Dei, and thus he was responsible for 
promoting and protecting the peace so that his subjects could live peace-
fully and pursue their occupations as God had intended.
1 Renna, Thomas, “The idea of peace in the West, 500–1150,” Journal of Medieval History, 
6 (1980), pp. 143–167.
2 Offfenstadt, Faire la paix, p. 63.
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This was in essence the primary concern of every medieval ruler, and it 
was what actually defĳined a state of peace. A novelty in the later Middle 
Ages was the increased focus on the importance of peace not just to assure 
the occupation of the three traditional ordines of the Middle Ages, namely 
those who pray, those who fĳight (that is, protect) and those who work (the 
land), but in addition the merchants, those who trade. In the discourses 
on peace in the period, it was argued that peace should be strengthened 
for the prosperity of the merchants, since more than any other occupation 
trade was dependent on a state of general security throughout the realm 
for the safe transport of goods over long distances. Thus, unhindered trade 
came to be the sign of order and peace.3
For the later Middle Ages Nicolas Offfenstadt, based in part on a more 
general study by Jörg Fisch,4 has identifĳied several components in the 
peace treaties. The fĳinal objective of any peace treaty was, of course, to 
restore order. However, to obtain order, the two key notions of amnesty 
and amnesia had to be implemented. These notions were part of a dis-
course of peace which functioned on a concrete as well as a symbolic 
level. In this discourse, the diffferent agents played carefully choreographed 
parts, where the kings pardoned, the guilty were granted remission, the 
despoiled returned to their ordinary lives, the warriors forgot the griev-
ances and deeds committed, the prosecutors became silent and a select 
few evil-doers remained excluded as scapegoats, thus symbolically bear-
ing the brunt of the general evils committed during the conflict. Thus, 
harmony and order was restored.5
Therefore, to obtain peace, a certain measure of general amnesty had to 
be applied for past acts of aggression, and the parties in the dispute had 
to “forget”6 these actions deliberately, in other words an act of “forgive 
and forget” even though these terms are a bit too general to confer the 
precise meaning in this context. The most important consequence of the 
willed amnesia was that no blame was assigned, no punishments were 
decided and in particular, no punishments were carried out.7 However, 
the peacemakers in the Middle Ages were not naïve, and a prerequisite 
for a successful application of amnesty and amnesia was due restitution 
3 Offfenstadt, Faire la paix, p. 66.
4 Fisch, Jörg, Krieg und Frieden im Friedensvertrag (Stuttgart, 1977).
5 Offfenstadt, Faire la paix, p. 50.
6 By Fisch called “unwillkürliches und gewolltes Vergessen”, which seems to be the 
most precise description of what is demanded in order for the peace to work. Fisch, Krieg, 
p. 36.
7 Fisch, Krieg, p. 50.
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for any seizures done before (and indeed sometimes during) the war up 
until the truce. Once the peace had been concluded, the government 
needed to control the way in which the previous adversaries spoke about 
each other in order to secure both the peace and especially the amnesty 
and amnesia, since words kept the flame of enmity alive. Offfenstadt calls 
this the control of paroles. Finally, the peace negotiations could never be 
seen as isolated in time and space, but rather, as we saw in the process of 
Montreuil, past precedence and decisions were invoked, and renegotiated 
during the peace procedure in question. In other words, peace was serial.8 
Thus, in a sense a peace was never fĳinal, but rather part of an ever ongo-
ing process drawing on past precedence to regulate future behaviour. All 
of the above-mentioned, except for the control of paroles, were explicitly 
present in the peace treaties analysed below.
However, contrary to these lofty ideals of the theologians and lawyers, 
the older concept of vengeance was still very influential on the disputes 
and their settlement. This contradiction has been described by T.B. Lam-
bert thus: “The rather utopian ideal of Christendom as, in efffect, one 
large family united in peace, could clearly never entirely displace older 
and much more entrenched ideals of protection and honour, shame, and 
vengeance”.9 In practice this meant, as Hyams has pointed out, that
the challenge to principals on both sides of the dispute, and especially for 
their counselling friends, is how to minimize the overall cost of a satisfactory 
resolution of the issues in such a way as to restore with maximum speed the 
working equilibrium necessary for the world to get on with its life.10
The discrepancy between the theory of peace and the harsh realities 
therefore reflects the possible conflict between the interests of the mari-
ners and those of the kings. While the kings, for the most part, were not 
emotionally engaged nor had sufffered any personal grievances in the 
mariners’ wars, the mariners for their part had sufffered insults, extreme 
predicaments and the loss of property, friends, family and countrymen. 
This generated anxiety, anger and a lust for vengeance, something which 
was rather difffĳicult to simply forget unless the treaties took their concerns 
and grievances seriously.
 8 See Offfenstadt, Faire la paix, chapter 2.
 9 Lambert, T.B., “Introduction: Some approaches to peace and protection in the Mid-
dle Ages,” in T.B. Lambert and D. Rollason, eds, Peace and Protection in the Middle Ages 
(Toronto, 2009), p. 9.
10 Hyams, “Feud in the High Middle Ages,” p. 163.
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In the following, I will present three diffferent, yet intimately related 
types of maritime peace. These are domestic peace treaties amongst sub-
jects of the English king, peace treaties between the English king and 
Continental rulers, and fĳinally the Anglo-French treaties which were com-
plicated by the lord-vassal relationship. While the outstanding disputes 
to be solved were between mariners, in almost all the cases the English 
king and his offfĳicers played an important part in the negotiations and the 
ratifĳications of the treaties.
Bayonne, the Cinque Ports and Great Yarmouth
In 1276, following a longstanding conflict between the Bayonnais and 
the mariners from the Cinque Ports, and between the Bayonnais and 
the mariners from Great Yarmouth, negotiations for a settlement were 
commenced with Edward I’s intervention, probably to secure his military 
campaign against Wales. A bipartite commission was appointed with two 
representatives from each party to negotiate the terms of peace.11 How-
ever, royal offfĳicers provided the framework for the negotiations, and royal 
offfĳicers (local bailifffs) and individual shipmasters were to act as executors 
of the stipulations of the treaty. Furthermore, the agreement was to be 
ratifĳied by the king, and he stood as the ultimate guardian of the peace 
and as the punisher of trespassers in the treaty agreed at Hythe on 7 Janu-
ary 1277. The treaty between Bayonne and the Cinque Ports constitutes 
the model for my analysis of English maritime peace negotiations and 
treaties, both domestic and foreign ones.
First of all, the treaty stated that all robberies, injustices, crimes, killings 
and woundings12 were acquitted and forgiven from the date of the ratifĳica-
tion, and that from that day the parties were agreed to uphold and main-
tain the peace. The treaty started with a proclamation of general amnesty 
and probably implicitly amnesia, since the mariners swore to keep the 
love (amour) and peace, that is, by letting love take the place of the nega-
tive feelings of rancour and anger.
The remaining stipulations of the treaty addressed future crimes and 
breakers of the peace. If a murder was committed, the murderer was to 
sufffer capital punishment at the same place as the murder had taken place 
11 CCR 1272–1279, p. 420.
12 “roberies, tortz et tutz trepas, mortz, les occisions e les playes.” Goyheneche, Bayonne, 
p. 533.
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or as close as possible. Anyone who defended or aided the murderer was 
to sufffer the same punishment. If the murderer escaped and if anyone 
from either party kept him in his ship, galley or town and refrained from 
giving him up to the (royal) authorities, he was to pay a fĳine of 100 l.t. to 
the family of the deceased. If a mariner wounded another mariner, the 
malefactor was to have his hand severed in the same side as the wound 
was caused and, as with murder, if his mates defended him, they were to 
sufffer the same penalty. Damages done with fĳists, a flat hand or a sword 
(épee—sic!)13 were fĳined 100 s.t. payable to the ship- or galley-master in 
the place where the damage was done, or if, in a town, to the local lord. 
A possible meaning of the payment to the shipmaster could be that this 
was intended for disputes arising at sea—probably while at anchor or in 
foreign ports.
As for the actual fĳinding and apprehension of the malefactors, the ship/
galley-master or the wounded and his companions were given permission 
to unhindered search of any ship where they suspected the malefactor to 
be hiding. If this happened in ports, the local bailifff had the same right 
as the master to search hostels, ships and galleys. If the malefactor could 
not be found, the master and four of the malefactor’s companions had to 
swear on the saints that they did not know where he was, and no ship 
nor any of the parties were permitted to sail with the malefactor nor keep 
company with him until he had been punished.
Debt and debt evasion seems to have been part of the origins of the 
conflict, as well as a continuous problem of maritime commercial life. 
The treaty stipulated that known (public?) debts were to be paid as soon 
as possible. Otherwise, no one was permitted to keep company with 
the debtor, either on ships or on land, until the debt had been paid. For 
unknown debts (“les dettes que ne sont pas conues”) they simply had to be 
paid as soon as possible. Likewise, threats and robbery should be recom-
pensed as soon as possible, and known malefactors were barred entrance 
to ships or towns until redress had been made in the form of a marcher-
trial, where prudhommes14 from both sides would inquire into the matter 
and reach a settlement. The treaty’s stipulation concerning arrest, also 
related to debts, stated that no one should engage in arrest of the other 
13 A possible meaning of this could be a strike with the flat side of the sword or the 
pommel. Finch, “The nature of violence,” p. 257.
14 Just, honourable and wise men. Godefroy, Dictionnaire, VI, 399. See also Gauvard, 
“Prud’homme,” in C. Gauvard, A. de Libera, and M. Zink, eds, Dictionnaire du Moyen Âge 
(Paris, 2002), p. 1158.
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party’s goods except for the creditor or his appointed pledges. How this 
relates to reprisals is unclear, even though it is likely that only the creditor 
was permitted to arrest the goods of the debtor in order to avoid incidents 
of fraudulent arrests. The treaty is, however, quite clear when it comes to 
piracy. It stated that if a man from either party took to the sea to rob and 
cause evil without the permission of the king of England, both parties 
were obliged to refuse him sanctuary and to hunt him tirelessly at sea.15 
In other words, pirates were outlaws and should be hunted down by both 
parties indiscriminately, but it is important to note here that mariners in 
royal naval service and people with letters of marque were exempt from 
this. This is the closest that I have come to a Ciceronean paradigm in the 
sources.
Again in accord with the amnesia and amnesty concept, the last arti-
cles of the treaty stated that the mariners of both parties should loyally 
aid each other against all other malefactors and stand together against all 
enemies except for the king of England. Should discord, however, arise 
between the parties, they were obliged to give each other forty days to 
evacuate before commencing collective reprisals. This was a customary 
procedure in the Middle Ages, both when conflict was about to erupt or 
when a peace treaty had been proclaimed.16 The purpose of this custom 
was to give innocent people time to evacuate before the reprisals com-
menced and to avoid being caught up in private quarrels. In addition, it 
served a purpose in the cessation of hostilities, for it was a measure to 
ensure that people at sea engaged in acts of hostility at the time of the 
ratifĳication of the treaty would not be punished for the infringement of a 
peace whose existence they were not aware of.
Finally, the parties swore to uphold this peace forever, seemingly an 
indirect acknowledgement of the eschatological character of medieval 
peace. Nevertheless, Edward II apparently found it necessary to renew 
the treaty in 1310, perhaps to make sure they were obligated to him, as to 
his father, but also because there indeed had been infringements of the 
peace, not least in the 1290s.17
15 “Et si nul homme qi soit d’une partie ou d’autre se velait metre en la mer pur robber 
ou malfer par soi meismes par fraude, santz maundement nostre Seigneur le Roi d’Engle-
terre, pur aler encontre asqun qi soit des parties pur faire mal, qe ambedeux les parties 
augent sur celuy e q’il ne lessent ester en pees en nul lieu, si la q’il le eient en gette de tute 
la mere.” Printed in Goyheneche, Bayonne, p. 534. 
16 See Beaumanoir, Coutumes, art. 1695, pp. 368–369, ORF, I, pp. 56–58, Carbonnières, 
“Pouvoir royal,” p. 3.
17 Printed in Goyheneche, Bayonne, pp. 533–535.
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This treaty was based on a lex talionis principle,18 and in part it had the 
aggrieved as the executors of punishment. Furthermore, it was directly 
related to maritime commercial life, shown by the insistence on debts and 
their recovery, and it had traits of the march procedure in the engagement 
of arbiters. Finally, it presupposed that when disputes arose, the parties 
would disregard solidarity with their fellow-countrymen or shipmates, to 
ensure that justice be done. This seems to have been extremely unrealistic, 
however. In the rest of the chapter, I shall show how in the fĳirst part of the 
fourteenth century the English kings abandoned this measure in favour of 
letting royal or indeed municipal authorities carry out the sentences and 
ultimately hold the municipalities responsible for their citizens’ actions, 
instead of going for the individuals directly responsible.
Incidents of Piracy and the Non-application of the Treaty
In the turbulent fĳirst years of the 1290s, probably in 1293 sometime before 
30 June, Bayonnais and English mariners clashed offf the Isle of Wight. 
In this incident, English shipmasters from Great Yarmouth, Winchelsea 
and Weymouth in four ships and one great cog attacked the ship of two 
Bayonnais merchants. The English robbed the merchants and killed some 
of the Bayonnais on the Isle of Wight. Quickly, royal offfĳicers were sent 
to investigate the case in Great Yarmouth, Winchelsea and Portsmouth, 
and orders were given to the bailifffs of the Isle of Wight and Portsmouth 
to fĳind and apprehend the guilty and present them to the king in the 
middle of July. On 15 July, royal orders to the Cinque Ports and Great Yar-
mouth to keep the peace with Bayonne were issued, and royal offfĳicers 
were commissioned to Portsmouth to carry out the agreement recently 
drawn up before the king and council with the assent of the parties.19 This 
agreement stated that peace was to be observed under forfeiture of life 
and goods and that the agreement should be sworn on the gospels by 
both parties. Furthermore, the English were to swear to the offfĳicers in the 
church of Portsmouth and on the gospels that they had taken the Bayon-
nais for Spanish, with whom hostilities were on the rise, and the English 
were fĳined a sum to be used to pay six chaplains to celebrate mass for 
the slain for one year. For their part, the Bayonnais were to retain three 
18 The lex talionis principle can be summed up as the law of retaliation where the pun-
ishment corresponds in kind and severity to the injury sufffered. The most famous example 
is the biblical “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”.
19 CPR 1292–1301, pp. 29 and 31.
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of the Englishmen (as hostages) until the families of the deceased had 
accepted the agreement. If the families accepted, all arrests from both 
parties made by the king as security were to be released. Furthermore, 
both parties were to swear on the gospels, not just personally but also 
on behalf of their communities, that the conflict was over and that peace 
would be observed. Thus, the conflict was settled. It is interesting to note 
in this case that, in addition to the above agreement, Edward ordered the 
Bayonnais to restore the goods that they had robbed from Lombard and 
Flemish merchants. In other words, the Bayonnais merchants, attacked 
by the English, had in fact themselves indulged in piracy on their way to 
England.20
In this incident, the lex talionis principles of the 1277 treaty were not 
applied. This may be because the conflict was between the Bayonnais and 
a mixed party. However, I fĳind it more probable that the answer to this 
absence is due to the plausible mistaking of the Bayonnais as being Span-
ish and Edward’s fear of a further escalation of the maritime conflicts.
The settlement between the Cinque Ports and Great Yarmouth in 1305, 
which marked the end of the maritime war that commenced with the 
naval battle offf Flanders in 1297, signals the English royal reform of set-
tlements between ports. In this settlement, Edward pardoned all previous 
violence and plunder in order to establish eternal peace. This peace was 
to be sworn by every shipmaster and two mariners from every ship from 
the maritime communities to the mayors and royal offfĳicers of the Cinque 
Ports and Great Yarmouth. The mariners furthermore pledged to enforce 
this peace amongst their own and to deliver any transgressor of the peace 
up to the bailifff in the nearest port. These bailifffs were to keep the trans-
gressors and their goods arrested until sufffĳicient amends had been made 
to the victims. If the owner of a ship knowingly received such transgres-
sors and their goods without informing the local bailifff, it would result in 
the arrest of the ship-owners goods as well, only this was to be forfeited 
to the king. However, any mention of corporal punishment is completely 
absent, and it seems as if the only punishment that could be ordered was 
economic.21 In spite of this peace, the mariners continued to clash. For 
instance in 1316, mariners from Great Yarmouth attacked and plundered 
mariners from the Cinque Ports and burned their ships offf Portsmouth, 
despite Edward II’s prohibition of such actions. The king reacted by 
20 CCR 1288–1296, p. 324.
21 Charters of the Cinque Ports, ed. Samuel Jeake (London, 1728), pp. 15–17.
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convening representatives from the parties to negotiate a peace and to 
avoid the Portsmen retaliating. Initially, Edward declared that the Yar-
mouthmen should be punished in a manner to strike terror into all and 
discourage them from further attacks. However, in the end, no corporal 
punishments were meted out, in tenor with the 1305 settlement. Instead, 
the men of Yarmouth agreed to pay a fĳine of £1,000 to the Portsmen,22 
and it seems as if the treaty actually worked in restraining the mariners 
from continuing the conflict. This treaty of 1305 can thus be seen as an 
experiment in settlement by the English kings, later to be tried out in an 
international arena, as I will show below.
Thus, the English domestic cases show that the draconian tenets of the 
1277 / 1310 treaties were not actually applied in cases involving subjects of 
the English king. The reason for this may well have been that such punish-
ments could be detrimental to the cessation of conflict. The very fact that 
the treaty was renewed in 1310 supports this argument, since there was no 
need to renew a treaty with perpetual relevance if it had been observed 
to the letter.
Flanders and Portugal
The beginning of the 1290s was characterised by a high level of animosity 
by all mariners in the northwestern seas against the Anglo-Bayonnais. It 
is impossible to tell if the conflict with Portugal and Castile was related 
to the conflict between English mariners and the Flemish and Norman 
mariners, or whether they developed independently of each other. Never-
theless, the number of maritime conflicts coming to light at the beginning 
of the 1290s certainly points to a very high tension at sea whose initial 
cause we can only guess at.
On 5 June 1291, Edward ordered the justiciar of Ireland to make sure that 
no harm befell French and especially Flemish mariners, either on land or 
at sea, and to let them come and go freely until the coming All Saints, 
because tensions between the Flemings and the English mariners were 
on the rise and Edward wished to minimise them. Furthermore, Edward 
ordered the justiciar to release arrested goods of two Flemish merchants 
22 RG, IV, nos. 1774, 1775 and 1776, pp. 516–518, CPR 1313–1317, pp. 520 and 576, CCR 
1313–1318, p. 367.
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which, in all probability, had been arrested as a reprisal for aggressions by 
Flemish mariners against the Irish.23
Seemingly, Edward’s actions did not help, and in 1292, he took fur-
ther actions to stop the conflict from escalating. This conflict was in all 
likelihood directly connected to the maritime war between the Anglo-
Bayonnais and the Normans, since it seems as if the Norman mariners 
were aligned with their Flemish colleagues against the English. Like the 
negotiations commenced with Portugal and Castile to stop similar mari-
time conflicts the same year, Edward’s actions were an attempt to limit 
the ongoing maritime hostilities to a strictly Anglo-French afffair and to 
bring peace to the seas for the prosperity of trade. Thus, in the years 1292–
93, Edward and the count of Flanders, Guy de Dampierre, negotiated a 
cessation of the hostilities between the Anglo-Gascon and the Flemish 
mariners. On 6 May 1292, Edward declared that a process for the cessa-
tion of hostilities had been commenced by the count and himself. They 
agreed to pardon all past damages and to enter a truce.24 Future offfences 
were prohibited from Easter to All Saints next (the end of the truce), and 
all damages done to innocent Flemings were to be restored by the Eng-
lish king and vice versa. This truce was to be proclaimed publicly, and 
Edward threatened punishment of grave forfeiture for infractions of the 
peace. The same day, Edward ordered a proclamation, that Flemish ships 
and goods arrested during the conflict were to be released and that the 
Flemings were permitted to export wool again.25
During that year and the next, negotiations over the settlement con-
tinued. On 6 May 1293, Guy wrote to Edward that Flemish merchants 
had been attacked at Saint-Mathieu by Anglo-Bayonnais, that some had 
been killed and that the merchants had sufffered tremendous economic 
losses. In all likelihood, this attack was done by the Anglo-Bayonnais lying 
in wait for the Normans. It is possible that what Guy described was the 
naval battle offf Saint-Mathieu where the Anglo-Bayonnais defeated a Nor-
man fleet and that the Flemings were allied to the Normans. If this is the 
case, we should not be surprised that Guy did not mention the Normans, 
for he had no interest in getting the attack on his subjects mixed up in 
23 Foedera 1273–1307, p. 755.
24 “ante omnia, rancoribus, contentionibus & injuriis universis prorsus sublatis, 
 necnon & dampnis ac jacturis quibuscumque datis seu illatis hinc indè, pardonatis totali-
ter & remissis.” Foedera 1272–1307, p. 759.
25 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 759. On 8 May, Count Guy issued an identical order to the 
Flemings. Foedera 1307–1327, p. 760.
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this maritime war. It must be noted, however, that most sources date the 
Saint-Mathieu naval battle to Pentecost which was ten days later than the 
dating of Guy’s letter, and the Chronicle of Bury Saint-Edmunds mentions 
two naval battles in May, on the 15th and on the 26th of May.26 Thus, it is 
more likely that the Anglo-Bayonnais had simply lain in wait for all trafffĳic 
at Saint-Mathieu and that the two incidents were separate. In any case, 
the count urged Edward to help him fĳind a remedy quickly, since this 
attack posed a grave threat to trade, since the Flemish merchants stayed 
at home out of fear of piracy.27
The outbreak of the Gascon War in 1294 disrupted these Anglo-
Flemish negotiations. As a result of the war, Flemish policies towards 
England became subsumed into the French ones, which entailed a trade 
embargo to the detriment of Flemish interests, and de facto French royal 
control of the county of Flanders occurred. This pushed Guy to ally him-
self openly with the English in 1297.28 On 8 March,29 the Flemings and 
the English agreed on a perpetual peace and alliance for mutual safety 
and protection between the masters and mariners of England, Bayonne 
and Flanders. This declaration stated that all English and Bayonnais ships 
going to Flanders should have banners with the arms of the king of Eng-
land and the Flemings’ banners with the count’s arms. In addition, both 
should carry letters patent with the town seal of their hometowns so that 
enemies would not be able to deceive them by carrying false colours. If a 
man from either party committed murder, robbery or trespass against the 
other party, the murderer should be punished by death, whereas wound-
ing and other trespasses were to be punished according to the local law 
where the trespass was committed, thus taking a lex talionis approach to 
piracy. Finally, any long-time delay in the execution of justice should not 
be allowed to influence the relationship between England and Flanders, 
and both parties strove to conduct justice as speedily as possible.30
In Easter a few weeks later, Flanders entered an offfĳicial alliance with 
England against France,31 and before the French invasion of Flanders 
in the summer and the Anglo-French truce of October 1297, Guy func-
tioned as intermediary in the settlement of maritime conflicts between 
26 Bury Saint Edmunds, pp. 116–117.
27 Foedera 1273–1307, p. 788.
28 Nicholas, David, Medieval Flanders (London and New York, 1992), pp. 187–190.
29 Not on the 20th as Marsden claims. Marsden, Law and Custom, p. 46.
30 Foedera 1273–1307, p. 861, Marsden, Law and Custom, pp. 46–48.
31   Foedera 1273–1307, p. 862.
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Castile, Portugal and the subjects of the English Crown. For instance, on 
17 February 1297, Edward wrote to his lieutenant in Gascony and the sene-
schal of Gascony to inform them that Castilian and Portuguese mariners 
had asked Guy to intercede on their behalf with the English king for the 
arrangement of mutual safe-conducts for merchants of the English realm 
and of Iberia to come and go until the quinzaine of Michaelmas. In case 
of a positive reply, a mariners’ and merchants’ truce would commence, 
which was to be proclaimed publicly so that trade could resume.32 Thus, 
Guy acted as an intermediary between these monarchs in the arrange-
ment of a truce. On 1 April, Edward wrote to Guy that the Bayonnais Piers 
d’Artiklong’s ship had been attacked and plundered by the Spanish offf the 
Flemish coast. Since this ran counter to the truce which Guy had facili-
tated, Edward asked him to conduct an arrest of Castilian goods in Flan-
ders, as a remedy for Piers and his associates in the interest of upholding 
the truce.33 Shortly thereafter, Guy was deposed, and the French more or 
less efffectively took over control of Flanders. Therefore, the arrest never 
occurred, and Piers d’Artiklong was still pursuing his claim in the fĳirst 
decade of the fourteenth century.
At the same time as negotiations were occurring between England and 
Flanders (and England and France) over the escalating maritime war, 
negotiations were also being conducted between England, Castile and 
Portugal. I will briefly deal with the short period of hostility between the 
English and the Portuguese before moving on to the more enduring con-
flict between Castile and England.
On 15 July 1293, the same day as Edward ratifĳied a truce with Castile, 
Edward wrote to King Diniz I of Portugal complaining about Bayonnais 
merchants being plundered in public in Lisbon. Since Edward desired 
peace, he asked Diniz to concede to an inquiry into the case by the royal 
offfĳicers in Gascony and by the Portuguese in order to determine and grant 
restitution to the Bayonnais in the interest of peace between the king-
doms.34 Nothing seemed to come of this. Instead the conflict escalated, 
and English merchants also became embroiled in the conflict with the 
Portuguese. On 23 April 1294, a settlement was negotiated by a bi-partite 
commission along the lines of those of marcher conflicts. Two Bayonnais 
and two Portuguese commissioners were to meet, inquire into each case, 
32 Foedera 1273–1307, p. 860.
33 Foedera 1273–1307, p. 863.
34 Foedera 1273–1307, pp. 789–790.
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and grant restitution when appropriate. If the commissioners could not 
reach an agreement, a neutral fĳifth person would decide with the major-
ity. Because of the distance between the kingdoms, safe-conducts were 
issued to English, Bayonnais and Portuguese mariners alike until the com-
ing Pentecost. However, this safe-conduct was not extended to Portuguese 
either freighting or sailing in Castilian vessels, since this conflict still had 
not been settled. Thus, an Anglo-Portuguese truce had commenced, and 
until the end of the safe-conduct period Diniz should actively protect Eng-
lish subjects going to Portugal.35 These negotiations seem to have pro-
gressed well, but Diniz feared that the continuing conflict between English 
subjects and the Castilians would jeopardize the negotiations. Thus, on 
30 December 1294, Diniz wrote to Edward that the “guerris et discordiis” 
between these two parties was a liability to innocent people, (that is, Por-
tuguese mariners), because they risked being taken for Castilians by the 
English. Furthermore, Diniz stated his concern that some people would 
take advantage of this state of afffairs to conduct indiscriminate plunder 
and piracy.36 He therefore strongly urged Edward to stop the guerras and 
restore law so that malefactors would not attack the innocent.37 Despite 
this, in 1295, Bernard Dongressili was granted a letter of marque against 
the Portuguese, which indicates that peace still had not been established 
(see chapter 5).
In any case, the settlement between England and Portugal, negotiated 
by Guy of Flanders in 1297, does seem to have worked, for after 1297 no 
disputes between Anglo-Bayonnais and Portuguese mariners appear in 
the sources.
Castile—The Change of a Procedure
The maritime conflicts between the Anglo-Bayonnais and the Castil-
ians were—contrary to those presented above—more enduring, and the 
peace treaties between these two parties reveal a fundamental change 
in the way in which international maritime wars were dealt with by the 
English kings.
35 Foedera 1273–1307, p. 799.
36 “Ex quibus guerris & discordiis dampna multitoda rerum & corporum provenerunt, 
non solum sibi ipsis, qui hujusmodi guerras susctârunt, set eciam aliis multis hominibus, 
qui non fuerunt, nec sunt in culpâ, propter mercimonia & res suas, quas in navibus aspor-
tari faciebant.” Foedera 1273–1307, p. 815.
37 Foedera 1273–1307, pp. 815–816.
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The disputes between the Anglo-Bayonnais and the Castilians can be 
divided into two parts, the ones of the 1290s and those of the fĳirst two 
decades of the fourteenth century. The settlement of these maritime 
wars was severely hampered by the death of the Castilian king Sancho 
IV in 1295 and the weak royal control over the kingdom of Castile until 
the 1320s. This period of Castilian history was characterised by the minor-
ity of the kings and the fĳight for the throne between the kings’ wardens, 
the pretenders to the throne and their noble backers. Thus, Fernando IV 
was six when he became king (1295–1312), and Alfonso XI was only a one-
year-old when he was proclaimed king (1312–1350). As a result, these kings 
and their government were severely weakened.38 Consequently, the royal 
Castilian government did not have much power to stop the piracies and 
maritime wars of the ports on the northern Atlantic coast, to the detri-
ment of a lasting maritime peace.
On 17 May 1293, Edward declared to all his subjects that the conflict 
between the Castilians and the Bayonnais, which had drawn in the Eng-
lish mariners as well, had now been settled, and a truce was commenced 
which was to last until Christmas. Johannes, judex of Sancho IV of Cas-
tile’s court, and Gundissalvus Martini, both commissioners of Castile, and 
the citizens of Bayonne, Arnaud de Villari (probably de Viele) and Jean 
d’Ardyr, were appointed to negotiate the terms of a settlement and to 
conclude a truce. In order that no one should be able to feign ignorance of 
the truce, it was to be announced publicly before Michaelmas, and from 
that time on no one could be excused either because of distance or long 
absence. It further stated that Sancho and the Castilians were to release 
all arrested persons, goods and ships of Bayonne taken after 1 December. 
People, goods and ships arrested before 1 December would be granted 
restitution during the truce by Sancho and his subjects, mariners or mer-
chants, and Sancho promised to restrain his subjects. The Bayonnais, for 
their part, promised the same, and Bayonnais offfĳicers (both municipal 
and royal) pledged to secure restitution for aggrieved Castilians. After 
Michaelmas, the commissioners were to convene in Fuenterrabìa and 
Saint-Jean-de-Luz. Here they were to treat the pending petitions, fĳind 
those guilty in causing the conflict, establish the values of the lost goods 
for those who had not yet obtained restitution, determine damages and 
injuries caused and fĳinally conclude a perpetual peace.39 On 18 June 1293, 
38 Ruiz, Teofĳilo F., Spain’s Centuries of Crisis, 1300–1474 (Oxford, 2007), pp. 53–63.
39 Foedera 1273–1307, pp. 789–790.
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Edward ordered the Anglo-Bayonnais mariners to desist from further con-
flict and to observe the truce with the Castilians. He furthermore ordered 
the cancellation of past letters of marque (“marque seu gagacione”) given 
to his Gascon subjects and the release of arrested goods and persons once 
Sancho of Castile had publicly approved the truce.40
However, the death of Sancho in 1295 and the struggle for the throne 
troubled this initiative. Indeed, in 1296 the mariners of the northeast-
ern Castilian Atlantic ports formed the port association known as El 
Hermandad, primarily for peaceful settlement of disputes between the 
ports but also to enforce an embargo on trade with England and Gas-
cony.41 It consisted of the ports of Santander, Laredo, Castro Urdiales, 
Bermeo, Guetaría, San Sebastián, Fuenterrabía, Vitoria and, from 1297, 
Vicente de la Barquera.42 These ports were relatively small, presumably 
of 2–3,000 citizens per port, and Teofĳilo Ruiz suspects that the merchants 
and shipmasters held a lot of power in these ports due to their wealth.43 
Sometime during the 1290s, possibly in 1297 with the Anglo-French truce, 
or the beginning of the 1300s, most of these ports seem to have ceased 
their war with the Anglo-Bayonnais, but Santander, Laredo and Castro 
Urdiales continued it. In 1306, Edward I commenced negotiations for the 
settlement of the conflict with the Castilian king (or more likely his war-
dens). The course of these negotiations is of fundamental importance to 
an understanding of the changes in English policy on piracy and maritime 
private war.
1306–1311
On 28 July 1306, Edward I wrote to the town of Bayonne concerning a 
conflict (discordiis & contentionibus) between Bayonne and the Castilian 
ports of Castro Urdiales, Santander and Laredo. Edward wrote that he 
had learned that a truce had been entered into by the Bayonnais which 
was to last until St. Johns in 1309. Edward acknowledged the truce and 
40 CPR 1292–1301, p. 34.
41 Ruiz, Teofĳilo F., Crisis and Continuity: Land and Town in Late Medieval Castile (Phila-
delphia, 1994), p. 197.
42 Childs, Wendy R., Anglo-Castilian Trade in the Later Middle Ages (Manchester, 1978), 
pp. 17–18, Arízaga, Beatriz Bolumburu and Bochaca, Michel, “Caractères généraux des vil-
les portuaires du nord de la péninsule Ibérique au Moyen Âge,” in Ports maritimes et ports 
fluviaux au Moyen Âge (Paris, 2005), pp. 63–78.
43 Ruiz, Crisis, pp. 198 and 204.
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afffĳirmed that the Bayonnais could continue to trade peacefully.44 This is 
the fĳirst indication of a renewed (or perhaps continued) struggle between 
the Bayonnais and the Castilians, and the truce was apparently negoti-
ated between the ports without the immediate interference of the kings 
as in the 1290s. Nevertheless, the kings quickly became embroiled in the 
conflict as arbitrators.
On 28 February 1307, Edward I wrote to King Fernando IV of Cas-
tile, informing him that while the commissioners were negotiating on 
the present conflict, seven Bayonnais citizens (amongst them Arnaud 
de Saint-Martin—see chapter 5) had been plundered for the amount of 
3,457 marcs, 6s. and 8d. during the conflict in the 1290s and still had not 
received either justice or restitution, but for £166 sterling (approximately 
220 marks). Thus, Edward asked Fernando to honour the agreement that 
Edward had made with his father and grant the remaining sum to the 
Bayonnais.45 This demand was repeated on 14 May 1308, and Edward II 
asked that their fathers’ agreement was respected and restitution was 
given,46 thus showing that nothing had come of it.
While these negotiations and the truce was going on, other English 
maritime communities seem to have been stirred by this conflict, or pos-
sibly Edward feared that they would mobilise in aid of Bayonne. At least 
this is the impression that one gets from Edward’s order of 13 November 
1308, to the authorities of Sandwich, Dover, Winchelsea and Bayonne, in 
which he forbade them from assisting the Bayonnais mariners in their 
war with the Castilians, ordered them not to hurt French subjects and 
moreover forbade the Bayonnais from continuing war with the Castil-
ian mariners.47 Thus, it would seem that the truce was not really being 
observed and that French mariners were becoming embroiled in the con-
flict, possibly as the Castilians’ allies. However, the day before, Edward II 
had informed Fernando that negotiations were going well, and to ensure 
the peace he had ordered the Bayonnais on pain of total forfeiture (“sub 
forisfacturâ omnium quæ nobis forisfacere poterunt”) to abstain from 
damage to the Castilians. Accordingly, he asked Fernando to order the 
same.48 These two statements do not really correspond, and it is likely 
44 Foedera 1273–1307, p. 991.
45 Foedera 1273–1307, p. 1010.
46 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 44.
47 CCR 1307–1313, p. 130.
48 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 60. On pp. 80–81, a similar case of non-compliance of the truce 
is recorded.
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that the order to the Anglo-Bayonnais to abstain from war was rather to 
make sure that the fragile truce did not break down altogether, signalling 
that, to the contrary, the negotiations were threatened by continued hos-
tilities. This is corroborated by a later document stating that between 1306 
and 1309 a Castilian fleet had descended upon English Saintonge and had 
plundered and killed Englishmen, thereby pointing to the by now well 
known escalation pattern.49 Indeed, as was evidenced later, these Castil-
ians had descended on the house of the English king’s bailifff of Saintonge, 
Guillaume Arnaud de Campaniha, amongst others, thus in efffect directly 
attacking the English king’s authority there.
In the late spring of 1309, the situation had developed in a reasonable 
direction. On 15 April, the Castilians afffĳirmed that the conflict would now 
be treated by the Castilian commissioners, Juan Didaci de Gaudalfayra, 
knight, and Fernando Gundisalui de Fries. The Bayonnais appointed the 
citizens Raymond Durand de Villa (de Viele) and Arnaud de Meuta as 
their commissioners, even though they made the reservation that these 
two could by no means be held personally responsible for the outcome. 
On 14 September, Edward II conceded to this procedure. The agreement 
that they had reached in the two years of truce was a negotiation and a 
settlement as stated in the following:
The truce was to be made public in Castile and in the English king’s 
lands before Christmas, so that none could claim ignorance of it. If any 
one from that day forward was arrested, captured or made any usurpa-
tion of the belongings of the others, knowledgeable or ignorant of the 
agreement, they were to do restitution during the truce. Breakers of the 
truce would be punished corporally and on their goods, and they would 
be strongly prosecuted. If capture, arrest or seizure was committed dur-
ing the two-year truce and the ship and goods were not consumed (that 
is, sold offf ) or could be found, restitution was to be granted immediately 
in forty days before next Sunday. If the goods were “consumed” or could 
not be found, a four-man commission was to be arranged. The commis-
sioners were to swear on the Bible to remain impartial and to reconvene 
next Sunday in forty days on the bridge of Fuenterrabìa and to proceed 
49 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 89. “sit notorium quod illi de Hispaniâ, factâ flotâ, congre-
gato ecercitu more hostili cum armis, & de die intraverunt terram nostrum de Xancto-
nia; & et murtriverunt multos homines; & deprædaverunt bajulum nostrum bonis quæ 
habebat, spoliaverunt, & locum suum tenentem ceperunt, &, et sine aliquâ culpâ, viliter 
murtriverunt, in magnum opprobrium nostrum; & plures Anglicos homines nostros qui 
non errant, nec sunt de guerrâ, in mari & in terrâ deprædaverunt”.
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with the negotiations after having examined their own (that is, examined 
their own accused). This was to be done with goods, etc., which were not 
consumed or found. With “consumed” or not-found goods they would 
hold inquiries from next Christmas to next Christmas over, and after that 
they would not hear or hold any more examinations and would consider 
the cases closed. Restitution to those heard by the four men would be 
granted before next St. John’s provided the four agreed on what was to be 
restituted. In regard to homicides, four men were to be appointed from 
Bayonne and four from the Castilian towns. They would capture the coun-
trymen who broke the truce and punish them according to their personal 
judgement or that of the kings. Those who had done trespasses before the 
truce, that is, during the guerra, would make restitution, but they would 
not be liable to any punishment as such. Concerning the sufffering of inno-
cent people who had been attacked nonetheless, and here the English 
referred specifĳically to the Castilian attack on Saintonge,50 Edward tol-
erated it because of his love for Fernando, and in essence amnesty was 
granted. However, future actions like this were to be judged by the four-
man commission. The mayor of Bayonne was to deal with his countrymen 
and the Castilian king with his subjects. Concerning the still outstanding 
cases of restitution dating from the reign of Edward I, Edward II pleaded 
that Fernando would grant restitution in accordance with the 1293 treaty. 
If the four commissioners could agree on the premises, conditions and 
punishments during the truce, future and eternal peace would be secured. 
If they could not agree, the commissioners were to report to the kings who 
would fĳind other means for reaching a settlement.51
In the autumn of 1309, the parties seem to have agreed to the procedure 
for the exact negotiation of the damages. On 14 September Edward wrote 
to the knight Arnaud de Caupenne, Gaillard de Saint-Paul, lord of Seros, 
the knight Guillaume Arnaud de Podenes, and Arnaud de Vicq, the king’ 
clerk at Bayonne, ordering two of them to go in forty days to meet with 
the Castilian representatives on the middle of the bridge52 in Fuenter-
rabìa on the Gascon border and to negotiate an agreement on behalf of 
Bayonne. These commissioners were furthermore given full authority to 
50 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 89.
51 Foedera 1307–1327, pp. 89–90, EMDP, I, 398–402.
52 It was a custom in the Middle Ages to meet on a bridge on the border to negotiate 
peace, since it represented a place controlled by no one and thus a neutral land between 
the belligerent parties. Furthermore, the water was taken as a symbol of the washing away 
of enmities and the past deeds of violence. See Offfenstadt, Faire la paix, pp. 157–159.
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negotiate, to see witnesses, to compel, cite, punish, judge, arbitrate and 
impose penalties on rebelles, that is, transgressors of the truce and peace, 
both in past and future. The English procedure was to let two of the above-
mentioned start the negotiations and then let the other two fĳinish them. 
Furthermore, Edward promised to write a letter to the seneschal of Gas-
cony, ordering him to carry out the decisions of these commissioners.53
However, despite these developments, the piracies continued, and on 
1 October four merchants from Southampton complained that they had 
been plundered by Castilian pirates offf the coast of Brittany. This com-
plaint was ordered to be forwarded to the four Anglo-Bayonnais commis-
sioners and to be included in the negotiations.54 For the next two years 
negotiations seem to have continued without any major impediments. On 
28 July 1311, the Castilian towns and councils of Castro Urdiales, Santander 
and Laredo gave their approbation of the proposed peace treaty by the 
commissioners. However, since the Castilian commissioner, Ordoño Pérez, 
was archdeacon of Palenzuela, and Pierre Arnaud de Vicq was a member 
of the clergy, they could not order corporal punishments, either death or 
mutilation. So the towns were left to devise and carry out the exact penal-
ties, which were proposed as the following: Murder was to be punished by 
corporal punishment in the same place as the murder had happened or, 
if the murderer was not apprehended there, then anywhere else he was 
found. Whoever aided the murderer was to sufffer the same punishment, 
and his goods were to be confĳiscated according to the custom of the town 
of his origin. The towns had a mutual obligation to prosecute murderers 
and confĳiscate their goods. If a person attacked another with a dagger or 
bludgeoning weapon and wounded another person, the attacker was to 
lose the hand that held the weapon—if he could be found. Any failure to 
stop this from happening by the attacker’s companion, or any aid to the 
malefactor, resulted in a fĳine of 100 l.t. payable to the local lord. If they 
were not able to pay, the person would lose his hand like the malefactor 
himself. Kicks and strikes with fĳists with no bloodshed were to be fĳined 
with 10 l.t. payable to the local lord. If the person could not pay, he was 
not to be admitted on any ship until the fĳine was paid. If anyone armed 
for piracy without the mandate of their lord (“leuantar a fazer se cossarios 
por fazer mal sint mandamiento de su seinhor”), both the Bayonnais and 
the Castilians were obliged to hunt the pirates tirelessly and not admit 
53 Foedera 1307–1327, pp. 88–89 and 92.
54 CPR 1307–1313, p. 243.
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them in their lands. Instead, they were to apprehend them and condemn 
them to death as violators of the peace. Should one be unable to arrest the 
pirate or if he fled, one had the right to kill the malefactor without having 
to fear prosecution. Finally, those who aided the pirates were also to sufffer 
the death penalty.55
On 9 October 1311, Edward II approved with his great seal the judge-
ment and treaty agreed in Fuenterrabìa by the four commissioners, by 
this time Gaillard de Saint-Paul and Master Pierre Arnaud de Vicq (the 
Anglo-Bayonnais commissioners) and Ordoño Pérez and Rodrigo Ibañez, 
alcalde of Vitoria, thus settling the maritime war between Bayonne and 
the Castilian ports of Castro Urdiales, Santander and Laredo. However, 
this fĳinal treaty difffered signifĳicantly from the one proposed by the 
Castilian ports.
The treaty commenced by invoking the image of Christ, who died for 
the sins of mankind in order to secure eternal peace. It then proceeded to 
praise the peace and indeed the kinship of the kings, as well as the ami-
cable relationship which the Bayonnais and the Castilians had enjoyed 
since old times. Thus, according to the treaty, it was the Devil who had 
instigated the discord, and the commissioners’ task was not just to estab-
lish a secular peace but rather the restoration of divine order.56 The com-
missioners claimed that the treaty had come about after careful scrutiny 
of every case presented to them and that it had been solved by equity 
rather than rigorous law.57 In accordance with this, the treaty changed the 
punishments from corporal to incarceration and fĳines. Thus, in the treaty, 
Edward was to inform all his offfĳicers of the following: transgressors of the 
peace were to lose all goods and to be imprisoned for life or banished 
but not punished such that life and limb were threatened (“citra mortem 
et membrorum emutilacionem puniantur”). A list then followed with the 
names of the aggrieved, their losses and the names of the pirates. The 
pirates on both sides were condemned to pay half of the sum of what was 
listed in the complaint. A possible explanation for this curious solution is 
a taking into account of the possibility of exaggeration in the complaints. 
This restitution was to be paid at the latest before Easter Sunday ( fes-
tum Resurreccionis) next year, and it was to be executed by the mayor 
55 Printed in Balasques, Etudes historiques, III, 74–75 and 516–519.
56 On the Devil’s role as the instigator of wars, see Offfenstadt, Faire la paix, pp. 
32–48.
57 “volentes amplectere equitatem pocius quam rigorem, ut nostrum judicium de vultu 
Dei prodeat et videat equitatem, concorditer et unanimiter.” RG, IV, no. 562 p. 161.
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and jurati of Bayonne through the confĳiscation of the properties of the 
malefactors. If the malefactors were not to be found, their families were to 
pay through coercion from the mayor and jurati. If the mayor and jurati 
refused to carry out the order, or if they were somehow unable to produce 
the sums from the family, they were to pay from their own pocket or be 
forced to do so by the king of England and his seneschal in Gascony. The 
same rule applied for the Castilians, where the executors were the alcal-
des, the jurati and ultimately the king of Castile. The treaty proceeded to 
set an example for the rest to follow by mentioning on the Bayonnais side 
the actions of Pierre Vital de Sayrelonque, Arnaud de la Biele / Viele and 
Jean d’Ardyr, shipmasters of Bayonne and prominent citizens of Bayonne, 
who had captured a ship from Santander. They were to restore the ship 
with tacking, etc., and if they could not because the ship and tacking had 
been “consumed”, they were to pay from their own property to make res-
titution or compensation of the goods to the owners and mariners before 
All Saints next. If this was not done, restitution was to be taken from the 
mayor and the jurati at the execution of the king and his seneschal. Thus, 
it was the responsibility of the municipal authorities to carry out, or at 
least make sure that restitution was made, or else they would personally 
have to pay for the malefactors deeds. Amongst the Castilians, Sancho 
Garcia de Larganes, who had captured Bernard Jean de Rua Majoris’s ship, 
was to follow the same procedure as the named Bayonnais. If he could 
not or would not make restitution, he was to pay 2,000 sous morlaas (app. 
£60–100 sterling). If he failed to pay, the alcaldes and jurati of the three 
Castilian towns were to make restitution from their own property. Con-
cerning the fleet from the three towns which had attacked Saintonge and 
robbed Guillaume Arnaud de Campaniha, the king’s bailifff, of 1000 livres 
petits tournois, he was to receive half in restitution from the alcaldi and 
jurati. If Campaniha refused this solution, however, (which he did) another 
solution would have to be found. Finally, in general, if either party’s 
malefactors failed to make restitution, the town offfĳicials were to provide it 
out of their own property. Thus, the Castilian towns and Bayonne as com-
munities were in efffect held responsible for the actions of defaulters, and 
they were to punish them according to the agreement. Symbolically, the 
four biggest malefactors of each party (who were unnamed in the treaty) 
were to be condemned to lose all goods and serve a lifetime sentence of 
imprisonment, but no harsher punishment was to be dealt.
The treaty was ratifĳied in Fuenterrabìa by the procurators, and Edward 
approved and ordered his servitors to carry out and punish all who 
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disobeyed.58 This treaty in efffect led to the abandonment of corporal 
punishment and instead made the local authorities responsible for mak-
ing sure that restitution was made. If they did not, these authorities had to 
pay the restitution out of their own money. The contrast with the previous 
maritime peace treaties, and indeed with the proposal by the Castilians 
three months prior, is striking. It is possible that this change was inspired 
by the results of the 1305 peace treaty between the Cinque Ports and Great 
Yarmouth. Nevertheless, this seems to be the fĳirst time that the model was 
tried out in an international treaty, but it was to be the preferred English 
settlement of maritime wars for the next decades.
Aftermath
Despite this agreement, in the 1310s it became apparent that at least the 
Castilians were either reluctant or more likely unable to actually carry 
out the stipulations of treaty.59 Indeed, the death of Fernando IV in 1312 
and the ascension of his one-year-old son, Alfonso XI, to the throne reo-
pened the struggles for power in Castile and plunged the kingdom into 
chaos. An enforcement of the treaty became practically impossible for 
the royal Castilian government. For example, the Bayonnais Arnaud de 
Saint-Martin, who had been robbed in the 1290s, had still not received 
complete restitution despite what was agreed in 1311. Thus, in 1317 (if not 
before) arrests and letters of marque were issued to Bayonnais to obtain 
restitution.60 The inadequate resolution of these cases is also shown by 
another case, namely the plunder of the bailifff of Saintonge, Guillaume 
Arnaud de Campaniha, during the Castilian incursion into Saintonge. 
On 24 May 1317, Edward wrote to Gilbert Pecche, the seneschal of Gas-
cony, informing him of the proceedings of this case. The words used in 
this document are interesting, as the Castilians from Santander, Castro 
Urdiales and Laredo, who attacked Campaniha’s hospitium in Saintonge, 
were described as “plures marinarios & piratas”. Yet in the rest of the doc-
ument, these are termed as malefactores, thus showing the synonymy of 
the words in medieval parlance. At the hospitium, the Castilians had killed 
Campaniha’s nephew, Campaniha had barely escaped them and they had 
58 EMDP, I, 402–6, RG, IV, no. 562 pp. 161–165.
59 See, for instance, CCR 1307–1313, pp. 383, 489, 512 and 582.
60 Foedera 1307–1327, pp. 325 and 332.
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plundered him of 1,000 livres petits tournois in open contempt of Edward 
II. This had been acknowledged by Alfonso and was recognised by the 
proctors during the negotiations of 1309–11. However, no restitution had 
actually been made. Therefore, Edward had ordered the previous sene-
schal, Jean de Ferrer, and now Pecche, to assure Campaniha restitution of 
the 1000 livres petits tournois plus extra damages through the issuing of a 
personal letter of marque to Campaniha (“concedendo eidem Guillielmo, 
marcham in personis”) of arrest against Spanish subjects until Campaniha 
declared to Pecche that satisfaction had been obtained. Furthermore, the 
Castilians had attacked and plundered three Bayonnais ships, and despite 
the fact that the Bayonnais had abstained from retaliations, no restitution 
had been made for the plunder.61 Thus, relations between the Castilians 
and the English mariners were deteriorating again, and the usual rem-
edies of arrest and marque were applied.
While this procedure of resorting to incarceration and fĳines over cor-
poral punishment seems a novelty, the towns themselves seem to have 
stuck to the customary lex talionis model. This is at least what is stated in 
the 1328 peace treaty between Bayonne / Biarritz and San Sebastian. This 
treaty was passed without the direct involvement of the kings of Castile 
and England, being agreed instead between the municipal governments 
of Bayonne and San Sebastian, and it was settled by a four-man commis-
sion as in the march custom. What is remarkable is that the articles in 
this treaty correspond in terms of punishments to those of the 1277 / 1310 
peace treaty of Bayonne-Cinque Ports and especially of the one proposed 
in 1311 by the Castilians. Nowhere is there any mention of abstaining from 
corporal punishment.62 This shows that the old maritime lex talionis cus-
tom was still being used, despite the effforts of, particularly, the English 
kings. The practice of a more amicable approach which abstained from 
corporal punishment, but which held the local governments accountable 
for the actions of their citizens, was apparently only used by the kings, 
whereas the communities themselves stuck to the old method. This was 
perhaps because of tradition, but more importantly also because these 
governments would not agree to a solution where the municipal authori-
ties were held economically accountable for the actions of their citizens. 
Finally, without the direct interference of the kings in this matter, it 
61 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 331, RG, IV, no. 1823, pp. 531–532.
62 Balasque, Etudes historiques, III, 538–547.
 peace and piracy containment 215
was not possible to have anyone control this. Instead, the executors of 
punishments and the receivers of fĳines were the local lords of the place 
where the damage was done.
It is worth noting here the coincidence of the English change in peace-
making applied to maritime wars with the reforms of the Societas Navium. 
While the municipal government obviously did not like the new way 
of making peace, it might have been a further impetus (apart from the 
socio-economic changes for maritime trade in the thirteenth century) to 
reform the Bayonnais mariners’ association. The reform led to the mayor 
becoming the leader of the Societas Navium and all shipmasters his sub-
jects. Thus, it became an instrument for the control of the actions of the 
shipmasters—in all likelihood to minimise damages to foreigners which 
the municipal government afterwards would have to pay. Perhaps this 
was the reason for the Bayonnais’ repudiation of Johannes de Bainhers 
and Arnaud de Saint-Martin?
Bayonne-Normandy
While the negotiations in Montreuil in 1306 had failed, other negotiations 
between the English and the French over the maritime wars between 
Bayonne and the Normans at the end of the thirteenth century and in the 
fĳirst decades of the fourteenth century were more successful.
1282
In 1282 the seneschal of Aquitaine, Jean de Grailly, informed the govern-
ment of Bayonne that he and André dit Oreylhom, citizen of Touques (?) 
(Tonca), Simon de Pont-Audemer and Jean dit Pyche, the French king’s 
sergeant in the bailiwick of Calais, had reached a settlement of the dis-
pute between Bayonne and the Norman ports of Dieppe, Fécamp, Étretat, 
Le Chef de Caux, Leure, Harfleur, Touques, Ouistreham (the Caen avant-
port), Barfleur, Cherbourg and Régneville, amongst others. The cause for 
the dispute was a series of violent plunderings (“rapinis violenciis mul-
tis et aliis similibus altercationibus”) in Gascony between Bayonnais and 
Norman shipmasters and mariners. Jean de Grailly therefore wrote to ask 
the Bayonnais to acknowledge the proposed agreement. He furthermore 
informed them that he would have the Bayonnais and Norman mariners 
swear on the Bible in the presence of the constable of Bordeaux before 
they left the port that “they will neither commit nor incite guerra and 
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discord or cause or aide in plunder, violence, killings, woundings or do 
any other damage or cause it to be done at sea as well as on land and with 
or without arms”.63
Those who swore to this would be acquitted of their past actions, thus 
obtaining amnesty. Any future trespassers were to be prosecuted by the 
constable, his lieutenant or any other bailifff or offfĳicer of justice accord-
ing to the agreement. If a person evaded punishment, he was not to be 
admitted to either English- or French-controlled ports. Furthermore, no 
shipmaster was to receive or have any trespasser of the peace on his ship 
if he had been denounced by a bailifff or justice until he had been pun-
ished, either by fĳine or corporally.
The constable or another offfĳicer would write down the names of 
those who took the oath, and anyone who, after the publication of this 
settlement in the towns and ports, acted against its articles by commit-
ting rapine or damage to any of the mariners of the opposing party were 
to be subject to forfeiture or corporal punishment in proportion to the 
crime, to be carried out by the constable or the bailifffs (English as well as 
French). The punishments were the following; for murder the trespasser 
was to sufffer capital punishment; for mutilating wounds the trespasser 
was to lose the hand; for wounding with no mutilation of the body and 
for rough concussion with no wounds, the trespasser was to pay 50 s.t. to 
the injured and 100 s.t. to the lord or justice in whose land the deed was 
done. For a strike with no wounds, the trespasser was to pay 50 s.t. to the 
injured and 60 s.t. to the bailifff or local justice. For rapine and plunder, 
the trespasser was to sufffer capital punishment. Any master or mariner 
who acted against the agreement by defending and making sure that the 
trespasser could not be apprehended, was to sufffer the same punishment 
as the trespasser.
Concerning arrests called marches (“ex arrestacionibus que vocantur 
marches”), if conflict should arise again, the mariners and masters were 
prohibited from having recourse to this means of reparation in the case 
where the principal debtor or his fĳidejussor could appear and raise the 
claim. The constables and justices in Bayonne, Bordeaux and Libourne, 
as well as in the Norman ports, promised to uphold this, and now Grailly 
asked the government of Bayonne to observe it as well. This agreement 
63 “in mare vel in terra cum armis vel sine armis, non facient nec movebunt guerram 
rixam vel contentionem nec rapinam, violentiam, occisionem vulnera vel alia dampna 
facient nec fĳieri procurabunt.” TNA C 47/32/22/2.
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was made public by Grailly in the duchy and by the king of France in 
La Rochelle and in his ports. The settlement was made at All Saints in 
1282, and agreed by the French and by Bayonne on 12 January (tertio nono) 
1282 (that is, 1283 in our time reckoning) with seals. After the winter par-
liament of 1282, Edward I ratifĳied it on 29 July 1283.64 We must assume, 
however, that even before All Saints 1282, a truce had been in efffect for 
some time.
Several interesting things are mentioned in this agreement. First of all, 
the mentioning of Bordeaux as the locus of the oath-taking reveals that 
the core of the maritime war must have revolved around the wine export 
from Bordeaux. Furthermore, the punishments mentioned in the docu-
ment follow the classic lex talionis model as seen above. However, it is 
worth noting that the royal offfĳicers are noted as the sole executors of pun-
ishments in these cases, contrary to the Bayonne-Cinque Ports agreement.
1316–1318
In 1316, the chronicler Gefffroi de Paris noted that famine (the Great 
Famine of 1315–17) made the Flemings attack the Bayonnais and English 
at sea and plunder them of wine and grain, and that the English and the 
French kings made common cause against the Flemings. How this related 
to a reopening of the Bayonne-Normandy conflict is unclear, but several 
possibilities present themselves. One possibility is that the Bayonnais mis-
takenly took Normans for Flemings and plundered them, thus leading the 
Normans to retaliate. Another possibility is that the famine and the raised 
prices for foodstufffs made piracy more attractive, and that the Bayonnais 
or the Normans attacked the others’ shipping to obtain produce to sell 
at inflated prices—perhaps with the clandestine support of the kings as 
the situation progressively got more and more desperate. However, the 
Bayonnais mariners had an installation in Flanders, and they might also 
have resorted to piracy, perhaps under Flemish colours, to supply Flan-
ders and make a profĳit from the crisis. Finally, the naval operations by the 
French admiral, Berenger Blanc, to enforce an embargo on Flanders may 
also have touched Bayonnais trade and have led them to retaliations on 
French mariners.65
64 TNA C 47/32/22/2.
65 Gefffroi de Paris, p. 163, ll. 7593–7615 and 7635–7644, and p. 166, ll. 7900–7918. See 
Jordan, William C., The Great Famine (Princeton, 1996), pp. 173–175, for the stimulating 
efffect the famine had in general on piracy.
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In any case, the famine of the years 1315–17 was probably part of the 
reason for the reopening of the conflict between the Bayonnais and the 
Normans, even though it seems as if the old rancour quickly resurged and 
presented a risk of an escalation like in the 1290s. Therefore, Edward II 
and the French king Philippe V quickly set procedures of settlement in 
motion. Apart from the famine, these kings had further impetus to stop 
this conflict, since the English war efffort against the Scots was becoming 
more and more desperate after the defeat at Bannockburn in 1314, and the 
French had to deal with regional uprisings because of taxes for the wars 
with the Flemings.
On 20 October 1316, Edward wrote to Philippe V’s lieutenants to inform 
them that he had agreed to commence measures to stop the conflict, and 
he asked that Bayonnais were allowed to present cases in French courts 
if they wanted to, and that he would likewise allow French subjects to 
present cases in English courts.66 In March 1317, Edward wrote to Gil-
bert Pecche, seneschal of Gascony, to appoint him to negotiate with the 
French on behalf of the Bayonnais and to protect them and their interests, 
all the while striving to obtain the best settlement for the dispute.67 Thus, 
Edward had taken control of the negotiations to protect the Bayonnais 
against possible French royal schemes.
The negotiations progressed slowly, and on 24 May 1317, Edward wrote 
to Philippe, asking him to appoint negotiators amongst the Normans as 
Edward had done with the Bayonnais, to fĳind a time and place for a set-
tlement, to enforce a prohibition of further Norman hostilities and to stop 
judicial actions against English subjects.68 Two days later, Edward asked 
the Bayonnais to enforce a prohibition of harassment of the Normans and 
to uphold the peace. However, this had limited success.69
On 28 January 1318, Edward wrote to the Bayonnais, the government 
as well as the citizens, to order them to make a truce with the Normans 
that would end their disputes conducted without the king’s consent, a 
truce which was to last for fĳifty years or more. Any infractions of the truce 
would be punished according to the penalties decided by the Bayonnais 
and the Normans. Edward further instructed the Bayonnais to observe 
the truce and to punish transgressors. However, an order was given to 
the Bayonnais mariners residing in the Zwin, Flanders, that any infraction 
66 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 299.
67 RG, IV, no. 1779, p. 519 and no. 1784, p. 520.
68 Foedera 1307–1327, p. 330.
69 RG, IV, no. 1804, p. 525 and no. 1806, p. 526.
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of the truce would be punished by total forfeiture, (“sub forisfacturâ 
omnium”), that is, life and goods. Edward ended the letter by informing 
them that he had asked Philippe to give similar orders to the Normans.70 
On 8 April, Edward wrote to the seneschal of Gascony, Amanieu de Fous-
sat (Fossato), Master Thomas de la Grave and the mayor of Bayonne to 
negotiate the specifĳics of the truce of fĳifty years and to punish transgres-
sors as they deemed fĳit (“sub poenis & conditionibus, modisque & viis 
aliis, quibus juxta discretiones vestras expedire videbitur”). Finally, on 
20 November 1318, Edward announced a formal declaration of the fĳifty 
years’ truce to end of the discordiis guerrinis between the Bayonnais and 
the Normans. It was furthermore decided that no inquiries over damages 
done before the truce should be undertaken and that none would be trou-
bled or would be aggravated from now on—in efffect, amnesty. The same 
day, Edward wrote to all his Gascon offfĳicers that they were neither to 
hinder the Bayonnais any more nor to arrest their goods, showing that this 
was the measure that Edward had applied to make the Bayonnais come to 
terms.71 In other words, Edward had put force behind his words.
To my knowledge, there is only one case which gives further details of 
this maritime war. In a petition to Edward from 1318, Domenjon de France 
and his brother, Andrieu, informed Edward that their ship, Seint-Johan 
de Bayone had loaded merchandise in Libourne to be taken to Leure in 
Normandy, probably in 1315. However, when the ship approached Leure, 
it was attacked—in a time of peace—by four Norman ships offf the port. 
The Normans killed the crew including their brother, Guillemot, and three 
other kinsmen Michel, Berthelot and Domenjon de Ville (that is, de Viele), 
and carried offf their goods and merchandise to the value of 1,700 marks 
sterling. Afterwards, war broke out between the Bayonnais and the Nor-
mans, and Norman envoys came to negotiate in Bayonne. The brothers 
presented their case to the Normans and demanded restitution for their 
goods and their dead relatives, but peace was concluded between the Ba -
yonnais and the Normans on the basis that all damages caused were to be 
pardoned. The de France brothers’ losses, which were sufffered in a time of 
peace, were therefore forgotten to the chagrin of the brothers. Now that 
a truce had been agreed between the kings, the brothers asked Edward 
70 Foedera 1307–1327, pp. 355–356.
71  Foedera 1307–1327, p. 376. For these procedures see also TNA C 61/32/29.
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to order the mayor and jurati of Bayonne to arrange for compensation 
for them.72
However, Domenjon had actually already received at least partial resti-
tution. In 1317, Edward wrote to the seneschal of Gascony that he desired 
that Domenjon (Dominicus) de France, citizen and merchant of Bayonne, 
was given a Norman ship taken by the Bayonnais for a certain price (a sort 
of security it later turned out). This ship had been repaired by Domenjon 
to great expense. In case of peace between Bayonne and the Normans, 
and if restitution for the ship was to be made, Domenjon was to have his 
security back.73 In a letter from Edward II to the seneschal of Gascony 
dated to 7 June 1318, we learn that this ship was given to Domenjon and 
was to be kept by him until he had received restitution, provided that he 
paid a security to the seneschal of Gascony which would not be paid back 
to the brothers until the ship was returned. By the time of the writing, 
the ship was still in their possession. The same day, Edward also wrote 
to the mayor and jurati of Bayonne to inform them that the de France 
brothers’ losses had not been included in the Bayonne-Normandy truce 
and that they had not received restitution. Therefore, Edward had ordered 
the mayor and jurati to assert whether the transgression took place as 
claimed and to cause restitution to the brothers all the while upholding 
the truce. In other words, the restitution was to be paid by Bayonne, not 
the Normans.74 However, whether the brothers actually received restitu-
tion is unknown.
This case is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it tells us how indi-
vidual cases might be treated in the course of general negotiations. It fur-
thermore says something about the reprisal and restitution system, since 
the brothers efffectively were given an arrested Norman ship to use until 
a formal restitution had been made. Finally, the account of the Norman 
pirate attack may simply have been a lie invented by the brothers, per-
haps to cover up a disastrous shipwreck or failed piracies of their own. 
The fact that they were left out of the truce lends some credence to this, 
since they and their associates were from powerful Bayonnais families. 
However, the truce stipulated a collective amnesty which counted for all 
implicated, and the provision that the local government should examine 
the case itself was not a guarantee for success for the brothers. While the 
72 TNA SC 8/193/9620.
73 RG, IV, no. 1783, p. 520.
74 TNA C 61/32/29.
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Bayonnais government might be inclined to help their citizens, whatever 
help was accorded was to be paid by the town itself, and 1,700 marks 
sterling was a considerable sum. What in the end makes me believe the 
general course of events described by the brothers is the killing of several 
named merchants from an influential Bayonnais family, even though it 
is quite possible that the Bayonnais were engaged in piracy themselves. 
Thus, they might have caused the Norman attack by their own actions.
Piracy and the War of Saint-Sardos
The truce did not hold for long, but it was not until the winter of 1323–24 
that a breach was severe enough for the royal authorities to act upon it.
At the beginning of January 1324, the seneschal of Gascony, Ralph Bas-
set, informed the French king Charles IV’s envoys that (apart from the 
problems concerning the bastide of Saint-Sardos) a conflict between the 
Normans and the Bayonnais had erupted because of Norman aggressions. 
He asserted that the Normans had launched attacks on the Bayonnais, and 
presumably in 1323 at Tonnay Charante they plundered several Ba yonnais 
ships, and Bayonnais mariners were killed despite the goods and ships 
being under the French kings’ protection, presumably signalled by 
panonceaux.75 Basset asserted that the Norman aggressions grew daily, 
and at Loyra (probably Leure) thirty-three Bayonnais mariners had been 
imprisoned despite their innocence, and at the same place mariners had 
been killed, ships burned and goods plundered. Nonetheless, the Ba-
yonnais had refrained from retaliation due to the truce. However, Basset 
doubted that the Bayonnais would stand for this much longer, as some 
people were beginning to consider the truce breached. He therefore urged 
Charles IV to take action to stop the Norman depredations.76
Basset’s letter was a reply to a French summons from 23 December, in 
which Charles informed the seneschals of Poitou and Saintonge and two 
sergeants (servientibus Regis) that the Bayonnais were cited to appear at 
Saintes, since they had breached the truce by attacks on Norman mari-
ners. The fĳine for this breach was £50,000 sterling, almost two-thirds of the 
English king’s income in the 1290s during the Gascon War. Thus, Charles 
instructed the seneschals and sergeants to inquire into the details of the 
75 The panonceaux were batons embellished with fleur-de-lis signalling the French 
king’s safeguard of, amongst other things, castles, houses and ships. Cheyette, “The royal 
safeguard,” pp. 645–649, Kaeuper, War, pp. 241–242.
76 Saint-Sardos, no. 9, pp. 7–10.
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Norman allegations and to assess, judge and punish in a terrifying manner 
the transgressors, in order to arrest their goods and uphold the king’s laws. 
Furthermore, they were to arrest the goods of suspects. On 12 January 1324, 
Charles additionally informed the offfĳicers that the Bayonnais mayor and 
certain shipmasters and mariners had been adjourned to appear in court 
in Saintes on 7 February to hear charges against them. This citation was to 
be announced publicly in Bayonne so that no one could claim ignorance. 
Likewise, the Normans were also to be adjourned in Saintes. Charles had 
furthermore prohibited both parties from continuing their struggle on 
pain of body and goods. This citation was announced publicly in Bayonne 
on 14 January 1324, but the Bayonnais replied that they had no intention 
of going to trial in Saintes, since they only recognised the English king as 
their overlord. In addition, they claimed that the citation was a violation 
of the customs of Bayonne and that the French king had no jurisdiction 
in Gascony.77 On 23 January, Basset informed Edward of the Bayonnais’ 
refusal and urged him to pursue an amicable solution with representatives 
of both kings (rather than judgement solely by French offfĳicers, as the case 
had been in 1310 in Périgueux).78 On 1 February, Edward wrote to Ralph 
Basset and Adam Lymbergh, constable of Bordeaux, to ask them to inter-
cede in the conflict between the Bayonnais and the Normans and try to 
negotiate a solution that would maintain the peace,79 but apparently with 
little luck. In August 1324, French forces invaded Gascony and defeated 
the English forces there. In October 1324, Edward’s proctor in Gascony 
wrote to him to remind him of the Gascon liberties in the negotiations 
with the French and to protect them, since the French had claimed the 
right to judge the Bayonnais based on their assertion of the French king’s 
sovereignty over land and sea, that is, the territory of the French kingdom 
and the seas bordering it.80
These issues were never resolved, since Edward was facing rebellion at 
home which ended with his abdication on 24 January 1327. In February, a 
truce with France was entered into, and by September 1327 an unfavour-
able peace for the English was agreed. Of special interest for the subject 
of the maritime conflict was that Edward III had to pay the French 50,000 
77 Saint-Sardos, no. 13, pp. 12–15.
78 Saint-Sardos, no. 14, pp. 15–17.
79 Saint-Sardos, no. 17, p. 18.
80 Saint-Sardos, no. 68, pp. 84–88.
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marks sterling as indemnity for the damages during the war, even though 
amnesty was provided for the Anglo-Gascons indicted.81
At the beginning of the 1330s,82 Edward III wrote to Philippe VI in 
connection with their plans for crusade and asked him to forbid reprisals, 
as he was bound to according to the Anglo-French agreements. The let-
ter contained several references to reprisals and the problems that they 
posed. Firstly, Edward wanted Philippe to forbid the use of reprisals by 
the marcher lords and their subjects, as agreed at Amiens in 1320, since 
these entailed the punishment of innocent persons, while the malefactors 
remained unpunished. Secondly, Edward wanted all criminal processes 
commenced during the reign of their predecessors to be changed into civil 
processes, and all corporal and monetary punishments to be changed into 
amicable processes of reciprocal restitution. Thirdly, Edward requested 
that Philippe issue safe conduct to all English offfĳicials and subjects who 
were to pursue cases in French courts.
Philippe presumably replied that his offfĳicers had sufffĳicient “ mandement 
et defense a surseer” in all these cases.83 How Philippe interpreted this is 
difffĳicult to say, but in 1331, an order from the French king to the provost 
of La Rochelle stated that according to the custom of the sea used by the 
English and the French, the royal offfĳicers of the ports in case of English 
piracy against French (or vice versa) were to conduct arrests of the goods 
of the fellow citizens of the pirates (les robbours et maufesours), in cases 
where the pirates could not be apprehended. The dorse of the letter inter-
estingly stated that this was contrary to the English declaration of superi-
ority over the English seas.84 Thus, Edward III continued his father’s and 
grandfather’s policies of changing corporal punishment and reprisals into 
monetary punishment and amicable solutions. The French do not seem 
to have been completely reluctant to follow this model. At least the claim 
in 1324 of £50,000 sterling as a fĳine indicates a movement towards purely 
economic punishments.
81 Vale, Origins, p. 248. For some of the conditions of the peace, see Foedera 1327–1344, 
pp. 700–701.
82 Probably in 1331 in connection with Edward III’s homage to Philippe VI. Sumption, 
Trial by Battle, p. 116.
83 EMDP, I, 388.
84 Chaplais, “Reglement des conflits,” pp. 297–298.
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Lex Talionis and the English Reform of Punishment
There was thus a clear development in English maritime peace treaties 
from a lex talionis model of punishment for transgressors of the peace 
to a model of punishment based on fĳines and incarceration. Further-
more, there was a development from holding the individual malefactors 
accountable to the municipal governments being held responsible and 
ultimately accountable for the acts of their citizens. These initiatives may 
also have been present in France but in a more moderate version.
In the following I shall briefly discuss the nature and shortcomings of 
the lex talionis model. Then I will compare it with the one of fĳines and 
municipal responsibility, which I will henceforth call the “the English 
model”.
In many ways, the lex talionis model resembled the criminal law statutes 
used on land in regard to violent and rapacious crimes. What made these 
maritime punishments somewhat diffferent was the inclusion of regula-
tions on debt recovery and the obligation of the fellows of the transgressor 
to give him up for punishment and to collaborate with the other party. 
In principle, this model sent the message that under no circumstances 
would the authorities tolerate such violent and self-serving behaviour. 
However, since the governments were not actually able to enforce the 
punishments declared in the treaties, and since the local offfĳicers were 
often liable to side with one group of mariners against another, these dra-
conic punishments actually resembled a claim to the potential power of 
the royal judicial prerogative more than an actual order. Furthermore, in 
relation to actually making conflicts stop, the severe punishments seem 
to have been counter-productive. In efffect, the lex talionis model could 
exacerbate the conflict by demanding that crews act against their fellows. 
If the crew found that a ruling was unfair and that they were subject to 
an injustice, instead of helping the authorities in “enemy territory”, they 
might instead decide to defy these authorities by resistance and evasion, 
thereby exacerbating the conflict instead of quelling it. Indeed, it is hard 
to imagine that the crews would actively give up a fellow to authorities 
whom they might not trust or who they felt had treated them wrongly. 
Even if they escaped or were forced to collaborate, upon return to their 
homeport, the mariners might spread the story of the injustices sufffered 
in the foreign ports leading to retaliations against mariners of these ports. 
Thus, the lex talionis model could actually exacerbate the disputes and 
wars rather than extinguish them. Indeed, this model may have played an 
important part in the mariners’ wars, since the assumption of an unjust 
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accusation and execution of punishment would—instead of curbing and 
discouraging future offfences—make previously unaligned compatriots 
rally and take collective offfensive action because of a perceived threat 
to (and perhaps also an insult to the honour of) their maritime commu-
nity. In addition, the mariners’ associations would most probably invoke 
obligations of mutual support in the face of danger. Thus, the lex talionis 
could in fact be a stimulus to maritime war.
By using the English model and ultimately holding the local govern-
ment responsible for the crimes of their citizens, and by using non-lethal 
means of punishment, in terms of pacifĳication of maritime wars this 
model represented progress. It is not surprising that it was the English 
authorities who came up with this solution. Firstly, England, as opposed 
to Continental Europe since the Norman invasion in 1066, had prohibited 
all wars but the king’s, and she had a tradition of a royal justice system 
applicable throughout the realm rather than a local, custom-based one 
for each fĳief or region. Secondly, as an island England was much more 
dependent on sea-borne trade and supplies than the Continental king-
doms. Consequently, England was much more touched by and embroiled 
in maritime wars and piracies than any other kingdom in northwestern 
Europe. It is therefore no surprise that the English had more experience 
in handling maritime conflicts and more interest in permanent solutions 
than any other kingdom in these waters. However, the English model was 
the product of pragmatic, not idealistic, considerations, since English jus-
tice was not as such more reluctant to employ corporal and death penal-
ties than the Continental justice system. It was simply the product of a 
realisation that the claim to harsh penalties for transgressors of maritime 
peace was, in the end, more an embarrassment to the royal government 
than a peacemaking instrument, since the kings repeatedly demonstrated 
that they would not in practice enforce the draconic tenets of the treaties.
The French kings’ reactions were more ambiguous. On the one hand, 
they seem to have realised that the English model was a sensible one and 
to a certain extent seem to have applied it. On the other hand, after the 
Gascon War, the French kings, and particularly Philippe le Bel, saw the 
potential in having minor conflicts with the English which could be used 
to justify further encroachments on Gascony.
In regard to Castile, the kinship between the kings of England and Cas-
tile may have given the Castilian governments more impetus to uphold 
the peace, but the royal power in the fĳirst decades of the fourteenth cen-
tury was lacking. This meant that they could not in practice carry out 
what they had pledged in the treaties.
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It seems as if the English approach in the period from 1280 to 1330 was 
to transform the lex talionis into pecuniary punishment and incarceration, 
probably to minimise future rancour and lust for revenge, in a sense to 
better facilitate the amnesty and amnesia required for a successful appli-
cation of peace. I suspect that the minimising of bloodshed could have 
had a diminishing efffect on the will to fĳight. This seems probable to me 
in theory at least, but the results and the sequence of negotiations, truces 
and peace agreements shows that it was by no means a guarantee.
Another reason for applying the English model was that it dismantled 
the recourse to private reprisal and retaliation. While both the lex talionis 
and the English model were based on the principle of collective liability, 
the English model extended the responsibility to the municipality as well 
as to individuals. By abstaining from corporal punishment in the treaties 
and trying to reduce the recourse to reprisals, the English model in efffect 
made private actions of reprisal and retaliation less acceptable, since the 
municipal government would ultimately be responsible. Thus, it is quite 
likely that the reforms of the Bayonnais Societas Navium were at least in 
part founded on the English change in peace procedures.
However, these treaties and their aftermath show how fragile these 
attempts really were and how futile it was to try to secure an enduring 
peace amongst mariners. This could thus be construed as a complete 
failure to obtain any sort of durable peace. On the other hand, as Keen 
has shown in his studies of the laws of war, no agreement had any real 
ambition of actually stopping a conflict for good.85 Rather, disputes and 
minor trespasses were to be expected and were a constant which could 
be continually negotiated and limited by the reprisal system of arrest and 
reprisal. What the treaties aimed at was therefore not the total cessation of 
hostilities, but rather the quelling of disputes before they developed into 
large-scale retaliation. An interesting comparison to this is Vale’s studies 
of the bellicose Gascons. He notes about the problems of the English and 
the French kings in making peace amongst the Gascons that:
A society inured to private war and frontier raids was unlikely to respond 
with alacrity to the imposition of ‘perpetual peace’ because the nobility had 
come to regard the droit de guerre and its practical expression not only as 
their inalienable right but as a way of life. It was a ready source of profĳits, 
and land lying on the borders between lordships, like those in the Scots 
marches, could supply lucrative plunder, booty and ransoms.86
85 Keen, Laws of War, pp. 207–217.
86 Vale, Origins, p. 126.
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This also seems to have been applicable to the English and the French 
mariners. Whether one model of settlement or the other was used, the 
governments had to contend with people living in an ungovernable mari-
time world and with the will to retaliate if they felt slighted. Thus, despite 
all the effforts of the governments, it was just as hard to make the mariners 
abstain from guerra as it was with the nobles on land. In fact, while the 
English model from a government perspective was more realistic and efffĳi-
cient, to the mariners and especially their communities it was repulsive 
and an attempt to diminish their independence. But even if the kings did 
not achieve lasting peace with either model, the peace served another pur-
pose, as pointed out by Kaeuper and Gauvard, namely to strengthen the 
growth and power of the royal government over the realm.87 By increas-
ingly getting involved in the negotiations of peace between the ports of 
the diffferent kingdoms, offfĳicially to protect the ports from being unjustly 
treated by the opponents’ monarch, it had strengthened the royal power 
over the ports.
87 Kaueper, War, p. 189.

CHAPTER EIGHT
CRIME AND LACK OF PUNISHMENT?
The royal authorities were at odds with what to do with pirates. They were 
granted general pardons in the peace treaties, reserving, however, in some 
cases harsh punishment for especially infamous pirates. Nevertheless, it 
would seem that in cases of piracy the usual punishment was not corporal 
but pecuniary, despite the draconian stipulations in the peace treaties as 
well as the immediate orders of the kings. This was the result of diplo-
macy, but how did the royal governments react to piracy in general?
This confusing situation led Marsden to conclude that: “Many of 
these ‘piracy’ cases were of a civil or prize rather than a criminal char-
acter; restitution of his ship and cargo was the plaintifff’s object, and not 
punishment of the ‘pirate’.”1 But why was this so? After all, the Middle 
Ages was not a period where the rulers were “soft on crime”. At fĳirst sight, 
it is incomprehensible that an action which involved (premeditated) rob-
bery and killing could be reduced to a demand for the restitution of one’s 
property.
This is of course partially because of the nature of the Law Merchant, 
with its focus on civil and fĳinancial solutions, but this only answers part 
of the question. In order to understand this treatment of piracy properly, 
we have to analyse the nature of the law and its enforcement in the 
 Middle Ages.
Violence and Killing
In the following, I shall rely on French research on violence and robbery 
in the Middle Ages. While these studies focus on the fourteenth and fĳif-
teenth centuries, thus to a certain extent on periods later than the period 
I study, I have made an efffort to use only research results which I feel 
confĳident are applicable for earlier periods of the Middle Ages and for 
England as well as France. While England had a judicial system that dif-
fered in some regards from the Continental system, the space where the 
1 Marsden, “Vice-Admirals of the Coast,” p. 469.
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mariners  operated was a march or a judicial no-man’s land. Consequently, 
they acted in maritime conflicts like their Continental colleagues and 
were part of a Continental conflict culture where private violence was 
permitted (under certain circumstances), rather than part of an English 
one where private violence and war were prohibited.
In the article “Violence licite et violence illicite”, Gauvard observes that 
by default, violence should always be perceived rather as a norm than 
an act.2 What Gauvard stresses here is that what constitutes violence (an 
illicit physical aggression), and what constitutes force (a licit physical 
aggression), is dependent on society’s view of what constitutes the right 
and wrong use of force. Thus, the perception of the act of one person 
killing another is dependent on the motives for the killing. If the person 
committed the killing in order to take the money of the other, the norm 
in medieval society was that this was a crime and accordingly should be 
punished severely. However, if the person could claim that the killing was 
an act of retaliation for an insult to his honour or some other form of self-
defence, medieval society looked favourably upon the act and the killer 
might get offf the charge by paying a fĳine or even be acquitted of the act. 
Therefore, it is the norms of society that defĳine what constituted illicit 
violence and what constituted the licit application of force, not the act. In 
other words, aggressive practices could be sanctioned if the motives were 
in accordance with the norms for the correct use of physical aggression.
A central issue in Gauvard’s research is the status of killing. She dis-
tinguishes between “murder” and “homicide”. Murder was committed at 
night and by ambush, often to obtain money. Homicide, however, was 
a beau fait governed by the principle of vengeance, a norm generally 
accepted in society.3 The opposition expressed here is the one between 
murder committed under occult circumstances (for example, at night and 
premeditated) for money, and homicide which was an act of just revenge 
(“une violence licite fondée sur l’amour”). However, the enmity and the 
cause for the homicide had to be known to all in advance, and it entailed 
a certain degree of publicity.4 Thus, murder was illicit and condemned; 
homicide was permissible or at least remissible in return for a fĳine. In 
regard to piracy where the victim (and his countrymen) felt that he had 
been subject to a violent crime, the pirate (and his countrymen) might 
2 Gauvard, “Violence licite,” p. 365.
3 Gauvard, “Violence licite,” pp. 378–379.
4 Gauvard, “Violence licite,” p. 380.
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rather feel that he had carried out an act of justifĳied reprisal or vengeance. 
This at least seems to have been the case with the Normans’ retaliations 
in 1292–93.
This clear judicial division between murder and homicide was espe-
cially due to the rise of royal jurisdiction in the twelfth century over local 
customary law. In criminal law, there was a movement from a lex talionis 
logic to Roman Law where the punishment imposed on a criminal was 
to set an example and not to be a response in kind.5 In efffect, what 
transpired was that capital punishment was primarily applied to violent 
robbers like highwaymen, more than to killers like avengers.
The efffect of the royal judicial initiatives was that the punishment and 
condemnation of predatory violence and killing became the resort of 
royal power. In contrast, emotionally and/or socially motivated violence 
and killing occupied a more ambiguous position. This division was the 
reflection of a society lacking police forces with universally recognised 
judicial powers and a single, uncontested government with a monopoly 
on the exercise of legitimate violence. Instead, honour, that is, the per-
sonal integrity, standing and reputation of an individual as well as a family 
or an association, and the protection of this honour were the concern of 
the aggrieved. It called for retaliation for its protection. Thus, homicide 
was not the worst crime that one could commit, since it was the necessary 
reaction to defamation. It was therefore an act of defence of one’s honour 
rather than a crime per se.6
In relation to this, the role of royal government was less to exact justice 
and more to re-establish order. In a society where honour and reputa-
tion were more valuable than a human life, the task of the government 
was therefore not to impose a diffferent order but rather to protect the 
values of honour on which society in toto rested. Indeed, while the guerra 
(the more organised and collective version of the individual act of ven-
geance) was a menace to public order, the violence that it engendered 
was founded on a system of values which justifĳied their existence and 
which took precedence over the royal ideal of peace. The French kings 
even acknowledged this right, for the nobles had to be shown a certain 
amount of respect, since they supplied the expertise and bulk force for the 
king’s wars. The French kings accordingly only tried to limit and regulate 
5 See also Cheyette, Frederic L., “Suum cuique tribuere,” French Historical Studies, 6: 3 
(1970), 296–299.
6 Gauvard, “Violence licite,” p. 275.
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the private war but not to prohibit it completely, since it was a fundamen-
tal feature of the exercise of law and order in the country.7
Thus, in the thirteenth century, while killing in principle was a capi-
tal offfence, fĳines and remission acquired an important role in royal juris-
diction. In a society governed by vengeance and honour, the goal of the 
judicial authorities and indeed the royal government was to make the 
punishment acceptable to both parties in a conflict, re-establish order and 
stop the vicious circle of retaliations. This is in efffect the same principle 
that we fĳind in the peace treaties and the (perceived) requirements for 
their successful application. Consequently, the goal of the justice system 
was rather to assure a successful settlement and public order than to con-
demn violence.8
This is not to say, however, that killings were always pardoned by the 
authorities. In theory, murder and homicide were both capital crimes and 
should be punished as such. Nevertheless, homicide often evaded this 
strict penalty, since the public perceived it as just retaliation (a beau fait) 
and a just response to an insult and injury to one’s honour and reputa-
tion. Failure to address this would result in loss of honour and respect 
in society. Gauvard gives the example of the rape of a girl. If this act was 
not avenged in public by her family, the girl would be considered a pros-
titute or at the very least have lost her value as an attractive object of 
 marriage.9
This understanding of justice and violence is also very visible in the 
way in which judges, lawyers and courts handled these cases. These 
quite learned jurists were, despite their familiarity with the legal clas-
sics, extremely careful with their words. Indeed, while the offfĳicers of the 
king as well as the accusers’ lawyers had an obvious interest in having 
the accused condemned, they nonetheless used incriminating discourse 
quite sparingly. For instance, the term scelus, known from Roman Law 
and used especially in the Digest, does not appear in the classifĳications 
used by the practitioners of law in the Parlement. Therefore, it seems that 
criminal cases were treated with extreme caution in regard to the words 
used for describing the actions of the accused.10 Thus, to pronounce the 
word “crime” in court was a taboo, for once it had been uttered, it was 
 7 Gauvard, “Violence licite,” p. 276., Firnhaber-Baker, “Seigneurial War,” p. 60.
 8 Gauvard, “Violence licite,” pp. 267–268.
 9 Gauvard, Claude, “Nommer les crimes et les peines,” in C. Gauvard, Violence et ordre 
public au Moyen Age (Paris, 2005), pp. 43–44.
10 Gauvard, “Nommer,” p. 40.
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extremely difffĳicult to withdraw or pardon the act—even by royal inter-
cession. Since the objective of the courts was the establishment of a set-
tlement and order, the lawyers were reluctant in the extreme (even the 
accusers) to push for a conclusion that, instead of settling the conflict, 
exacerbated it. Hence, the subtlety of the words used in trials, for while 
accuser and defendant obviously tried to achieve the best result for their 
client, the consideration for the establishment of order was the primary 
concern. This relegated individual justice to a secondary position.11 The 
procedure was in no small part due to the fear that medieval legal think-
ers had of the trial as a means of dispute settlement. In the writings of the 
learned jurists, the trial was perceived as a kind of weapon in the hands 
of a malignant accuser whose purpose was not to establish peace but to 
strike a blow against his adversary. Consequently, the trial as such was 
not a peacemaking instrument, but an extension of the means of revenge.12 
The lawyers therefore had to control the process and seek an amiable 
solution to obtain peace rather than seeking a victory for their client.
In principle, the judges and advocates were pledged and had as their 
offfĳicial goal to establish the truth in all cases, yet in practice their actions 
indicate that they were more concerned with the re-establishment of 
peace than the punishment of criminals. In the end, these conditions 
made the trials more into a debate than a proceeding for the establish-
ment of truth and the carrying out of justice. Thus, the negotiation of the 
punishment contributed to the resolution of the conflict, and it tended to 
make the trial into a champ de joutes oratoires where the honour of the 
aggrieved party was repaired and the potential vicious circle of vengeance 
was ended. However, Gauvard writes that while the quest for the truth 
was secondary to the necessity of assuring peace, sometimes severe pun-
ishments were meted out. This was done to set an example, and to show 
the potential severity of punishments and to justify the compromises that 
made up the major part of suits presented in court.13
In the end, what often led to one criminal walking free and another 
being condemned was the reputation, honour and status of the indi-
vidual rather than the act itself. Indeed, it was the personal reputation 
and motive that mattered, not the act. Therefore, the judicial system was 
quite reluctant to inflict harsh punishments on respectable and “peaceful” 
11  Gauvard, “Nommer,” p. 41.
12 Mausen, Yves, “ ‘Pugio malignitatis’ violence du procès et prudence de la proce-
dure,” in F. Foronda et al., eds Violences souveraines au Moyen Âge (Paris, 2010), p. 10.
13 Gauvard, “Nommer,” pp. 44–45.
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 citizens, whereas vagabonds and other inherently suspect persons were 
often submitted to the full rigour of the law. In this view, society consisted 
of two categories of people: those susceptible to be condemned and pun-
ished harshly, and the respectable citizens whose actions were the con-
sequence of unfortunate circumstances. The purpose of the lawyers was 
thus to make their client move from one category to the other, either to 
obtain a conviction or an acquittal. In this judicial construction from the 
speech in defence to the sentencing, the words used were of paramount 
importance. They were not destined to defĳine a crime as much as they 
defĳined a state, and their purpose was to establish a watertight human 
stereotype.14 Gauvard’s division between murder and homicide and the 
way in which these acts were treated in court resembles the sociologist 
Charles Tilly’s concept of a “continuum of violence”. He argued that acts 
of violence cannot be seen in a binary manner as violence (illicit) contra 
force (licit), but rather as a sliding transition between two. Here the legiti-
macy of acts of violence is dependent on who did them and their context.15 
Thus, in order to obtain a conviction or an acquittal, the lawyer had to 
move a person from one category to another. The same concerns seem to 
have been present in the dealings with bellicose mariners, where most, 
as we have seen, were acquitted not only because of the impossibility of 
punishing all pirates, but also because most had normally honourable 
occupations as merchants and mariners and a respectable reputation.
Robbery and Theft
The problem with the courts and the words used there also exists when 
we are dealing with the other fundamental element of piracy: robbery. 
14 “Dans cette construction qui se poursuit de la plaidoirie à la sentence, les mots sont 
essentiels: moins destinés à défĳinir le crime qu’à défĳinir un état, ils usent de leur force pour 
donner peu à peu corps à un stéréotype humain aux barrières infranchissables.” Gauvard, 
“Nommer,” p. 46.
15 Tilly, Charles, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 27–28, “For the 
purposes of explaining violent interactions, however, the distinction between (legitimate) 
force and (illegitimate) violence face three insuperable objects. Firstly, the precise bound-
ary of legitimate force remains a matter of fĳierce dispute in all political systems. . . . Sec-
ond, in practical experience a long continuum runs from (1) duly licensed governmental 
actions whose propriety almost everyone accepts through (2) derelictions by governmen-
tal agents to (3) damage wrought with secret support or encouragement of some segment 
of some government.” While Tilly focuses on governmental agents here and analyses use 
of violence in a nineteenth-twentieth century context, the principle is equally applicable 
to medieval society.
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Contrary to killing, proven theft with no framework of war or reprisal 
of lost goods was deeply reprehensible. From the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, the communal legal documents ranged theft in the category 
of magna forefacta,16 and, as with murder, it was often associated with 
obscure and nocturnal activities.
In the Middle Ages, the distinction between whether a theft had been 
committed with or without the use of violence was often blurred. How-
ever, in the thirteenth century, a distinction appeared between theft and 
robbery and between thieves and brigands (violent criminals). This dis-
tinction was dependent on whether or not violence was used in the act. 
In the Second Council of Lyon 1274, robbery was defĳined thus: “By the 
word ‘robbed’ we wish to be understood in this case a criminal accusation 
whereby someone declares that he has been stripped by violence of all 
his substance or a greater part of it”.17 However, in the thirteenth century 
following Roman Law, the medieval writers began to use the words rapere 
(Latin) or rapine (French), both meaning seizure and plunder for all acts 
of theft committed with the use of force. This distinction was also present 
in Thomas Aquinas’s reflections on fures (thieves) and latrones (brigands). 
Aquinas concluded that theft, robbery and rapine had the same goal but 
that they used diffferent methods to achieve it. However, since the dam-
ages caused by rapine and robbery were much more serious than those of 
theft, robbery was more abominable than theft. The argument was that 
violence was a direct action whereas theft was considered executed by 
a ruse or legerdemain. Thus, Aquinas concluded that there was a difffer-
ence in kind between robbery and theft, since rapine/robbery added an 
injury to property, honour and liberty to the already natural criminal act 
of theft.18 Nevertheless, a diffference in words could be seen and especially 
the word roberie (robbery) was incriminating. Indeed, the word used in 
the Parlement de Paris for acts that would solicit the granting of a letter 
of marque was an act of roberie (roberia).19 Thus, piracy was unmistakably 
in this reprehensible category. On the meaning of the word roberie, Valé-
rie Toureille writes that “desroberie” or “roberie” was borrowed directly 
from the Germanic vocabulary on war. Roberie had its origins in the word 
16 Toureille, Vol et brigandage, p. 23.
17 “Illum autem spoliatum intelligi volumus in hoc casu, cum criminaliter accusatur, 
qui tota substantia sua vel maiori parte ipsius per violentiam se destitutum afffĳirmat.” 
Decrees, I, 286.
18 Toureille, Vol et brigandage, pp. 37–38.
19 Chavarot, “Lettres de marque,” p. 51.
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rauba, which signifĳies booty and plunder. On rauba, Toureille notes that 
it is the act of robbery (rauba) which is at the origin of the word for the 
garment “robe”, since rauba in its original meaning implied that one was 
robbed to the bare skin. In the thirteenth century, Norman customary 
law defĳined robbery primarily as an assault on a person’s life and health 
and only secondarily as an attempt on one’s belongings. Thus, robbery 
represented a sacrilegious crime since it violated the peace of God and 
consequently the lord’s peace.20
Thus, robbery was distinguished from theft and became almost synony-
mous with rapine and plunder, that is, a theft carried out with aggressive 
means. By defĳinition, roberie implied the use of violence. From the end 
of the thirteenth century, robeurs de chemins appeared in the Coutumiers 
with murderers.21
In regard to pirates and piracy, this information is at the same time 
illuminating and perplexing. While killing could and probably was often 
justifĳied as some sort of just retaliation, the act of robbery was clearly 
criminal, yet still pirates were not indicted and most of the time did 
not sufffer capital punishment. A case related to piracy and the dispute 
between the Normans and the Bayonnais in 1323 and 1324 was the plun-
der of the house of the Bayonnais, Pierre-Arnaud de Saint-Savinien, in 
Saintes by the Harfleurais Michel Hay and his Norman companions. Con-
sequently, Michel had been imprisoned in Saintes, but he broke prison 
and escaped. Michel Hay then made a deal with the seneschal of Poitou 
that he would be granted pardon and acquitted, provided he paid a fĳine 
of 300 l.t. This agreement was acknowledged by the Parisian Chambre de 
Comptes. Thus on 18 June, Charles IV formally granted Michel Hay pardon. 
However, nothing in the case is said of satisfaction to Saint-Savinien, just 
that the Norman and his pledges had been acquitted of the robbery (robe-
rie) and the escape from prison.22
This may also explain why the merchants in their petitions demanded 
the resolution of the cases by Law Merchant, with a clear system for res-
titution and a solid foundation, not in criminal law, but in civil fĳinancial 
transactions ultimately in the form of debts and their recovery. While the 
merchants might have felt sorely aggrieved, unless they came from pow-
erful, bellicose maritime communities like Bayonne, the Norman ports or 
20 Toureille, Vol et brigandage, p. 39.
21  Toureille, Vol et brigandage, p. 40.
22 Printed in Goyheneche, Bayonne, pp. 529–530.
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the Cinque Ports, realistically the best and most secure way of obtaining 
restitution was to pursue the fĳinancial side of the quarrel and accept the 
human losses. In fact, if in turn the aggrieved had recourse to reprisals 
and retaliation without royal backing, they ran the risk of getting killed 
in the process, and they furthermore risked getting embroiled in a con-
flict where tit-for-tat actions might eventually bring them more loss than 
benefĳit, economically as well as in human lives.
Imprisonment as Punishment
In the previous chapter, we saw that in the fĳirst decades of the fourteenth 
century the English, in particular, introduced two innovations in the way 
that mariners were punished for piracy and maritime war. The fĳirst was 
the transfer of the ultimate responsibility for restitution from the trans-
gressor himself to the local government of his home port. The second was 
the shift from corporal punishment to imprisonment. While it is hard to 
determine to what extent the English royal authorities actually enforced 
these sentences, the ideological change in itself is remarkable. It signalled 
a new way of dealing with maritime justice and punishment.
In the High Middle Ages, imprisonment was a rare punishment usu-
ally meted out to debtors of counts or kings. It included both the bodily 
custody of the debtor to make sure the debt was paid and a punishment 
for the audacity of delaying payment to the lords. Nevertheless, imprison-
ment even in these cases was rare. The imprisonment of nobles for many 
years was expensive, and it was only used if no other option existed. For 
commoners the punishment was even rarer, as execution was cheaper 
and more efffĳicient. Thus, imprisonment was usually only used for people 
awaiting trial.23 Furthermore, the notion of incarceration as a punishment 
(especially lifetime) was abhorrent to lawyers and to Roman Law.24
However, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Italian 
city-states increasingly began to use incarceration as punishment, and it is 
possible that the English were inspired by the Italians for this penal prac-
tice.25 The reasons for the English change may, however, also have been 
due to more practical considerations. Simply put, dead men do not trade, 
23 Dunbabin, Jean, Captivity and Imprisonment in Medieval Europe 1000–1300 (New 
York, 2002), pp. 98 and 102.
24 Geltner, Guy, The Medieval Prison (Princeton, 2008), p. 45.
25 Dean, Crime, pp. 120–121.
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pay customs or supply ships for naval service. Furthermore, the English 
kings might have feared to alienate their maritime subjects, as any rebel-
lion on their part could bring catastrophe to the security of the realm, 
as was evident in the 1210s and the 1260s with the Cinque Ports. It was 
not only in Italy and England, however, that incarceration as punishment 
was increasing. In 1303, Philippe le Bel authorised imprisonment for debt 
in the royal jurisdiction. This imprisonment could only be carried out, 
though, if the creditor had a contract with a royal seal, that is, on approval 
stating that imprisonment would be the result of failure to pay back the 
loan. While this could be seen as a security institution in an expanding 
credit market, Claustre points out that it also had the efffect of strengthen-
ing royal authority throughout the kingdom.26 As with the procedure of 
arrest and letters of marque, this initiative was efffectively a governmen-
tal imposition into an area hitherto regulated between private persons.27 
Thus, as with reprisals and marque, this measure should be seen as a 
government initiative to regulate a practice that already took place any-
way. Furthermore, the punishment of imprisonment not only meant the 
bodily custody of a person. It was also a social scandal which seriously 
damaged the honour of the person, not least because failure to repay 
debts was assimilated with theft. Thus, royal justice considered imprison-
ment a kind of torture which should be (and was) feared.28
Punishment and Piracy
Cases of persons punished for piracy in the Middle Ages are rather hard 
to come by. In the Anglo-French sources for the period 1280–1330, only 
a handful can be found. Furthermore, it is difffĳicult to determine if the 
punishment was meted out for piracy specifĳically or if piracy was just one 
crime amongst several others. In other words, it is hard to isolate the exact 
punishment for piracy from other crimes.
The fĳirst thing that strikes one is the almost complete absence of cap-
ital punishment in the sources, despite the fact that pirates killed and 
robbed. These were crimes which the medieval authorities by no means 
condoned nor usually let go unpunished. According to Marsden, the only 
documented death sentence for piracy in the English sources before the 
26 Claustre, “Dette,” p. 797.
27 Claustre, “Dette,” p. 814.
28 Claustre, “Dette,” pp. 817–819.
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sixteenth century was the hanging of William Briggeho in 1228 for con-
sorting with pirates (malefactores). What was meant by consorting (pro 
consensu) is unclear, but it probably refers to him as a fence or in other 
ways a co-conspirator of the pirates.29
While Marsden is certainly right in noticing the almost complete 
absence of capital punishment for piracy in the Middle Ages, I have been 
able to locate a few more cases. However, the exact way in which they 
should be interpreted is circumstantial. Thus, in 1294, a lay-brother and 
keeper of the ship of the Abbey of St. Mary in Dublin, John le Jeuene, 
was hanged for robberies, presumably piracies. The ship was forfeited to 
the king, and then was granted to Peter de Parys, a merchant of Yoghel, 
Ireland, on the condition that he answered anyone having rights in the 
ship.30 Likewise, in 1321, protection was granted to one Richard Brian of 
Bardestaple, his men and his ship, presumably because the ship had been 
acquired by forfeiture to the king from the former owner, John Kytty, for 
his and his men’s diverse felonies in the realm (possibly piracies), for 
which they had been convicted and hanged.31 The need for protection 
was probably a safety precaution for Richard to avoid being attacked by 
the vindictive victims of Kytty.
A reason for the scarcity of sources for capital punishment may be 
because punishments for piracy were meted out directly on the spot in 
the ports by local offfĳicers and/or enraged locals.32 Consequently, it did not 
leave any trail in the sources. The stipulations in the peace treaties of the 
lex talionis model, as well as a lynching in Norway in 1303, certainly indi-
cate this possibility. That year, Edward I wrote to King Håkon V of Norway 
explaining that two merchants of Scarborough had hired the shipmaster 
John Mus of Fivelee to take to the sea to fĳish. Due to contrary winds, the 
ship had driven to Northbene(?) in Norway, where John Mus was hanged 
for a previous piracy committed against one Swayn Tungesheved. In addi-
tion, the Norwegians had arrested the ship and its load of fĳish to the value 
of £100 sterling, which then had been forfeited to King Håkon. Since the 
ship and fĳish did not belong to John Mus, Edward demanded restitution 
for the merchants, but he did not complain over the execution of the 
 shipmaster.33
29 Marsden, Law and Custom, pp. 6–7.
30 CPR 1292–1301, p. 60.
31  CPR 1317–1321, p. 563.
32 Dumas, Étude, pp. 34–35.
33 CCR 1302–1306, p. 46.
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Because of the scarcity of evidence and the general impression that 
piracy was rarely punishable by death, the cases of the English treatment 
of the Boulonnais pirate/privateer Eustache le Moine and especially of 
the French vice-admiral, Nicolas Béhuchet, in 1340 after the Battle of Sluis 
has puzzled historians. Mollat interpreted the execution of Eustache as an 
expression of the disgust felt by contemporaries for pirates, but against 
this Ciceronean view Russon has argued that the hanging from the yard-
arm of the captured Béhuchet was rather an expression of the vindictive 
English conception of maritime justice, rather than expressing a particu-
lar hatred of pirates. Furthermore, the execution had the benefĳit of getting 
rid of a dangerous opponent once and for all. This was possible because 
neither Béhuchet nor Eustache were part of the high nobility.34 While 
Russon is right in stressing the vengeance aspect, the actual reason for the 
hanging was rather a reaction to Béhuchet’s ferocious attacks on the Eng-
lish south coast in 1338–40, where he brutally executed captive English 
mariners.35 This treatment made him pass from a legitimate combatant to 
a violator of the conventions of the treatment of prisoners of war. As for 
the execution of Eustache le Moine, it is quite possible that this occurred 
because at least some English considered him a traitor.36 He therefore did 
not merit the treatment normally conferred on vanquished foes.
The English sources contain slightly more evidence for the imprison-
ment of suspected pirates. In 1311, thirty-eight persons were imprisoned 
in Ipswich and put on trial for piracies at sea in the port of Yarmouth, co. 
Sufffolk, against English and Flemish merchants.37 However, the fate of 
these suspects is unknown.
In another, more complicated case, imprisonment was also used 
against people suspected of having committed piracy. In 1316, two Eng-
lish royal offfĳicers were ordered to inquire amongst the merchants and 
other prominent men in the West Country into who had plundered two 
Flemish ships at Crozon, Brittany, and who in England had afterwards 
received the pirates (and bought their goods). The two commissioners 
were ordered to fĳind and imprison the pirates and presumably confĳiscate 
their loot. This inquiry was carried out because the Bordelaise citizen, 
Perrota Brune de Solar, had sent a ship to Flanders before Louis X’s war 
with Flanders (where the English were allied with the French against the 
34 Russon, Côtes, pp. 293–294.
35 Sumption, Trial, pp. 247 and 327–328.
36 Roger of Wendover, Flores, vol. IV, pp. 28–29.
37 CPR 1307–1312, p. 373.
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Flemings and the Scots) with 192 tuns of wine to the value of £550 ster-
ling. This wine had been arrested by the Flemish authorities in the port of 
Damme. Therefore, Edward reacted (at the request of Perrota’s attorney) 
to the Flemish arrest by ordering the arrest of English mariners who had 
plundered Flemings. In this way, Edward hoped to obtain restitution for 
Perrota by paying back the Flemings who would then (hopefully) release 
Perrota’s ship and wine.38 In other words, had Perrota not sufffered arrest, 
it is unlikely that Edward or the royal authorities would have done any-
thing against the English pirates.
This case seems related to the issue of extradition of people suspected 
of piracy to foreign justice. I have only come across one explicit demand 
for extradition, and in this case the demand had more to do with power 
politics than the execution of justice. In 1311, Philippe le Bel demanded the 
extradition of English mariners for the plunder of Rochelais merchants. 
Edward II would under no circumstances extradite the mariners, but even-
tually the English authorities found the mariners, and they were forced 
to give the Rochelais full restitution.39 Nothing in the sources, however, 
shows that the mariners were ever punished in any way, even though they 
were identifĳied. In the end, the piracy had been an operation from which 
no punishment was to be feared.
We should not doubt, however, that the royal authorities in principle, 
and sometimes in fact, pursued pirates. Thus in 1324, Edward ordered two 
royal offfĳicers (one of them the sherifff of Norfolk and Sufffolk) to arrest six 
named and an unknown number of unnamed persons who had attacked a 
ship laden with the king’s fĳish to the value of £60 sterling between Deford 
and Lynn. These mariners had killed the crew, plundered the ship and 
taken it to Sheford, co. Sussex, where they sold offf at least some of the 
goods.40 What fate Edward had in mind for the arrested is not known. 
The order only stated that the they were to be held in custody.
The use of pressure on the local government in the ports by the royal 
authorities does not seem to have been merely a hollow declaration in 
the treaties, nor do these authorities seem to have been wholly indifffer-
ent to stopping their countrymen’s piracies. In 1323 or 1324, a Castilian 
merchant, Martin Perez, had been plundered by men from Sandwich on 
the sea-coast of that town. Hence, Edward ordered the mayor and bailifff 
38 CPR 1313–1317, p. 490.
39 CCR 1307–1313, pp. 445, 486–488 and 565, Foedera 1307–1327, pp. 146 and 149.
40 CPR 1321–1324, p. 390.
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of Sandwich to make satisfaction to Martin, which had not yet been done. 
Therefore, Edward ordered fĳive men from Sandwich to make satisfaction 
to Martin by themselves or by the pirates of the 200 marks loss which he 
had sufffered. These fĳive asked Edward to compel the pirates to contribute 
to this amount (which the fĳive apparently otherwise were obliged to pay 
even though they were innocent). Therefore, Edward ordered the mayor 
and the bailifffs to call before them all those whose names were supplied 
by the fĳive and to compel those found guilty to contribute.41
However, even when the pirates were identifĳied, punishment for piracy 
was not the norm, as is shown in the case of piracy against William Ser-
vate by the Flemings in chapter 2.42 No punishment for the pirates was 
demanded, and presumably none was made despite the fact that what 
was at hand was violent robbery at sea of goods destined for the king.
In the previous chapter, we saw that pardons for piracy were relatively 
easy to obtain—especially if one was a prominent member of a port com-
munity and supplied ships and expertise for naval service. An example 
of this can be seen in 1322, when Edward II granted a pardon for all 
offfences committed on land and at sea (that is, piracy) to Stephen Alard, 
Robert Alard and Robert Batayle, prominent citizens of Winchelsea, infa-
mous pirates and later royal admirals.43 The pardon was most probably 
given to assure their service with their ships against the Scots, who were 
threatening English shipping. In 1294, at the outbreak of the Gascon War, 
something similar occurred when Edward granted a pardon to convicted 
pirates on the condition that they accompanied the king to Gascony and 
served in the war against France.44
This also seems to have applied to a certain extent to the French 
authorities. In 1296, Philippe le Bel ordered the Vicomte d’Avranches to 
go to Brittany to fĳind Bayonnais guilty of piracies against the French in 
general and specifĳically against the Normans.45 No Bayonnais were actu-
ally apprehended on this mission, as all those suspected were cleared of 
charges. However, this mission cannot be taken as part of a general opera-
tion for the suppression of piracy, but rather as a one-time procedure to 
punish Bayonnais pirates for their past actions against the French and the 
king’s offfĳicers. Thus, it was rather a measure applied during the war with 
41  CPR 1324–1327, pp. 30–31.
42 CCR 1302–1306, pp. 3, 8 and 48–49.
43 CPR 1321–1324, p. 107.
44 Marsden, Law and Custom, pp. 31–35.
45 Borderie, “Nouveau recueil,” pp. 152–162.
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England. The inquiry of Philippe VI to the provost of La Rochelle in 1331 
into the customs for the regulation of piracy between England and France 
likewise testifĳies to the fact that the problems posed by piracy were not 
new, but apart from asserting the French king’s authority over the sea, it is 
unclear if any actual measures to reduce piracy were implemented.46
Thus, the extremely low risk of getting punished for piracy denotes a 
royal reluctance to prosecute at least some pirates, and it meant that piracy 
in most cases seemed an enterprise with little or no risk of  punishment.
Finally, to complete the confusing picture of the arbitrary judicial treat-
ment of piracy, the offfĳicers of justice were far from being neutral, disinter-
ested civil servants. They were rather corrupt or at least corruptible men, 
which meant that obtaining justice, restitution and punishment of pirates, 
who were often citizen in the local port, were few and far between. A 
blatant example of this is the case already treated in chapter 2, where 
Bartholomew de Welle was cheated by the sherifffs of London.47
In conclusion, what we are dealing with are people robbing, mutilating 
and killing people at sea, yet we fĳind no or very little evidence of these 
people being punished for this—at least not as severely as people on land 
would be for these actions. Why this diffference?
First of all, many of the piracies could plausibly be claimed as just 
reprisals or retaliations for previous attacks on the mariners by the fel-
low citizens of the victim. Since reprisal and retaliation was a recogn-
ised means of action by society when a person had been slighted or if 
debt was involved, and since the authorities were more interested in the 
re-establishment of order than justice to be served as such, acts of piracy 
were punished rather lightly or simply pardoned. Simply put, like with 
the nobles waging guerrae, if the mariners and their communities were 
important and strong enough, they were pardoned, as if they were waging 
war. This formally went against the theories of just war, since the ports did 
not possess the required auctoritas to wage war, but it was in accordance 
with the practical realities.
Secondly, since the kings were dependent on the mariners for a sup-
ply of ships for naval war and, especially for England, for the security of 
the realm, the kings were reluctant to punish the mariners harshly—
especially if the evidence against them was circumstantial. In short, the 
46 See also Russon, Côtes, pp. 305–306.
47 CPR 1312–1317, pp. 147, 231 and 323.
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 governments must have been afraid of alienating the mariners of the 
realm. Thus, the relative scarcity of capital punishment for piracy may 
account for the exemplary punishments as used by the French govern-
ment in homicide cases to show that homicide in principle was illegal and 
that the government had the prerogative as well as the will to punish this 
as severely as possible.
Thirdly, the pirates and piracy were not as such considered a funda-
mental threat to order in the northern European kingdoms. No distinction 
was made whether acts of killing and robbery were committed on land or 
at sea. What mattered were the motives, and like on land, especially with 
the guerrae, good excuses could be found for the actions.
Finally, but by no means least important, was the fact that it was 
extremely difffĳicult for the authorities to determine the exact course of 
events during a pirate assault. The accused could often come up with at 
least a probable explanation for the assault, that is, reprisal, and some-
times he could even prove or at least claim that he was in fact innocent. 
Thus, in the end, to avoid a protracted judicial procedure and an escala-
tion of conflicts in a tit-for-tat manner, the authorities (and indeed some-
times the victims as well) may have found it more expedient to simply 
have recourse to fĳinancial restitution but with no further punishments 
apart from the arrest and the forced repayment of the outstanding values. 
What mattered most was the re-establishment of peace and order, not 
justice for the individual.
CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION
Medieval merchants and mariners are usually portrayed in the histori-
ography as persons only interested in trade, leaving the issues of war to 
the lords and the kings. Pirates are usually portrayed as the antithesis of 
merchants, and following Cicero’s condemnation of pirates as the enemy 
of all, traditionally they have been seen as an especially dangerous and 
repulsive kind of robber who was to be exterminated. This is the product 
of a hegemonic world order where only the state has the right to use vio-
lence, and it is a perception held today as well as when it was formulated 
in the Late Roman Republic.
However, St. Augustine’s conversation between Alexander the Great 
and a captured pirate expresses another view on piracy. The essence of 
this conversation is that “pirate” is not a legal category, but rather a sub-
jective term used for one’s enemies. The action of piracy itself, whether it 
was done by a king or a shipmaster, was identical. St. Augustine’s descrip-
tion of piracy fĳits the situation in the Middle Ages perfectly. In this period, 
the royal governments were too weak to efffectively control the means of 
violence in society, and noblemen in particular often had recourse to pri-
vate wars (guerrae) to protect their privileges and avenge slights of hon-
our. The motives are also present in medieval piracy. While at fĳirst glance 
it appears to have been carried out by robbers, a closer analysis of the 
phenomenon reveals that in reality the pirates were most often the sup-
posedly peaceful merchants. Consequently, piracy was not the antithesis 
to trade, it was an integral part of it. The local authorities, the citizens of 
the ports and the port communities as a whole enjoyed the fruits of it and 
extended their protection to the pirates.
In the period c. 1280–c. 1330, Bayonne, the Cinque Ports and the Nor-
man ports in particular were engaged in piracy. These ports shared certain 
defĳining traits, namely that they had a large fleet of ships at their dis-
posal, geographically they commanded strategically important locations, 
and they were all secondary ports supplying freight of Gascon wine to the 
big trade emporiums like Bruges, London and Rouen (and Paris). Since 
these ports supplied a substantial portion of the ships for the royal navies 
and because of their geographical locations, the kings endowed them with 
extensive judicial privileges and immunities, and these ports enjoyed a 
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close relationship with the kings. This made punishment of them less 
likely, and consequently the mariners often indulged in piracy.
These ports were often engaged in private or rather maritime wars 
(guerrae maritimae) with commercial rivals, especially over the lucrative 
wine trade from Bordeaux to northern Europe. Piracy was the primary 
instrument in these wars. These wars closely resembled the noble private 
war, not only in the actions of plunder, killing, destruction and public 
humiliations, but also in their justifĳications. Since the kings were depen-
dent on these mariners, they often turned a blind eye to these wars until 
they became so serious that they threatened the general state of peace 
between the kingdoms.
However, piracy was technically illicit, since it entailed killing and rob-
bery which were deeply reprehensible actions in the Middle Ages. But the 
laws for commercial and maritime life did not in any way deal with piracy. 
In the suits concerning piracy, it was judged as if piracy was a purely civil 
transaction of debt recovery. This was due to several factors in maritime 
and commercial life. First of all, since the Middle Ages lacked formal 
credit institutions, the recovery of debt was handled by the creditor him-
self and violence was often applied in the collection of outstanding debts. 
In maritime life, this took the form of reprisals, namely the taking back of 
one’s property unjustly acquired by others—theoretically without the use 
of violence. These and other fĳinancial concerns seem in part to explain 
the recourse to reprisals. However, in practice, reprisals often developed 
into retaliations; the application of violence in the recovery of possessions 
repeatedly led to equally violent counteractions, since reprisals and retal-
iation were based on a principle of collective liability. This meant that 
reprisals could be carried out not only against the pirates themselves, but 
also against their innocent countrymen. These in turn would opt for coun-
ter-reprisals and retaliations, both to recover their goods and to avenge 
the assault on them.
The medieval governments knew that they could not stop this prac-
tice since they lacked “police” forces and control over the means of vio-
lence. Instead, they created an institution of government-licensed reprisal 
expressed in two diffferent measures: arrest by royal offfĳicers, and/or let-
ters of marque which allowed the aggrieved to obtain restitution through 
the assistance of royal offfĳicers by arrests or by private action against the 
countrymen of the pirates. However, this system in no way stopped the 
recourse to reprisals. In fact, it sometimes exacerbated the conflicts and 
started a series of reprisals and counter-reprisals. Rather, it served to 
exonerate the government for denying justice to their subjects and to 
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restrain the escalation of violence since it took years to be awarded these 
government-licensed measures.
The piracies and maritime wars were further stimulated by the politico-
legal status of the sea as a border region or a march characterised by 
overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions by the lords and the kings. In 
a march, private actions of reprisals and retaliations were the norm for 
obtaining justice. Thus, when maritime wars had to be settled at the inter-
vention of the kings, they applied the model for dispute settlement used 
in these marcher regions. These were procedures of equity rather than 
rigorous law. An example of this is the Anglo-French process of Montreuil 
in 1306. This process, however, was disrupted by the kings conflicting 
claims of sovereignty, and the English and French kings seem to have used 
the process not to solve cases of piracy, but to counter each others’ claims 
of sovereignty. Thus, while piracy was the cause of the process, it was not 
the real concern of it. On a theoretical basis, these claims of sovereignty 
were a royal initiative used to negate the marcher procedure and to make 
the king the sovereign judge in maritime disputes.
Even so, the marcher procedure was the one usually applied in cases 
of maritime wars. Thus, the English applied it in settlements of maritime 
wars with the Flemings, the Portuguese and the Castilians. However, dur-
ing the negotiations in 1309–11 with the latter, a fundamental change in 
English policy became apparent. The English changed the settlement 
method from a lex talionis model where offfences were punished in kind 
(capital punishment for murder, etc.) to a method of punishment where 
corporal punishments were abandoned. Instead the pirates were fĳined 
or imprisoned. Furthermore, the English changed the level of ultimate 
responsibility from the pirates themselves to the municipal government 
of the pirates’ homeport. Thus, if the pirates could not pay the fĳine or if 
they evaded justice, the local government had to pay. To a certain degree, 
the French followed this model as well. For the municipalities this was an 
abhorrent method of settlement and punishment, however, and in their 
individual treaties they continued to use the lex talionis model. Even 
though the English model in a sense constituted progress in the curbing 
of piracy, it was dependent on a royal government who could enforce the 
punishments. If such a government was not present, the new English pro-
cedure was useless and, even when applied, it seems to have only limited, 
but not stopped, the maritime wars, as shown by the prelude to the War 
of Saint-Sardos.
Furthermore, a signifĳicant hindrance in the curbing of piracy was that it 
was not perceived as a fundamental threat to the kingdoms. Indeed, while 
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violence, killing and robbery in principle were extremely reprehensible 
actions in the Middle Ages, killing especially could be pardoned if the 
accused could prove that they were defending their honour, privileges and 
goods. In addition, the custom of debt recovery by private means and the 
difffĳiculties in proving piracy and running a successful court case meant 
that most cases of piracy revolved around the restitution of lost property. 
The violence was rarely punished. In fact, the kings’ dependence on the 
ports to supply ships for the navies meant that violence in piracy cases 
was mostly pardoned. This is due to the fact that the kings did not want 
to alienate mariners who supplied naval service, that maritime war had 
a quasi-legality to it, and that piracy did not constitute a fundamental 
threat to the kingdom. Thus, there was no Ciceronean condemnation of 
pirates. In the end, the re-establishment of peace and order was more 
important to the kings than individual justice. The ultimate losers in 
these settlements were often the individual victims of piracy, since they, 
through judicial action, could at best hope for restitution, but sometimes 
even this was sacrifĳiced by the kings in exchange for the re-establishment 
of peace. Accordingly, some victims took to private actions to obtain 
justice and restitution and worried about the consequences afterwards, 
confĳident that they would be pardoned.
Thus, piracy was, in the end, just as much an act of self-defence and 
revenge as it was a profĳit-seeking act. In many ways, it was a pursuit of per-
sonal as well collective port ends against commercial rivals. The mariners 
were criminals in the abstract sense, but they could almost always claim 
just reprisals as an excuse. It is therefore debatable whether “pirate”, in the 
sense of a criminal sea robber, is an acceptable term at all for these mari-
time “malefactors”. But while pirates perhaps did not exist in the Middle 
Ages, there certainly was piracy. However, since this practice did not difffer 
signifĳicantly from other types of medieval armed conflict, it did not consti-
tute a more severe problem than other armed conflicts, nor was it anymore 
threatening to the government’s control of the kingdom than the nobles’ 
private wars. It was rather an integral part of trade and a way of handling 
disputes in societies with a low level of government-supplied protection.
APPENDIX ONE
CHRONOLOGY
1204 The French conquer Normandy.
1216–17 The French invasion of England.
1242–43 War between England and France.
1259 The Treaty of Paris. Anglo-French peace—Henry III recognises Gas-
cony as part of the kingdom of France and Louis IX as his liege lord for 
Gascony.
1258–65 Baronial uprisings led by Simon de Montfort against the English 
Crown.
1270 Louis IX dies on crusade in Tunis. Philippe III is crowned king of 
France.
1272 Death of Henry III of England.
1274 Edward I of England returns to England.
1277 First Anglo-Welsh War.
1282 Second Anglo-Welsh War.
1285 Philippe IV le Bel is crowned king of France.
1292 John Balliol enthroned as king of Scotland.
1294 Philippe Le Bel confĳiscates Gascony (4 February) in retaliation of 
Edward I’s failure to appear before the Parlement de Paris.
 The Gascon War (1294–97, truce and negotiations 1297–1303) breaks 
out.
1296 John Balliol is deposed by the Scots. Edward intervenes for his vassal. 
Anglo-Scottish War begins.
1297 Guy de Dampierre of Flanders allies with England against France.
 Anglo-French Truce of Vyve-Saint-Bavon (1297–1303). Franco-Flemish 
war continues.
 The English are defeated by the Scots at the Battle of Stirling Bridge.
1298 The English defeat the Scots at the Battle of Falkirk.
1302 The French are defeated by Flemings at the Battle of Courtrai.
1303 Anglo-French peace treaty in Paris. Gascony is restored to Edward.
1304 Most of Scotland is subdued by the English and the Scottish nobles 
swear obedience to Edward.
 French victories over the Flemings in the Battles of Zierikzee and 
Mons-en-Pévèle.
1305 Franco-Flemish peace treaty of Athis.
 Robert de Béthune becomes count of Flanders.
1306 The Anglo-French “Process” of Montreuil over piracies.
 Scottish rebellion under Robert the Bruce.
1307 Edward I dies on 6 July, Edward II is crowned king of England.
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1308 English campaign against Scots.
 Marriage of Edward II and Isabelle of France. Anglo-French alliance.
1309 The Flemish towns rebel against the French king.
1311 English campaign against Scots.
1313 Franco-Flemish peace treaty of Arras.
1314 Battle of Bannockburn—Scots defeat the English.
 Philippe le Bel dies. Louis X is crowned king of France.
1314–15 Tax uprisings in the northern French provinces.
1315–17 The Great Famine devastates northern Europe.
1315 The French invasion of Flanders stopped by torrential rains.
 English campaign to Scotland.
1316 Louis X dies in June. Philippe V becomes king of France and makes 
peace with Flanders.
1318 The Scots capture Berwick-upon-Tweed.
1319 English campaign to Scotland.
 Anglo-Scottish truce.
1322 Philippe V dies, Charles IV is crowned king of France.
 English campaign to Scotland.
1323 Anglo-Flemish peace.
 Anglo-Scottish 30-years truce.
1323–28 Rebellion of maritime Flanders against the count of Flanders.
1324–27 The War of Saint-Sardos between England and France.
1325 Isabella of England goes to France to negotiate truce.
1326 September, Isabella and Mortimer invade England.
1327 January, Edward II abdicates and dies in September. Edward III is 
crowned king of England.
 The Scots break the truce with England.
1328 Anglo-Scottish peace.
 Charles IV dies, Philippe VI de Valois is crowned king of France.
 The French defeat the Flemings at the Battle of Cassel.
1331 Edward III swears homage to Philippe de Valois.
1337 The Hundred Years’ War begins.
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THE SENESCHAL ROSTAND DE SOLER’S REPORT TO EDWARD I 
ON THE NORMAN DEPREDATIONS IN SAINTONGE IN 1293
There are two almost identical versions of this report in the National Archives, 
London: C 47/31/5/1 and C 47/27/15/1. Both are somewhat damaged, but the best 
preserved is C 47/31/5/1. Accordingly, I have used that version for the transcrip-
tion. However, some parts are missing or are illegible, and I have used the C 
47/27/15/1 to complete the transcription. Only once have I digressed from the C 
47/31/5/1. This has been marked in a note. Variations are in the footnotes, and 
illegible words or passages have been marked with [. . .].
I have retained the original punctuation as far as possible. The starting letters 
of personal names and place names have been put in capitals, however.
“Excellentissimo principi et domino vero reverendo domino Edwardo dei gra-
tia Regi Anglie domino Hibernie et Duci Aquitanie salutem Rostandus de Soler 
seneschallus Xantonie se ipsum ad pedes regis maiestatis ut prosperat sibi vota 
sucessus [. . .] ad [. . .] de mandato vestro per[. . .] michi facto de excessibus in-
iuriis et violentiis factis in terra [. . .] Xantoniensi vobis et gentibus vestris Angliis 
et aliis personis per Normannos ab inicio defensionis novissime[. . .] inter [. . .] 
et [. . .] pro [. . .] quorum facta excessus a violentia perpetrata inferans anotan-
tur quorum transcriptum domino [. . .] vel magistro Petro Aymerici clericis ves-
tris misi Parisius secundum mandatum vestrum [. . .] predictas per presentiam 
petitionem.
Primo venerunt in prioratu Monasticii Novi1 prope Sanctum Anianum2 qui 
est de obedientia justicia et superioritate vostra in terra Xantoniensis, Gaufri-
dus Gossa magister navis vocate Larosa de Leura3 Godefredus Cormean magister 
cuiusdam navis de Berflers et Nicolas de la Mere magister cuiusdam navis de 
Berflers4 quarum nautum nomina non potui invenire cum decem et novem aliis 
Normanniis armatis videlicet actonis5 bacenetis ensibus balistis et aliis armaturis 
et in dicto prioratu intraverunt et de priore dicti loci per minas et verba iniuriosa 
habuerunt violenter contra voluntatem ipsius prioris unum sextarium bladi et 
duos pethesos6 que secum portaverunt
1 Montier Neuf.
2 Saint Agnant.
3 La Rose de Leure.
4 Barfleur.
5 Haketon. A light armour.
6 “Petasos”?
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Item ipsi malefactores vi rapuerunt et amoverunt quidam monacho 
Sola . . . Sancti Georgii de Esseron7 in dicto prioratu suam coram qua . . . gebatur 
et bursam suam in qua erat trigenti solidi turonensis et amplius que etiam secum 
portaverunt
Item predicti malefactores posuerunt quendam magnum cuttellum ad gurges 
cuiusdam veteris monachi dicti prioratus ac si vellent ipsum interfĳicere qui aude-
bat contradicere rapinis et violentiis quas faciebant in dicto prioratu
Item rapuerunt et secum portaverunt de dicto prioratu unam ballistam et bau-
drerium quos in dicto prioratu invenerunt et voluerunt interfĳicere quondam ser-
vitorem dicti prioris nisi fugisset quia ausus fuit petere dictam balistam
Item cum quidam monachus dicti prioratus veniret ad ipsum prioratum obvia-
vit ipsis malefactoribus quem ipsi malefactores suis vestibus exuere voluerunt 
et perquisierunt bursam suam et etiam in braccis suis invenerunt sex oboles(?) 
tantum in bursa dicti monachi quas rapuerunt et secum portaverunt
Item predicti malefactores intraverunt alia die in dicto prioratu manasteri Novi 
et invenientes dictum priorem ceperunt ipsum inter se et praeceperunt eidem 
quod redderet eisdem Robinum Anglicum Sancti Aniani et quosdam alios angli-
cos quos ipse receperat et reposuerat in dicto prioratu qui respondit quod dictus 
Robinus propter metum ipsorum Normannorum forte fugerat ad dictum locum 
et ibi per aliquos dies fuerat tamen recesserat de dicto prioratu et tunc iuverunt 
ad domum dicti Robino et quesiverunt domum suam utrum ipsum possent inve-
nire quo non invento rapuerunt de domo predicti Robini barellis cal . . . [. . .] et 
alias mercaturas dicti Robini que omnia secum portaverunt et camisiam ancille 
dicti Robino rapuerunt et portaverunt. Et hec facta fuerunt circa Octavas festi 
Pasche proximi preteriti anno domini M CC nonegesimo tertio.
Item predicti Nicolas de la Mere cum multis aliis Normanniis complicibus suis 
intraverunt per [. . .] in domo Gyletini Ulbaudi in terra vestra Xanctoniensi et 
quandam arcam ipsius Guillermi(!) fregerunt de qua extraxerunt unum monile 
et quendam annullum argentos panes caseos et alia que omnia secum por-
taverunt.
Item ille Nicolas de la Mere et suis complicibus armati intraverunt in prioratu 
de Podio [. . .] in terra vostra existentes et ceperunt per violentiam de [. . .] dicti 
prioratis bona [. . .] quem secum portauerunt [. . .] fuerint cum dicto priore contra 
voluntatem suam.
Item predictus Nicolas de la Mere fuit et suis complicibus Normanniis armati 
intraverunt domino Guillermi(?) Begandi(?) huius [. . .] et eis rapuerunt duodecim 
[. . .] quos habebat in bursa quid plures [. . .] ipsos duodecim denarii parisis.
Item et [. . .] fuerit intra predictum festum Pasche et sequentem [. . .]
Item venerunt plures Normanni usque ad viginti et amplius armati lori-
cis batonis et sagittis ensibus et aliis [. . .] ad domum Rectoris ecclesie Sancti 
Nazarii8 prope Subisiam9 que est de obediencia et superioritate vestra die dome-
nica quindem Pasche proximo preterito et cum intrassent domum dicti presbiteri 
7 Unknown location. Possibly Saint-Georges-des-Coteaux.
8 Saint-Nazaire-sur-Charante.
9 Soubise.
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ipse presbiter eos ad prandium invitavit et dedit eis panem vinum caseum et alia 
cibaria que tunc habebat parata et cum pransi fuerunt dictus presbiter credens 
quod ipsi recederent exuere domum suam et cum exisset malefactores ceperunt 
capones et galinis quos capere potuerunt et sic cum dictis galinis et capunibus 
recesserunt
Item ipsi [. . .] cum multis aliis armati iterum ad domum dicti presbiteri 
venerunt die martis sequente post quindenam Pasche [. . .] dicto presbitero rapu-
erunt et ceperunt de domo dicti presbiteri omnes galinas capones anseres et por-
cellos que dictus presbiter habat in domo sua nec unum caponem vel galinam 
dimiserunt et secum premissa portaverunt
Item die Jovis proxima post quindenam Paschi venerunt iterum alii malefac-
tores Normanni non illi qui supra venerunt usque ad quartuor decim [. . .] et cum 
dictus presbiter sensisset ipsos venientes absentavit se timens de malicia eorun-
dem et resecavit cum magnas barros prout melius potuit ostium camere sue et 
exivit per quandam fenestram et fugit in viridarium suum et intravenientes ipsi 
malefactores in domum dicti presbiteri petierunt ab ancilla sua ubi erat dictus 
presbiter que respondit quod nesciebat et statim venientes ad ostium camere 
dicti presbiteri fregerunt dictum ostium et ibidem intraverunt et fregerunt quen-
dam forcerium de quo quemdam annulum aureum cum bono lapide precioso 
valore centum solidorum et quedam alia jocalia argenta rapuerunt ceperunt et 
portaverunt et etiam cartas memoralia et alias litteras in dicto forcerio existentes 
[. . .] ceperunt et portaverunt et cum ipsi hoc fecissent intrantes viridarium dictum 
presbiterum invenerunt et arcubus et ensibus et sagitiis super positis venerunt 
maliciose contra ipsum et ipsum tanquam latronem ceperunt et captum in sua 
camera adduxerunt que eum inter ipsos malis suis gradibus sedere fecerunt quo 
sedente preceperunt ei quod aperiret arcas suas et antequam posset respondere 
[. . .] stupefactus aliqui ex ipsis dictas arcas statim frangere voluerit cum securibus 
et aliis ferramentis que ibidem invenerunt et sic [. . .] oportuit miserimo presbi-
tero arcas suas aperire quibus apertis ipsi raptores ceperunt sextaginta et decem 
solidos et amplius lintheamina robas et vestes ipsius presbiteri et vestimenta illa 
que pueri receperunt in baptismia et multa alia bona ipsius presbiteri que erant 
in dictis arcis [. . .] et portauerunt
Item rapuerunt et secum portaverunt predicti raptores de domo ipsius presbi-
teri multa ferramenta et bonos videlicet ferreos ligones10 et martellos et cutellos 
ferreos et quandam furcam ferream et alia quem[. . .] voluerunt et in recessu11 
[. . .] dicto presbitero et perceperunt quod eisdem centum libras turonensis 
mutaret alioquin sciret se condempnari sententia capitali postmodum [. . .] vero 
primo die maii sequentis venerunt ad domum dicti presbiteri decem Normanni 
alii quam predicti [. . .] presbiter eos videret intrantes ipsos plus per timore quam 
pro dilectione motus ad prandium invitavit et eisdem vini [. . .] clara et rubea et 
clarea que tunc habebat parata dedit eis quibus sic pransis ipsi ducentes dictum 
10 “videlicet(?) ferreos(?) ligones(?),” from TNA C 47/27/15/1. This passage is illegible in 
TNA C 47/31/5/1.
 11 “in recessu,” from TNA C 47/27/15/1. This passage is illegible in TNA C 47/31/5/1.
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presbiterum [. . .] requisierunt cum12 quod mutaret vel daret eis viginti librarum 
turonensis alioquin ipsum capite privarent et ignem ponerent [. . .] domo suo 
[. . .] responsavit quod13 denarios non habebat quia alii Normanni qui predicto 
die Jovis venerunt ceperant omnia bona [. . .] et secum recesserunt viros(?) extra 
villam14 ad crucem ville et ibidem remanserunt et residentes ibidem dicto pres-
bitero mandaverunt per quendam15 [. . .] ipsi Normanni16 reneverunt ad dictam 
villam Sancti Nazarii cum tabardis in brachii involutis et cum [. . .] domum dicti 
presbiteri [. . .] intraverunt et invenientes dictum presbiterium a quendam cleri-
cum extravenum qui ibidem venerit17 [. . .] pro ipso presbitero visitando eidem 
clerico quendam ensem quem portabat subtus super secum amoverunt et postea 
[. . .] ipsam violentiam [. . .] ipsum vestribus suis quibus inductus erat exuere volu-
erunt quem cum ita exuerunt gentes que viderunt dictum factum clamaverunt 
erunt aus[. . .]entia cui clamore venerunt gentes de patria et ipsos malefactores 
fugaverunt et aliquos ex ipsis [. . .] vulnaverunt In Crastino venerunt ad dictam 
villam centum quinquaginta vel plures de dictis Normannis armatis Lanceis balis-
tis ensibus et aliis diversis armatis et domum dicti presbiteri intraverunt et decem 
tonellos vini boni et puri fregerent et tirculos(?) tiderunt(?) et totum vinum ad 
terram fuderunt necnon plures alios tonellos grossos archas tabellas bacinetos et 
omnia utensilia et superlectulia domus dicti presbitieri et ruperunt fregerunt et 
penitus destrugerunt quod plura quod detestabile est sacrilegium commitentes 
portas ecclesia sue fregerunt et archas ipsius eclesiae aperientes frangentes mo -
numentis et ornamentis ecclesiastitis ut pote(?) mappis altaris et aliis ornamentis 
ipsam ecclesiam privaverunt et quod deterius et oribile corpus Christi et sanctam 
eucharistiam ceperunt de dicta ecclesia et luminaria dicte ecclesie et cimbala de 
clocherio descenderunt et quandam ymaginem beate Mariae Virginis de eccle-
sia extraxerunt et secum omnia premissa in vituperium Dei et sancte ecclesie et 
in suarum omniarum dispendium portaverunt et preter hec predictus Gaufridus 
Gossa magister navis vocati Larosa sancta eucharistia usus fuit ipsam ut dicitur et 
fama referet corporaliter in sue detrimentum anime corporaliter masticando.
Item post modum quadam alia die venerunt alii malefactores de Normannis 
predictis ipso presbitero absente de suis partibus que fugerat ad partes alienas 
propter metum dictorum Normannorum ad domum dicte presbiteri et duos 
boves arantes et unum rucineum et instrumenta ferrea ad faciendum ostias18 et 
pluria alia feramenta rapuerunt et secum portaverunt et sic dampnifĳicaverunt 
ipsum bene usque ad valorem centum quinquaginta librarum nec non in talem 
statum dictum presbiterum posuerunt quod non habet modo dictus presbiter 
sustentationem necnon provusionem suam et omnia ista facta fuerunt in terra 
vestra Xantoniensis.
12 “requisierunt cum,” from TNA C 47/27/15/1. This passage is illegible in TNA C 47/31/5/1.
13 “responsavit quod,” from TNA C 47/27/15/1. This passage is illegible in TNA C 47/31/5/1.
14 “et secum recesserunt viros(?) extra villam,” from TNA C 47/27/15/1. This passage is 
illegible in TNA C 47/31/5/1.
15 “per quendam,” from TNA C 47/27/15/1. This passage is illegible in TNA C 47/31/5/1.
16 TNA C 47/27/15/1 has “statim” instead of “Normanni”.
17 from TNA C 47/27/15/1. This passage is illegible in TNA C 47/31/5/1.
18 TNA C 47/27/15/1 has “hostias”.
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Item venerunt [. . .] malefactores Normanni ad molendinos Prioris de Subisia 
in vestra terra Xantonensi et ferra seu instrumenta ferrea dictorum molendino-
rum ceperunt et asportaverunt secum molas dictorum molendinorum ad terram 
prostraverunt.
Item fuerunt multi malefactores de ipsis Normannis de nocte in domo Johan-
nis Gauteri morantis19 prope Subisiam in terra vestra et quendam Pethesum et 
quinquaginta libras parvi linei de ipsa domo contra voluntatem ipsius rapuerunt 
et secum portaverunt de hominibus ipsorum malefactorum certiorari potuerunt 
nullo modo.
Item fuerunt multi malefactores de ipsis Normannis in domo domini Arnaldi 
Boterelli presbiteri de nocte in terra vestra Xantonensi et de domo ipsius pres-
biteri gallinas capones ex multa alia bona dicti presbiteri rapuerunt et secum 
portaverunt et dictum presbiterum nudum fugientem et clamantem cum ensibus 
fugaverunt nomine vero illorom malefactorum penitus ignorantur.
Item ipsi malefactores fregerunt plures tonellos Petri Bernardi de Letelon’ 
mansionis vestre et vinum in dictis tonellis contentum ad terram fuderunt et 
mayramentum(?) dictorum tonellorum et etiam archas suas tabellas et multa 
alia bona sua combusserunt ipsum dampnifĳicando usque ad valorem triginta 
librarum et amplius.
Item rapuerunt et per violentiam amoverunt in una publica terra vestre Xan-
tonensis cuidam homine nomine Guillermo Bardelli tres solidos de bursa sua.
Item rapuerunt cuidam alteri homine nomine Perotus Mercerius septem para 
caligarum et quedam alias merces suas et quadraginta solidos in pecunia et 
istud factam fuit per dictum mercatorum expositum Constabulo custodientibus 
navigium Normannorum qui fecerunt pecuniam tantam et residuum sibi retinu-
erunt.
Item venerunt de dictis Normannis in domo Johannis de Peilhe et invenientes 
quondam fĳiliam suam petierunt ab ea ubi erat archa in qua erant denarii dicti 
patris sui qui dixit quod nesciebat et statim apprehenderunt eam et prostraverunt 
ad terram et quandam magnam tabulam super eam posuerunt et postea duo ex 
ipsis super ipsam tabulam sederunt ipsam fĳiliam deprimentes et male tractantes 
et cum propter huiusmodi oppressionem non possent ab ea scire ubi erant de-
narii patris cur dimiserunt eam tamen de bonis dicti Johannis que in domo ipsius 
invenerunt ceperunt et secum portaverunt ad valentiam triginta librarum
Item venerunt multi malefactores de dictis Normannis in villa Sancti Anyani 
prope Subisiam que movet de feodo vestro et invenientes quandam mulierem 
tenentem puerum inter brachia sua petierunt ab ea cuius erat dictus puer asse-
rentes ipsum sue fĳilium anglici que dixit quod non erat Immo erat fĳilius suus 
et cuiusdam viri sui nati de patria et statim unus ex ipsis respondit dicens tu 
mentiris iste puer non est tuus quia modo tenebas alium puerum inter ulnas 
tuas et tunc respondit ipsa mulier quod duos pueros habuerat et peperat (sic!) 
insimul istum et alium et tunc unus ex ipsis irruens inter ipsam mulierem voluit 
sibi rapere dictum puerum sed ipsa mulier de puero amplexato prostravit se ad 
terram cum dicto puero clamando quod dictum puerum interfĳicerent volebant 
19 “morantis,” omitted in TNA C 47/27/15/1.
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Normanni et congregata multitudinem gentium clamorem dicte mulieris ipsi 
malefactores recesserunt.
Item venerunt apud Mignanes20 in domo cuiusdam boni viri et invenientes 
ipsum cum quadam sua fĳilia ipsam fĳiliam ceperunt et ipsam carnaliter per vio-
lentiam tres vel quatuor ex ipsis cognoserunt in presentia patris sui et quia ipse 
pater ausus clamare ipsum atrociter verberaverunt et male tractaverunt
Item venerunt ad domum Guillermi Caradelli valeti et invenientes uxorem 
ipsius valeti eam cognoscere per violentiam carnaliter voluerunt nisi aliqui coa-
diutores superuenissent qui dictam mulierem defenderunt et eam de manibus 
eorum liberaverunt quam mulierem postea statim extra patrum feci duci propter 
timorem ipsorum malefactorum.
Item venerunt in prioratu Sancte Gemma21 sex Normanni cum ensibus 
petentes et querentes Anglicos qui fugerant ibidem et requisierunt gentes dicti 
prioris quod Anglicos ibidem repositos traderent et libarerent eisdem alioquin 
quod dampna facerent in prioratu predicto.
Item ceperunt capelanum de Cerayo22 mansionarium in terra vestra Xanto-
nensi et captum eum duxerunt apud Sanctum Savinianum23 in manibus suis et 
captum tenuerunt quousque fuit per predictos Constabulos Navigii liberatus pro 
eo autem captus fuit quia se advocavit et mansionarium in terra vestra.
Item die sabati ante festum beati Gregorii proximo preteritum venerunt multi 
Normanni in Civitate vestra Xantonensi24 cum ensibus succinctes et [. . .] . . . tes 
per dictam civitatem petebant cuius erat illa civitas respondentes gentes dicte 
civitatis dicebant quod domini Regis Anglie et tunc succuciebant et movebant 
capita sua postmodum vero petebant qui erant ditiores homines de civitate. 
Et respondentes gentes nominabant illos qui magis in diuities habundebant et 
inquirentes domos et mansiones ipsorum faciebant signa in domibus eorum-
dem et aliquas signabant in ostiis et aliquas in fenestis et dixerunt multotiens 
publice per civitatem quod ipsam in vituperium domini Regis Anglie combure-
rent et destruerent accidit autem die Jovis sequente ante dictum festum Sancti 
Georgii quod plures Normanni venerunt ad dictam civitatem portantes secum 
aliqui enses fffauchones25 et petierunt domum cuiusdam boni viri mercatoris de 
civitate Anglici nomine magister Galterus Anglicus qui habet et habuit per longa 
tempora mansionem in ipsa civitate una cum uxore liberis et familia sua et cum 
pervenissent domum dicti mercatoris invenerunt ipsam domum clausam et bene 
reseratam quia ipse mercatore multum timebat de ipsis Normannis pro dampnis 
et injuriis que et quas aliis inferebant et sederunt ante portam dicte domus et 
respicientes non viderunt locum per quem intrare possent in dicta domo et tunc 
accedentes ad ipsam januam sub [. . .] eam fortiter ac si vellent ipsam frangere 






25 Falchion. A heavy one-edged sword.
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multis aliis astantibus petiit ab eisdem quid vellebant et respondentes dixerunt 
quod aportarent pecuniam dicto magistro Galtero quam volebant sibi solvere et 
tunc respondit eisdem dictus homo quod ipse non erat tunc in domo nec etiam 
in villa et statim dictam januam magis [. . .] volentes ibidem intrare si possent et 
tunc dictus homo dixit eis quod male faciebant quo dicto unus ex ipsis extraxit 
ensem et voluit ipsum percutere et cum dictus homo videret gladium contra se 
evaginatum clamavit fugiendo per villam aus murtrerios26 Normannos et tunc 
dicti omnes Normanni illi extraxerunt enses suas propter quod omnis civitas fuit 
commota et clamabant omnes aus murtrerios Normannos. Dicti vero Normanni 
aliquos de civitate cum ensibus et aliis gladiis percusserunt. Et cum ego predictus 
Rostandus de Solerio audirem tantum tumultum in civitate misi gentes meas ibi-
dem videre quid hoc erat et venientes dicte gentes meas versus ipsos Normannos 
invenerunt ipsos cum ensibus fauchonibus et aliis gladiis evaginatis et precipientes 
eisdem Normannis quod redderent eis dictos enses et ceteros gladios dixererunt 
quod non facerent Immo fuerunt in defensa et voluerunt vulnerare gentes meas 
et tunc gentes mei evaginatis gladiis suis ceperunt octo de ipsis Normannis quo-
rum duos vulneraverunt quia aliter capi non potuerunt et ipsos ad me in castro 
Xantonensi captos adduxerunt ceteri vero fugerunt et cum ego dictus Rostandus 
viderem duos ex ipsis vulneratos statim feci perquiri cirugicos et preparere pla-
gas eorum et inquisita veritate qui ex ipsis erant in culpa dicti facti inveni ipsos 
duos vulneratos culpabiles quos in prisona retinui in Castro Xantonensi et sex 
alios eorum consocios quos cum parva culpa inveni liberavi et eis reddi feci enses 
suos et alia bona sua in crastinum vero facta congregatione et conspiratione inter 
ipsos et alios Normannos navigii qui erant apud Sanctum Savinianum inter se 
ordinaverunt quod cum quatuor milibus armatorum venirent aggredi civitatem 
et ipsam igni submittere et totaliter destruere et gentes interfĳicere si possent 
que conspiratio per aliquos amicos dicte civitatis fuit michi et burgensibus dicte 
civitatis nunciata et tunc omnes de civitate perteriti et stupefacti fugerunt huc et 
illuc cum bonis suis cum non haberent arma cum quibus se defendere possent. 
Ego vero Rostandus accidi [. . .] et quod . . . tebatur feci muniri et dictum castrum 
prout melius potui licet parum vel quasi nichil invenirem ad defensionem castri 
si dictus casus accidisset et porta Civitatis claudi et custodiri cum magni expensis 
ipsa vero die veneris semper27 expectante adventum et insultum dictorum Nor-
mannorum miserunt ad me Constabuli navigii predicti plures servitores domini 
Regis Francie Normannos et maiores magistros navigii post ipsos Constabulos et 
venerunt ad januam castrum Xantonensem requierentes januam quod permiter-
ret eos intrare in castro quia mecum volebant loqui ex parte domini Regis Francie 
et dictorum Constabulorum quos precepi in castum recipere et cum intrassent 
[. . .]28 ex ipsis nomine C . . . [. . .]29 domini Regis fuit [. . .]30 me ex parte domini 
Regis Francie constabularie custodientii navigii Normannorum quod duos [. . .] 
26 “Aux meurtres!”
27 TNA C 47/27 “semper me”.
28 Illegible in TNA C 47/31 and omitted in TNA C 47/27/15/1.
29 Illegible in TNA C 47/31 and omitted in TNA C 47/27/15/1.
30 Illegible in TNA C 47/31 and omitted in TNA C 47/27/15/1.
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quos captos tenebam in castro Xantonensi qui ad partes Xantonensi se venebant 
sub gardia et protectione domini Regis Ffrancie eis redderem et a dictis prisona31 
liberarem cum cognitione ipsos si in aliquem commissem spectaret in mediate 
ad dominum Regem Ffrancie vel ad gardiatores dicti navigii ratione gardie anti-
dicte Ego vero vocatu meum Consilium venerabili Decano et pluribus canonibus 
Xantonensibus multis hominibus ligeis vestris nobilibus et alii meliori predicte 
civium Xantonensi retuli et explicavi eisdem servientibus causam quare dicti 
Normanni capti fuerant et arrestati et modum captionis et totum processum 
superius nominatum et dixi quod vos non suberratis nec gentes vestros suberrant 
mandato alicuius iuditis vel delegati curie Ffrancie nisi ipsis expresse habebant 
certum mandatum a dicta curia et requisivi ab eisdem mandatum exhiberi si 
super hoc haberent quod non habebant plures ratione efĳicaces propositii32 quare 
dictos captos liberare non tenebar nec propter requestam predictam ipsos volui 
liberare. Et audientes quod dictos captos liberare nolebam statim perceperunt 
michi33 ex parte [. . .] domini Regis Ffrancie sub incurrimento bonorum meorum 
quod eisdem dictos captos liberarem cuius precepto nullatenus voluit obedire 
dixi tamen dicti presentibus34 ne forte viderent latrones fuisse pensari vel malici-
ose contra ipsos Normannos quod peius vel similie fecissem personis aliis si tali-
ter volnerassent35 quod ob reverentiam dicti domini Regis Ffrancie paratus eram 
eos liberare hac Conditione adiecta et et protestatione expresse facta quod ipsos 
malefactores totaliter tenerent et imprisonarent quod de violentii et excessibus 
commissis in dicta civitate possent vobis et vestris gentibus et passis iniuriam 
satisfactione facere36 et etiam emendare quotiens essent super hoc requisiti et 
cum dicti capti fuerant liberati sub conditione predicta
Item rapuerunt et secum portaverunt quindam de Normannis predictis vio-
lenter de bonis Arnaldi Bartholomei mansionaris in terra vestra Xantonensi tam 
in bladis quam panineis et rebus aliis ad estimationem ad decem librarum tur-
onensium
Item de bonis Bartholomei de Fonte Regnialde ad valorem sexta librarum et 
ulterius et voluerunt ipsum interfĳicere et exuerunt ipsum vestibus suis
Item habuerunt rapuerunt et secum portaverunt de bonis Johannis Chant per 
violentiam ad estimatione sextaginta solidorum et amplius.
Item habuerunt rapuerunt et secum portaverunt domini Guyllermi de Paugues 
duo dolea vini et ultra fuderunt ad terram maiorem partem alterius tonelli et hoc 
fecerunt de nocte.
Item habuerunt per violentiam de bonis Prioris de Subisia tam in blado 
vino denariis ciphis argenteis pannis et rebus aliis ad valorem quatuor decim 
librarum.
31  “prisones,” in TNA C 47/27/15/1.
32 TNA C 47/31/5/1 has “eorum [. . .] Ffrancie propter sui” but this makes less sense than 
“ratione efĳicaces propositii” in TNA C 47/27/15/1. Thus, I have preferred this reading.
33 TNA C 47/27/15/1 has “in” not “michi”.
34 Almost illegible.
35 TNA C 47/27/15/1 has “deliquissent”, not “volnerassent”.
36 “facere” omitted in TNA C 47/27/15/1.
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Item habuerunt de bonis Petronille Vesuerie duo dolea vini per violentiam et 
contra voluntatem suam.
Item de bonis Petri Trolli37 in pannis utensilibus et aliis ad valorem vinginti 
solidorum.
Item de bonis Petri Calibere tam in pethesis blado vino et aliis rebus ad valorem 
triginta solidorum.
Item de bonis Johannis Bernardi tam in blado vino denariis et rebus aliis ad 
valeriam decem librarum et amplius ulterius quod fuderunt ad terram vinum 
dicti Johannis ad estimationem dimidii tonelli.
Item rapuerunt quidam presbitero nomine dominus Hugo Guyllermi octo 
decim solidos quos habebat in bursa sua et ceperunt eum in publica via38 et 
eidem multa viturperia fecerunt cum Constabularius navigii fecerunt sibi reddi 
duo decim solidos et sexta solidos duos retinuerunt.
Item rapuerunt et per violentiam portaverunt de domo Johannis Reginaldi 
quartuor decim lintheamina et quinque pulvinaria et duo coopertoria furrata 
pellibus toni coloris et duas mappas meniedeyngnias (sic!) et unam calderiam 
et unum vestimentum cum quo missa celebratur et fregerunt portam domus sue 
que omnia estima valere poterant centum solidos
Item rapuerunt et secum portaverunt de domo dictorum Aus Quasbenes (sic!) 
duodecim costeretos boni vini et decem costeretos boni de refffon(?) et tabulas 
dicte domus et archas suas fregerunt et exinde duodecim bussellos bladi extra-
xerunt et portaverunt
Item intraverunt in domo Johannis Liore et rapuerunt et secum portaverunt 
dimidium pethesum et duos agnos.
Item intraverunt et rapuerunt de domo Arnaldi Arguyn duos porcellos et alia 
bona dicti Johannis ad valorem quadraginta solidos
Item intraverunt et rapuerunt de domo Johannis Ogardi dimidium pethesum 
et fuderunt ad terram unam tonellum vini alia bona dicti Johannis ceperunt ad 
valorem decem librarum.
Item cum duo mercatores de Navarre bone persone et divites venirent de 
Rupella39 apud Burdegalem40 progressuri pro suis mercibus41 et facerent tran-
situm per villam Sancti Saviniani predicti Normanni cum maxima multitudine 
ipsos mercatores ceperunt credentes ipsos esse Bayonenses et ipsos ceperunt 
et octo milia Florinorum eisdem in primis rapuerunt et postmodum eos viliter 
occiderunt et frustarunt [. . .] eosdem nec mors nec membrorum decisio potuit eis 
sufffĳicere Immo revera quidam ex ipsis Normannis posuit qui astavit in quadam 
lancea intestina dictorum mercatorum et portabat ad collum per villam sancti 
Saviniani dicens quis vult emere Trypes de Bayona ego vendam et quidam alius 
de ipsis Normannis cepit caput alterius defunctorum et auriculam ipsius cum 
dentibus coram toto populo masticabat et maximim partem ipsius auriculae de 
37 TNA C 47/27/15/1 “Trolii”.
38 TNA C 47/27/15/1 “via publica vestra”.
39 La Rochelle.
40 Bordeaux.
41 TNA C 47/27/15/1 “mercibus procurand”.
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capite emulsit et comedit quod inhumaniter fuit factum et pernitiosum exemplo 
maxime quia constabul’(?) et custodes navigii antedicti presentes in villa et hoc 
scientes vendicare comtempserunt quibus sic peractis membra ipsorum interfec-
torum postmodum in flumen Carantonis42 proieterunt
Item venerunt ad domum Rectoris ecclesie de Agonay43 et super muros 
clamose dicte domus ascendentes in ipsa domo intrare voluerunt et cum capellanus 
seu Rector predictus hoc videret venit contra eos petens ab eis quid volebant qui 
dixerunt quod statim sciret et descenderunt infra dictam clausuram et cum dic-
tus presbiter videret ipsos descendentes fugit in domum suam et portam domus 
sue cum barris et cum aliis ingeniis prout melius potuit reseravit et insequentes 
ipsum portas ipsius domus fregerunt et presbiterem predictum quem invenerunt 
statim ceperunt precipientes eidem quod statim archas suas aperiret quod facere 
denegavit et frangentes archas de ipsis extraxerunt et rapuerunt undecim libras 
turonenses, et septem viginti turonenses grossos argenteos et unum tabardum de 
perso forratum et unum ensem et tres ciphos argenteos et duo decim clocheria 
argentea et multa alia bona ad estimationem quinquaginta librarum.
Item violenter rapuerunt ceperunt et secum portaverunt de domibus persona-
rum infra scriptarum bona que secuntur videlicet de domo Johannis de Airolio 
quartuor decim denarios et voluerunt portare lectos et cooperturas lectorum suo-
rum et mantellum uxoris sue.
Item de domo dicti Johannis qua quatuor caseos et duas gallinas
Item de domo Benedicti Taste Crispe unum capriolum et duas gallinas.
Item de domo Petri Suttoris duas gallinas.
Item de domo dictorum Elyars quartam partem unius pethesi
Item de Prioratu de Romegus44 quatuor tibias porcii
Item de domo Laurentis de Boyes unum annulum argenteum
Item de domo Aymerici Vignerii unum supertunica [. . .] quatuor Lintheamina
Item de Gaufrido Ossendi unam gallinam de Gaufredo Achardi unam gallinam 
de Vigerio de Melay unum capriolum de Arnaldi prepositi unum agnum et unum 
porcellum et quartuor caseos et quartam parte unius Pethesi
Item de Arnaldo Granerii duas gallinas et duos caseos et de domo dicte 
Alaseguine ceperunt vinum quantum ibi invenirunt ad estimationem decem 
corperellorum et illud consumpserunt
Promissa autem omnia et multa alia forefacta comissa fuerunt per dictos Nor-
mannos in terra vestra Xantonensi et locus circum vicinis inter festum Pasch’ 
proxime preteritum et sequentem festum Ascensionis Domini prout per rela-
tionem et testimonium personarum predictarum inquisitarum et prout fama 
patria attestatur vero nomina illorum exceptis quibusdam superius nominatis 
penitus ignorantur nam quidam veniebant una die et alii alia die sic vicissim ne 
possent discerni ab aliquo vel cognosci.





ANSWER OF THE MEN OF THE CINQUE PORTS AND BAYONNE TO 
CHARGES OF PIRACY DURING THE MARITIME WAR OF 1292–93
These accounts exist in three almost identical versions in the National Archives, 
London: C47/27/15/1, C 47/31/5/2 and C 47/31/6. Furthermore, Champollion-Figéac 
supplied a transcription in Lettres de rois, reines et autres personnages des Cours 
de France et d’Angleterre. However, this transcription is somewhat faulty, and I 
have felt the need to produce my own transcription based on the best preserved 
version, C 47/31/5/2. However, since the manuscript is damaged I have occasion-
ally used C47/27/15/1, C 47/31/6 and Champollion’s transcription to fĳill in lacunae. 
Especially, the last lines of both C 47/31/5/2 and C47/27/15/1 are almost illegible. 
Fortunately the latter part of C 47/31/6 is very well preserved. Thus, to a large 
extent I have relied on this document for the latter part of the transcription. 
Variations are in the footnotes.
I have retained the original punctuation as far as possible. The starting letters 
of personal names and place names have been put in capitals, however.
Ceo sunt les grevaunces et damages ke les Normaunz ount fet a la gent de Rey 
de Engleterre cest asavoir de Baione des Cinck Portz de Irelaunde et dayleurs 
del marinage de Engleterre Et le respouns qe les Cinck Portz et les autres de la 
maryne de vostre seigneurie ont fet sus les choses dount vous les avez chargez.
Adeprismes a Kymenoys1 es parages de Bretaygne le an de nostre seigneur le 
Rey xx. En quareme Normaundz occistrent un homme de Bayone a la fonteigne 
de Kymenoys e apres asailirent la nef Peres de Moungy de Bayone et couperent 
le mast e robberent la neef e les homes occistrent a leur gref damages de mille 
livres
Apres meysmes ceus Normaunds vindrent a Roaint seur Gironde2 et trove-
rent iloekes iiii bateaus de Bayone e les decoperent e enfundrerent de sus le ewe 
et occistrent vi homes de Bayone a terre. Kaunt les utrages desusdiz furent fetz 
noveles vindrent de ces et Bordeaus as mariners Dengleterre de Irelaunde et de 
Bayone e mustrerent le outrage et le fet au conestable de Burdeaus Iter Dengo-
lesme e meintenant le conestable fesoit asembler les mariners Dengleterre de 
Bayone de Irelaunde de Normandie et de Bretaygne qe la furent e la se entreju-
rerent touz les mestres qe de cel eure en avant nul ne feroyt a autre grevaunce ne 
damage e si nul alast cuntre cel serment touz les autres luy corerent sus taunt qe 
le trespas feust amende e au partir de Burdeaus les neefs de Engleterre et Bayone 




furent charges les unes devant les autres apres come gent de pees. A meymes cel 
heure iiii xx neefs de Normandie demorerent a Burdeaus e se chargerent de vyns e 
quant les neefs furent charges ne se voloient partir nul de autre mes tantot drece-
ront leur chasteus devant et derere e chastels sus le mast et leur baneres si come 
gent de guere e en cele manere issirent hors de Girounde ensemble e singlerent 
devant La Rochele e troverent en un leu que est apele La Pertuis de Antioche une 
neef de Bayone charge de dras et des autres marchandises venantz de Fflaundres 
la dite neef asailirent e pristrent les mariners e les marchans de Burdeaus e de 
Bayone occistrent les biens pristrent e robberent a leur gref damage de mmm 
livres e la neef enfundrerent en la mer.
A pres meysmes le an auaundit les Normandz trouerent gent de Baione a la 
tour de Vilein e occistrent xx homes a pres meismes lan meismes ceus Normandz 
ala Chaere en la Bay3 occistrent xii homes de Cinck Portz et de Irlaunde.
En meysmes lan une neef de Irelaunde de la vile de Ros vint chargee de quirs et 
de leynes a la vile de Roan4 en Normandie e le mestre de la nef vendi en miesmes 
la vile les quirs e les leynes pur vc livres e quaunt il sigla vers sun pays Normandz 
li asailierent devaunt Chereburgh e la neef pristrent e occistrent les maryners e 
un garcoun pendirent a la verge del tref e les cinck cent livres pristrent e mene-
rent la neef en le havene de Caan5 a tut le garcoun pendu.
Apres en meismes cel an xx apres Pasches Normaundz trouerent une neef de 
Wycheringe de Sufffoxe6 la neef asailierent e pristrent les mariners as uns coupe-
rent les oreyles e les occistrent trestuz e les biens de la neef roberent iiii c livres 
desterlynges e la neef enfunderent en la mer.
En meismes cel an en la mer countre Fescaump Normaundz trouerent une 
neef de Irelaunde de la vile de Drogheda la nef [. . .]7 e les mariners e les mar-
chauns occistrent e leur biens robberent e enporterent a la mountance de v c 
livres e de plus.
A pres en meismes lan e en cele sesoun gent de Wynchelese e de Hastynges 
vindrent devaunt Diepe en deus neef e fesauntz leur marchandises a tere les Nor-
maundz de meismes la vile de Diepe e pristrent le ii nefs e les biens robberent 
a la vailance de v c livres les mariners couperent les piez e les poynz a prez pur 
meuz aseurer leur besognes(?)8 couperent les testes a la mountaunce de xl homes 
qe mariners qe peleryns e les neefs enfundrerent en la mer.
En le an avaundit la gent des Cynck Portz e de Baione e autres de la maryne de 
Engletere et de Irlaunde alierent a Burdeaus a vendenges por charger marchaun-
dement si come il solerent fere et pur co qe il savoient bien qe Normaundz les 
avoyrent maudite qe il lur fĳirent damage les mestres de la maryne de Engleterre 





7 Hole in the manuscript, C 4/27/15/1: “pristrent”.
8 Taken from TNA C 47/27/15/1. The TNA C47/31/5/2 is almost illegible in this part, but 
it seems to have “losargnes”, which makes no sense in the text.
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Normaundz ne se chargerent fors qe ala moyte e ensi retornerent a leur damage 
e al damage del reaume de Engletere x m livres.
A pres en lan xxi le Rey de Ffraunce envera un son chevalier a Burdeaus e fesoit 
soner trumpes e la pes fĳist crier entre la gent le Rey de Ffraunce e la gent de Rey 
de Engleterre e defendi de par le Rey de Ffraunce seur vye et seur membre et seur 
forfecture de teres et de chateus qe nul ne feit damage moleste ne grevaunce a 
la gent del Reaume de Engleterre, de Irelaunde ne de Baion et meismes cel hure 
seigneur Edmond vostre cher frere fu a la curt de Ffraunce e entendy coment 
la pees fu comaunde par quoi il maunda a sire Estevene de Penecestre nostre 
gardein qe il entendi qe vos gens de la maryne de Engleterre et de Bayone et de 
Irlaunde poient seyrement aler a Burdeus e ayleurs en le poer de Ffraunce fesauns 
leur marchandises ausi come il soloient fere e seur cele aseurte votre gent de la 
maryne de Baione et de Engleterre et de Irelaunde fĳirent alerent a leur marchan-
dises fesaunt a Burdeaus e ayleurs come gent de pees et en la seurte auaundite e 
en la pees crie vostre gent de la marine de Baione et de Engleterre et de Irelaunde 
furent a Burdeaus por charger et normaundz avoient ceo entendu fĳirent une flote 
de iii c neefs et de plus e partirent la flote en trois cest asaver a leysle de Baas9 une 
partie, la seconde a Seint Maheu,10 la tertre a Penmarc11 quaunt les nefs charges 
retornerent vers lostel la ou eles estoyent frettes e si come les dites neefs vin-
drent come ceus qe entendirent estre en pees la flote des Normaundz auaundite 
le nefs de vostre realme et de Baione et de Irelaunde asailirent feluneusement e 
encountre le auandite pees criee lxx nefs pristrent si come les neefs vindrent par 
v, par vi, par x les biens et les chateus robberent, les marchaunts et les mariners 
occistrent e des neefs fesoient leurs volunte e ceo damage leur fĳirent a la mon-
tance de xx m livres desterlings e de pluis sanz la gent mortz. Encore de dens la 
auandite pees cryee a Seint Malou delisl12 avoient xx neefs de Baione Normaundz 
pristrent les ii nefs e les biens robberent a la montance de mm livres e pristrent 
lxx homes et les uns pendirent, e les autres escorcherent e les pendirent par leur 
quirs de mesme13 e pendirent mastins juste les cristiens en depit de la cristiente 
et de vous e de vos homes.
Apres a Lanyom14 en Bretayne ix neefs de Baione prises et arses par gent de 
Normaundie a leur damage de vi m livres et les gentz occis.
Apres en lan xxi en quareme prochein passe Normaundz robberent une neef 
chargee de vins de Aucerre15 qe furent les vyns de Wauter le Taverner de Sand-
wyz a soun damage de c livres. Normaundz pristrent la neef Adam de Ffulham 
de Loundres devant Somme meysmes cel an et la neef robberent de vjj xx livres 
desterlings en deners comtaunz e les mariners pendirent sur la verge de lur tref 
e la nef lesserent aler a wreks.




13 TNA C 47/31/6 “demene”
14 Lannion. TNA C 47/27/15/1 “Lanion”.
15 Probably Auxerre.
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Apres une nef de Sandwyz qui est apelee le Godier fu chargee de vins de la 
Rochele e vint en lancresom de Glenaunt la vindrent v nefs de Normaundie e 
pristrent lavaundite nef ove les vins et occistrent xvj homes de vostre port de 
Sandwyz des damages qe il receurent de lur chateus a la montaunce cc livres 
et pluis.
Normaundz robberent une nef de Donewyz a Barbeflet16 de dens le havene e 
les biens emporterent a la mountaunce de c livres et jjj homes occis.
Sire totes ces angoisses e grevaunces nous avaunteditz avoms receu par la gent 
de Normaundie a leur tort a ki de rien ne avons trespasse car touz iours nostre 
gardein17 nous defendi de par vous qe nous ne feisuns damage ne grevaunce a 
la gent du Roy de Ffraunce mes vos gentz dessus ditz avoient mestier de aler 
a leur marchaundises au Reks18 es partyes de Burdeaus et se purvirent de aler 
enseble enterement come gentz de peis e garniz pur dute des Normaundz en 
aventure si ascune gentz les voleyent asailer qe eus se puissent defendre et garder 
de peril e de tous damages come devaunt avoyent recu et cest enterement e en 
cele manere partirent de Portesmutz lendemein del iour Seint Giorge qe passe 
est e siglerent taunt a Seint Maheu en Bretaigne e en celes parties demorerent qe 
avant ne poeyent aler par defaute de vent et a meismes cel houre19 la navie de 
Normaundie fust asemblee a la Rivere de Charaunte au pount de Tauney20 e la se 
chargerent des vins chescune neef la meite21 de son charge por ceo qe il volerent22 
aler legerement pur grever vos gentz de la navie de Engletere et de Baione et de 
Irelaunde les queus furent en la costere de Bretaygne, e les Normaundz bien le 
savoient Normaundz se hastirent taunt come il poeyent de issir hors de la Rivere 
de Charaunte et si tost come Normaundz furent hors de la Rivere il avoyent vent 
a suthes23 de aler a la costere de Bretaygne la ou vos gentz furent aunkres e la le 
vendredi prochein devaunt la Pentecoste qe passe est en cest an vindrent Nor-
maundz ove cc24 neefs bien eskipees de gent de armes chasteus hordys devaunt 
e derere, chasteus au somet de chescun mast banere despleis de ruge cendeal25 
chescun banere de ii aunes de large et xxx aunes de long lesqueles banere sount 
apele baucens et la gent de Engletere les apeles stremeres e celes baneres signi-
fĳient mort saunz remede et mortele guere en touz les lious ou mariners sount 
et en cele fourme et en cele manere Normaundz vindrent sur vos gentz e les 
asailirent fffeluneusement en cuntre la pees avaunt crie vos gentz se defendirent 
e Deu par sa grace lur dona victoyre de leur enemis en eus meismes defendaunt 
16 Biervliet?
17 The Warden-Constable Stephen de Pencestre.
18 Unknown location.
19 TNA C 47/31/6 “cele heure”.
20 Tonnay Charente.
21 TNA C 47/31/6 “moyte”.
22 TNA C 47/31/6 “voloient”.
23 TNA C 47/31/6 “soheit”.
24 Based on TNA C 47/31/6. TNA C 47/31/5/2 presumably says c lxxxx, but as the rea-
ding of that passage is uncertain, I have used TNA C 47/31/6 where the reading is clear. 
This passage is illegible in TNA C 47/27/15/2.
25 TNA C 47/31/6 “desploies de rouge sendal”.
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com ceus qe ne poeyent en autre manere eschure la mort. Et tutes cestes choses 
sunt fetes par fet de guere comencee et continuee par Normaundz e notories 
sunt e apertes compasses e fetes felonuessement en contre vostre gentz e de denz 
pees cries Et pur ceo qe les Normaundz par leur outrage et par leur coupe ount 
comence e continue la dite guere e ount envaye e asaili vostre gent ove signe de 
guere mortele cest a saver del dit baucans e vostre gent ount fet ceo quil ount fet 
en eus defendenz si come il est dit par desus. Nous dioms par les choses e resons 
desus dites qe nous ne sumes tenu fere restitucions ne amende si nule chose 
eit este fete, ou prise par nous en la dire guere kar il est usage et ley de mer qe 
des choses fetes, ou prises sur mer en guerre meimement ou le dit Baucan seyt 
leve ne doit estre fete restitutioun ne amende del une partie a le autre qi tele 
banere leve Cest usage et ley del reaume de Engletere, qe si home feist une mort 
ou autre fet semblable en soi defendaunt il nest tenus de ceo ne en tens26 de 
pees, ne de guerre. Dunt sire vos barouns de Cinck Portz e touz les autres de la 
marine de vostre reaume de Engletere e de vostre seygneurie vous prient qe tort 
ne force ne lour soit fet kar eus serunt touz iours prests de fere et receyvre dreze27 
en vostre curt par agard de leur pers countes et barons solom la ley de marinage 
kaunt deveront e la ou il deveront.
E cher seignur vos barouns de Cink Portz e les autres de la marine28 de Engle-
tere et de vostre seignurie vos prient par Deu qil vos plest ke il vos soveygne 
coment vostre gent des portz et touz les autres de la marine al sire sermentez 
contre toz qe [. . .] sil plest qe il vous soveygne coment vous estes sermentez a 
vostre peuple de tener les a dreiture solom les leys e les custumes et les fraunchi-
ses qe vos auncestres Roys de Engletere ount donee et vous meismes graunte et 
conferme.
E seit le conseil le Roy bien avise qe si tort ou grevaunce lur soit fet en autre 
manere cuntre dreit pleus tost qerperont femmes et enfaunz qe il ont e irount 
puchaser par la mer la ou quideront leur prefere.
Ceo sunt les damages qe les Normaundz ount fait as marchauntz e as bones gentz 
de Baione estre les autres damages contenus entre les grevaunces fetes as bones 
gentz Dengletere mariners e as ditz Bayoneys en comun Cest asaver qe les Nor-
maundz felonousement e sanz reeson. Les queus furent de Vernamle murdrerent 
e decolerent Gillam Peire de Bardos mestre de une neef de Baione e robberent 
les biens a la value de iiij m livres de turnoys et de plus.
Item les Normaundz murdrerent felonousement e atort, en Lisle de Bas Garcias 
Ernaud de Byndos e Peres29 de Lasican e aucuns autres les compaygnuns iesques 
a x marchauntz e mariners de Baione
26 TNA C 47/31/6 “temps”.
27 TNA C 47/31/6 “droit”.
28 The TNA C 47/31/6 digresses here. The passage from “marine” to “qil” is absent in that 
document. Rather it has: “les autres de la marinage vous sount sermentez countre tous qui 
pourroit vivre et morir et si vous plest qil vous soveigne”. After that, it follows the text of 
TNA C 47/31/5/2 and C 47/27/15.
29 The “Peres” in this latter part of the text are called “Piers” in the C 47/31/6.
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Item les Normaundz murdrirent felonousement e atort Peres de Fort marin de 
Baione, e vi de ses compaignons a la Palice en La Rochele
Item les Normaundz pristrent maliciousement Peres Arnaud de la Berne mar-
chaunt e mariner de Baione saunz nul tort qar il avoit fet a Harefleu en Norman-
die e si li tindrent pris mult longement, pur la quele reson il fesoit custages e 
despenses a la mountaunce de mil livres de tournoys e pluis estre les damages e 
damagez qil receut
Item les Normaundz si li leverent les ancres de la neef de Arnaud Remon de 
Castanos la quele nef fut en ancre en le port de Harefleu et le robberent sun 
auncre de cele ancre par la quele levee lavandite neef si ala perillant par la mer 
e si perdit v homes qui estoient en la neef, e si en feust damage a la mountaunce 
de m livres de turnoys et pleus.
Item les Normaundz maliciousement e atort se enancrerent en port de Odierne 
Piers de Saubiom mestre de une neef de Baione e ses compaignons qi furent en 
la neef ovesques lui, e les plairerent mortement, e occistrent aucuns de com-
paignons e ceus qe remistrent vifs pristrent e les mistrent en maveis prisoun e si 
les fĳirent grever30 e par les queus choses si sunt damagez a la mountaunce de x m 
livres de turnoys e de pluis estre les mortz e les plaiez e les corps qil pristrent
Item les Normaundz si pristrent a Penmark e en la costere de Bretaigne deus 
escarperyes ove le persoun31 e les deners e les autres biens qe furent de dens des 
bones gentz de e de marchauntz de Baione, e si en fĳirent lor volunte atort e a 
peche, e sanz reeson a la mountance de x m livres de turnoys, e de pluis.
Item les Normaundz pristrent cuntre reson atort au Boys de La Rochele un 
selop charge de cire e de cuire e de autres avers de poys de bone gentz de Baione 
ala mountaunce xxv m livres de turnoys e de pluis
Item les Normaundz si pristrent a tort e contre reson une neef de Baione la 
quele estoit annexe en sauvete en le chay de la Rochele e la boterent hors del 
avandite chay e si la depescerent e la arcerent en flamme la quele vaust32 v c 
livres de turnoys e pluys.
Item les Normaundz pristrent par lor malice atort en La Rochele Piers de 
Artigalonga Peres Vidal Dordize et Gillam Arnaud donc pristrent les mestres 
de iij nefs de Baione e si les detindrent pris sanz reeson mult longement par la 
quele prisoun si fĳirent coustages e furent damages a la mountance de m livres de 
turnoys
Item les Normaundz si pristrent saunz reeson a grant tort robberent Gillam 
Arnaud de Saut(?) marchaunt de Baione e ses biens a la mountance de mvc livres 
de turnoys. Les queu biens estoient a La Rochele
Item les Normaundz pristrent e robberent a la Rochele de Peres de Caupec 
Peres Reymond Corder Jehan de Juzon, Gillam Arnaud de Lagios Peres Arnaud 
de Josses Arnaud Doran, Reymond de Ffarges Domenion de Luchardz Jehan de 
Hogarelh Michel de Hogarelh Peres Jehan de Vik Gillam de Tremelet Piers Dorancs 
30 Uncertain reading.
31  Uncertain reading.
32 TNA C 47/31/6 has “comunalmant” after “vaust”.
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Piers Arnaud de Lescar e de ascuns austres cyteins33 de Baione qe avoient cus-
tume ala demorer a La Rochele e se sunt fuis por doute e par la malice de Nor-
maundz a la mountance e de damages de v c livres de turnoys e de pluis
Item les Normaundz si vindrent a Saint Bret en Bretaigne le mercredi apres 
le dareine feste de Pentecoste passe e si tuerent et murdrerent illekes Reymund 
Arnaud de la Forcade marchant de Baione et pristrent ses deners et ses biens et 
depescerent ses charges et ses lettres et pristrent tous les autres biens qe furent 
ileck des bone gentz de Baione e userent les vins e fĳirent damage a la mountance 
de xxx m livres de turnoys
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